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ABSTRACT 
 
Plagiarism may have accompanied acts of creation, either endorsing or contradicting 
them. Esteemed as a general rule of literature or censured as literary larceny, it 
embodies the disavowal of authorship in the intellectual works of others and thus 
breaches their right to be acknowledged as authors, while also feasibly deceiving the 
public and, in any case, contradicting the universal rule of creative imitation. 
Historically entangled with the concepts of counterfeiting and piracy, it only 
later reached an autonomous collocation as a violation of the moral right of 
attribution. Placed in the broadest context of copyright law, it yet struggles against its 
confinement to a strict legal characterisation, given its colourful appearance and 
inherent inconsistency according to the type of works or field of knowledge to which 
it relates, thus refuting any unyielding interpretation. 
In such a mutable context, the purpose of this research, which revolves 
around the systems of Italy and the United Kingdom, is to explore a view of 
plagiarism that appreciates the different instances in which a genuine borrowing or a 
deceitful practice appear, considering the dimension of copyright infringement, but 
also looking at other possible legal and non-legal means of construal. Given these 
premises, an accurate exploration of the phenomenon requires a preliminary 
consideration of the manifold literature on the subject, which increasingly progresses 
together with the development of technology and social practices. 
Furthermore, its literal absence in statutory law does not impede finding a 
collocation in the context of the judiciary, which is analysed with reference to the 
legal systems of both Italy and the United Kingdom. This does not infer that courts 
deliver a flawless and unfailing interpretation of plagiarism. On the contrary, a 
careful reading of the ruling confirms that the narrow realm of copyright law is 
shrinking. 
However, the unpredictability of the statutory and judicial approach towards 
plagiarism may also be welcomed as an attempt by the law to acknowledge the 
difficulty to appraise its complexity. Therefore, the present study openly adopts an 
interdisciplinary and comparative analysis that may help to describe its controversial 
legal breadth while also possibly unravelling any other principled range.
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The issue of plagiarism has been broadly examined in law, with valuable studies 
undertaken on its origins and further development. However, many of these studies 
nowadays seem inadequate to the task of explaining some of the present dynamics that 
typify the phenomenon, particularly following the digital revolution, after which many 
traditional concepts of copyright law need to be reconsidered in light of these changes.  
Indeed, the pressure of technology has made it an even more interesting and 
intriguing subject to investigate in contemporary copyright law. In fact, plagiarism 
proves to be particularly open to the influence of unceasing social and technological 
transformations that characterise modern copyright and challenge its conventional rules 
and standards. Besides, previous studies have lacked in-depth analysis of the judicial 
approach to plagiarism that this research also aims to cover. Therefore, an accurate 
assessment of the phenomenon seems desirable, given that, besides the apparent 
casualness of the legislator, plagiarism is still a matter of judgement in court. 
Surrounded by ambiguity and versatility, plagiarism appears to be hardly 
definable in firm and strict legal terms. A possible solution may be to portray plagiarism 
more neutrally, by referring to it as the practice of usurping an author’s attribution of 
authorship in the work he/she has created or, in other words, the act of passing another 
person’s work off as one’s own. Besides, as will be illustrated, any conduct that may 
fall under the heading of plagiarism is indeed not strictly limited to the instances of 
simple non-attribution. Besides, if non-attribution is comprised in the broader category 
of misattribution, the latter may also entail acts that only partially undermine the 
author’s right to be acknowledged as such. 
The same reluctance of the law to confine it to a precise normative definition 
supports the assumption that its accurate understanding implies a more balanced and 
flexible interpretation that is not limited to statutory law, but engages with the variety of 
disciplines in which plagiarism takes place, which also increases interpreters’ efforts to 
explain and regulate the phenomenon. 
The aim of this research is therefore to illustrate the legal history and evolution 
of plagiarism, retracing its origins and drawing its further developments in terms of 
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statute law, as well as doctrinal and judicial interpretation, in both the civil and common 
law legal traditions of Italy and the United Kingdom. 
In particular, before considering the exact legal dimension of authorship 
attribution, it has proved particularly valuable to venture upon non-strictly legal factors 
that unquestionably influence its treatment in both a statutory and judicial way. The first 
part of the study, therefore, is dedicated to the bygone and in-depth analysis of the 
concept of attribution of authorship, which represents the exact and most accurate 
means of interpreting plagiarism. 
Chapter 1 therefore addresses the appraisal of authorship misattribution, with a 
considerable section devoted to its understanding in literature from ancient times to the 
late fifteenth century and to the exploration of the imitative canon, the relevance of 
authorship attribution and the significance of piratical or plagiarist conducts.  
Chapter 2 continues such a “glimpse into the past” by recapping with the 
sixteenth century literature onwards, when the scrutiny of the individual and personal 
understanding of authorship will link the earlier approach to imitation with the modern 
concepts of creativity and originality. The second part of Chapter 2 focuses exactly on 
the meaning and scope of creativity and originality within the Italian and UK contexts, 
both recently and greatly influenced by the EU framework. 
Both sections, indeed, represent the essential preamble for the following 
articulation of the study, establishing the basis for the mature discussion of the 
contemporary dimension of plagiarism in subsequent chapters. In fact, they provide a 
meaningful instrument with which to understand the actual treatment of plagiarism-
related issues, on the one hand elucidating its wider social background – which is the 
main subject of Chapter 3 – and, on the other hand, clarifying the legal statutory and 
judicial assumptions that will be unfolded respectively in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. 
Accordingly, the analysis will be undertaken through an interdisciplinary 
approach that paints the complex picture of plagiarism, taking into considerable account 
the multifaceted dimension of the phenomenon. As we shall see, the resort to an 
interdisciplinary approach conveys an essential instrument for the interpreter who is 
aware of the difficulties of adopting a single and exclusive criterion to evaluate 
plagiarism. This difficulty, it is worth reiterating, is not only caused by its moveable and 
malleable objectification but it furthermore depends, as became apparent in the 
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preceding paragraphs, on the inherent difficulty of enucleating a definite and single 
connotation of just the reverse of plagiarism, which is articulated in the notion of 
creativity and originality. 
Given these premises, as Chapter 3 will expound, through the lens of 
interdisciplinary analysis, the overall purpose of the study is to show that there are many 
different elements and instruments to consider when evaluating the controversies of 
plagiarism. These may not be limited to conventional legal remedies and sanctions, but 
may also take account of the informal rules and sanctions that fall under the term of 
social norms, as well as the technological means to avoid or limit the phenomenon. 
The double face of technology, particularly digital, is essentially articulated in 
the capacity both to enhance the production of creative works of the mind and to 
exercise stringent protection of the same works. There seems to be sufficient grounds to 
argue that they facilitate any imitation, borrowing or appropriation of others’ works, 
regardless of the positive or negative connotation that one may accord to these works. 
Focusing on misattribution, in particular, it is inevitable to notice how current digital 
practices are often accompanied by a deficiency of genuine attribution. Acknowledging 
authorship in an individual work that is copied or simply reused for the purpose of 
further creation seems not to be always accomplished. In this regard, the reaction of the 
author may vary. 
In line with its contrasting nature, the law has always shown some conflicting 
interest in the subject: on one hand, the strong arms of the law have often reached the 
practice of misattribution, although with different means and outcomes according to the 
particular legal system considered. On the other hand, the attitude of the law has also 
been expressed in the careful omission of a statutory definition of plagiarism, leaving 
the judiciary with the heavy burden of unravelling the intricate claims of those who 
wish to secure their right of attribution. 
Furthermore, the fact that the law does not either provide a clear definition of 
what is considered creative and original, for the purpose of the law itself, can be seen as 
having a double-layered effect. On the one hand, it may not help in terms of clarity and 
certainty (a principle that the law should always pursue); and on the other hand, the lack 
of a statutory definition may be a reflection of deliberate avoidance. 
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In addition, it will be argued that, despite the inaccuracy of the statutory 
language that, as Chapter 4 explains, is first exemplified by the lack of a designation, 
plagiarism has played a relevant role in copyright law and is still a current subject 
matter in court, as well as in ordinary life, although not always with its actual 
appellation, which appears, to some extent, to be even more taboo than speaking of 
counterfeiting and piracy.   
However, this may not be understood without a proper background explaining 
how the courts' decisions reflect cultural, social and economic transformations, which 
clearly have important legal implications, as Chapter 5 aims to illustrate. At the same 
time, we have seen that servile imitation was almost never considered desirable, 
although this inference does not automatically imply that it should have been severely 
reprimanded. The delicate role of the judiciary lies also in this precise and crucial point, 
as it has to discern the hypothesis in which misattribution should find a legal response 
and those in which it should rather be left to the discretion of literature, the arts and 
other non-legal disciplines. 
In general, many grey areas remain, which are in part due to the extreme 
variability of the phenomenon; however, in part they are also enhanced by a lack of 
clarity and certainty over the definition or regulation of misattribution. The same 
judiciary indeed also confirms such a difficulty. 
Moreover, the methodology chosen also has a distinctive comparative attitude 
since the research essentially revolves around two legal systems respectively belonging 
to the civil and common law traditions. Focusing on the usurpation of the attribution of 
an intellectual work, there are fewer differences than one would expect. The right of 
being acknowledged as the author of the work, therefore, really represents an ideal 
object of comparison. 
Noticeably, at the core of this project is the comparative analysis of the Italian 
author’s right and the UK copyright systems on plagiarism and the moral right of 
attribution. Although each of them belongs to different legal traditions, which have 
often been considered opposing poles in copyright law, they share some similarities and 
common features. In line with these considerations, it has been necessary to conduct 
part of the research in Italy and part in the United Kingdom, specifically at the 
universities of Bournemouth, Cambridge and Edinburgh.  
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The results of the research show how the two main systems involved in the 
comparison feature similar approaches to plagiarism, also in terms of judicial 
interpretations and expert opinions, notwithstanding the structural differences that 
characterised them, as they belong to dissimilar legal traditions in which the author’s 
right/copyright has historically evolved in a different way. This outcome suggests a 
trend of similarity that may help each interpreter to reappraise plagiarism using a more 
considered approach that takes into account the peculiarities that emerge in both 
systems.  
Likewise, considering the Italian and UK legal systems, it is easy to notice that 
the former expressly refers to the sole creativity in its statutory words, but then 
complements it with the notion of originality elaborated by its own judiciary. On the 
contrary, the latter requires by statute that the work must be original, but its courts 
appear to have blended this exact definition with creativity when they asked that the 
work must be the result of some creative effort. In any case, given the supposed 
convergence of their meaning, which is supported by their ordinary meaning and partly 
enhanced by the recent development of the EU jurisprudence, the two wordings may be 
used indifferently. 
Finally, the case law survey delivered in the last chapter will focus on the 
interpretation of plagiarism in court, with an emphasis on the perspective of experts 
who participate in the judicial decisions. The purpose of such ultimate analysis, in fact, 
is to demonstrate how, and to what extent, the phenomenon of misattribution is 
influenced by several instances other than formal law. In addition, it aims to explain 
why plagiarism is still so critical to define and regulate without taking into account the 
contribution of other disciplines, thus proving once more the advantages, but also 
inevitability, of an interdisciplinary analysis to approaching the matter. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
THE NARRATIVES OF PLAGIARISM AND COPYRIGHT BETWEEN 
MYTHS AND HISTORY 
 
 
1 Attribution of authorship in literary and legal discourses on intellectual property 
 
The history of plagiarism is, to a certain extent, the history of humankind. Humans, for 
their innate nature, tend to imitate and observe what they witness in their natural 
surroundings. This assumption validates the idea that plagiarism may have gone along 
with acts of creation. Nonetheless, appearing as legitimate borrowing or as outright 
piracy that contradicts the principles of imitation, the act of copying from others’ works 
has been both cherished and criticised, taking the shape either of a universal rule of 
literature or of an authentic theft.1  
The literature on the subject has indeed confidently supported the idea that the 
practice of imitation and borrowing has traditionally characterised the production of 
knowledge and the creation of art.2 To corroborate this broad statement, scholars have 
often recalled practices from the classical period and their intense revival in 
Renaissance times, but also the more contemporary dimension of the arts, where the 
creative process implies collaboration and continuous exchange of knowledge.  
                                                          
1
 The Latin poet Martial offered a classical explanation of plagiarism as literary theft. In the background 
of the Flavian De Plagiariis law (D. 48, 15 C. 9, 20), his Epigram I, LII appears to put under the label of 
plagiarist who trades or steals a free man or someone else’s slave, as well as who removes the name of the 
author from a work and adds his/her own: «To your charge I entrust, Quintianus, my works. If, after all, I 
can call those mine which that poet of yours recites. If they complain of their grievous servitude, come 
forward as their champion and give bail for them; and when that fellow calls himself their owner, say that 
they are mine, sent forth from my hand. If thrice and four times you shout this, you will shame the 
plagiarist». MARTIAL, Epigrams. With an English translation by Walter C. A. Ker, London: Heinemann, 
New York: Putnam, 1919, 62-63. However, as will soon be illustrated, complaints against alleged acts of 
stealing with regard to the usurpation of an author’s attribution are found in several sources. Martial’s 
epigram is perhaps the most renowned and surely mostly quoted by scholars, but it would be incorrect 
and imprecise to argue that he was the only ancient writer to expose the metaphor in his compositions. 
2
 This articulated concept is well condensed in the words of Professor Steeves who, speaking to his 
student and future poet Allen Ginsberg exclaims: «There can be no creation before imitation». Kill Your 
Darlings (2013), directed by JOHN KROKIDAS, distributed by Sony Pictures Classics, USA. Script at: 
<http://www.dailyscript.com/scripts/Kill_Your_Darlings.pdf>. 
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The typical authors’ drift to borrow others’ works to create their own invention 
exemplifies how the creative process has been influenced by the imitation of early 
precursors’ authority. Nevertheless, servile imitation ending in conduct that is mainly 
categorised in terms of counterfeiting, piracy and mere disavowal of authorship, which 
deceived the public and impudently took another individual’s reward contradicting the 
universal rule of creative invention and refuting the encroachment of learning, were 
indeed all reproved. 
At the same time, it is precisely such a contrasting appeal that demands an 
accurate analysis of the phenomenon and, while gathering the speculations of the past 
literature on the subject,3 aims to provide a contemporary and original contribution to its 
legal and social assessment,4 taking into account the most recent research on the topic 
                                                          
3
 Few early works offered an interesting picture of the historical evolution of plagiarism, but now they 
plausibly have more literary value than being an accurate and updated contribution to the legal analysis of 
the phenomenon. Among Italian works, see D. GIURIATI, Il plagio. Furti letterari artistici musicali, 
Milano: Hoepli, 1903, who, expanding the metaphor of plagiarism as literary theft, also provided a few 
instant examples of early judicial assessment; A. SANDULLI, Plagio letterario e parodia, Napoli: La Toga, 
1928, who, distinguishing plagiarism from counterfeiting and other unlawful acts , focused his brief but 
pleasant study on plagiarism and parody, occasionally referring to various legal systems and mostly 
quoting what other scholars have argued on the topic. With regard to the English contributions, see H. O. 
WHITE, Plagiarism and imitation during the English Renaissance, A study in critical distinctions, 
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1935 (reprinted by Octagon Books, New York, 1965), in 
which the author’s circular study first described the classical praise for imitation and its further 
development during the sixteenth century; W. A. EDWARDS, Plagiarism: an essay on good and bad 
borrowing, Cambridge: Fraser, 1933, who had the foresight to look into the artist’s experience and also 
provided some hints on self-plagiarism (at 88 et seq.). 
4
 Later, limiting the list to a couple of monographs, more structured studies were found in A. LINDEY, 
Plagiarism and Originality, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952, who literally offered «a glimpse into 
the past» that reconnected the earlier analysis of sixteenth century with the modern epoch, also noting a 
worthy section on legal material that included a number of relevant case law in various branches of art (at 
281-341); Z. O. ALGARDI, La tutela dell’opera dell’ingegno e il plagio, Padova: Cedam, 1978, who, in an 
attempt to provide a more legally focused approach, dedicated a relatively lengthy space to the exact 
violations that may be confined to plagiarism and their remedies. See also, of the same author, a previous 
monograph on the subject: Z. O. ALGARDI, Il plagio letterario e il carattere creativo dell’opera, Milano: 
Giuffrè, 1966. 
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applicable to the Italian and English contexts without forsaking a brief overview of 
other systems.5 
With this in mind, this study aims to contribute to the larger debate, providing a 
new perspective to looking at plagiarism and confidently understanding why it may 
appear to be a legitimate copy of someone else’s work, resulting from a mere exercise 
of creative imitation or having a vibrant veil of fraudulence that demises the original 
author and misleads his/her readership. It is a twofold look that requires a careful 
assessment of plagiarism and its multiple overlapping shapes and refutes strict and 
intransigent interpretation,6 with regard not only to the issue of copying7 but to also the 
broader concepts of authorship and attribution.8 
This concern seems to be even more crucial when an interdisciplinary and 
comparative appraisal is sought. Since plagiarism does not have a univocal meaning in 
all given contexts, and it assumes manifold forms and degrees depending on the exact 
field of knowledge in which it occurs, it is probable that it may have a distinct relevance 
according to the given creative field. Similarly, it is plausible that various legal systems 
                                                          
5
 In particular, see R. POSNER, The little book of plagiarism, New York: Pantheon Books, 2007, who 
succinctly but with extreme lucidity guides the reader into the dynamic realm of contemporary 
plagiarism, exploring its most controversial aspects in the artistic and academic environments; T. J. 
MAZZEO (ed.), Plagiarism and Literary Property in the Romantic Period, Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2007, editing a collection of writing that discusses plagiarism, but also imitation and 
originality; R. CASO (ed.), Plagio e creatività: un dialogo tra diritto e altri saperi, Quaderni del 
Dipartimento di scienze giuridiche, Vol. 98, Trento: Università degli Studi di Trento, 2011, 
<http://eprints.biblio.unitn.it/2278>, who emphasises the extremely fleeting nature of the phenomenon and the 
determinant aid offered by various disciplines to the proper legal and social assessment; D. BONAMORE, Il 
plagio del titolo delle «opere dell'ingegno» nella dogmatica del diritto d'autore, Milano: Giuffrè, 2011, 
who has the value to provide an insightful illustration of the scholarly and judicial approach regarding 
plagiarism of works’ titles, although ending with the controversial and hardly shareable conclusion that it 
represents a typical conduct of theft (at 140). 
6
 Some suggest that the tendency to interpret the phenomenon with a strict and rigid attitude is due to the 
clear influence of the romantic view of the author as the sole creator of his/her works. See A. QUONDAM, 
Note su imitazione, furto e plagio nel Classicismo, in R. GIGLIUCCI (ed.), Furto e Plagio nella letteratura 
del Classicismo, Roma: Bulzoni, 1998, 373, who concisely defines plagiarism as an extreme practice of 
reutilisation. 
7
 Cf. E. MILLER, J. FEIGENBAUM, Taking the copy out of copyright, in Proceedings of the 1st ACM 
Workshop on Security and Privacy in Digital Rights Management (DRM), Lecture notes in computer 
science, vol. 2320, Springer, Berlin, 2002, 233-244, who contest that the right to copy is still the most 
crucial element of copyright, especially after the digital revolution. 
8
 See, in this respect, the studies of E. ADENEY, Authorship and fixation in copyright law: a comparative 
comment, in Melb. Univ. L. Rev., Vol. 53, 2011, 677; D. SAUNDERS, Authorship and copyright, New 
York: Routledge, 1992, who precisely praises treating authorship according to its specific cultural 
context. 
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would not necessarily take the same approach to the subject. It may be differently 
labelled, or it may even raise only limited concerns for the law in force.9 
In this respect, a probable pitfall may arise when comparative analysis takes the 
place of a more broad-spectrum narrative, especially with regard to the United 
Kingdom, where the exact term plagiarism is only occasionally mentioned, being the 
corresponding conduct rather described in terms of copyright infringement, which 
consists in substantial or verbatim copy of another person’s work. In such instances, in 
order to comprise the attitude of both systems, it is then more accurate to provide a 
more detailed representation of the phenomenon in terms of a violation of the norms on 
the attribution of authorship;10 that is to say, the occurrence of disavowing the 
entitlement of the author to be acknowledged as such, which can occur together with a 
violation of the economic rights in the work or exist independently from it.11 
Likewise, it becomes essential to look at the subject as a chameleonic figure that 
transcends the law, deeply tangled by the specificities of various disciplines but not 
inescapably confined to any of them. Given these features, beyond symbolising the 
manifest frustration of the norms on the attribution of the work, it also demonstrates 
how the traditional discourse on the acknowledgment of authorship has evolved, likely 
providing a new understanding of the complex dynamics behind the creative process.  
The outcomes of such a confident assessment clearly depend on the way that law 
looks at authorship attribution, which also varies according to the specific legal system 
under consideration. To this extent, considering the common law and the civil law legal 
traditions, it is not wide of the mark to maintain that the former has been more focused 
                                                          
9
 In line with these assumptions, for the purpose of the present research, the term plagiarism is often used 
in a wide-ranging sense and, according to its diffuse meaning and broad application in academic 
discourse and everyday language; it is knowingly intended to embrace all its multi-layered shades. In fact, 
a comprehensive view of the topic predictably involves few oversimplifications, including a common 
designation of all practices and conducts that may fall under the umbrella of plagiarism. However, 
additional distinctions will furthermore be made in order to differentiate more specific conducts that 
should rather be analysed separately.  
10
 See, in particular, E. ADENEY, The moral rights of authors and performers, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2006, who offers a broad but very detailed analysis of moral rights across different 
jurisdictions, including the United Kingdom, aimed at guiding the reader in the complicated statutory 
enactment of moral rights, including the right of attribution. 
11
 The first and manifest important difference between the Italian and the UK systems is, in fact, the 
manifest independent relevance of a violation of the moral right of attribution (literally, diritto morale di 
paternità) concerning the former, and the usual recurrence of a simultaneous copyright infringement with 
regard to the latter, at least as far as copyright law is involved. However, as will be further explained, and 
particularly when other areas of the law are intertwined with the impairment of authorship attribution, the 
distance between the two becomes less rigorous. 
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on the economic facet of copyright-promoting incentives for the creation and 
advancement of learning,12 while the latter has been mostly committed to protecting the 
personal interests of the creators.  
However, in two different but complementary ways, both the copyright and the 
authors’ right systems have revealed a proclivity to quiver this steady antagonism.13 
This is not to suggest that any convergence has occurred; neither is there any proof that 
a genuine harmonisation may ever take place, even within the limited boundaries of the 
European Union. On the contrary, what an accurate observation of the two traditions 
suggests in this regard is that, despite the obvious and intrinsic differences, their attitude 
towards authorship nonetheless shows interesting similarities in their approach to the 
violation of the norms on attribution and therefore on plagiarism. 
In fact, when concerns about the explicit protection of the right to be 
acknowledged as the author of the work began to be taken more seriously by various 
theorists,14 similarly something changed in the law. The former anxieties for the mere 
economic facets of the above-mentioned disrupting practices began to intensify and be 
aggravated by more delicate concerns for the personal interests of the author, which 
could be harmed by certain conducts other than the abusive exploitation of the work.15  
                                                          
12
 This explicit endorsement has existed ever since the Statute of Anne of 1710. See, for a broad analysis 
of the copyright system, K. GARNETT, G. DAVIES, G. HARBOTTLE, Copyinger and Skone James on 
Copyright, Sweet & Maxwell, 2010. 
13
 Cf. M. ROSE, The Statute of Anne and Author’s Rights: Pope v Curll (1741), in L. BENTLY, U. 
SUTHERSANEN, P. TORREMANS (eds.), Global Copyright: Three Hundred Years Since the Statute of Anne, 
from 1709 to Cyberspace, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2010, 70-78, who attempts to make a 
cognisant assessment of the alleged contrast, revealing some stimulating similarities by analysing the case 
law, including Pope v Curll, Millar v Taylor and Baigent and Leigh v The Random House Group Ltd. As 
he concludes, it is still accurate to foresee the traditional divide between the two systems, but this needs to 
be better qualified, leaving room for some important likenesses. 
14
 What is more, the concept of authorship appears to have arisen lately, and it is still provocatively 
recapped by Michel Foucault’s interrogatives on the autonomous and distinct relevance of the work from 
the person of its author. M. FOUCAULT, Qu'est-ce qu'un auteur, Dits et Écrits, Vol I. (1969), Paris: 
Gallimard, 1994. See also D. SAUNDERS, Authorship and copyright, cit.; M. BIRIOTTI, N. MILLER (eds.), 
What is an author? Manchester and New York:  Manchester University Press, 2003; S. BURKE, The death 
and return of the author: criticism and subjectivity in Barthes, Foucault and Derrida, Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh Univ. Press, 2004 (first ed. 1992). Some of these contributions will be discussed in detail in 
the following chapters. 
15
 Besides, when plagiarism began to personify in the legal context what has since been fashioned as a 
fictional evil by literature, the law started looking at it as a potential target of stern regulation, either as a 
peculiar variation an unlawful use of the work or as a distinct and self-determining violation. On the 
definition of plagiarism as a «literary evil», see F. ROSCALLA, Storie di plagi e di plagiari, in F. 
ROSCALLA (ed.), Attribuzioni, appropriazioni, aprocrifi nella Grecia antica, Atti del Convegno 
internazionale (Pavia, 27-28 May 2005), Pisa: Edizioni ETS, 2006, 69. 
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Certainly, the dual attitude of the law is to some extent expanded by the different 
approaches followed in this respect by civil and common law jurisdictions.16 The former 
began embracing a more personal view of the work and so explicitly granted protection 
to what are known as the moral rights of the author. The latter, instead, strictly relying 
on their copyright history of creative enticement,17 carefully narrowed the legal shield to 
cases in which copyright economic rights were also impaired.18 
However, such obvious pronounced distance is to be partly reduced by looking 
at the broader legal picture, taking into account the answers that the law provides 
against the violation of authorship attribution.19 On the one hand, the seeming 
estrangement of the civil law tradition to the pure monetarist aspects of attribution 
appears to be contradicted by the fact that claimants, in the event of its violation, may 
seek remedies for both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages. On the other hand, 
common law countries may have offered some relief against the violation of the right of 
attribution through other legal areas, such as the law of torts and contracts. 
Although such statements may appear controversial and receive either consensus 
or disapproval, it is nevertheless reasonable to argue that from a watchful eye the two 
legal traditions show some awareness for authorship attribution, within the larger 
creative process, albeit with dissimilar hues. Given these premises, it seems significant 
to make a distinction between the acts of honest imitation by those who emulate others 
                                                          
16
 See, in particular, M. ROSE, Authors and Owners. The Invention of Copyright, Harvard University 
Press, 1993, who illustrates the concepts of property, originality, authorship and their complex 
entanglement. 
For a recount of the distinct paths followed by the two traditions, but also on their possible intersections, 
see U. IZZO, Alle origini del copyright e del diritto d'autore. Tecnologia, interessi e cambiamento 
giuridico, Postfazione di Roberto Caso, Roma: Carocci, 2010. See also R. C. BIRD, C., S. C. JAIN, The 
Global Challenge of Intellectual Property Rights, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2009. 
17
 From a common departure when the primary concern for both systems was to protect the pecuniary 
interests of publishers, by privilege first and by statute then, the two traditions have outwardly followed 
different paths. Regarding the latter, see M. ROSE, The Statute of Anne and author's rights: Pope v Curll 
(1741), in L., LIONEL, U. SUTHERSANEN, P. TORREMANS (eds.), Global Copyright: Three Hundred Years 
Since the Statute of Anne, from 1709 to Cyberspace, cit., 70. 
18
 Cf. W. CORNISH, D. LLEWELYN, Intellectual Property: patents, copyright, trademarks and allied rights, 
London: Sweet and Maxell, 2003, 452-467. 
19
 The seeming leaning that the two countries share is in part showed through the judicial pronouncements 
on the topic, as will be further developed in the course of this dissertation. 
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to learn and foster the construction of new knowledge,20 and the acts of those who 
attempt to pass off other persons’ creations as their own.21  
It is common knowledge that the practice of creation predictably comprises 
taking on the ideas of others who have preceded us, and often implies borrowing even 
the actual expression of those ideas that at that point become inspiring works.22 This 
suggests that creation is indeed a story of concerted instead of individual efforts.23 New 
works appear to be gaining from others’ works and this assumption cannot be left aside 
in examining authorship attribution, and plagiarism-related discourses.24 To such an 
extent, the contribution of humanist studies to the larger debate on the matter is 
undeniable,25 as it helps to determine the most accurate framework by also appreciating 
the role that imitation has played, and still plays, in the process of creation. 
 
 
1.1 Acknowledging imitation as an intrinsic feature of creation 
 
The significance of imitative practices, and their link to the creations of the mind, was 
already present in Plato and Aristotle’s thoughts on arts and aesthetics.26 However, the 
two theorists offered a pointedly different appraisal of imitation: while Plato 
                                                          
20
 Such a distinction, however, is still far from being straightforward. In fact, it is hard to distinguish the 
former from the latter in several instances. The reason it may be problematic to draw a steady line 
between acceptable and unbearable behaviours is directly related to the core of the creative process. For a 
detailed analysis of this process, see C. BOHANNAN, H. HOVENKAMP, Creation without Restraint. 
Promoting Liberty and Rivalry in Innovation, New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. 
21
 See P. DRAHOS, J. BRAITHWAITE, Information Feudalism. Who Owns the Knowledge Economy? 
London: Earthscan, 2002 (New York, N.Y.; London: New Press, 2007). 
22
 Cf. N. GROOM, Unoriginal genius: plagiarism and the construction of 'Romantic' authorship, in L. 
BENTLY, J. DAVIS, J. C. GINSBURG (eds.), Copyright and Piracy. An Interdisciplinary Critique, New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2010, 271. 
23
 M. RIMMER, Wikipedia, collective authorship and the politics of knowledge, in C. ARUP, W. VAN 
CAENEGEM (eds.), Intellectual Property Policy Reform. Fostering Innovation and Development, 
Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2009, 172. 
24
 See I. ALEXANDER, The genius and the labourer: authorship in eighteenth and nineteenth-century 
copyright law, in L. BENTLY, J. DAVIS, J. C. GINSBURG (eds.), Copyright and Piracy. An Interdisciplinary 
Critique, cit., 300. 
25
 For a comprehensive analysis of the entanglement of legal and literary studies, see, in particular, R. 
POSNER, Law and literature, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard university press, 2009, who, despite 
acknowledging the essential differences that exist between law and literature according to their respective 
social function, believes in their capacity to illuminate one another. Cf. D. SAUNDERS, Authorship and 
copyright, cit. 
26
 The analysis conducted in the instant paragraphs will be limited to the literary field, since such an area 
represents the perfect arena for a primary enucleating of plagiarism and related discourses, while the 
illustration of other disciplines will be provided in the following sections. 
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distinguished between good and negative imitation, openly discouraging the latter,27 
Aristotle emphasised the positive aspects of imitation as belonging to any form of art, 
simply considering it a good thing.28  
Overall, the Aristotelian understanding of imitation as an intimate feature of art, 
and a natural aspiration for men who are pleased to create indeed represented the 
starting point for a mature exploration by other theorists. This was confirmed, in 
particular, by Isocrates, who encouraged exploring the various ways in which a subject 
matter can be told,29 arguing that there is no unique manner in which to speak of it, 
although «one must not shun the subjects upon which others have spoken before, but 
must try to speak better than they».30 Indeed, it is precisely the way one chooses to 
elaborate the theme that deserved appreciation and leads to advancement.31 
Therefore, classical literary theory significantly boosted imitation, also by means 
of reinterpreting the subject matter that is common property. Nevertheless, the same 
theory predicted that imitation alone is not sufficient and called for some 
distinctiveness, which could emerge through a cautious choice and arrangement of the 
                                                          
27 E. BELFIORE, A Theory of Imitation in Plato's Republic in T.A.Ph.A., Vol. 114, 1984, 121-146. Cf. G. 
PERON, A. ANDREOSE (eds.), Contrafactum. Copia, imitazione, falso, Atti del XXXII Convegno 
Interuniversitario. Bressanone/Brixen 8-11 luglio 2004: Esedra, 2004. 
28
 P. SIMPSON, Aristotle on Poetry and Imitation, in Hermes, Vol. 116, No. 3, 1988, 279. 
29
 Indeed, as further articulated, «if it were possible to present the same subject matter in one form and in 
no other, one might have reason to think it gratuitous to weary one's hearers by speaking again in the 
same manner as his predecessors; but since oratory is of such a nature that it is possible to discourse on 
the same subject matter in many different ways to represent the great as lowly or invest the little with 
grandeur, to recount the things of old in a new manner or set forth events of recent date in an old 
fashion». ISOCRATES, Panegyricus (Oration IV), § 7–10, with an English translation by G. Norlin, Loeb 
Classical Library 209, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London, UK: William Heinemann, 
1980, Vol. I, 115, <http://www.loebclassics.com/view/isocrates-discourses_4_panegyricus/1928/pb_LCL209.115.xml> 
(subscription required). 
30
 Consequently, he concluded that the development of art depended on the attitude of artists to first 
cherish the works of those who have proved exceptional skills, instead of admiring those who have just 
begun their artistry. Similarly, he expected poets to admire the exceptionality of telling an already known 
subject instead of those who pursue unexplored themes. ISOCRATES, Panegyricus (Oration IV), cit., 123-
125. 
31
 As Horace later reinforced, failure to transform the taken material motivates an early striving for 
originality, by also avoiding verbatim copy that prevents the imitator from making the common theme 
his/her own. An example of this is given by his warnings: «should you, advent'ring novelty, engage Some 
bold Original to walk the Stage, Preserve it well; continu'd as begun; True to itself in ev'ry scene, and 
one! Yet hard the task to touch on untried facts: Safer the Iliad to reduce to acts, Than be the first new 
regions to explore, And dwell on themes unknown, untold before. […] Quit but the vulgar, broad, and 
beaten round,   The public field becomes your private ground […] Nor word for word too faithfully 
translate; Nor leap at once into a narrow strait, A copyist so close, that rule and line Curb your free march, 
and all your steps confine!». HORACE, The Art Of Poetry. An Epistle To The Pisos (Epistola Ad Pisones. 
De Arte Poetica), Translated from Horace, with notes by G. Colman, London: T. Cadell, 1793, 
<http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/9175/pg9175-images.html>. 
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borrowed material that demonstrate the personal effort of the imitator, who then 
becomes a creator. 32 
Moreover, accepting that ordinary subject matter is common property, it was 
established that any theme that another author had used could, with no repercussions, be 
reused by subsequent imitators. Such an instance is well uttered in the work of Seneca 
the Younger who acclaimed the reutilisation of fruitful subjects that «served [authors] 
all with happy results, and those who have gone before seem to me not have forestalled 
all that could be said, but merely to have opened the way».33 This appeared to be an 
advantage for the artist and for the advancement of learning of all, thus not amounting 
to larceny insofar as some rules were respected.34 
Acknowledging the importance of imitating the successful inventions of other 
authors, given that «it is a universal rule of life that we should wish to copy what we 
approve in others», so believed Quintilian who highlighted that imitation alone may not 
be enough to ensure actual development, when he specified that «imitation alone is not 
sufficient, if only for the reason that a sluggish nature is only too ready to rest content 
with the invention of others».35 Of a similar attitude was Pliny the Younger who, 
despite acknowledging the likeness of remembering how a given author has 
successfully elaborated a given subject matter, pressured for the pursuit of a sort of 
artistic challenge in which one compares one’s performance with that of the model and 
is willing to outshine the other for the advancement of learning of all. 
                                                          
32
 Nonetheless, despite this early apprehension for honest borrowing, ancient Greek and Latin writers 
regularly practised imitation with less concern for originality, at least in the way this concept has been 
defined since modern times. 
33
 As he further explained, it is one thing treating a subject that others have explored and maybe 
exhausted, and another thing altogether to approach an almost new theme. The novel subject, in fact, is 
capable of being further developed, since «what is already discovered does not hinder new discoveries». 
Indeed, in his view, who comes after is the one that benefits the most from imitation, since he/she might 
use subjects and figures that, despite already being used by others, are still capable of being transformed 
into something different and new. Therefore, in doing so, «he is not pilfering them, as if they belonged to 
someone else, when he uses them, for they are common property». L. A. SENECA, Ad Lucilium epistulae 
morales. LXXIX, § 6-7, with an English translation by R. M. Gummere, London, UK: London 
Heinemann, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1917, Vol. II, 203-279, 
<https://archive.org/details/adluciliumepistu02seneuoft>. 
34
 L. A. SENECA, Ad Lucilium epistulae morales, cit., 203–205, 281. 
35
 In his words, «it is for this reason that boys copy the shapes of letters that they may learn to write, and 
that musicians take the voices of their teachers, painters the works of their predecessors, and peasants the 
principles of agriculture which have been proved in practice, as models for their imitation». QUINTILIAN, 
Institutio Oratoria, Book X, Ch. 2, § 2-4, 8. The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, with an English 
translation by H. E. Butler, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London, UK: William 
Heinemann, 1922, Vol. IV, 75–79, <https://openlibrary.org/books/OL23306618M/The_Institutio_oratoria_of_Quintilian>.  
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Classic literates accepted and endorsed the principle of copying as a crucial 
means to reaching perfection. Cassius Longinus, for instance, praised the emulous 
imitation of great ancient poets, which he firmly believes «[it] is not plagiarism, but 
resembles the process of copying from fair forms or statues or works of skilled 
labour»,36 explaining how the gathering of the one’s divine impulse from others’ spirit 
functions as a medium that «leads to sublime heights».37 
Likewise, Macrobius believed that taking from others’ fortunate creations was a 
fundamental component of art and surely should have not been taxed with reprobation 
insofar as it was done with good judgement.38 If this condition were fulfilled, the 
borrower could easily have replied to the accusations brought against his/her taking, 
such as he/she had taken too much, all for the sake of art, which was believed to be 
mostly advanced through the sharing and exchange of ideas and inventions. 
Accordingly, those who borrow previously used material are yet expected to 
transform and, by personally re-interpreting it, make it their own intellectual product, in 
a way that, figuratively speaking, resembles the biological process of digestion, which is 
colourfully expressed through the metaphor of the bee that, after careful and laborious 
arrangement and labour, produces its honey from several flowers. Like bees, poets 
should then blend the material gathered from others or common property matter in order 
                                                          
36
 As he further explains, the advancement of literature, philosophy and generally any other art would 
never have occurred if artists had not engaged in the fruitful context with their models. LONGINUS, On the 
Sublime (Perì Hypsous), XIII, § 2-4, translated into English by H. L. Havell, with an introduction by 
Andrew Lang, London: Macmillan and co., 1890, 30, <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/17957/17957–h/17957-h.htm>. 
Greek text (with translation by W. Rhys Roberts, Cambridge: University Press, 1907, 79-81) at 
<https://archive.org/details/cu31924012529800>. 
37
 Such an imitative process was, in his understanding, very similar to the one that characterised the 
divine impulse described by the goddess’ priestess. The sublime geniality of the ancient predecessor 
would move from his soul to that of the imitator, who will breathe this divine flatus and be inspired by 
that until they all share the same «sublime enthusiasm». LONGINUS, On the Sublime (Perì Hypsous), cit. 
38
 As he specifies, taking the side of comedian Afranius, who Menander accused of having taken too 
much: «thanks, furthermore, to the manner of his imitations and the good judgment he displayed in his 
borrowings, when we read another’s material in his setting, we either prefer to think it actually his or 
marvel that it sounds better than it did in its original setting». MACROBIUS, Saturnalia, Book VI, I, Edited 
and translated by R. A. Kaster. Loeb Classical Library 510. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2011, § 6, <http://www.loebclassics.com/view/macrobius-saturnalia/2011/pb_LCL512.1.xml> (subscription required). 
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to make their own product, which by this means becomes a new and unique intellectual 
syrup.39 
Besides, even admitting that imitation knows multiple forms of expression, 
which may entail the copy of only a few lines or a larger amount of material, with or 
without alteration or adjustments, the source or origin of the taking must still be 
recognisable.40 This is a point of particular importance, since it suggests that proper 
attribution of authorship was a significant concern for literature and art, even within the 
larger frame of imitation: the right of the former author to be acknowledged as such 
appears therefore to somehow confine the boundaries of imitative creation that at the 
outset appeared to be averse to any restraints. 
Certainly, imitative practices that extended from the Middle Ages to the decades 
preceding the Renaissance strictly relied on their worship for authority, with almost no 
safeguard for any creative or original efforts, although the latter assumption is virtually 
accurate in relation to the early decades of the Middle Ages. As Lindey sustains, the fall 
of the Roman Empire brought away the prolific literary tradition that Classical theorists 
had established, and it was replaced by «a cloud of jargoners and compilers [that] 
darkened the face of learning».41 This, however, does not mean that the entire epoch 
should be regarded as a thorough dwindling of culture.  
Furthermore, the abundant transcription of early works by monkish artists who, 
during the ninth century, copied a large amount of compositions may, to some extent, 
have facilitated the usurpation of others’ compositions by those who were eager for 
effortless glory wearing, and purposely did not acknowledge the authorship of their 
sources, seeking to pass these works off as their own.42 Nevertheless, this conclusion 
seems to be too precipitate, especially when one considers the peculiar patterns that 
                                                          
39
 As Seneca articulated: «we also, I say, ought to copy these bees, and sift whatever we have gathered 
from a varied course of reading, for such things are better preserved if they are kept separate; then, by 
applying the supervising care with which our nature has endowed us, - in other words, our natural gifts, - 
we should so blend those several flavours into one delicious compound that, even though it betrays its 
origin, yet it nevertheless is clearly a different thing from that whence it came». L. A. SENECA, Ad 
Lucilium epistulae morales, cit., § 3-5, 277. 
40
 Describing the imitative process, he explained that borrowings might comprise half lines or all verses; 
it may entail some variation or few additions; it may also insist on a deliberate misplacing of some 
passages, making it difficult to locate their actual source; it may indeed imply some adjustment without 
erasing the source, which may still be recognised. L. A. SENECA, Ad Lucilium epistulae morales, cit., § 7. 
41
 A. LINDEY, Plagiarism and Originality, cit., 67. 
42
 A. LINDEY, Plagiarism and Originality, cit., 68. 
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described that age of history.43 In fact, the overall disregard for the genuine imitation 
proclaimed by Classic literates, and the disdain for the attribution of authorship, find 
their deep roots in the awareness of the most affordable and prompt way to spread the 
inherited knowledge of their predecessors.44 
Moreover, writers of that time, which Constable described as scribes and 
compilers rather than authors, aimed at providing authority instead of acknowledging 
individual attribution.45 Consequently, it did not matter whether the former author had 
been properly credited, although the copyist’s interest might also extend to the 
enhancement of the copied text, either in the sense that it could be more easily and 
amusingly read or in a way that could increase its circulation among readers.46 
Indeed, if the picture of the copyist lonely monks truly describes high medieval 
centuries, it however does not effectively apply to the late centuries. As Hobbins makes 
clear, beginning with the year 1000, in fact, numerous social vicissitudes determined the 
rise and spread of a cultural change that greatly transformed literature and writing 
practices, determining a prominent profusion of fabricated books, particularly during the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and allowing their distribution on a larger scale.47 
                                                          
43
 See also H. MAUREL-INDART, Plagiats, les coulisses de l'écriture, Paris: Éditions de la Différence, 
2007, 2-16, who puts an emphasis on the influence that the so-called copiste-auteur had on the 
establishment of the modern concept of authorship, suggesting him/her to be a co-author, given his/her 
proximity to the text and any intervention he/she might have made. Cf. (cited at 12, note 5) L. CANFORA, 
Il copista come autore, Palermo: Sellerio Editore, 2002, who argues that the true author is the copyist that 
has the closest relationship with the text. 
44
 Therefore, in order to tie up the previous analysis with the subsequent paragraphs and then expound the 
theory that lies behind the concept of plagiarism as the counterpart of originality, which will be illustrated 
in Chapter 2, a detailed examination of the period that extends from the collapse of the Roman Empire to 
the sixteenth century is thereby (so forth) illustrated. 
45
 G. CONSTABLE, Forgery and Plagiarism in the Middle Ages, in ADipl., Vol. 29, No. JG, 1983, 1, 2-3, 
27-28, 38-39, who defies the prospect of even using the term plagiarism with reference to the Middle 
Ages, since writers, when discarding the accuracy of attribution, were primarily moved by social motives 
rather than being the result of «obscure personal motives».  
Likewise, some suggest it not to be considered counterfeiting, but rather a «façon, un modelage». M. 
MEZGHANI-MANAL, Source, façon et contrefaçon au Moyen Age, Actes du colloque de Tours 2001, Le 
plagiat littéraire, Littérature et Nation, Vol. 27, Tours: Université de Tours, 2002, 49-70, cited by H. 
MAUREL-INDART, Plagiats, les coulisses de l'écriture, cit., at 14 note 10. 
46
 P. KUNSTMANN, Œcuménisme médiéval et auctoritates: art et liberté de la copie, in C. VANDENDORPE 
(ed.), Le plagiat, Ottawa: Presses de l'Université d'Ottawa, 1992, 140-141, also cited by H. MAUREL-
INDART, Plagiats, les coulisses de l'écriture, cit., 13. 
47
 Diminishing the cost to produce manuscripts, but increasing the availability of new techniques, 
including the introduction of the use of paper, the diffusion of grammar schools and literateness, in the 
late medieval ages, people in fact witness a great demand for manuscripts that inevitably challenged the 
role of the copyist, who became even more mindful of their work. D. HOBBINS, Authorship and publicity 
before print. Jean Gerson and the transformation of Late Medieval learning, Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2009, 7-8. 
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The pronounced dissemination of the Romance of the Rose during 1200, for 
instance, is an exemplary demonstration of such abundance. Besides, some claim that 
the spread of vernacular allegory disclosed the prestigious status that such composition 
enjoyed, which began challenging the role of the authors and the same notion of 
authorship.48 Moreover, the use of the fictional first-person narrative, interpolations, 
allusions and borrowing from others’ works actually helped to define a new type of 
author, who, if not yet seen in his/her distinctiveness, is beginning again to perform 
some kind of originality.49 
Nevertheless, the twelfth and thirteenth centuries indeed saw a change in the 
approach to writing, thanks to the prolific activity of exegetes and authoritative 
schoolmen with their glosses and commentaries, such as Thomas Aquinas and William 
Ockham who are understood as «valuable repositories of medieval theory of 
authorship».50 The erudite scrutiny they conducted on scriptural texts appears to have 
had an impact on the concept of authorship, defining the role of the auctor and his 
auctoritas, which became particularly intense with the «shift from the divine to the 
human auctor of Scripture»,51 even though this concept is still far from its 
contemporary meaning.  
Yet, the most tangible change occurred after 1400, describing what has been 
defined as «a growing appetite for information».52 Writers of that time, including the 
Italian Boccaccio and Petrarch, and the English Chaucer and Gower, showed a special 
affinity for ancient classic literature that bounced their approach to a distinctive 
                                                          
48
 S. A. KAMATH, G. VIERECK, Authorship and first-person allegory in Late medieval France and 
England, series Gallica, Vol. 26, Cambrige, UK: D.S. Brewer, 2012, 2-3. 
49
 S. A. KAMATH, G. VIERECK, Authorship and first-person allegory in Late medieval France and 
England, cit., 5-10. Cf. C. WHITEHEAD, Castles of the Mind: A Study of Medieval Architectural Allegory. 
Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2003, 260.  
50
 A. J. MINNIS, Medieval theory of authorship. Scholastic literary attitudes in the later Middle Ages, 
London: Scolar Press, 1984, 1 et seq., who openly contests that scholastic literature lacked any interest in 
art. On the contrary, also considering the unavoidable influence of Aristotelian principles, they became 
increasingly interested in the artistic and literary aspects of writing, opening the way for the following 
humanist approach of the fourteenth century onwards. 
51
 A. J. MINNIS, Medieval theory of authorship, cit., 2, 5. 
52
 D. HOBBINS, Authorship and publicity before print., cit., 10. 
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humanist writing, all the time engaging more with the reader,53 but likewise showing a 
peculiar pattern of imitation, interpolation and borrowing.54  
All these developments may arguably still be reconciled within the general 
framework of imitation,55 claiming that the lack of exact authorship acknowledgement 
would not impede the conceptualisation of a deferential recollection of others’ works, 
similarly to the attitude of those who praised unconditional borrowing in ancient times. 
Sixteenth-century writing practices across and beyond continental Europe 
greatly appreciated imitation,56 considering it a valuable instrument of learning through 
the reiteration of classical and traditional themes, especially in view of the fact that it 
promoted the gathering of derivative knowledge,57 while understanding the critical 
importance of posing some boundaries. In other words, theorists maintained and 
strongly promoted the classical paradigm, but they did not renounce the benefit of 
collateral rules to endorse good imitation. 
Among them,58 the Italian Daniello recouped the classical paradigm of subject 
matter having a common property dimension where anybody can use any theme or idea, 
also with the aim of citing or improving the model, but again on the condition that it 
was reinterpreted and created something novel.59 His insistence on the cautious 
collection and arrangement of others’ material, indeed, was brought forward by many 
                                                          
53
 D. HOBBINS, Authorship and publicity before print., cit., 7, who furthermore suggests that they began 
caring for the aesthetic and creative value of their works, in the end becoming «the reader’s respected 
friend». 
54
 To such an extent, the alleged imitation by Boccaccio of Statius’s Thebaid in his Teseida is considered 
an example of creative imitation that, also by means of analogical patterns, recalls the principles set by 
ancient theorists. 
The imitative attitude of Boccaccio has been widely explored and researchers have demonstrated the 
occurrence of such conscious imitation with regard to several works, including Dante Alighieri’s Divina 
Commedia. See, in this respect, V. KIRKHAM, M. SHERBERG, J. LEVARIE SMARR (eds.), Boccaccio: a 
critical guide to the complete works, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2013, 81 et seq. Cf. D. 
ANDERSON, Before the Knight's Tale: Imitation of Classical Epic in Boccaccio's Teseida, Middle Ages 
Series, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania, 1988. Likewise, scholars compare his imitative 
approach with that of Chaucer and, regarding his imitation of Dante’s masterpiece, extensively analyse 
the motives of his drawing. See, for instance, P. BOITANI (ed.), Chaucer and the Italian Trecento, 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University press, 1985, particularly at 117 et seq. 
55
 G. CONSTABLE, Forgery and Plagiarism in the Middle Ages, cit., 36-37. Cf. S. STEWARD, Crimes of 
writing: problems in the containment of representation: problems in the containment of representation, 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. 
56
 On the writing practices of Italian and English artists during the sixteenth century, see, in particular, the 
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Nicolini da Sabbio, 1536, 74-75, <http://digital.onb.ac.at/OnbViewer/viewer.faces?doc=ABO_%2BZ169363103>.  
  
23 
 
artists of the epoch and yet reiterated the essential scheme of creative imitation that one 
has so far witnessed with regard to ancient classical literature. 
For instance, Minturno recalled the metaphor of the bee that gathers material 
from flowers and, with its laborious intervention, transforms it into honey, to replicate 
Seneca’s suggestion that poets should do the same.60 Also critical of  verbatim copying 
and what he called a slavery to imitation was Pontanus, who discussed the importance 
of avoiding the reproduction of the exact words of others’ works, and instead suggested 
pursuing assimilation, once again recalling the metaphor of the bee: «apes imitari 
preacipit, quas videmus volitare per florea rura, & succos ad mellificandum idoneos 
quaerere».61  
In that context, what appears repudiated is certainly not imitation in itself, but 
instead the servility of the conducts that contrast with the above-illustrated principles.62 
Endorsing some kind of judicious creation, writers believe that imitation and invention 
may very well coexist, especially when some effort in terms of organising the material 
is considered.63 According to Tasso, in fact, poets are natural imitators who sew what is 
common property into their own invention, creating something new from the old to 
reach ultimate perfection.64  
Similar contemplations are retrieved by English writers.65 According to Hawes, 
a wise writer is expected to invent «upon auctoryte».66 In this sense, imitation became a 
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the expanded edition of the work that was released a few years later: T. TASSO, Discorsi del poema 
heroico del S. Torquato Tasso all’Illustriss.mo e Reverendo Signor Cardinale Aldobrandino, Napoli: 
Paolo Venturini, 1594. 
65
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meaningful instrument to invent or create, where invention in the words of Cox, «is 
wherby we shew that the signe whiche is brought agaīst vs: maketh for vs. As I wolde 
nat haue taryed to couer hym yf I had done the dede my selfe: but haue fled and shronke 
a syde into some other way for feare of takynge».67  
As Wilson confirmed,68 imitation seeks to resemble others’ inventions without 
necessarily having to bring forward new things that nobody ever said, but rather 
following the example of the great authorities that populated the literary universe.69 
Lupset himself insisted on imitation but furthermore specified that novelty does not 
necessarily mean independent fabrication, but may also consist in judicious borrowing 
from notorious models.70  
Like their Italian colleagues, English Renaissance writers did not attempt 
imitation tout court but equally opposed flattering conducts that sloppily resembled the 
process of genuine imitative creation.71 One for all, Elyot praised imitation, but 
demanded some caution in borrowing others’ material, thus suggesting it to be 
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assembled according to the celebrated pattern of the laborious bee,72 and Ascham, who 
praised the same careful approach with regard to the choice and use that the imitator 
made of the borrowed works.73  
In the latter’s view, it was essential to avoid poor judgement in imitation. but 
instead to pursue happy invention and slight allusion and to demonstrate judgement in 
imitation, all of which contributed to raising the imagination. A promoter of the 
classical pattern of imitation, Ascham encouraged imitative practices but appeared 
equally critical towards servile and superficial borrowing. Accordingly, imitation, 
which he described as «a facultie to expresse liuelie and perfitelie that example: which 
ye go about to folow», appeared to be not always sufficient; he also acclaimed those 
who created «some newe shape him selfe»,74 it being essential to gather wisely, 
avoiding taking other’s work word for word, and constantly bearing in mind the final 
purpose of enhancing knowledge.75  
During the Renaissance, imitation was an essential component of creation and 
deference, for the great authority of predecessors justifies not only the borrowing of 
previously used themes and ideas, but also word-for-word copying. This is not even 
challenged by the practice of «invective or flyting poems», which indeed, according to 
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White, proves that «imitative composition enjoyed general and unquestioned 
acceptance».76 
The similarities between the Italian and English approaches to the matter during 
the sixteenth century are well illustrated by Hoby and his translation of The Book of the 
Courtier by Castiglione,77 in which he argued that, although there could be no good 
writing without imitation, there was indeed no requirement for following the source 
entirely. The importance of choosing the material to be reinterpreted is a critical aspect 
of the process, to the extent that it determines whether imitation is original, perhaps 
devoting special attention to the details that have not yet been elaborated by others; 
particularly when the ultimate aim of the artist it to surpass his/her model.78 
Such conscious criticism towards servility and superficiality was to some extent 
linked to a growing interest and concern for some originality of compositions, partly 
compelled by the increase in published works and authors and perhaps by the renovated 
ethical motives of literates.79  
In other words, if at first the classical principle of imitation was interpreted 
according to its strict and severe meaning, it was later perceived that a genuine imitative 
practice did not get along with fawning and shallow conduct. Moreover, forestalling 
what in modern times would be described as a cry for originality and creativity, it was 
also understood that borrowing should have rather entailed «individual adaptation, 
reinterpretation, and if possible improvement».80  
Acknowledging imitation as an intrinsic feature of creation is, therefore, a first 
and essential step to comprehending the true nature of creativity and, accordingly, to 
explaining the complex mechanisms that lay behind plagiarism and misattribution 
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practices. Moreover, a wary reading of the past certainly reveals many consistencies 
with the idea that taking the words of others has been a constant feature of the process 
of creation. However, in general, it should be clarified that since then this was accepted 
on the condition that imitation and reutilisation became themselves the instrument of 
further creation,81 or as long as this would not entail a passing-off of these words as 
their own. 
 
 
1.2 A tale of individual misattribution and public deception 
 
History shows that borrowing has at all times been an accustomed practice in literature, 
as well as in art and other fields of knowledge. However, even though authors and, 
more generally, artists were entitled to use others’ works to develop their own creations, 
there was still some obligation always to mention the first authors unless they wanted 
by ill chance to attract larcenous accusations. In other words, while accounting for the 
accepted resorting to imitation in the creative process, there has also been a constant 
leaning towards distinguishing dissimilar imitative acts.82  
Deliberate misattribution of the original work brings a negative element to the 
enchanted tale thus far described. From whatever perspective we look at it, with only a 
few exceptions contingent to specific artistic movements and periods, authors have 
indeed relentlessly been devoted to properly acknowledging authorship. This 
postulation additionally explains the need to understand the various forms that violation 
of such a normative scheme may assume, from whole non-attribution, to the various 
forms of misattribution. Among all variations that plagiarism displays, the first and 
simplest is the act of disrupting the very core element of the author’s credit; that is to 
say, not acknowledging his/her authorship despite it evidently not being the only aspect 
to consider. 
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Likewise, the careful attitude towards a proper founding of attribution should 
accompany a cautious concern for the different looks that misattribution may assume, 
which is firmly related to the need to avoid an overly rigorous stance on the matter. 
Accordingly, it should not be taken for granted that every misattribution is irreparably 
condemned, especially when some adaptation occurs.83 The powerful role of variations 
may then turn the act of copying into an entirely autonomous creation cherished by a 
creative imitation or inspiration, thus bringing into question whether discouraging such 
a practice appears justified only in the name of a rigorous defense of authorship 
attribution. 
In essence, the practice of encroaching the right of authors to receive attribution 
or credit for their works, by suppressing their name or failing to acknowledge them 
accurately, either way being willing to pass those works off as their own, remains a very 
convoluted issue. It may be encapsulated by the limits already anticipated, with the 
echoing term of plagiarism, or more accurately described as the usurpation of the 
author’s (or who is otherwise entitled) right of attribution. 
In any case, similar conducts appear to contradict the true nature of creation that 
has persistently intended to pursue the result of some individual creative effort, if not, in 
its own words, original. Most of all, it certainly reveals some hints of treachery that, if 
not necessarily taken into full account by the law, still have a meaningful denotation in 
the realm of ethics and social norms. 
As a result, a possible way out of this bewildering condition may be to isolate 
the conducts of those who go beyond creative imitation, instead deceitfully 
misattributing another person’s work and making it as if it were a product of their 
creation, particularly when it is warily camouflaged.84 Nonetheless, there is also an 
accepted belief that in some disciplines, in particular in the world of art, even a slavish 
copy is considered to have a distinct and significant value, even though this apparently 
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means refuting the paradigm of virtuous imitation that has been so extensively 
proclaimed.85 As a consequence, there seems to be an additional need for the law to 
constantly have in mind the precious help that non legal disciplines bring to the 
discussion and so to potential legal claims.86 
Above all, the first urge to sanction the conduct of plagiarism has been directly 
associated with the necessity to prohibit the unauthorised exploitation of the work, 
therefore with the first purpose to protect the interests of the publisher before even 
considering the author of the work itself. 87 For these reasons, it seems correct to argue 
that in both the Italian and the UK systems, from a strictly legal perspective, plagiarism 
first assumes the contours of counterfeiting and piracy,88 the main concern of the law 
being towards the pecuniary interests in the work that ought to be fully protected.  
Nevertheless, such an approach was to some extent also connected to a specific 
worry for the public interest, as it was soon understood that the public had a relevant 
interest in not being deceived by works with false or improper attribution.89 This last 
aspect also represents an actual modern-day concern, and perhaps it might be a useful 
tool for a more mature appreciation of the phenomenon.  
Focusing on the increasing relevance of misattribution practices and their 
aptness to harm the right of society not to be deceived by unattributed or misattributed 
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authorship, the concern for the public interest in this matter is likely to grow. However, 
there is no absolute proof that public interest is effectively safeguarded through the 
formal and strict sanctioning of such conduct, which may not indeed actually harm the 
public and could rather simply be confined to the realm of art and literature, and 
therefore regulated by the social norms that apply in a specific context and environment. 
Even so, another issue has arisen in this already complex picture, which deserves 
a dedicated analysis but will here only be briefly anticipated. If an asserting plagiarism 
that has its deep roots in the very mutable nature of art has to be acknowledged, there is 
still some latitude to foresee the risk that a much-unregulated attitude towards 
authorship may mean a hazardous deception at the expense of the public. Justice Posner, 
who describes plagiarism as a deceptive copy that misleads the public, which instead 
relies on the outward accuracy of the attribution, has recently described this concern,90 
and yet it had already been articulated by earlier literates. 
Among them, Vida focused specifically on the reader. Recommending his young 
audience to imitate the works and style of their predecessors, he truly believed in the 
power of adaptation, which, if done in a surreptitious way, risked misleading the reader. 
On the other hand, when the imitative conduct was unconcealed, he had enough 
confidence to believe that the reader him/herself has the ability to detect the borrowing, 
recognising the source from which the borrowed passage has been taken and thus 
understanding the real intention of the imitator to consciously allude to the model, 
perhaps in an effort to compete with it.91 
Returning to present times, it appears more than plausible that the individual 
concerns of the authors are, to some extent, shared by the public. In particular, Litman 
discusses how the interest of the public is likely to intersect the author’s interest in 
protecting the integrity of his/her work.92 Borghi and Karapapa further develop such an 
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argument, reaffirming the interest of the audience, especially in the digital environment, 
and suggesting foreseeing in the right to integrity «a powerful safeguard on the public 
sphere as such», which anyway must remain a chief concern for copyright law.93 
Futhermore, if these arguments are acceptable with regard to the right of 
integrity, they seem even more significant when referring to the right of attribution. 
Here, in fact, the entitlement of the author to be properly acknowledged appears to 
overlap with the audience’s right not to be deceived and thus receive the most accurate 
information pertaining to the work. This might be established with some degree of ease 
reading between the lines of ancient theorists, for instance, Terence, who intentionally 
addressed to the public his apprehension about being misjudged. 
In conclusion, it is correct to say that many literates adopted the rule of invention 
without discussing it,94 or without explicit concern for the public right to be 
appropriately informed of the works’ authorship. However, invention and its expansion 
as independent fabrication shortly began to be taken into consideration,95 and a more 
distinctive fence between the common property of subject matters and the private realm 
of individual creation has entered the scene,96 suggesting furthermore the importance of 
avoiding any trickery at the expense of the public. 
 
 
2. Legendary plagiarists in the allegory of piracy and literary theft 
 
The praise for imitation, as previously explained, has relentlessly entailed a general 
respect for borrowing. However, originality-driven attacks that are quite similar to those 
foreseen nowadays were not lacking, mostly moved by jealous retorts or rigid analysis 
that compared borrowed materials with their alleged sources. This without showing any 
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further interest in the reasons behind the taking or redeeming of the kind of genuine and 
pondered imitation that has traditionally featured in art.97 
In addition, the concept of labour, which, to some extent, anticipates what would 
later be known in modern times as the sweat of the brow doctrine, made its appearance 
within the larger debate on creation. One of its first advocates was the Italian 
Castelvetro, for whom labour, or fatica, became a central issue most likely influencing 
his scant hesitation to designate imitators as thieves who usurp the poet’s credit by 
using the flamboyant epithet of «rubatori […] degni d’ogni grave punitione».98 
The figure of theft also recurred in some English literates during the 
Renaissance. Cranmer, who proclaimed the need to handle the matter both with 
sincerity and faithfully, criticised the conduct of those who irresponsibly take what 
another had gathered with great labour, «[stealing] from him all his thank and glory, 
like unto Æsop’s chough, which plumed himself with other birds’ feathers».99 The 
verbatim copying of others’ works therefore represented the booty of stealing, 
especially when the taking was particularly extensive in length and focused on a single 
author’s work.100  
Accordingly, when the classical paradigm of imitation began to be demonstrated 
together with a demand for improvement, to some extent it became inherent that the 
borrower should imitate wisely – an apparently simple expectation that originates from 
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the inference that artists imitate the wise to learn some wisdom.101 In Wilson’s thought, 
in particular, there was likewise confidence that a wise man would have not 
counterfeited another’s work: 
For if they that walke much in the Sunne, and thinke not of it, 
are yet for the most part Sunne burnt, it can not be but that they 
which wittingly and willingly trauayle to counterfect other, 
must needes take some colour of them, and be like vnto them 
in some one thing or other, according to the Prouerbe, by 
companying with the wise, a man shall learne wisedome.102 
The practice of misattributing others’ works of the mind and passing them off as a new 
and original product of their own was widely known in fifth century Ancient Greek 
comedy. Poets were used to give-and-take contentions of plagiarism and, quite often, 
such accusations also had an element of public deception: the case is finely exemplified 
by Aristophanes, who endorsed the right practice of always delivering new and original 
concepts to the audience instead of purely reusing only prior and recurring ideas, thus 
inevitably implying a hint of treachery.103 
Some degree of deceitfulness could then originate from the recycling of one’s 
creation, which noticeably brings some additional complexity to the instant picture.104 
However, this specific aspect may likewise be correlated to the characteristic features of 
the Attic comedy, which entailed elements of competition, challenge and vexation: all 
aspects that contribute to explaining the firmness of Aristophanes’ accusations.105  
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The crying of Terence for the need to use his prologues to answer «malignant 
rumors» that jealously contended he blended others’ works to construct his verses,106 
which he openly admitted, apparently contradicts this point. Terence’s admittance of the 
borrowing, and the belief that such conduct does not constitute an offence, thus 
deferring himself to the judgement of his audience, indeed clearly recap the main 
patterns surrounding imitation. 
However, as has been previously portrayed, shallow and secret taking, which 
may be assimilated to the phenomenon of piracy or plagiarism that otherwise belong to 
what have been termed «faulty types of imitating or borrowing», remain always 
reproached.107 As a result, the discrepancy foreseen among pure invention, genuine 
imitation and a measly copy of someone else’s work became the target of precise 
attacks. As Vitruvius recounted, a lack of originality was highly disheartening in 
poetics, and authors were explicitly condemned for the indolent taking of another poet’s 
verses, which literally configured theft and thus deserved to be punished: 
[so] deserve our reproaches, who steal the writings of such men 
and publish them as their own; and those also, who depend in 
their writings, not on their own ideas, but who enviously do 
wrong to the works of others and boast of it, deserve not 
merely to be blamed, but to be sentenced to actual punishment 
for their wicked course of life.108 
Classic literature offers several other examples of what has been described in terms of 
«plagiarism hunting».109 As illustrated at the very beginning, one of the most notable is 
certainly offered by the reaction of Martial to the alleged piracy of his work, whose 
perpetrator he labeled as plagiarius.110 
                                                          
106
 TERENCE, The self-tormentor [Heautontimorumenos], Prologue. (English translation) From the Latin 
of Publius Terentius Afer, with more English Songs from Foreign Tongues, by F. W. Ricord New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1885, 18-19, who so concluded: «wherein an old and envious poet makes 
pretence That Terence, all at once, himself to verse applied, And more on friendly aid than on himself 
relied. Your judgement shall be form'd; and be it what it may, It shall prevail; and all of you, I therefore 
pray». Full text at: <https://archive.org/stream/selftormentorhea00rico#page/n27/mode/2up>. 
107
 H. O. WHITE, Plagiarism and imitation during the English Renaissance, cit., 15. 
108
 M. POLLIO VITRUVIUS, The Ten Books on Architecture, Translated by M. H. Morgan, with illustrations 
and original designs prepared under the direction of H. Langford Warren. [Edited and translation 
completed by A. A. Howard], Cambridge: Harvard University Press; London: Humphrey Milford. Oxford 
University Press, 1914, Book VII, Introduction, s. 3. 
109
 H. O. WHITE, Plagiarism and imitation during the English Renaissance, cit., 14-15. 
110
 For additional accounts on the occurrence of plagiarism by Latin writers, see the recent contribution of 
S. MCGILL, Plagiarism in Latin literature, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. 
  
35 
 
Similarly was the antiphon on the dishonest conduct that, according to Donatus, 
was perpetrated to the detriment of Virgil’s authorship. In more detail, the alleged 
laments of Virgil appeared to have provoked the famous and enigmatic hos ego motto, 
on which literates further developed their theories on the equivalent myth,111 thus 
endorsing the ancillary metaphor of theft to describe the conduct of those who take the 
honour (thus the credit) for a work that they neither created, nor contributed to creating: 
«Hos ego versiculos feci, tulit alter honores. Sic vos non vobis nidificatis aves: Sic vos 
non vobis vellera fertis oves: Sic vos non vobis mellificatis apes: Sic vos non vobis 
fertis aratra boves».112  
The hos ego paradigm was expressly linked to plagiarism by the British Hall, 
who also uses the exact term coined by Martial to allude to the practice of fraudulent 
borrowing.113 Moreover, the usurpation of the author’s authorship envisioned in the first 
half-line, where the author of the verses is not properly acknowledged as such and 
therefore defrauded of his reward, recalls the metaphor of the laborious bee in the way 
that it is indeed suggested in the third half-line. Some poets, therefore, may meet the 
same fate as Virgil’s animals: they do not get credit for their labours, while someone 
else benefits, unjustly taking all the merit.  
Also against servile copyists and pirates was Googe, who was particularly 
careful and sometimes even flamboyant in declaring others’ authorship so avoiding 
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being accused of «taking [someone else’s] honour and glory of his travaile».114 
Furthermore, Hooper, describing those who violate the eighth commandment (Thou 
shalt not steal), who are punished as thief and robber, acknowledged that the stealing 
offence could also be perpetrated by taking the credit for someone’s work by deceitfully 
attributing it to oneself.115 
Recalling Aesop’s fable of the Vain Jackdaw that borrowed the peacock’s 
plumes to pass himself off but was soon discovered and revealed as a thief,116 in 
addition to Virgil’s piracy laments and Martial’s plagiarism, Hooper foresaw actual 
theft,117 in the conduct of misusing the public good for private purposes: «which is very 
theft […] so the diminution of any man's fame; as when for vain glory any man attribute 
unto himself the wit or learning that another brain hath brought forth, whereof many 
hath complained, as this of Virgil: Hos ego versiculos feci, tulit alter honores».118 
To some extent more problematic appears the attitude of those who intentionally 
followed imitative patterns that look a lot like plagiarism. The English Gascoigne, for 
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instance, purposely gathers a good amount of his material from other authors. 
Nonetheless, he failed in some cases to properly attribute the authorship of his source,119 
therefore creating doubt about whether his works were «an outright piracy of (other’s) 
works»120 or the expedient for literary and artistic mystifications.121 
Even more controversial are the examples of Kendall and Fleming, who seem to 
have consciously embraced a principle of authorship disavowal that turned into actual 
piracy, either fairly persuaded of the superfluity of attributing authorship or 
knowledgeably willing to let the text speak for itself.122 In truth, particularly when such 
denial of authorship is deliberate, the alleged pilfering being mindful manifestation of 
an artistic array, it becomes very contentious to determine whether the conduct of the 
accused should be admonished or cherished.  
Moreover, if there is no sufficient evidence that the assumed plagiarist had acted 
relying on the expectation that his/her taking would not be discovered or, on the 
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contrary, would certainly have been recognised by the reader,123 the issue becomes even 
more contentious. 
Furthermore, although the tendency to reprimand instances of «incorrect 
imitation, chiefly outright theft or piracy» attracted a degree of consensus,124 it still did 
not refute the classical imitation doctrine. Certainly, some concerns, such as the 
principle that themes or ordinary subject matters belong to common property and 
creative imitation required personal interpretation, have been initially established. 
Nonetheless, for the most part the concept of originality as it is known in its 
contemporary meaning only originated in modern times, becoming increasingly 
prominent when it took the form of a more structured inventive array. 
In conclusion, it may reasonably supported that «[instances of] piracy, and 
imitation marred by secrecy, perversity, servility, or superficiality [that] receive short 
shrift».125 More established accounts of originality, however, were later found in 
Renaissance times, when plagiarism received further explicit disapproval, not only in 
noticeable circumstances of plundering others’ works and perpetrating misattribution,126 
but also in cases of unpretentious translations that slavishly replicated the original text, 
refuting any original contribution or creative addition.127  
Therefore, the previous, more permissive outlook, in large part linked to a much 
closer deference to the works of predecessors, had sooner been placed side by side with 
a different and less peaceful approach that unsurprisingly risks challenging the 
cumulative picture of creation thus far portrayed.128  
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In recent times, we have in fact witnessed the rising of a different legal 
attitude.129 Either for practical and economic reasons that are essentially linked to 
copyright and related rights, or for apparently more sincere concerns for the intimate 
and personal interests of the authors of the works of the mind, the law clears its voice 
when it comes to prohibiting or inhibiting conduct that entails violation of the authors’ 
right of attribution.  
However, some important distinctions must be predicted, especially when 
different legal traditions are accounted. In particular, civil law countries such as Italy 
have conventionally sanctioned the conduct of usurping the author’s attribution or 
paternity in the work he/she created on the grounds of expressly protecting the author’s 
moral rights apart from any economic aspects that may be attached. On the contrary, 
common law systems such as that of the United Kingdom, have always ensured that the 
economic interests that move the wheels of creative incentives would come first,130 at 
least when copyright is explicitly involved.131  
Besides, if the bestowal of imitation and the legitimation of replicating previous 
ideas and formulae unquestionably prove to be a distinctive feature of our culture,132 
highlighting the significance of endowing certain literary practices that presumably 
could have been deemed undesirable instead, this corroborates the assumption that 
plagiarism has always been hesitant about rigid taxonomy and strict regulation. This 
aspect appears to be common to many jurisdictions and therefore crosses the boundaries 
and divergences of both legal systems here considered, together with the belief that 
misattribution still maintains the same convolutedness that it has had ever since it 
accompanied the metaphor of literary burglary. 
Similar considerations may conclusively suggest that the law should, on the one 
hand, make every effort to consider the significant degree of changeability in which 
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plagiarism is articulated and, on the other, perhaps stand down to a more flexible and 
informal system of regulation and sanctioning, such as the one suggested by the 
doctrine of social norms. A feasible influential instrument that has some discernible 
chances of success, but that also shows some counter-indications.133 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE PATTERNS OF CREATIVITY AND ORIGINALITY IN 
INTANGIBLE WORKS 
 
 
1 Plagiarism as the counterpart of originality and creativity 
 
The historical framework illustrated thus far has helped to reveal the ambiguities 
surrounding plagiarism, envisioning it as either an inescapable consequence of classical 
imitation or a reproachable example of literary larceny.1 Indeed, the desire to embrace 
or stem the flow of all its potential implications has not automatically found an 
equivalent craving for a meticulous and steady definition. This is certainly true for 
literature and, in a broader sense, the arts, but it is even more accurate within the legal 
context. 
Nevertheless, when the notions of originality and creativity became the leading 
grounds with which to justify protection of copyright work and plagiarism began to be 
perceived as the counterpart to such concepts, a more exacting regulation started to be 
craved and with it the demand for a feasible description of the phenomenon.2 
As already validated, when the colour of art and other non-legal disciplines enter 
the sterner realm of the law, it may be necessary to provide a designation that, although 
never necessarily the only or the perfect one, avoids embracing one or another diverging 
interpretation. Such a definition seeks instead to portray plagiarism more neutrally, by 
referring to it as the practice of usurping an author’s attribution of authorship in the 
work he/she has created or, in other words, the act of passing another person’s work off 
as one’s own. A definition that, in sum, neither condemns plagiarism wholeheartedly as 
                                                          
1
 The latter conclusion is particularly endorsed by its strict derivation. From an etymological standpoint, 
the term plagiarism plausibly originates from the Greek plaghios, which also means ambiguous and 
deceitful, and then merged into the Latin term plagium, keeping the same meaning and in some instances 
referring in figurative speech to the larceny of literary works. On this see Z. O. ALGARDI, La tutela 
dell’opera dell’ingegno e il plagio, cit., 367-368. 
2
 Though there is still currently a lack of a shared notion of plagiarism, for quite some time there was no 
actual need to give a categorical and explicit connotation to the concept, as suggested also in Z. O. 
ALGARDI, La tutela dell’opera dell’ingegno e il plagio, cit., 341-343. 
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a despicable burglary offence nor unquestionably bestows the defilement of one’s 
entitlement to be acknowledged as the author of a work. 
At the same time, the notion provided above is undeniably linked to the broader 
sense of authorship and copyright.3 In fact, as previously upheld, plagiarism was 
originally conceived as being strictly related to the violation of the exclusive right of the 
owner to make whatever use of the work he/she liked, which is why historically it has 
been associated with piracy and counterfeiting.4 
However, when the idea-expression dichotomy found explicit representation, the 
irreproachability of plagiarism began to be confined to the circumstances in which it 
violated the right to proper attribution of authorship in the work, which at the same time 
must be the expression of the author’s original mind. The strong bond between 
plagiarism and originality is unavoidable, even more so if one considers its definition to 
be an act that simulates the originality of someone else’s work.5  
The principle that only the expression of the idea, not the idea itself, receives 
copyright protection offers, therefore, a first foundation to evaluate any accusation of 
plagiarism. Evoking what is known to be the principle of protecting the manifestation of 
the idea, rather than the idea itself, summarised by the renowned idea-expression 
dichotomy, the literature on the issue has often made a distinction between a servile 
taking and a genuine borrowing, sometimes with firm poise and sometimes with less 
confidence.6 
In fact, it is only on the condition that the work receives protection from the law 
that such a practice may be sanctioned, independently or contingently to the 
                                                          
3
 This particular linkage requires further clarification that will be expounded in the subsequent sections. 
However, although the notions of plagiarism and copyright infringement are not to be considered 
equivalent, it is nevertheless accurate to warn that they cannot either be deemed completely separate 
subjects. 
4
 Even within the civil law tradition, in fact, where it was often found to conform to the act of forgery, 
only later did it carve out a separate and distinct place as a sharper moral rights’ violation.  
See, on this issue, E. ROSMINI, Legislazione e giurisprudenza sui diritti di autore, Milano: Hoepli, 1890; 
E. ROSMINI, Diritti di autore sulle opere dell’ingegno di scienze, lettere e delle arti, Milano: Società 
editrice libraria, 1896; D. GIURIATI, Il plagio. Furti letterari artistici musicali, cit. 107. 
5
 See, on this respect, Z. O. ALGARDI, La tutela dell’opera dell’ingegno e il plagio, cit., 370, who insisted 
on the plagiarist’s replicative attitude towards others’ works, either entirely or limited to a few but still 
creative and protectable elements. In any case, these alleged plagiarised works must first be original in 
order to receive protection in the first place. 
6
 Such ambivalence, indeed, may foster a narrow approach towards plagiarism in such a way that, 
generally speaking, only extensive and verbatim copy would be considered a harmful practice. A. 
SANDULLI, Plagio letterario e parodia, cit., 376, who consequently brought the interpreter’s attention to 
the impairment of the most outward element of the work. 
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infringement of the economic rights on the work,7 thus distinguishing the dual attitude 
of the law regarding whether or not to sanction the violation of the moral right of the 
author.8  
Likewise, since there is no flawless designation of originality and creativity,9 the 
typical vagueness of plagiarism increases even more at this point, thus corroborating the 
idea that plagiarism deserves unique consideration and a careful assessment that 
considers the extreme variability of its forms and the powdery context in which it 
occurs.10  
The immediate association between plagiarism and originality finds its roots in 
earlier times and can easily be portrayed by recalling the imitative canon that has 
characterised the literary field ever since. As has been seen before, early literates have 
in fact traditionally praised genuine borrowing, which expressed itself in an imitation 
that entailed some personal effort in the sense of it being so it became creative. 
Moreover, the safeguard for originality that ancient literates proved to have established 
was destined to endure and, with the limits previously anticipated, it continued 
throughout the sixteenth century and onwards, if not even increased by a renovated 
claim for inventiveness.11  
These assumptions bring back the earlier discourse on imitation that created the 
basis for a more comprehensive assessment of plagiarism from a historical perspective 
and now, Lindey permitting, demands a new “glimpse into the past”.12 Besides, the 
comparative analysis of the Italian and UK systems that is hereby sought cannot escape 
                                                          
7
 Furthermore, when the sanctioning of misattribution depends on the occurrence that an infringement of 
the work’s copyright had been established, the instances in which the right of attribution may be 
independently sheltered being rarer and limited in scope, the preliminary appraisal of the work’s aptitude 
to be protected is made even stronger. 
8
 Overall, with explicit regard to the Italian system, it is accurate to sustain that the tradition of moral 
rights has greeted lengthy deliberation on plagiarism. Purposefully defining it as an aggravated form of 
counterfeiting, it also differentiated the case in which there was simply non-attribution and the instance in 
which omitting the author’s name was accompanied by the substitution of one’s own. As emphasised by 
Messina in the early 1930s, the former could be labelled implicit plagiarism, while the latter described 
explicit plagiarism. S. MESSINA, Le plagiat littéraire, Parigi: Sirey, 1936, 131-132. 
9
 Cf. L. LESSIG, (Re)creativity: how creativity lives, in H. PORSDAM, (ed.) Copyright and Other Fairy 
Tales, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2006, 15. 
10
 As Posner recalls, in fact, only a critical and balanced approach may provide some valid answers to the 
typical ambiguity that surrounds it. R. POSNER, The little book of plagiarism, cit., 107-110. 
11
 Cf. H. O. WHITE, Plagiarism and imitation during the English Renaissance, cit., 201-202, who 
explained how Englishmen from 1500 to 1625, although not having the same idea that people might have 
now about plagiarism, however, «restored, in its true form, the classical doctrine that originality of real 
worth is to be achieved only through creative imitation», at 202. 
12
 Here retracing the analysis interrupted at Chapter 1. 
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a detailed recounting of its historical and literary depiction.13 Greater space will indeed 
be given to English writers and dramatists,14 in an attempt to demonstrate that explicit 
concern and related debates about authorship attribution and plagiarism were not 
exclusive to the Continent, but were also acknowledged elsewhere, at least in a non-
legal context.15 
 
 
1.1 The modern safeguard for creation and the idea–expression dichotomy 
 
Across the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a man of theatre such as William 
Shakespeare demonstrated how historical, classic and legendary subjects could easily be 
served as a productive foundation for classic plays. Thanks to his extensive borrowing, 
he earned the heading of «prize exhibit of the source-hunters», taking on other artists’ 
works’ general design, plot and characters. Moreover, whether he may have copied 
verbatim or carefully paraphrased more than a few lines, it is bewildering to notice that 
many of the authors from which he borrowed may not have accomplished the same 
notoriety as he did.16 
Similarly, the English playwright and poet Benjamin Jonson has been labelled as 
an artist that assimilated everything he had read. However, the peculiar incorporation 
that features in many of his works may have afforded him the label of an archetypal 
plagiarist that took more than he could, especially from the ancients, including Horace, 
                                                          
13
 While keeping in mind the warning of Lindey, who once said: «just as one swallow doesn’t make a 
summer, so a lapse or two does not make an author. If we are to be instructed by history, we must not 
misread its precepts». A. LINDEY, Plagiarism and originality, cit., 94. 
14
 Intentionally, many other good examples will be left aside, such as the proliferous contribution of 
French, German and US artists, who may be occasionally brought back to light when the single categories 
of intellectual works are examined (see infra, Chapter 5). 
15
 However, this exact choice does not imply that the subsequent illustration is to be considered 
exhaustive. On the contrary, the following references to literary and artistic understanding are only 
exemplary of what characterises a non-legal interpretation of originality and creativity, which 
substantiates copyright protection. 
16
 A. LINDEY, Plagiarism and Originality, cit., 73-75 (quotation at 73), who articulates his recalling that 
his works resemble the work of others, such as Holinshed for Macbeth, North and Plutarch for Antony 
and Cleopatra, A. Brooke for Romeo and Juliet, Cinthio for Othello, Boccaccio for All’s Well That Ends 
Well, Chaucer for Troilus and Cressida, Gower for Pericles, and Kyd for Hamlet. As Lindey underlines, 
for instance, despite the fact that his Winter’s Tale may have closely resembled the Pandosto by Greene, 
soon there was almost no trace of the latter. 
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the elder Seneca, Plutarch, Pliny the Younger and Plato.17 In particular, such 
assimilation seemed to have become quite problematic, especially if no interest by the 
borrower to make any acknowledgment is proved.18  
The aptitude to elude credit for authorship was often associated with the well-
known Aesopian fable of the jackdaw, as it is with Milton who appeared, with his 
omnivorous appetite, through the picture of an author that  «plucked feathers from the 
wings [of others]».19 For that he received quite stern criticism, particularly from 
Hawker, who, discussing his art, claimed that, in his knowledge, «the false fame of that 
double-dyed thief of other mens brains […] one-half of whose lauded passages [were] 
felonies committed in the course of his reading on the property of others».20 
What emerged from this fierce statement is the deliberate reference to the 
wrongdoing committed at the expense of other people’s property. A picturesque notion 
of robbery that carried on during the seventeenth century, the beginning of the early 
modern era. Guilty of having made collages of previous works was, for instance, 
Bunyan,21 who so replied to the attacks moved against him: 
Let this suffice To show why I my “Pilgrim” patronize. It came 
from mine own heart, so to my head, And thence into my 
fingers trickled; Then to my pen, from whence immediately On 
paper I did dribble it daintily. Manner and matter, too, was all 
                                                          
17
 Being described as having a sharp ear and memory, he appeared to have drawn for his tragedies much 
from Tacitus, Juvenal, Suetonius, Cicero and Seneca (such as Sejanus and Catiline His Conspiracy), and 
for his comedies much from Petronius, Lucian, Plautus, Horace and Ovid (such as The Alchemist and 
Timber). A. LINDEY, Plagiarism and Originality, cit., 78. 
18
 This might be true in the case of Izaak Walton (1593-1683), whose The Compleat Angler takes the 
form of a miscellany of previously recognised anecdotes and precepts, but also includes characters that 
appeared in other authors’ works. See A. LINDEY, Plagiarism and Originality, cit., 79, who also cites H. J. 
OLIVER, The Composition and Revisions of The Compleat Angler, [1947] Modern Language Review 295, 
which have explained how other writers later stole from Walton too. Besides, although he was accused of 
plagiarism later in the fifties, his practice was also armoured by those who indeed made a mockery of the 
matter. See The Chicago Tribune, 18 December 1956, 20, 
<http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1956/12/18/page/20/article/a-line-o-type-or-two>, which concluded that the column itself 
might have constituted a case of plagiarism since it referred to much of the story narrated by others. 
19
 A. LINDEY, Plagiarism and Originality, cit., 75-76, who notices how source-hunters found many 
similarities, parallels and digressions in Paradise Lost or simple digressions, provoking a large debate on 
the paternity of the work that may never die. 
20
 R. S. HAWKER, The Life and Letters of R. S: Hawker (Sometime Vicar of Morwenstow), Reprint of 1924 
edition, London: Forgotten Books, 2013, 232, who continues commenting that the plunder had still 
received royalties for his larcenies. 
21
 His The Pilgrim’s Progress from This World to That Which Is to Come; Delivered under the Similitude 
of a Dream of 1678, a spiritual allegory that became an English classic, was the main target of such 
accusations, comprising quite a few explicit references to others’ works, including the Holy Bible and the 
Isle of Man by Bernard. A. LINDEY, Plagiarism and Originality, cit., 79. 
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mine own, Nor was it unto any mortal known Till I had done it; 
nor did any then By books, by wits, by tongues, or hand, or 
pen, Add five words to it, or write half a line Thereof: the 
whole, and every whit is mine.22 
Bunyan’s heated reaction, contending that every word, subject and style were his own 
and nobody else’s, depicts a clear apprehension for those allegations that is, to some 
extent, far from the unworried attitude of many aforementioned artists. The fervour he 
demonstrated in defending himself against insinuations of some kind of literary robbery 
may be a symptom of a more conscious feeling towards intellectual works of creation, 
which to some extent creates some distance from the idea that creation mostly has to 
satisfy a general and common interest of learning and advancement of the arts.23 
On the contrary, other still believed in the full legitimate scope of their taking. 
One who plainly admitted borrowing was, for instance, Dryden who, upon being 
charged of a crime that nonetheless he considered irrelevant,24 namely the stealing of all 
his plays, allowed to have validly used «the wit and languages of others».25 As he 
explained, the foundation of the story is a less relevant aspect of property. Poets are 
expected to shape the story like a piece of jewellery to make a good poem.26 What 
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 As he wrote in the Advertisement To The Reader of his Holy War, «some say the ‘Pilgrim’s Progress’ is 
not mine, Insinuating as if I would shine In name and fame by the worth of another, Like some made rich 
by robbing of their brother». J. BUNYAN, The Holy War Made By Shaddi Upon Diabolus For The 
Regaining Of The Metropolis Of The World Or The Losing And Taking Again Of The Town Of Mansoul, 
London and Aylesbury: Hazell, Watson And Viney Ld., 1907, <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/395/395-h/395-
h.htm>. 
23
 Here instead, the author becomes increasingly individualistic and feels the need to justify his works and 
protect them against what he believes to be unjust accusations. 
24
 In fact, he acknowledged himself to have said more than he actually wanted and, even more, should 
have, when he underlined: «I shall but laugh at them hereafter, who accuse me with so little reason; and 
withal contemn their dulness, who, if they could ruin that little reputation I have got, and which I value 
not, yet would want both wit and learning to establish their own; or to be remembered in after ages for 
any thing, but only that which makes them ridiculous in this». J. DREYEN, An evening's love, or, The 
mock-astrologer, in W. SCOTT (ed.), The Works Of John Dryden, Now First Collected In Eighteen 
Volumes. Illustrated with notes, historical, critical, and explanatory, and a life of the author, Vol. III, 
London: James Ballantyne and Co. Edinburgh, 1808, 231 <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/37645/37645-h/37645-
h.htm#EVENINGS_LOVE>. 
25
 J. DREYEN, An evening's love, or, The mock-astrologer, cit., 228. Cf. A. LINDEY, Plagiarism and 
Originality, cit., 79. 
26
 Besides, since the range of characters is also limited, therefore any character may be used and reused, 
as the story varied and enlarged to the extent that it becomes new and original. J. DREYEN, An evening's 
love, or, The mock-astrologer, cit., 230-231. 
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matters is the labour and judgement of reshaping it, which give the story the quid pluris 
and make it art.27 
An explicit defence of a judicious use of previously established subject matter is 
once again reaffirmed and, not mistakenly, it provides strong arguments in favour of the 
principle of protecting the expression resulting from a different and personal treatment 
of even mere unprotected ideas. With this in mind, accusations of plagiarism became 
highly and openly fierce across the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, provoking 
contentious reactions of either blame or endorsement.  
Pope, for instance, in his satire Dunciad, drew a scathing representation of 
plagiarists: «next o’er his books his eyes began to roll, In pleasing memory of all he 
stole; How here he sipp’d, how there he plunder’d snug, And suck’d all o’er like an 
industrious bug»,28 although it has been suggested that he was an assiduous plunderer 
himself.29 Johnson, instead, wrote explicitly in defence of the plagiarist,30 warning 
against foolish allegations of piracy, when he explained that it is the task of the writer to 
make familiar things seem new, and new things familiar.31 He went even further when 
he claimed that even a work that treats in a different manner something that has been 
already narrated is entitled to originality.32 
Indeed, the interest in originality had increasingly become a matter of concern 
and, between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Romantic cultural wave 
brought a renovated focus on authorship, individual creativity and inventiveness. 
                                                          
27
 Indeed, he found it easy to admit: «wherever I have liked any story in a romance, novel, or foreign 
play, I have made no difficulty, nor ever shall, to take the foundation of it, to build it up, and to make it 
proper for the English stage». J. DREYEN, An evening's love, or, The mock-astrologer, cit., 229. 
28
 Dunciad, in G. GILFILLAN (ed.), The Poetical Works Of Alexander Pope. With memoir, critical 
dissertation, and explanatory notes, Vol. II, 1856, Book I, 127-130, 
<http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/9601/pg9601.html>. 
29
 A. LINDEY, Plagiarism and Originality, cit., 81 who recalls how Dunciad harks back to Dryden by 
Flecknoe, while The Rape of the Lock clearly reminds him of Tassoni’s Sacchia Rapita. 
30
 N. GROOM, Unoriginal genius: plagiarism and the construction of 'Romantic' authorship, in L. 
BENTLY, J. DAVIS, J. C. GINSBURG (eds.) Copyright and Piracy. An Interdisciplinary Critique, cit., 288. 
31
 In other words, ordinary subject matter, which equates to the common theme, is relatively small, and 
therefore it is hard not to find similarities, and someone should not be accused of plagiarism simply 
because of this very simple rule of literature. See on this A. LINDEY, Plagiarism and Originality, cit., 82. 
32
 Speaking of Pope he asked: «for what is there but the names of his agents which Pope has not 
invented?  Has he not assigned them characters and operations never heard of before?  Has he not, at 
least, given them their first poetical existence?  If this is not sufficient to denominate his work original, 
nothing original ever can be written. In this work are exhibited in a very high degree the two most 
engaging powers of an author». S. JOHNSON, Lives of the English Poets: Prior, Congreve, Blackmore, 
Pope, London: Cassell & Company, 1891, 786-790 <http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext04/lvpc10h.htm>. 
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Artists of that period reinterpreted the concept of imitation inherited by classics, 
highlighting the crucial role of employing labour and judgement.33 Among them, 
Coleridge, dealing with the issue of common subject matter and what he called 
foundation, made clear that judicious borrowing,34 described in terms of a «constant 
reply to authorities»,35 should never be considered banned or even misunderstood. 
Furthermore, he remarked that what really counts and genuinely amounts to art is the 
interpretation that each author offers of the foundation, also claiming that the reader is 
not interested in absolute novelty, but in the originality of each individual reading.36 
Judgement, together with labour, confers originality to the work despite the fact 
that it arose through imitation or even copying. Shelley greatly emphasised this point, 
explaining that imitative practice may sometimes be tempting, to the extent that he often 
felt allured «to throw over their perfect and glowing forms the grey veil of my own 
words».37 At the same time, he also recalled how the best poetry was the result of much 
                                                          
33
 With regard to these Romantics’ views, see also the comprehensive analysis of T. J. MAZZEO, 
Plagiarism and Literary Property in the Romantic Period, cit. 
34
 In other instances, when borrowing lacks judgement it is likely to foster accusations of misbehaviour, 
which not all can handle. A. LINDEY, Plagiarism and Originality, cit., 85.  
Lord George Gordon Byron (1788-1824), for example, appeared to have extensively copied Goethe’s 
Faust in his Manfred, even if the latter reacted with surprising tolerance, implying he should have replied 
to the plagiarism accusation saying «what is there, is mine […] Whether I got it from a book or from life, 
is of no consequence, if I do but use it aright». As he further clarified, however, although copying could 
be legitimate, there were wise but also not judicious ways to do it. Others, on the contrary, were wiser 
borrowers: «Walter Scott used a scene from my Egmont, and he had a right to do so; I must praise him for 
the judicious manner in which he did it. He has also copied my Mignon, in one of his romances; but 
whether he was equally judicious there, is another question». Specimens of Foreign Standard Literature. 
Edited By George Ripley. Vol. IV. Containing Conversations With Goethe, From The German Of 
Eckerman [J.P. ECKERMANN, Gespräche mit Goethe, 1836], Boston: Billiard, Gray And Company, 1839, 
<https://archive.org/stream/conversationswit00goetiala#page/n7/mode/2up>, 128-129. 
S. T. COLERIDGE, Biographia Literaria: or, Biographical sketches of my literary life and opinions, and 
two lay sermons; 1. The statesman's manual, 2. Blessed are ye that sow beside all waters. London: Bell 
and Daldy, 1898, Chapter 1, <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/6081/6081-h/6081-h.htm>. 
36
 So he explained: «I laboured at a solid foundation, on which permanently to ground my opinions, in the 
component faculties of the human mind itself, and their comparative dignity and importance. According 
to the faculty or source, from which the pleasure given by any poem or passage was derived, I estimated 
the merit of such poem or passage». S. T. COLERIDGE, Biographia Literaria, cit., 11. 
See also A. LINDEY, Plagiarism and Originality, cit., 84, according to whom, despite appearing to have 
copied from Schelling, he might even have outshined him with better results. 
37
 Letters To Leigh Hunt. Florence November 1819, in R. H. Shepherd (ed.), The prose works of Percy 
Bysshe Shelley from the original editions, in two volumes, London: Chatto & Windus, 1888, Vol. 1, 381, 
388–389, <https://archive.org/details/proseworksofperc01shelrich>, in which he also claimed that still in the case of a 
translation what he meant by original was the work behind it. 
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«by labour and study», while creativity entailed either creating something new or 
reproducing or re-arranging pre-existing material according to shared patterns.38   
Inspiration from the classical canons is also shared by the literates of the 
Continent, such as the Italian Foscolo, who brought the classic theory together with the 
typical Romantics’ ideals.39 Literary criticism often discussed his imitative practices, 
which were indeed often considered acts of inspiration rather than copying.40 In his 
works, in fact, it could always be detected some original autonomy and, beyond the 
borrowing of the subject matter, it was still possible to discern a peculiar and modern 
feeling.41 
The novelist Manzoni also worked in praise of judicious imitation, refuting 
servile copying and rather pursuing any rimembranze to recall the greatness of ancients 
while taking the shape of true creations that did not diminish the beauty of those that 
were evoked, but yet strengthening and reviving their magnitude.42 Such refusal of 
servile imitation typified the Romantic view, with the further clarification that, although 
originality was rigorously pursued, this did not mean that any imitation had to be 
banned.43  
                                                          
38
 H. S. SALT (ed.), Selected prose works of Shelley. London: Watts & Co., 1915, 109-110, 111, 
<https://archive.org/stream/selectedprosewor00shelrich#page/110/mode/2up>. Cf. A. LINDEY, Plagiarism and Originality, 
cit., 75-76. 
39
 In accordance with the classical theory of imitation, inspiration, or even explicit reference, has always 
been praised. Nonetheless, while some poets followed directly, others still imitate but with enough 
distinctiveness in their thoughts and expression to warrant being considered original. E. FLORI, Il teatro di 
Ugo Foscolo. Con prefazione di Michele Scherillo, Biella: G. Amosso, 1907, 43, 89, 
<https://archive.org/details/ilteatrodiugofos00floruoft>, 61. 
40
 The clear reminder of Sofocle in his tragedy Ajace has been judged with suspicion, but at the same time 
considered, according to Marchese, «an imitation with much inspiration» [translation is mine]. G. 
MARCHESE, La poesia del Foscolo: Sonetti, Odi, Sepolcri, Brani delle grazie, appendice critica, Palermo: 
Ila Palma, 1990, 43. 
41
 D. CAIAZZO, Ugo Foscolo, Volume 1, Roma: Libreria Ulpiano, 1950, 163. 
42
 In other words, «you would rather speak of them as imitations rather than imitations; given that 
Manzoni was so good to include his very own thought in the ancient subject to the extent that his 
reshaping gives new life and beauty to the old one. As a consequence, he did not deprive Virgil of 
anything, but indeed Virgil has created something that later equate the beautiful work of Manzoni» [my 
translation]. Delle poesie giovanili di Alessandro Manzoni; e quindi del suo modo di imitare gli Antichi, 
in Opere di Alessandro Manzoni milanese con aggiunte e osservazioni critiche, Prima edizione completa, 
Firenze: Batelli e figli, 1829, Vol. 1, 610. 
43
 What was missing, however, was a clear principle that explained in reasonable terms how exactly 
originality should have been reached. A. MANZONI, Sul Romanticismo. Lettera al marchese Cesare 
D’Azeglio (1823), in Opere Varie, Milano: Rechiedei, 1881, 583, 588, 
<https://archive.org/stream/operevarie00manzuoft#page/582/mode/2up>. 
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Besides, it appeared clear that if a reasonable imitation were allowed, the same 
could not be said of pure invention,44 since the true and original creator could only be 
the one who found something that makes the subject, even a historical and reprocessed 
one, special and unique.45 Accordingly, people could have the same idea about 
something and from that even create a similar or even identical work, assuming that 
ideas are simple and belong to nobody,46 at least until they become something else and 
original, thanks to the artist’s imitation, judgement and composition.47  
The nineteenth century welcomed these principles of originality and judicious 
imitation so carefully praised,48 but it also hosted several instances of more or less 
evident plundering.49 Tennyson, in particular, placed pronounced emphasis on 
borrowing, to the extent that he was deemed as having re-clothed other artists’ works.50   
So far, the rules of literature allow the practice of what has been defined a 
genuine «indebtedness to other poets»;51 on the contrary, the act of deliberately 
avoiding taking authorship credit was indeed rebuked and, with little difficulty, called 
                                                          
44
 Thus, as he accentuated, writing to his friend, «all the great monuments of poetry have as their basis 
events given by history, or, what comes down to the same thing, by what has once been regarded as 
history». A. MANZONI, Letter to M, Chauvet on the Unity of Time and Place in Tragedy [translation of 
Lettre à monsieur Chauvet sur l'unité de temps et de lieu dans la tragédie of 1820 by F. ROSEN, reprinted 
in A. MANZONI, Opere Compete, Paris, 1843, 257-260], in O. LEWINTER (ed.), Shakespeare in Europe, 
edited by Meridian books, Cleveland and New York: The world publishing company, 1963, 130-135, 
<https://archive.org/details/shakespeareineur007013mbp>. 
45
 For that, he ascribed to Shakespeare «the highest originality». P. QUERNI (ed.), La lettera di Alessandro 
Manzoni a m. Chauvet, Firenze: G. P. Vieusseux, 1843, 77, 91-93. 
46
 As he underlined, «to invent is fact means to find something, namely the idea or more ideas, which 
cannot be made because they already exist». A. MANZONI, Dell'Invenzione. Dialogo, in ID, Opere Varie, 
Milano: Rechiedei, 1881, 387, <https://archive.org/stream/operevarie00manzuoft#page/582/mode/2up>. 
47
 A. MANZONI, Dell'Invenzione, cit., 369-373, 377. In this sense, he asked his interlocutor whether it 
was feasible that two different artists could invent (meaning create) the same thing independently or 
whether the fact that one author had created something precluded others from creating the same on their 
own and not necessarily with any difference at all. His answers were all affirmative. 
48
 See also the meticulous analysis of R. MACFARLANE, Original Copy. Plagiarism and Originality in 
Nineteenth-Century Literature, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
49
 Charles Dickens (1812-70) was blamed for copying the works of others, sometimes verbatim, 
sometimes with few modifications. Similarly, Robert Bulwer-Lytton (1831-91) also known as Owen 
Meredith, was defined as «one of the most audacious plagiarists that ever lived», while renewed artist 
Oscar Wilde (1854-1900) was also unambiguously charged with the plagiarism of Milton, Keats and 
others. A. LINDEY, Plagiarism and Originality, cit., 86-87. 
50
 In his defence, Tennyson denied having copied, instead claiming independent creation. A. LINDEY, 
Plagiarism and Originality, cit., 87-88. 
51
 A. C. BRADLEY, Commentary on Tennyson’s “In Memoriam”, New York: The Macmillan Company, 
1907, 70, <https://archive.org/details/commentaryontenn00bradrich>. 
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plagiarism.52 The fact that many parallels and similarities were found certainly attracted 
great debate about whether this borrowing was a deliberate reference, a reminiscence or 
a coincidence, or indeed the appropriation of someone else’s property.53  
Nevertheless, English playwright Shaw exposed himself to a different theory of 
originality when he stated: 
What the world calls originality is only an unaccustomed 
method of tickling […] Meyerbeer seemed prodigiously 
original to the Parisians when he first burst on them. Today, he 
is only the crow who followed Beethoven's plough. I am a 
crow who have followed many ploughs. No doubt I seem 
prodigiously clever to those who have never hopped, hungry 
and curious, across the fields of philosophy, politics and art. 54 
By providing this explanation of originality,55 he declared himself to be lucky enough 
not to be deemed a plagiarist,56 despite many describing him as «an extremely clever 
assimilator of other men’s ideas [and] a thief».57 In Italy, Pirandello also received 
explicit accusations of plagiarism, allegedly being guilty of having deliberately 
misappropriated others’ works by means of insertions and adaptations.58 However, he 
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 Moving on from this, it has been noticed that sometimes similarity is deliberate, as the writer expects 
the reader to see it, but it can also be a mere coincidence or an unconscious replication of something that 
his/her mind has recovered. Last, it may be deliberate but with the further intention not to disclose the 
actual source, so purposely avoiding authorship acknowledgement. A. C. BRADLEY, Commentary on 
Tennyson’s “In Memoriam”, cit., 70-71. Cf. A. LINDEY, Plagiarism and Originality, cit., 88. 
For an explicit analysis of the concept of unconscious copy by the early UK case law, see infra Chapter 5. 
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 A. C. BRADLEY, Commentary on Tennyson’s “In Memoriam”, cit., 73, 74, who also added that «when 
there can be little doubt that he had read the passage of an earlier poet in which the phrase occurs, it is 
more probable that he reproduced this phrase than that he invented it». By saying that he called into 
question the element that access makes plagiarism easier, as will be seen when discussing other copyright 
infringement controversies. 
54
 G. B. SHAW, Three Plays for Puritans, Chicago and New York: H. S. Stone and company, 1900, 
xxxvii, <https://archive.org/stream/threeplaysforpur00shaw#page/n7/mode/2up>. 
55
 In his Caesar and Cleopatra he continued saying that «originality gives a man an air of frankness, 
generosity, and magnanimity by enabling him to estimate the value of truth, money, or success in any 
particular instance quite independently of convention and moral generalization». G. B. SHAW, Notes To 
Caesar And Cleopatra, in ID, Three Plays for Puritans, cit., 216. 
56
 G.B. SHAW, Three Plays for Puritans, cit., xxv. 
57
 J. LUTZ, Pitchman's Melody: Shaw about Shakespear, Bucknell University Press, 1974, 141, 146. 
58
 One of the most recalled accusations was moved by Luigi Capuana’s widow, while Capuana himself 
was deemed of having replicated Zola’s Curée, as it is briefly recounted in M. MANOTTA, Luigi 
Pirandello, Milano: B. Mondadori, 1998, 41. Cf. E. C. FUSARO, Forme e figure dell'alterità: studi su De 
Amicis, Capuana e Camillo Boito, Ravenna: Pozzi, 2009, 108 
Besides, Pirandello’s work Suo marito also attracted significant criticism, as noted also by R. DEAZLEY, 
What's New About the Statute of Anne? or Six observations in search of an act, in L. BENTLY, U. 
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was often unencumbered by stating that his typical and conscious inspiration had always 
permeated his work.59  
 In the twenties Woolf also wrote of originality, and was actually accused of 
being fanatical about it.60 According to Bennet, originality of view was considered one 
of the good qualities of fiction, 61 but placing too much emphasis on cleverness, that is 
to say inventiveness, appeared to be useless. 62 In his view, Wool’s mistake was to have 
exceeded in creativity, becoming «obsessed by details of originality and cleverness».63  
 Finally, the notion of originality was explicitly linked to technology with the 
work of Calvino who, refuting the notion of prodigious originality, addressed the issue 
of intellectual creation, providing a modern interpretation of it as being continuously 
challenged by technological changes and provokingly suggesting that automation and 
computing could take the place of the individual writer.64 As a true believer in the 
power and potentialities of readers, he purported a new image of originality that really 
seems to be vested «in the ability to reorder the traditional elements of genre fiction to 
suit his own purposes; while other novelists feel that they are creative in their writings, 
Calvino knows that he is being re-creative, that is consciously offering variations of 
stories that have been told before».65 
                                                                                                                                                                          
SUTHERSANEN, P. TORREMANS (eds.), Global copyright: three hundred years since the Statute of Anne, 
from 1709 to cyberspace, cit., 26, 27-28. 
59
 C. O'RAWE, Authorial Echoes: Textuality and Self-plagiarism in the Narrative of Luigi Pirandello, 
Oxford: Legenda, 2003, 36, 107, 127. 
60
 This point was particularly raised by Bennet, according to whom, although the essential elements of 
good poetry include «style counts; plot counts; invention counts; originality of outlook counts; wide 
information counts; wide sympathy counts; but none of these counts anything like so much as the 
convincingness of the characters. If the characters are real, the novel will have a chance; if they are not, 
oblivion will be its portion». A. BENNET, Is The Novel Decaying? in Things That Have Interested Me. 
Third Series. London: Chatto & Windus, 1926, 191, <http://www.gutenberg.ca/ebooks/bennett-things3/bennett-things3-00-
h.html>. 
61
 Cf. R. FERGUSON, Criminal Law and the Modernist Novel: Experience on Trial, Cambridge University 
Press, 2013, 40-43. 
62
 She replied to Bennet’s allegations wondering what exactly was to be considered reality and who was 
the judge of such reality. Mr Bennet and Mrs Brown, first published in 1923, London: The Hogart Press, 
1924, 3-6, 10, <http://www.columbia.edu/~em36/MrBennettAndMrsBrown.pdf>. 
63
 A. BENNET, Is The Novel Decaying?, cit., 193-194 . 
64
 I. CALVINO, Cibernetica e fantasmi (appunti sulla narrativa come processo combinatorio), 1967, in 
Una pietra sopra, Torino: Einaudi, 1980, 15. Cf. T. GABRIELE, Italo Calvino: Eros and Language, 
Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1994, 57-58. 
65
 W. D. EVERMAN, Who Says This?: The Authority of the Author, the Discourse, and the Reader, 
Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1998, 119. Cf. also M. FOUCAULT, The order of things: 
Archeology of the human sciences, London: Routledge, 2001, 360 (English translation of Les mots et les 
choses, Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1966), who underlines how «it is always against a background of the 
already begun that man is able to reflect on what may serve for him as origin. For man, then, origin is by 
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This last designation of originality as a mechanism for the recreation and 
reshaping of existing themes and subject matters functions as a crucial juncture for the 
historical recounting of literature that has thus far been delineated. In essence, creativity 
appears to have been much more than independent fabrication, as it could also have 
been perfectly conveyed in the original composition or arrangement of previously 
established subjects. What matters, in particular, is that since then these practices have 
almost been the result of a personal and therefore creative effort of the author who 
completes or arranges unprotected common subjects.66 A conclusion that does not really 
strike at all with the contemporary handling of creativity and originality, even in the 
dominion of law, as we will soon see in detail.  
 
 
1.2 A plain and ordinary meaning of the creative and original act 
 
The seventeenth century has paved the way for the concept of originality in its mature 
sense and its connection with the idea of virtuosity and uniqueness. Accordingly, this 
notion of creativity may have substituted the imitative creation that ancients first 
construed, but this is not necessarily accurate. What is indeed true is that the affirmation 
of a renovated principle of creative or original contribution has allowed a stronger 
relation between the work and its author to be construed, on which the subsequent 
theories on plagiarism and misattribution would then have been elaborated.  
At the same time, the time lapse between the seventeenth and twentieth centuries 
has welcomed a fundamental evolution in the conceptualisation of creativity and 
originality. Increasingly, we assisted in the reclamation and rehabilitation of the initial 
claims of wise borrowing, which does not mean uniqueness but rather careful imitation 
that implies labour and judgment.67  
However, any discourse around originality is far from being easily framed, and 
the most accurate conclusion, in such instances, is that we should always take into 
account what arts and literature have to say on this regard. In view of such composite 
                                                                                                                                                                          
no means the beginning – a sort of dawn of history from which his ulterior acquisitions would have 
accumulated». 
66
 Z. O. ALGARDI, La tutela dell’opera dell’ingegno e il plagio, cit., 102-105. 
67
 Here comes the full circle, we may say, recalling the ealier literary theorisations, especially in the pre-
moden era. 
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representation, it is now conceivable and worthwhile to enucleate accordingly a 
definition of creativity and originality in more general and possibly a-contextual terms, 
which will then lead to a better and more confident depiction of their legal 
understanding and consequent regulation. 
Reinterpretation of previously established themes has appeared indeed crucial 
from time to time, as it is the personal contribution of the borrower to the development 
of knowledge and increase of learning, which may be pursued by adding something of 
his/her own to the existing subject. Such personalisation is believed to serve the 
common interest in the development of the arts, which is why the expectation of 
borrowing serves the ultimate purpose of improving the arts and hopefully surpassing 
their predecessors, not simply taking the works of the latter with no advance of any 
kind.68  
 However, if these argumentations appear to be validated in general terms, it 
seems less immediate to argue that, on the one hand, the notion of originality we may 
have today is the same notion that the ancients had;69 and on the other hand, that the 
artistic meaning of creativity and originality arts is the same as the legal one. Whether 
“true originality”, according to the classical paradigm, is discernible from cautious 
imitation followed by personal interpretation and an intent to compare and beat the 
model,70 nowadays it is not immediate to support the same inference.71 
Furthermore, the precise usage of both terms of creativity and originality within 
the legal context is even more complicated. First, the two concepts share a similar 
etymology, suggesting the initial or primitive creation, but furthermore they have the 
same aptitude to define the subsistence of copyright and, consequently, delimit the 
                                                          
68
 This is exactly the reason why the adaptation of Greek works by Romans was regarded as having in 
itself some degree of novelty, that is to say in contemporary words, originality. H. O. WHITE, Plagiarism 
and imitation during the English Renaissance, cit., 11-13, who explained how both the first 
creator/inventor and the one who later adapted the former’s work «deserved the “inventor’s” crown of 
bays», at 13. 
69
 Back then, in fact, the practice of choosing the subject - preferring those which had already been used 
and thus proved their suitability, carefully selecting the most valuable and fruitful aspects, interpreting 
them according to one’s own personality, and hopefully improving itself with the resulting outcome - was 
unquestionably believed to amount to originality; on the contrary, servile imitation was mostly rebuked.  
Cf. H. O. WHITE, Plagiarism and imitation during the English Renaissance, cit., 7-8. 
70
 H.O. WHITE, Plagiarism and imitation during the English Renaissance, cit., 30.  
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 The notions of creativity and originality have indeed greatly evolved, as has been discussed in the 
previous dedicated analysis of the literature from the seventeenth century onwards. 
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boundaries of infringement.72 Second, the concept of neither creativity nor originality 
equates to that of novelty, and they should therefore not be seen as completely different 
concepts, it being more appropriate to consider them variables of the same attempt to 
delimit the spectrum of copyright protection in accordance with the idea–expression 
dichotomy.73 
 In addition, whether it is acknowledged that the meaning of creativity and 
originality in the non-legal and legal contexts differ, the lack of a clear and statutory 
definition of the two concepts, with the limited exceptions that will be discussed further, 
certainly complicate the issue, requiring essential and careful consideration of their 
judicial interpretation given by the courts. Before doing that, however, it seems 
advisable to recall what makes a work creative and original in the broader context of 
everyday language. 
Looking at the etymology of creativity and originality that we may find in 
dictionaries and thesauri, creating indicates the act of making or producing, particularly 
something new, while creativity is what results from «producing or using original or 
unusual ideas»;74 and whereas origin means «the beginning or cause of something», the 
meaning of original varies. It may refer to «something [that] existed from the beginning 
of a process or which is the first or earliest form of something [;] is first one made and is 
not a copy [or is] not the same as anything or anyone else and therefore special and 
interesting».75 
At the same time, creativity means «the use of imagination or original ideas to 
create something»,76 while originality defines «the ability to think independently and 
creatively [or] the quality of being novel or unusual».77  Conversely, novelty appears to 
have a more qualifying denotation, what is «new and original being novel; not like 
anything seen before» and therefore having the «quality of being new or unusual».78 
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 However, although a peculiar process of some convergence is foreseen, it would not be correct to argue 
that they should be considered synonymous, especially if one considers their diverse application in the 
different legal contexts of Italy and the United Kingdom. 
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 Cf. infra, Chapter 4, particularly in consideration of the unavoidable influence that EU law has brought 
to the matter.  
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 Cambridge International Dictionary of English, P. PROCTER (ed.) Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995, def. creation, creative, 321. 
75
 Cambridge International Dictionary of English, cit., def. origin, original, 996. 
76
 Oxford Dictionary of English, (third edition) A. STEVENSON (ed.), Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press, 2010, def. creativity. 
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 Oxford Dictionary of English, cit., def. originality. 
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 Cambridge International Dictionary of English, cit., def. novel, novelty, 965. 
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Nonetheless, it may be that in such a contextual environment, the terms creative, 
original and novel are often considered synonymous.79 Yet, if this has to some extent 
been allowed within the literary field, it is instead explicitly disliked in the legal 
context. 
Given all these premises, also recalling the previous analysis of literature has 
shown, it can be inferred that the legal understanding of creativity and originality has 
not been too different from that expressed by a first dictionary reading, with some 
exceptions in a more extended or limited latitude.80  
Giving an exact and uniform meaning to the concept of creativity, however, is 
still far from being an easy task for the interpreter. Undeniably, the utmost challenge is 
to describe a phenomenon that, like its counterpart plagiarism, is everything but simple 
and stable. Cultural and social standards continually change, as it does technology, and 
all push for a continuous reshaping of what creative and original acts mean.81 
In consideration of such an influence, there is an increasing demand for a new 
assessment of creativity in line with technological evolution; otherwise, there seems to 
be a plausible risk of depreciating the important role that creative contribution has in 
foreseeing the protection of intellectual works, thus denying entirely the evolution of 
arts in this regard. In simple terms, creativity amounts to the creative effort that shapes 
intellectual works. What is not clear, in legal terms, is the precise significance and scope 
of creativity and originality. This is therefore referred to as the legal interpreter whose 
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 See, for instance, Oxford Paperback Thesaurus, (fourth edition) M. WAITE (ed.), Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 2012, def. creative, creativity; novel, novelty; original, originality, 170, 561, 578. 
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 These different attitudes will be further explored in the following sections… 
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 Scholarly works concerning the impact of technology on creativity in the legal environment abound. 
See, among others, M. FABIANI, Creatività e diritto d'autore (Relazione alle Giornate di Studio della 
Proprietà Intellettuale promosse dalla Facoltà di Giurisprudenza dell'Università di Perugia, Montone, PG, 
14-16 May 1998) [1998] Dir. autore 600; M. J. MADISON, Where Does Creativity Come from? And Other 
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D. L. BURK, I giochi elettronici: alcune problematiche giuridiche ed etiche con riferimento alla 
«proprietà» delle informazioni e dei contenuti generati dagli utenti, in G. ZICCARDI (ed.), Nuove 
tecnologie e diritti di liberta nelle teorie nordamericane: open access, creative commons, software libero, 
DRM, terrorismo, contenuti generati dagli utenti, copyright, Modena: Mucchi, 2007, 110-143; D. W. 
GALENSON, Understanding Creativity NBER Working Paper No. w16024 (May 2010), 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1613070>; S. GATTI, Studi in tema di diritto d'autore, Milano: Giuffrè, 2008, 196 et 
seq; E. SUBOTNIK, Originality Proxies: Toward a Theory of Copyright and Creativity, in Bro LR, Vol. 76, 
No. 4, 2011, <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1999456>; V. FALCE, La modernizzazione del diritto d'autore, Torino: 
Giappichelli, 2012, 9-26; G. F. FROSIO, Rediscovering Cumulative Creativity from the Oral Formulaic 
Tradition to Digital Remix: Can I Get a Witness? in J. Marshall. Rev. Intell. Prop. L., Vol. 13, 2014, 
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aim is to delineate the meaning and latitude of originality through the cooperative 
support of doctrine and judiciary.  
 
 
2 «Thou shall be original» may say the law: the composite assessment of creativity  
 
Focusing on the requirements prescribed by the law to afford copyright protection to 
intellectual works, as has already been anticipated, neither the Italian nor the UK 
copyright laws provide a firm definition of creativity or originality. A similar deficiency 
is found in the international law on the matter. 
According to Article 2, Section 1 of the Berne Convention,82 creations that fall 
under the broad category of literary and artistic works, that is to say any production of a 
literary, scientific and artistic nature, enjoy copyright protection,83 regardless of their 
specific expression and fixation, which is indeed remitted to the discretion of each 
country. Similarly, with the Convention setting only minimum standards of protection, 
participating countries may indeed grant a greater shield,84 a possibility that could also 
affect the actual meaning and scope of originality in their legal systems. 
The same article does not mention the word creative or original, with the 
exception of Section 3, where it defines translations, adaptations and other alterations of 
existing works as «original», as the works on which they are based. Furthermore, 
Section 5 specifies that certain selections and arrangements of a collection of works are 
«intellectual creations» and for this reason they shall be protected.85 Finally, the word 
original appears also in Article 14bis, Section 1 of the Convention, where 
cinematographic works are literally assimilated to original works. 
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 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, of September 9, 1886, completed 
in Paris on May 4, 1896, revised in Berlin on November 13, 1908, completed in Berne on March 20, 
1914, revised in Rome on June 2, 1928, in Brussels on June 26, 1948, in Stockholm on July 14, 1967, in 
Paris on July 24, 1971, and amended on September 28, 1979, 
<http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/text.jsp?file_id=283698#P85_10661>. 
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 The same provision describes a number of exemplary works that are likely to fall under the umbrella of 
protection but, as will be explained with reference to the Italian and UK provisions, such a list is to be 
considered only representative and thus not exhaustive, with the eventual limitations provided by each 
country. 
84
 Article 19 of the Berne Convention, which completes the principle of allowing each participating state 
to define, within certain evident boundaries, their own rules regarding the matter, explicitly states this. 
85
 At the same time, Section 8 of the Berne Convention clarifies that protection of news or mere facts is 
excluded. 
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Considered the international framework above succinctly illustrated, we may 
now focus on the two systems object of the instant research, Italy and the United 
Kingdom, which have both signed the Berne Convention.86 
According to Article 1 of the Italian copyright law, hereinafter referred as LA 
1941, «works of the mind having a creative character and belonging to literature, music, 
figurative arts, architecture, theater or cinematography, whatever their mode or form of 
expression, shall be protected in accordance with this Law».87 Article 2 completes this 
statement by indicating a provisional list of works that,88 as far as they satisfy the 
requirement of Article 1 and therefore are the result of a creative process, they shall be 
protected.  
At the same time, there are few scattered mentions of the word “original”,89 
which may lead to the conclusion that it must be to some extent considered synonymous 
with creativity or, more appropriately, to be understood in a more neutral way as non-
derivative.90 
What seems to be clear is that the law foresees two essential requirements of 
copyright protection. First, the work must belong to any of the artistic (here used in its 
broadest sense) contexts. Second, it is expected, however, to have a creative character, 
either as an original or derivative work and regardless of the distinct forms in which its 
creative expression is explicated. However, as has been delineated, the exact and textual 
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 The United Kingdom, which signed the Berne Convention on September 9, 1886, and ratified it on 
September 5, 1887, entering into force on December 5, 1997, exactly opted for enacting such a 
requirement. On the contrary, Italy, which signed and ratified the Convention at the same times, did not 
impose any condition of fixation, providing that no formality should have prevented creators from 
enjoying and exercising their rights. 
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 Law No. 633 of April 22, 1941, for the Protection of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights (unofficial 
translation), <http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/files/30289/11419173013it_copyright_2003_en.pdf/it_copyright_2003_en.pdf>. 
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 It is worth noticing that the list is only exemplary and thus is likely to embrace any other works that the 
law may protect, precisely in consideration of the social, cultural and technological variations that bring 
to light new works that were omitted at the outset. Similarly to the Berne provisions, Italian statutory law 
in particularly specifies that copyright protected works belong to several disciplines and may be referred 
to the list thereby provided, which, however, is not to be considered exhaustive. 
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 For instance, Section 2 of Article 2 LA 1941 refers to «musical variations that themselves constitute 
original works»; while Article 3 clarifies that collective works «shall be protected as original works, 
independently of and without prejudice to any copyright subsisting in the constituent works or parts 
thereof». 
90
 The latter explanation seems to be supported by the specification, in Article 2, Section 2, LA 1941, that 
protection is afforded to «computer programs, in whatever form they are expressed, provided that they are 
original and result from the author’s own intellectual creation». Furthermore, according to Article 4, 
works of a creative character derived from any [original] work [although] do not constitute an original 
work, shall also be protected». Article 12 LA 1941, in fact, makes a clear distinction between «original» 
and «derivative» works. 
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reference to a creative character does not find any further statutory explanation in terms 
of the meaning that such a formula implies. 
Similar countenance is found in Article 2575 of the Italian Civil Code, which 
provides that «copyright law protects any creative intellectual work in the scientific 
field, literature, music, figurative arts, architecture, theatre and cinema, in whatever 
form or expression». Right after, Article 2576 of the same Code, however, defines the 
«creation of the work» in terms of a peculiar expression of the intellectual work, also 
outlining that such a creation becomes the «original legal title» to the intellectual 
property.91  
Nevertheless, despite a few more elements having been brought together from a 
coupled reading of the above-mentioned provisions, there is still insufficient latitude to 
define it in a clear and satisfying manner. Consequently, scholars and magistrates have 
come forward completing the picture with certain supplementary elements that help to 
better describe the significance and scope of creativity and place a few more boundaries 
on copyright protection. 
The consistent appraisal of statutory provisions, judicial decisions and academic 
theories seeks to suggest an enhanced definition of the creative character that the work 
must have in order to be protected. Accordingly, another concept appears to be decisive 
to such an extent, which has been temporarily spared, although it finds explicit 
reference in the previously described articles of the law. This is the outward appearance 
of the work (form or mode of expression), which is to say the manifest objectification of 
the idea-expression dichotomy, since – through it – only the external expression or 
manifestation of the idea receives protection.92 
Indeed, the notion of creativity has to be referred to the work in its actual 
expression, thus providing an initial edge of protection, but it would be improper to 
conclude that it may simply denote the aptness of the work to be the result of a mere act 
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 The Italian Civil Code (approved by Royal Decree No. 262 of March 16, 1942). [Translation is mine]. 
Noticeably, while the term original is here meant as initial and not derivative, thus originating from its 
creator, the inference of a creative intellectual work certainly has an additional and more qualifying 
meaning.  
92
 This principle finds explicit confirmation in judicial decisions, with very limited exceptions. See, for 
instance, A. CIAURI, Un caso limite del diritto d'autore: sulla tutelabilità giuridica dell'idea (Nota a Pret. 
Roma 1 April 1993), in Il Nuovo diritto, 1993, 508, noticing how protection was afforded to the idea itself 
when it distinctively individuated the personality of the author in a given social context], still a very 
crucial aspect of Italian copyright law. 
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of creation. In fact, there seems to be something else behind its formula, which denotes 
the quality that an intellectual work must have in order to be protected.  
At the same time, although it is clear that creativity must be established to deem 
the work protectable, it is still extremely controversial to define what would be the 
standard of the claimed creative character.93 This makes the work of the interpreter quite 
challenging, especially when approaching the matter from the many distinct angles of 
all possibly involved subject matters.94 
In brief, recounting the main theories that have been purported in this context, 
the work must be equipped with distinctiveness (individualità rappresentativa), which 
to some extent makes it unique and capable of being distinguished from other works.95 
In addition, while the concepts of creativity find express mention in the law, as well as 
large consensus in judicial pronouncements and scholarly works, the same cannot be 
said with reference to the other notion of novelty, which appears, at least with regard to 
copyright,96 to be much more contentious.97 
Nonetheless, despite this seemingly flawless approach, scholars and magistrates 
have long debated the precise range to give to the exact concept of creativity. Initially, 
sharing the worries that it could have been interpreted in terms of an absolute novelty, 
creatività was intended to denote the originating provenance of the work from the 
author’s mind.98 Afterwards, the role of the creator and the bond that connected him/her 
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 Furthermore, as will be explored with reference to the distinct types of copyright protected works, 
taking into account all the perplexities expressed by both magistrates and academics, all seem mostly to 
agree on the point that the quantum or quality of creativity and originality may be minimal. See, for 
instance with reference to commentaries, M. FABIANI, Sul 'minimum' di creatività richiesto per la 
protezione di testi commentati [1994] Dir. autore 599. 
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 Such considerations offer the perfect foundation for the quest of an interdisciplinary analysis, as will be 
further uttered in the next chapter. 
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 Furthermore, as has just been mentioned, its typical exteriority (esteriorizzazione) confirms the 
principle of protecting not the idea itself, but only its expression. To such an extent, it also became critical 
at some point to distinguish the outward form of the work (forma esterna) from its internal one (forma 
interna), in order to determine which one deserves protection. This may be better comprehended 
considering the judicial pronouncements on the matter. See infra, Chapter 5. 
96
 On the contrary, it finds express mention in the law of patent. 
97
 As has been articulated in the previous chapter, the word novel was sometimes used synonymously 
with creative and original, especially to sustain the theory of endorsing imitative compositions that add 
something new to the existing arts. However, the greatest problem with novelty is that it is not clear 
whether it has to be ascertained in a subjective manner, thus leaving more discretion to the interpreter, or 
instead whether it should be seen as an objective standard, with the likely consequence  of being 
unfortunately confused with the standard required for patents. 
98
 This appears much clearer in the preparatory works for the current legislation. See, on this exact point, 
Z. O. ALGARDI, La tutela dell’opera dell’ingegno e il plagio, cit., 101, who also recalled how previous 
Italian copyright statutes ante LA 1941 did not even mention the concept of creativity. 
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to the work became increasingly emphasised, with a proclivity for a higher degree of 
creativity when such a bond was stronger.99 
However, with regard to the Italian legal system, it represents the one and only 
criterion to determine in the first place whether the work in question shall be protected 
or not by the law. No other formality, such as the requirements of fixation, deposit or 
registration, is required to such an extent, only counts of evidence and procedure being 
relevant.100 On the contrary, the UK law, although it does not entail registration or other 
formal claims of copyright, indeed requires fixation, that is to say the recording of the 
work in a permanent and material form, or its manifestation in print, writing or any 
other form of expression.101 
Predictably, the prerequisite of fixation is not the only difference between the 
two countries. To begin with, the threshold for copyright protection in the United 
Kingdom, in fact, to the letter involves the «originality» of the intellectual works that 
are meant to be protected. Yet, similarly to what has been inferred with regard to Italian 
law, UK statutory law lacks, with the exceptions that will be illustrated, a clear 
definition of originality. 
Within Chapter I of the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 
(hereinafter CDPA 1988), which concerns the subsistence, ownership and duration of 
copyright, Section 1 articulates that copyright subsists in «original literary, dramatic, 
musical or artistic works»; «sound recordings, films or broadcasts»; and «typographical 
arrangement of published editions», which for this reason are called copyright works. 
However, it also specifies that subsistence be subject to fulfilment of the requirements 
set by the same Act.102 
Copyright works are further described by Section 3 CDPA 1988, which initially 
provides very concise definitions of literary, dramatic and musical works; mostly 
                                                          
99
 Z. O. ALGARDI, La tutela dell’opera dell’ingegno e il plagio, cit., 32, who explicates this assumption by 
comparing copyright with patent, explaining how, contrary to what happens with inventions (whose value 
is easily distinguishable from its own inventor), with regard to creations it is in her view accurate to 
conclude that an actual separation of the created work from its creator is harder to make. 
100
 Few exceptions apply, for instance, according to Article 2, Section 3, Law No. 633/1941, with regard 
to «choreographic works and works of dumb show, the form of which is fixed in writing or otherwise». 
101
 See infra, Chapter 4. 
102
 Including the qualification for copyright protection provided by Chapter IX. 
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alluding to few examples of what may be included in such definitions.103 However, it 
also indulges in more details,104 especially with regard to artistic works,105 sound 
recordings, film and broadcasts.106 Section 3, in fact, additionally postulates copyright 
subsistence to the recording of such works «in writing or otherwise», which entails the 
requirement of fixation, so providing a supplementary restraint to the given protection.  
In this multifaceted picture, the word original is explicitly mentioned at the 
commencement of the Act to qualify works wishing to receive copyright protection, or 
it appears sporadically, even denoting derivative works, but it is not further explained in 
its actual meaning and scope. The only important exception concerns the database that 
is to be considered «original if, and only if, by reason of the selection or arrangement of 
the contents of the database the database constitutes the author’s own intellectual 
creation».107  
Departing from this statutory framework, the concept of originality, similarly to 
what has been alluded with regard to Italian law, has been filled out with meticulous 
and various connotations, both by the judiciary and academia. However, there were 
indeed statutory indications of originality before the CDPA 1988.108 Even earlier case 
law, however, deliberately alluded to the concept, although essentially with the meaning 
                                                          
103
 The literary work is defined as «any work, other than a dramatic or musical work, which is written, 
spoken or sung, and accordingly includes a table or compilation, a computer program, a database». A 
dramatic work as including «a work of dance or mime», and a musical work as «a work consisting of 
music, exclusive of any words or action intended to be sung, spoken or performed with the music».  
104
 Section 3A CDPA 1988, in particular, defines database as «a collection of independent works, data or 
other materials which are arranged in a systematic or methodical way, and are individually accessible by 
electronic or other means».  
105
 Section 4 CDPA 1988, instead, refers to artistic work as «a graphic work, photograph, sculpture or 
collage, irrespective of artistic quality, a work of architecture being a building or a model for a building, 
or a work of artistic craftsmanship», further specifying each of the elements there listed. 
106
 See Sections 5A, 5B and 6 CDPA 1988. 
107
 Section 3A (2) CDPA 1988. The instant formulation includes another relevant element, namely the 
explicit prescription that such a peculiar work is the result of its author’s intellectual creation, which is a 
manifest derivation of EU law and has been the subject of a larger debate that has also entered the field of 
judicial decisions. The analysis of the issue is therefore postponed to the next paragraph, when the 
treatment of the creativity and originality threshold by the Italian and the UK courts will be illustrated. 
108
 In primis, The Copyright Act 1911, of December 16, 1911. An Act to amend and consolidate the law 
relating to copyright, but also The Fine Art Copyright Act 1862, 25 & 26 Vict, c. 68, although the latter 
only with specific reference to drawings, photographs and paintings. Cf. L. BENTLY, B. SHERMAN, 
Intellectual Property Law, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2014, 93. 
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of labour, skill or (and) judgement or slight variations of the same formula,109 as we 
shall see in the next paragraphs. 
 In the same way early scholarly works on the subject also did so, seeing no 
difficulty in referring literally to original and originality in the above-mentioned sense. 
In particular, some spoke of originality as «an essential attribute of copyright [with the] 
most comprehensive meaning», being careful enough précising that the «work need not 
to be wholly original» given that the law did not protect the sole creator.110 
At the same time, even before the enactment of the Statute on copyright, there 
was little doubt that originality did not in any case mean novelty.111 The banning of 
novelty emerged in further rulings as well, with the consequence that originality had to 
be interpreted in terms of originating from the author and thus without any kind of 
inventive meaning.112  
As a result, there were all the premises to assess a low standard of originality,113 
yet providing that what ought to be protected was the expression of the idea originating 
from someone who was then entitled to receive protection against someone else’s 
                                                          
109
 As noticed in L. BENTLY, B. SHERMAN, Intellectual Property Law, cit., 97, other words have been 
occasionally used, such as capital, effort, experience, industry, ingenuity, investment, knowledge, taste, 
time, and work.  
Among relevant decisions on the matter, see Lewis v Fullarton, regarding the protection of a 
topographical dictionary, which was appraised by looking at the mode of composition, concluding for an 
extensive piracy that occurred when the other work was partially taken and altered. Lewis v Fullarton, 16 
July 1839, Rolls Court [1839] 2 Beav 6, [1839] 48 ER 1080 (the judgment was also reported in Courts of 
Great Britain (ed.), Reports of cases argued and determined in the several courts of law and equity in 
England, during the year 1839, New York: Halsted and Voorhies, 1840, 127-128). See also Walter v 
Lane, which granted protection to the notes of public speeches transcribed by shorthand writers on the 
basis that someone’s labour skill and capital had to be protected against the misappropriation of others. 
For this exact reason such case is also crucial for the issue of fixation. Walter and another (on behalf of 
themselves and all other the proprietors of the business of publishing and carrying on the times 
newspaper) appellants; and Lane Respondent, 9 November 1899, House of Lords, [1900] AC 539 (cf. 
Walter and another v Lane, 6 August 1900, Court of Appeal, [1899] 2 CH 749). Both cases will be 
further discussued in Chapter 5. 
110
 E. S. DRONE, A Treatise on the Law of Property in Intellectual Productions in Great Britain and the 
United States. Embracing Copyright in Works of Literature and Art, and Playright in Dramatic and 
Musical Compositions, 1842 (Boston: Little, Brown and company, 1879), 198, 199-200, 
<https://archive.org/details/cu31924019216898>. 
111
 On this particular point, see I. ALEXANDER, Copyright Law and the Public Interest in the Nineteenth 
Century, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010, 271. 
112
 University of London Press Ltd v University Tutorial Press Ltd, 26 July 1916, Chancery, [1916] 2 Ch 
601, [1916] 32 TLR 698, also famous for having said (in the words of Peterson J.): «there remains the 
rough practical test that what is worth copying is prima facie worth protecting», at 610. Cf. Hollinrake v 
Truswell, 8 August 1894, Court of Appeal, [1894] 3 Ch 420; [1894] 10 TLR 663. (before, Hollinrake v 
Truswell, 18 Mar 1893, Chancery, [1893] 2 Ch 377). 
113
 With the exception of some rulings that appeared to have endorsed a standard much closer to 
inventiveness. Cf. Dicks v Brooks, 4 May 1880, Court of Appeal, [1880] 15 ChD 22, [1880] 13 ChD 652, 
denying the copyright on a book’s title. 
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taking.114 The following case law resulted in strengthening the idea–expression 
dichotomy,115 requiring substantial input and forswearing originality when the amount 
of labour was deemed trivial.116  
However, the threshold has not always been easy to define, either because it 
appears more difficult to discern the originality of some particular works, also in 
consideration of an ever-changing cultural, social and technological landscape, or 
simply because its meaning remains ambiguous.117 Such difficulty in interpreting the 
applicable standard is made even harder by the new trend – in great part influenced by 
EU law on the matter – of foreseeing originality even in the author’s own creation.118 
 
 
2.1  Categorising creativity and originality into distinct intellectual works 
 
The topic becomes even more intricate when single categories of works are 
considered.119 In these instances, in fact, the inference of creativity and originality 
                                                          
114
 According to the MacMillan case, for instance, in order to be protected the work has to show some 
quality or character that sufficiently differentiated it from the mere and raw material on which it is based. 
MacMillan and Co Ltd v K. & J. Cooper, 1 January 1923, Privy Council, [1924] 40 TLR 186, [1923] 93 
LJ PC 113. 
115
 The Football League case of 1959, for instance, although it clarified that the amount of labour, skill 
and judgement had to the established case by case, also made it extremely clear that no copyright 
protection could be given to mere information or opinions. Football League Limited v Littlewoods Pools, 
13 May 1959, Chancery, [1959] 1 Ch 637, [1959] 2 All ER 546, [1959] 3 WLR 42. 
Cf. Ladbroke (Football) Ltd v William Hill (Football) Ltd, 21 January 1964, House of Lords, [1964] 1 
WLR 273, [1964] 1 All ER 465; British Northrop Ltd v Texteam Blackburn Ltd, 1974, Chancery, [1974] 
RPC 57, [1973] FSR 241. 
116
 This was true in the case, for instance, of a facial make-up that was not considered an artistic work to 
be protected by copyright. Merchandising Corp. of America Inc. and others v. Harpbond Ltd and others, 
1983, Court of Appeal, [1983] FSR 32.  
Cf. P. GROVES, Sourcebook on intellectual property law, London: Cavendish Publications: 1997, 345. Cf. 
L. BENTLY, B. SHERMAN, Intellectual Property Law, cit., 97. 
117
 This has been explicitly exposed by S. RICKETSON, The Concept of Originality in Anglo-Australian 
Copyright Law, in J. Copyright Soc'y U.S.A., Vol. 39, 1991-1992, 265. 
118
 Cf. L. BENTLY, B. SHERMAN, Intellectual Property Law, cit., 93. On this aspect, particularly on the 
more recent assessment of the originality standard, we shall get into more detail in the following pages. 
119
 For a more accurate analysis on this point, see J. PILA, Copyright and its Categories of Original 
Works, in O.J.L.S., Vol. 30, No. 2, 2010, 229, <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1160176>. See also Z. O. ALGARDI, La 
tutela dell’opera dell’ingegno e il plagio, cit., 463 et seq., who also emphasises how the requirement of 
creativity varies according to the genre to which the works belong, thus showing a greater or thinner 
degree of intensity. 
  
65 
 
varies significantly and the first category that comes to mind is certainly the literary 
work,120 in its written or oral form.121  
In this particular field, the main applicable principle has been to look at the heart 
and most distinguishing element of the work, in other words its substantial or otherwise 
most important part, although not with easy and unanimous results. Similar 
considerations concern the protection of characters122 and the practice of re-elaborating 
others’ works.123  
Such a principle, however, needs some specification with regard to certain works 
of literature that, although belonging to the broader genre of writing, have some peculiar 
features that require further attention. The protection of works of journalism, for 
instance, has gone along with the denial of protection to the mere news.124 Express legal 
shield, on the contrary, may be given to the individual journalist’s piece or the original 
composition of more pieces, even when creativity arises from the particular way of 
organising the pieces.125 
In the musical field, creativity has mostly emerged from one particular element 
of the composition, namely the melody, which appears to be the kernel of the music, 
                                                          
120
 J. PILA, JUSTINE, A. F. CHRISTIE, The Literary Work within Copyright Law: An Analysis of its Present 
and Future Status, in I. Prop. J., Vol. 13, 1999, 133, <http://ssrn.com/abstract=886949>, who also offers an 
interesting study of the literary work according to Anglo-Australian copyright law. 
121
 Despite this broad category also attracts software and databases, it seems more appropriate to dedicate 
a separate analysis to them. 
122
 The emphasis Bennet put on characters appears brought back to life, particularly in the arguments of 
those who notice how their increasing centrality may sustain an independent protection regardless of the 
work to which they belong, although the requirement of fixation would seem to impede such a 
conclusion. Z. SAID, Fixing Copyright in Characters: Literary Perspectives on a Legal Problem, in 
Cardozo L. Rev., Vol. 35, 2013, <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2246511>. Similarly, the life of a character assumes 
relevancy, for instance, within biographical works, but when no creativity at all is established, it seems 
more plausible to predict a sui generis protection like a database. M. FABIANI, Biografie E Opera 
Biografica. Quale Protezione? in Dir. aut., 2008, 21. 
123
 For example, a relatively large debate has attracted the idea that fans could write secondary works 
basing the theme on some peculiar elements of the original literary works. M. RICHARDSON, D. TAN, The 
Art of Retelling: Harry Potter and Copyright in a Fan-Literature Era, [2009] MALR 14, No. 1, 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1365657>. 
124
 Cf. R. BRAUNEIS, The Transformation of Originality in the Progressive-Era Debate over Copyright in 
News, GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 463/2010), <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1365366>. 
125
 See E. SANTORO, Attività giornalistica e creatività: dati e spunti preliminari, in Dir. aut., 1974, 1, who 
so refers to creatività organizzativa. 
Besides, considering the current development of journalism and the rise of those who are often called 
amateurs that also engage with blogging, the traditional image of the journalist may require redefinition. 
On this, see L. E. RIBSTEIN, From Bricks to Pajamas: The Law and Economics of Amateur Journalism, in 
Wm. & Mary L. Rev., Vol. 48, 2006, 185, <http://ssrn.com/abstract=700961>. 
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while also allegedly the most remembered element of the so-called “lay listener”,126 
although the emphasis may also regard other elements,127 as it will better emerge 
analysing the case law on the matter.128 In addition, when the contribution of more than 
one artist is to be evaluated to establish joint authorship, it has been determined that 
such a contribution shall also be original.129  
Regarding dramatic works, including plays and dances, the creative effort has 
also been foreseen in the organisation of the subject and its externalisation, although 
making clear that it had to be ascertained only with full consideration, especially when 
establishing that protection may be made more difficult because of the particular nature 
of the work.130 In any case, it is never with regard to the mere idea or inspiring theme.131 
Moreover, in the context of films, the creativity or originality test, especially in 
its typical derivation of measuring substantiality, has been complicated by the fact that 
more than one medium is involved, often entailing a cross-sectional analysis.132 This is 
certainly valid in the case of adapting novels into films. A similar complexity lies 
                                                          
126
 J. LUND, Fixing Music Copyright (March 12, 2013), <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2231836>; who analyses the 
Lay Listener test and the substantiality criteria to establish copyright infringement, suggesting that it 
would be more appropriate to devise a test for fluent musicians who are more capable of discerning the 
features of musical composition.  
127
 In the musical context, the search for creativity has also regarded the critical editions. See, for a brief 
reflection on that, O. FITTIPALDI, Edizioni critiche di opere musicali e creatività nella disciplina del 
diritto d'autore (Nota a Cass. 17 January 2001 n. 559), in Corr. giur., 2001, 640. 
128
 See infra, Chapter 5. 
129
 However, this conclusion indeed appears to conflict with the nature of musical works, especially when 
arrangement, not just composition, is considered. L. MCDONAGH, Rearranging the Roles of the Performer 
and the Composer in the Music Industry. The Potential Significance of Fisher v Brooker, in I.P.Q., Vol. 
1, 2012, 64, <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2034899>, who also expresses the risk of confusing the role of 
performers and composers. On the issue of arrangement and the difficulty of distinguishing it from a 
creative variation, see, for instance, V. MADAU, Elaborazione Creativa Di Una Monodia Tradizionale 
Sarda: Variazione Musicale Costituente Di Per Sé Opera Originale O Arrangiamento Musicale? (Nota a 
Trib. Cagliari 15 January 2008, n. 119), in Riv. giur. sarda, 2010, 562. 
130
 This is particularly true in the case of scenographic works. See on this M. FABIANI, Sulla protezione 
Dell'opera di scenografia (Nota a pret. Roma 9 luglio 1977), [1978] Giurisprudenza di merito 796. 
131
 See M. RIMMER, Heretic: Copyright Law and Dramatic Works, in QUTLJJ, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2002, 131, 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=600862>, who considers the role of the various contributors other than writers, in 
determining the original dimension of the work. For a broader analysis of the protection of works of 
theatre, see V. MAFFEI ALBERTI, Opera Teatrale [2009] Contratto e impresa 1037. In addition, some 
have recently expressed concern over the protection of experimental forms of music and dance beyond, 
concluding that it may rather be collocated before and beyond copyright. C. WAELDE, P. SCHLESINGER, 
Music and dance: beyond copyright text? [2011] SCRIPT-ed 8, No. 3, 257, <http://script-ed.org/?p=83>.  
132
 See C. J. HUTCHISON, Adapting Novel into Film & Copyright (July 25, 2012), 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2117556>, which warns against oversimplifications and asks for a more accurate 
consideration of each medium’s features, and is also very interesting for the interdisciplinary study 
pursued therein. Likewise, in the case of adapting a novel for the theatre. Cf. A. ALESII, La tutela 
giuridica della riduzione teatrale di un'opera narrativa (Nota a Cass. sez. I civ. 10 March 1994, n. 2345) 
in Giust. civ., 1995, 1075. 
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behind broadcast, whose developments have been highly influenced by technology and 
digital transformations, which have clearly changed the landscape of copyright.133 
Concerning artistic works, including figurative arts,134 which have encompassed 
great transformations, especially during the twentieth century,135 the recognition of 
some protection to the assembling and preliminary planning of the work has gone along 
with the traditional shield of protecting single pieces of art, at the same time suggesting 
a reconsideration of the copyright approach.136  
With regard to photography,137 either as having an artistic hint or not, the focus 
of the interpreter has been directed towards the choices that the photographer makes 
and, to some extent, to his/her individual and personal touch.138 This indeed may be 
concluded by a specific and distinct approach to the subject that the photographer has 
chosen or in the exact moment in which he/she actually portrays it.139  
                                                          
133
 On the re-elaboration of mere ideas in works of broadcasting, see the early analysis of M. BURNETT, 
La protection des idees en materie d'emissions de radio et de television - La protezione delle idee in 
materia di emissioni radiotelevisive, in Dir. radiodiff., 1988, 412. See also T. JAIN, Broadcaster's Right 
Under Copyright Law, in J. Intellect. Property Rights, Vol. VII, No. 3, 2008, who provides an interesting 
view on the comparative approach to the protection of broadcast within a few legal systems, for example, 
the UK. 
134
 Like journalism, art too has been challenged by the transformation of those who were at first only 
users into authors. See, for instance, A. NG, When Users are Authors: Authorship in the Age of Digital 
Media, in Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L., Vol. 12, No. 4, 2010, 853, <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1545005>. Cf. C. 
RIDOLFI, Creatività e plagio nelle opere d'arte figurativa (Nota a Pret. Pesaro 4 November 1993), in Dir. 
autore, 1996, 111. 
135
 See D. W. GALENSON, Conceptual Revolutions in Twentieth-Century Art, NBER Working Paper No. 
15073/2009, <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1418931>. Interesting forethoughts emerge from the analysis of what is 
called “appropriation art”. See, for instance, G. SPEDICATO, Opere dell'arte appropriativa e diritti 
d'autore (Nota a ord. Trib. Milano sez. spec. P.I. 13 luglio 2011), in Giur. comm., 2013, 118; J. B. 
ASTRACHAN, The Case of the Appropriation Artist, The Daily Record, September 2008, 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1621882>. 
136
 See A. BARRON, Copyright Law and the Claims of Art. [2002] I. P. Q. 4, <http://ssrn.com/abstract=346361>, 
who explained the troubled relationship between the law and the arts. Yet, boundaries that are more 
definite have been suggested to confine the protection of advertising, in which it becomes essential to 
discern the value of the work from its material application. R. DE MEO, Pubblicità, creatività e tutela del 
diritto d'autore in Dir. inf., 2000, 460. 
137
 C. H. FARLEY, The Lingering Effects of Copyright's Response to the Invention of Photography, in 
Univ. Pittsburg L.R., 65, 2004, <http://ssrn.com/abstract=923411>, who explores the reflections of technological 
change in the legal treatment of photography, focusing particularly on the threshold of originality on the 
subject.  
138
 For a comprehensive analysis on the standards of protecting photographic works, see P. CRUGNOLA, Il 
requisito della creatività in materia di fotografia [1994] Dir. autore 353. 
Besides, it is worth noting that Italian law distinguishes artless photographs (fotografie semplici) from 
photographs that fall under the terms of artistic works (opera fotografiche). The latter enjoy greater 
protection, also with regard to the term of protection, the same that is granted to any other copyright 
works. The former, instead, are subject to the different and lower protection afforded to neighbouring 
rights. 
139
 Cf. R. BOCCA, La tutela della fotografia tra diritto d'autore, diritti connessi e nuove tecnologie [2012] 
AIDA 375. 
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This last aspect, which may even appear somehow tantalising, has been 
particularly emphasised by the opinion of those who notice that most of today’s 
photographs would not enjoy protection at all, with the further consequence that there 
might be different ways of protecting such a result.140 In other words, even when the 
creative effort is proved, and often expressed in the choices of subject, composition, 
light, and so on, this seems to be insufficient to afford protection.141 
Finally, the test of creativity and originality seems to have rapidly evolved with 
regard to other protected works, such as a database,142 which, if not original, may enjoy 
a different sui generis protection,143 and computer programs. With particular regard to 
the latter, the forcefulness of the idea-expression divide that has traditionally 
accompanied copyright appears unmistakably overshadowed. Additionally, the task of 
the interpreter seems centred on foreseeing some personal or simply autonomous 
contribution that, even with minimum results, would overcome the limits posed by 
dichotomy.144 
 
 
                                                          
140
 This seems to be suggested by J. HUGHES, The Photographer’s Copyright. Photograph as Art, 
Photograph as Database, Cardozo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 347/2011, 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1931220>, who compares photographs to databases, highlighting that mere copyright 
protection of photographs entails a dangerous strength of the criterion of originality, while many 
photographic works remain unprotected. 
141
 This view is well summarised in T. BRUCE, In the Language of Pictures: How Copyright Law Fails to 
Adequately Account for Photography in W. Va. L. Rev., Vol. 115, 2012, 93, who suggests how “straight 
photographs” receive inadequate protection, as the main standard to assess creativity remains influenced 
by pictorial theories, too often foreseeing factual rather than creative works.  
142
 On the swinging of the theories on the protection of database, also considering the US sweat of the 
brow doctrine, see D. J. GERVAIS, Feist Goes Global: A Comparative Analysis Of The Notion Of 
Originality In Copyright Law, in J. Copyright Soc'y U.S.A., Vol. 49, 2002, 949, 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=733603>. On the renewed estrangement from the originality standards, instead, see A. 
TABREZ, D. SOURAV, Comparative Analysis of Copyright Protection of Databases: The Path to Follow, 
in J.I.P.R., Vol. 17, No. 2, 2011, <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1839325>. 
143
 For a summary review of this peculiar mechanism of protection, see also P. DAL POGGETTO, La 
disciplina giuridica delle banche dati: obiettivi perseguiti e risultati ottenuti ad oltre un decennio 
dall'adozione della normativa comunitaria, in Informatica e dir., 2008, 73, who also reconstructs the 
implementation of the EU Database Directive. 
144
 See, among others, M. G. JORI, Diritto, nuove tecnologie e comunicazione digitale, Milano: Giuffrè 
editore, 2013, 33 et seq; P. GUARDA, Looking for a feasible form of software protection: copyright or 
patent, is that the question? in EIPR, 2013, 4; V. FALCE, La modernizzazione del diritto d'autore, cit., 11-
14; D. GERVAIS, E. DERCLAYE, The scope of computer program protection after SAS: are we closer to 
answers? in EIPR, 2012, 3-5; V. MOSCON, Diritto D’autore E Protezione Del Software: L’irrisolta 
Questione Dell'originalità (Nota a Cass. sez. I civ. 12 January 2007, n. 581), in Dir. Internet, 2007, 350. 
For a broad investigation of the protection of computer programs, see also an early study of E. 
DERCLAYE, Software Copyright Law: Can Europe Learn from American Case Law? in EIPR, 2010, 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1133638>, who also compares EU and US legislation on the matter.  
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2.2 Italy and the United Kingdom: are their courts balancing the threshold? 
 
Regarding the multiple definitions that have been given to plagiarism and its 
innumerable variations, including its link to other concepts such as piracy and 
counterfeiting,145 the need to discern hypotheses of minimal copy more dutiful to the 
classical canon of imitation relentlessly emerged. In this case, the act of copying has 
been deemed to being left to the wiser discretion of historians and literates instead of 
being subject to fiddly claims in court. Such assertiveness towards cases of minimal 
taking has also been applied to limited and partial instances of plagiarism, to be 
distinguished from the more troubling cases of taking the whole work, or its substantial 
kernel being plagiarised.146  
On the contrary, more concerns seem to arise when the differences between the 
two elements are less prominent, particularly when the expression of the work hardly 
departs from the plain idea that it exemplifies. A good example of this is software, 
which by its nature fosters the merging of ideas and expressions.147 The same could be 
said of all cases in which the nature of the work entails elements that, like ideas, are not 
considered to be protected.148 
Departing from this very basic principle, forestalling some of the distinctions 
made by the Italian and UK judiciaries to such an extent, courts have been prone to 
acknowledging creativity and originality in various ways. Where the former 
demonstrates a clear sensibility for the pecuniary aspects of the issue, which is a typical 
                                                          
145
 An early use of the blended concept of plagiarism–counterfeiting has been found in some judgements 
made by Italian courts until very recently, as also anticipated in E. PIOLA CASELLI, Del diritto di autore 
secondo la legge italiana comparata con le leggi straniere, in P. FIORE (ed), Il diritto civile italiano 
secondo la dottrina e la giurisprudenza, IV, Napoli: Eugenio Marghieri, 1907, 623. 
146
 Such a cautious approach appears to be consistent with the necessity to provide a cautious analysis of 
the phenomenon that, to some extent, may be more respectful of the idea–expression dichotomy. 
Accordingly, this assumption avails itself of disheartening the literal or substantial copy, but allows an 
aloof reproduction of the work or the mere replication of the idea, which rests on the work. 
147
 On the topic, see D. BAINBRIDGE, Software Copyright, Pitman Publishing, London, 1992. See also L. 
STANLEY, The Copyright Protection of Computer Software in the United Kingdom, Oxford and Portland: 
Hart Publishing, 2000; E. HARISON, Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Software Technologies. 
The Economics of Monopoly Rights and Knowledge Disclosure, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2008, 
who also carefully explains the strict link between software development and the promotion of 
innovation. 
148
 This happens, for instance, with regard to common themes or general plots in literature, but also trivial 
music schemes, all of which will be better illustrated when discussing the treatment of plagiarism by 
courts in detail. 
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UK feature,149 the latter has yet shown some concern for guaranteeing a proper shield to 
the individual’s works of the mind.150 
In particular, even though the explicit Italian contemplation of plagiarism 
appears to confine it to the violation of the moral right of attribution this does not 
prevent courts from expressing the additional concern that such conduct may also 
violate the economic right of the author to exploit the work.151 
Accordingly, anticipating the contents of some of the UK judgements that will 
be well examined, UK courts have been consistently persuaded to afford protection in 
the limited occurrences of either word-perfect replication or a substantial taking of 
someone else’s work, yet on the condition that it may not endanger the public interest in 
drawing from others’ unprotected ideas and seemingly common places that could still 
serve as an inspiration for further creations.152 
Altogether, each system may have tried to be careful in acknowledging 
protection to the individual creation insofar as this would not diminish the entitlement 
of the broader society to enhance common knowledge and avoid the unnecessary 
protection of ideas and common subjects that may instead impede further creation. 
Unsurprisingly, this thoughtfulness echoes the classical rule of artistic imitation that has 
                                                          
149
 See, for a clear resolution on this exact point, Abba c Gotta, 17 October 1963, Trib. Milano, [1964] 
Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n.778; [1964] Foro it. I, 388; [1964] Dir.Autore, 55. Donati Minelli c Panzeri, 
29 April 1976, Trib. Milano, [1977] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 680; [1977] Riv. dir. ind. 457. 
150
 See King Features Syndicate Inc v O and M Kleeman Ltd, 1 January 1941, House of Lords, [1941] 1 
AC 417, [1941] 2 All ER 403, [1941] UKHL J0527-2; (cf. King Features Syndicate Inc v O and M 
Kleeman Ltd, 1941, Court of Appeal, [1940] Ch 806, [1940] 3 All ER 484; King Features Syndicate Inc v 
O and M Kleeman Ltd, 1941, Chancery, [1940] Ch 523, [1940] 2 All ER 355); Ludlow Music Inc v 
Williams and others, 1 October 2000, Chancery, [2000] EWHC 456 (Ch), [2001] EMLR 155, [2001] FSR 
271,<http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2000/456.html>; Designers Guild Limited v Russell Williams 
(Textiles) Limited (Trading as Washington Dc), 23 November 2000, House of Lords, [2000] 1 WLR 
2416, [2001] 1 All ER 700, [2001] IP & T 277, [2001] FSR 11, [2001] ECDR 10, [2000] UKHL J1123-1, 
<http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2000/58.html>; Nova Productions Ltd v Mazooma Games Ltd and Others, 14 
March 2007, Court of Appeal, [2007] ECDR 6, [2007] BusLR 1032, [2007] EWCA Civ 219, [2007] RPC 
25, [2007] EMLR 14, <http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2007/219.html>. 
151
 Early Italian decisions included Comisso c Soc. Ponti de Laurentis, 10 January 1958, Trib. Roma, 
[1959] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 691; [1959] Rass dir. cinema 17; Ed. Antonelliana c Soc. ed. Il 
Rostro, 28 January 1980, Trib. Torino, [1983] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 42; [1980] Giur. dir. ind. 
191. 
152
 See Navitaire Inc v Easyjet Airline Co and Another, 30 July 2004, Chancery, [2004] EWHC 1725 
(Ch), [2005] ECDR 17, [2005] ECC 30, [2006] RPC 3, <http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2004/1725.html>; 
Navitaire Inc v Easyjet Airline Co and Another (No. 2), 11 March 2005, Chancery, [2005] EWHC 282 
(Ch), [2005] EWHC 3487 (Ch); Baigent and Leigh v The Random House Group Ltd, 28 March 2007, 
Court of Appeal, [2007] EWCA Civ 247, [2008] EMLR 7, [2007] FSR 24, 
<http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2007/247.html>; Baigent and Leigh v The Random House Group Ltd, 7 
April 2006, Chancery, [2006] EWHC 719 (Ch), [2006] EWHC 1131 (Ch), [2006] EMLR 16, [2007] IP & 
T 90, [2006] FSR 893, [2006] FSR 44, <http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2006/719.html>. 
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traditionally ruled their common history. The praise for genuine borrowing, not servile 
imitation, has in fact always been linked to the broader picture of knowledge.  
Looking into some Italian pronouncements, the marginalisation of the plain idea, 
with the exception of some limited opposing instances,153 has mostly led to ascertaining 
infringement in the replication of its creative expression or its core original and unique 
elements, or in their special assembly or coordination.154 At the same time, there have 
been cases in which courts found it reasonable to establish a violation in the 
reproduction of a narrow fragment of the work, on the condition that such taking 
revealed actual emphasis and with no will to make any modifications to hide or 
diminish it.155 
From a dangerous appropriation of the authors’ own thoughts or works that 
endangers their literary property to the apocryphal annihilation of the works’ identity, or 
the substantial reproduction of someone else’s work, these practices essentially 
repudiate the principle of virtuous imitation, while also affecting the whole individuality 
of the creation in its outward appearance and substance.156 
However, the approach of the judiciary has demonstrated further restraint 
towards a unique and stern description of the phenomenon, especially when it became 
manifest that not all cases in which such copying was alleged could be fittingly 
                                                          
153
 See, for instance, Coscia c Soc. Cella, 1 July 1955, App. Milano, [1955] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 
693; [1955] Riv. dir. ind. II 303, [1955] Dir. autore 343; Soc. Uti produz. associate c Universal City 
Studios inc., 7 March 1989, Trib. Roma, [1990] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 100; [1990] Foro it. I 2998. 
154
 In particular, see Grimaldi c Soc. Ponti de Laurentis, 23 June 1954, Trib. Roma, [1955] Rep. Foro it. 
v. Dir. autore n. 695; [1955] Rass. dir. cinem. 93; Perego c Ceramica Canova, 24 August 1966, App. 
Venezia, [1966] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 751; [1966] Corti Brescia Venezia e Trieste 641; Famous 
film c Soc. Stefano film, 30 October 1980, Trib. Roma, [1981] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 70; [1980] 
Riv. dir. ind. II 287; Soc. internaz. pubblicità c Soc. ed. Sanguinetti, 10 May 1993, Cass. n. 5346, [1994] 
Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 256; [1994] Dir. aut. 70, [1993] Riv. dir. ind. II 296, [1994] Dir. inform. 
507. 
155
 See H.R. c D.G.R., 30 November 1988, Trib. Torino, [1992] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 90; [1992] 
Impresa 3021; Soc. Gabric c Rotunno, 10 October 1983, App. Roma, [1984] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore 
n. 50; [1984] Dir. aut. 189; Raccanelli v Touring Club It., 27 October 2005, Corte di Cassazione n. 
20925, [2006] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 117; [2006] Foro it. I 2080, [2006] Dir.ind., 290, [2007] 
Annali it.dir.autore 664. 
156
 These elaborated descriptions reveal an established understanding of the complex phenomenon that 
was already present in the oldest Italian case law, before the enactment of the Copyright law No. 
633/1941, on the matter. See, in particular, Bemporad e Vecchi c Carozzi, 30 June 1897, Trib. Milano, 
[1897] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 415; [1897] Mon. trib. 690; Barsotti c Mannino, 4 February 1924, 
App. Palermo, [1924] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 485; [1924] Circ. Giur. 21; Gronda, 5 April 1935, 
Cass. Regno, [1935] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 483; [1935] Giust. pen. 839, [1936] Riv. pen. 63. 
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adjudicated in court.157 For instance, the necessity to isolate and discard instances of 
limited and off-the-cuff taking emerged, while a greater apprehension has been directed 
towards the reutilisation of elements and parts of the work that indeed were most 
representative and revealed the personality of its author.158  
Similarly, apart from an explicit reference to the author’s personal touch, UK 
courts proved that there had to be copying of a substantial part of the work, if not the 
whole work, to establish infringement, provided that copyright protection may regard 
the single elements of the works if considered original.159 Moreover, even though the 
centrality of the substantial copy parameter is confirmed by several pronouncements, 
the issue still appears to be largely unresolved, especially when the substantiality 
requirement has to be applied in cases where it has actually copied only a trivial 
quantity of material.160 
Indeed, the risk of frustrating the basic guidelines of protecting the expression of 
the idea is always present,161 despite the abstract cogency of the principle that no 
copyright protection is granted to ideas, especially in the field of computer programs, 
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 In sum, the significance of proving the occurrence of substantial and literary copy appears to be 
predominant within the Italian jurisdictional debate, although there have also been a number of cases in 
which the court found it reasonable to extend the line of defence to narrower and less distinctive 
reproduction. See, for instance, Sarita Esquenazi c Rai-Tv, 1 March 1991, Trib. Roma, [1994] Rep. Foro 
it. v. Dir. autore n. 258; [1992] Annali it. dir. autore 638. 
158
 Such conclusions were the result of a comparison between the works involved in the given disputes, 
which often implied discarding a simple presence of shared particular elements that did not also amount 
to an identity of representation. See, among later Italian decisions, Pagliai c Simoni, 23 May 1947, App. 
Roma, [1947] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 409; [1947] Foro it. I 782; Pietri c Fonzo, 15 April 1932, 
App. Milano, [1932] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 435; [1932] Temi lomb. 756, [1933] Riv. dir. ind. 372, 
[1933] Foro Lomb. 12; Branduardi c Soc. Buitoni Perugina, 12 May 1993, Trib Roma, [1986] Rep. Foro 
it. v. Dir. autore n. 259; [1994] Foro it. I 2258; [1994] Dir. inf., 305; [1994] Dir.autore, 459; Soc. Bmg 
Ricordi c De Gregori, 23 May 2002, Trib Roma, [2002] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 129; [2002] Dir. 
aut. 452. 
159
 See Regina v Gilhan, 9 November 2009, Court of Appeal (Crim), [2010] Lloyd's Rep FC 89, [2009] 
EWCA Crim 2293, [2010] ECDR 5, <http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2009/2293.html>. 
160
 Likewise, there have been difficulties acknowledging the protection of headlines and thus their status 
as original literary works. See, in particular, The Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd and Others v 
Meltwater Holding BV and Others, 26 November 2010, Chancery, [2010] EWHC 3099 (Ch), [2010] 
WLR (D) 303, <http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2010/3099.html>, (cf. The Newspaper Licensing Agency 
Ltd and Others v Meltwater Holding BV and Others, 27 July 2011, Court of Appeal, [2012] Bus LR 53, 
[2011] EWCA Civ 890, [2011] WLR (D) 261, CA, <http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2011/890.html>; The 
Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd and Others v Meltwater Holding BV and Others, 17 April 2013, 
Supreme Court, [2013] 2 All ER 852, [2013] CN 584, SC (E)) favourable to protecting the headlines, 
unlawfully extracted by an online media monitoring service, that are the result of a creative process. Cf. 
further appeal. 
161
 Similarly, express concern for the dichotomy emerging in Navitaire Inc v Easyjet Airline Co and 
Another, 30 July 2004, Chancery, cit., in which the Court warns about avoiding extensive copyright 
protection to purely functional effects that would result in a clear frustration of the dichotomy and 
impediment of software development. 
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where interfaces, programming language, or the mere functionality of a computer 
program do not enjoy any copyright shield if they do not result in the original or 
creative expression of ideas, namely if they do not constitute the intellectual creation of 
their author.162 With explicit regard to computer generated works, it is also worth 
anticipating that the UK law expressly exclude them from moral rights protection, thus 
adding a further important element of distinction in the larger framework of protecting 
original works from authorship misattribution. 
However, in general terms, it seems to be recognised that the status of 
originality, beyond assessing what constitutes an original work,163 given that it has to 
fall fail within the copyright subject matters,164 is afforded by the inference that it may 
be the result of an expenditure of skill, labour and judgement.  
In other cases, originality has arguably been related to a creative contribution to 
the work,165 which, however, is yet far from being a clarifying test. For instance, 
assessing the originality of a script inspired by another author’s work - upon which 
assessment the granting of copyright protection depended - has been quite 
controversial.166  
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 SAS Institute Inc v World Programming Ltd (No. 2), 25 January 2013, Chancery, [2013] EWHC 69 
(Ch), [2013] RPC 17, [2013] CN 119, <http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2013/69.html> (appealed in SAS 
Institute Inc v World Programming Ltd (No. 2), 21 November 2013, Court of Appeal, [2013] EWCA Civ 
1482, [2013] CN 1769, CA), previously considered in SAS Institute Inc v World Programming Ltd, 23 
July 2010, Chancery, [2010] EWHC 1829 (Ch), [2011] RPC 1, [2010] ECDR 15, 
<http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2010/1829.html>, to which followed SAS Institute Inc. v World 
Programming Ltd, case C-406/10, 2 May 2012, CJEU. 
163
 Accordingly, even a brief letter may be regarded as an original literary work and its unlawful copy 
amount to copyright infringement. On this, see Cembrit Blunn Ltd and Another v Apex Roofing Services 
LLP and Another, 5 February 2007, Chancery, [2007] EWHC 111 (Ch), 
<http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2007/111.html>, which contested the fair dealing defence and additionally 
entailed breach of confidence. 
164
 See Lucasfilm Ltd and Others v Ainsworth and Another, 16 December 2009, Court of Appeal, [2009] 
EWCA Civ 1328, [2010] ECDR 6, [2010] Ch 503, [2010] 3 WLR 333, (2010) 33(4) IPD 33021, [2010] 1 
Ch 503, [2010] EMLR 12, [2010] Bus LR 904 [2009] EWCA Civ 1328, 
<http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2009/1328.html>, which explored the difficulty of determining whether a 
prototypal product, such as a costume helmet of Star Wars, was an original work of sculpture within the 
meaning of Section 4 CDPA 1988, and thus deserved protection against copyright infringement. 
165
 Godfrey v Lees, 21 March 1995, Chancery, [1995] EMLR 307, in which, however, the claimant, 
should have demonstrated that he actually contributed to the creation of the work in a significant and 
original way, but failed to assert his rights and therefore did not succeed in that claim. Unsuccessful also 
was Brighton and Dubbeljoint v Jones, 18 May 2004, Chancery, [2004] EWHC 1157 (Ch), [2004] EMLR 
26, [2005] FSR 16. On the contrary, a similar claim was successful in Bamgboye v Reed and Others, 28 
November 2002, Queen’s Bench, [2002] EWHC 2922 (Qb), [2004] EMLR 5, [2002] All ER (D) 435. 
166
 Christoffer v Poseidon Film Distributors Ltd, 6 October 1999, Chancery, [2000] ECDR 487, [1999] 
IP&T 118, which recognised the originality and thus entitlement to copyright protection to a script 
narrating a story that, considering its expressed form and details, although inspired by the legendary 
Odyssey by Homer, showed enough differences to be considered the result of creative effort. 
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At the same time and with the same controversial outcomes, some 
pronouncements have also dealt, by reflex, with the issue of authorship.167 The link 
between matters of originality and attribution of authorship has indeed found dedicated 
analysis, for instance, with regard to whether the creation of a new edition of a pre-
existing musical work is to be regarded as an original composition which copyright 
subsists, and whether this entitles its author to be identified as such. 
Furthermore, attempts to define the scope of protection with reference to the 
elements or parts of the work that are the «author’s own intellectual creation», for 
instance, headlines or excerpts from newspaper articles,168 have also been to some 
extent related to the bond between the author and the original product of his/her 
mind.169 
For the same reason, the protection of common design techniques has been 
excluded also on the grounds of independent creation,170 which may not be sufficient, 
instead requiring some creative choice under the influence of EU jurisprudence. The 
criterion for originality assessment has been centred on measuring whether there has 
been an expenditure of a sufficient degree of effort, labour, skill and time that justifies 
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 See, for instance, Fisher v Brooker and another, 20 December 2006, Chancery, [2006] EWHC 3239 
(Ch), <http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2006/3239.html>, which investigated, among other aspects, the issue 
of joint authorship and the delicate question of lawful proper attribution. The instant judgement’s later 
appeal was allowed, saving the granting of a co-authorship declaration, but limiting the first instance 
decision on the matter of licensing (Fisher v Brooker and another, 4 April 2008, Court of Appeal, [2008] 
Bus LR 1123, [2008] FSR 26, [2008] EWCA Civ 287, [2008] EMLR 13, [2009] Bus LR 95, 
<http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2008/287.html>). See also Fisher v Brooker and another, 30 July 2009, 
House of Lords, [2009] UKHL 41, [2009] 1 WLR 1764. 
168
 The Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd and Others v Meltwater Holding BV and Others, 27 July 2011, 
Court of Appeal, cit., which also negates that the copied excerpt had to be substantial, it being appropriate 
only to assess that a substantial part of the copied author’s work had been taken. 
This instant ruling echoes the EU test of originality, which will be discussed more extensively in the 
following paragraphs. Indeed, it was later referred to the EU Court of Justice in The Newspaper Licensing 
Agency Ltd and Others v Meltwater Holding BV and Others, 17 April 2013, Supreme Court, cit. 
See Public Relations Consultants Association Ltd v Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd and Others, case C-
360/13, 5 June 2014, CJEU, ECLI:EU:C:2014:1195, [2014] All ER (Comm) 657, [2014] 1 AC 1438, 
[2014] ALL ER (EC) 959, [2014] BUS LR 970, [2014] ECDR 22, [2014] EMLR 28, [2014] EUECJ C-
360/13, [2014] WLR(D) 244, <http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&jur=C,T,F&num=360/13&td=ALL>. 
169
 See, for instance, Sawkins v Hyperion Records Ltd, 1 July 2004, Chancery, [2004] EWHC 1530 (Ch), 
[2004] All ER 418, [2005] RPC 4, [2004] EMLR 27, [2005] ECDR 10 (later appealed in Sawkins v 
Hyperion Records Ltd, 19 May 2005, Court of Appeal, [2005] 3 All ER 636, [2005] EWCA Civ 565, 
[2005] 1 WLR 3281, [2005] RPC 32, [2005] EMLR 29, <http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2005/565.html>. 
170
 IPC Media Ltd v Highbury SPL Publishing Ltd, 21 December 2004, Chancery, [2004] EWCH 283 
(Ch), [2005] FSR 20, [2004] All ER (D) 342, regarding the protection of the design, subject matter, theme 
and presentational style (not the content), of a home design magazine. 
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copyright protection,171 given that in any case the work in question should in abstract be 
considered a copyright subject matter according to the UK Copyright Act.172 
Furthermore, the parameter of substantiality may apply, not only to the latitude 
of the copy,173 but also to what is the object of the copy.174 This aspect is of crucial 
importance for the purpose of ascertaining copyright infringement,175 but it also matters 
in determining misattribution, confirming the idea-expression dichotomy, according to 
which the highest abstraction of a copyright work, similarly to mere ideas, is unlikely to 
be protected, especially when it does not form a substantial part of the work. 
This concise illustration of Italian and UK case law served as a first indication of 
some similarities that emerge from the comparison of the two systems in their 
approaches to the subject, although they may indeed appear somewhat faint when 
matched against the divergences between the two systems.176 Hence, the preview of the 
judicial approach to the matter has attempted to explain, in practical terms, the partition 
between the unshielded ideas embodied in the work and their protected expression, 
which is essential for a comprehensive and mature assessment of plagiarism. 
Either in its objectification, as the individuation of creativeness in the work of 
the mind or as the establishment of skill, labour and judgement, the creativity or 
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 In Sawkins v Hyperion, cit., the Court foresaw sufficient originality in the composition a musical work 
within the meaning of the CDPA 1988, the claimant having created an original work although not 
completely new but from previous existing scores that justified copyright protection. 
172
 However, this does not entail that the mere occurrence of skill, labour and judgement is in itself 
capable of making any work original and protected under copyright. Interlego AG v Tyco Industries Inc, 5 
May 1988, Privy Council, [1988] RPC 343, [1988] UKPC 3, [1989] AC 217, [1988] 2 FTLR 133, [1988] 
3 All ER 949, [1988] 3 WLR 678 <http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKPC/1988/3.html>. 
173
 See, in particular, Baigent and Leigh v The Random House Group Ltd (2006, Chancery), cit., which 
concerned non-textual copying and the alleged infringement by Dan Brown’s famous Da Vinci Code. The 
Court nevertheless held that no substantial copying occurred. The appeal was also dismissed (Baigent and 
Leigh v The Random House Group Ltd, cit.) 
174
 It appeared disputable whether the theme of a literary work received protection and whether it could be 
regarded as a substantial part of the work allegedly copied. However, as will be further discussed, 
infringement has been established even when a not exactly substantial, but yet important part was copied. 
Ravenscroft v Herbert and New English Library Limited, Chancery, 1 January 1980, Chancery, [1980] 
RPC 193. 
175
 The topic will soon be recouped when the mechanism of infringements is analysed. See infra, Chapter 
4. 
176
 First, the more pronounced variability of the Italian case law is consistent with the quintessence of a 
civil law tradition, where the stare decisis doctrine is inapplicable. UK pronouncements are in fact 
considerably fewer in number in accordance with the principle of precedents. Second, they do not always 
contemplate attribution related matters from the angle of copyright, but quite often address such issues 
from different legal standpoints. Third, even if copyright applies, the applicable rules relating to the 
violation of the authors’ right of attribution tend to differ. 
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originality tests in both Italy and the United Kingdom in theory require no evaluation in 
terms of artistic merit for the purpose of copyright protection. 
In addition to the need to safeguard the idea–expression dichotomy, with the 
aforementioned limits, the work seeking to be protected seems today to be the necessary 
result of a creative or original effort.177 This latest prompt inevitably requires careful 
pondering over the legal scope of creativity and originality amid the larger landscape of 
misattribution, and yet against the increasingly lively background of EU law. The 
considerations above, in fact, have found explicit grounds within the Court of Justice of 
the European Union in accordance with the European law on the matter.  
 
 
2.3 The criterion of originality under EU law 
 
Having explored the criteria of originality and creativity within the Italian and UK 
systems, it becomes essential to look at the meaning and operability of these issues 
under the UE legal framework, which undoubtedly has greatly influenced the evolution 
of the originality test in its Member States, including Italy and the United Kingdom. 
In general terms, EU legislation does not provide a clear and univocal definition 
of these concepts, nor of copyright works, with the exceptions of photographs, 
databases and computer programs, which are all grouped by the specification that they 
enjoy protection on the condition that they represent the intellectual creation of the 
author. 
In particular, some EU directives set forth the standards of originality. 
According to Article 1, Section 3 of the Software Directive, computer programs are to 
be considered original and thus entitled to be protected insofar as they belong to the 
«author’s own intellectual creation».178 Similar entitlement regards original 
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 At the same time, their conceptualisations evolved together with the development of technology, 
sometimes going along with it and sometimes being in open conflict with it. This inevitably provokes the 
concern that the law may take an excessive distance from the reality of art, despite the latter indeed being 
the object of its regulation and therefore requiring its full consideration. 
178
 Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the Legal 
protection of computer programs, OJ L 111, 5 May 2009, 16-22, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32009L0024> [repealing and replacing Directive 91/250/EEC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 1991 on the Legal protection of computer programs, OL 122, 17 
May 1991, 42–46]. The instant section continues precising that «no other criteria shall be applied to 
determine its eligibility for protection». 
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photographs, that, under Article 6 of the 2006 Term Directive,179 are «the author's own 
intellectual creation»,180 with the further specification that such a definition reflects the 
«personality [of the author and] no other criteria such as merit or purpose being taken 
into account»,181 all for the purpose of affording the highest protection to copyright.182 
Similarly, under the 2011 Term Directive, «the socially recognised importance of the 
creative contribution of performers should be reflected in a level of protection that 
acknowledges their creative and artistic contribution»,183 at the same time 
acknowledging the collaborative nature of certain creations.184  
Likewise, Article 3, Section 1 of the Database Directive and its Recitals 15 and 
16 define the only applicable criteria to assess the originality of a database, which, «by 
reason of the selection or arrangement of their contents, constitute the author's own 
intellectual creation [and] shall be protected as such by copyright».185 In addition, 
shortening the apparent distance with the UK labour skill and judgement test, the same 
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 Directive 2011/77 /EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September 2011 amending 
Directive 2006/116 /EC on The term of protection of copyright and certain related rights, OJ L 265, 11 
October 2011, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1420400285856&uri=CELEX:32011L0077>, has 
amended the 2006 Directive. 
180
 Directive 2006/116/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006, OJ L 
372, 27 December 2006, 12-18, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32006L0116>, repealing 
and replacing Council Directive 93/98/EEC of 29 October 1993 harmonising the term of protection of 
copyright and certain related rights, OJ L 372, 27 December 2006, 12-18]. Again, no other criteria 
applies, but «Member States may provide for the protection of other photographs». 
181
 Directive 2006/116/EC, Recital 16. 
182
 As Recital 11 of the same Directive states, in fact, «the level of protection of copyright and related 
rights should be high, since those rights are fundamental to intellectual creation. Their protection ensures 
the maintenance and development of creativity in the interest of authors, cultural industries, consumers 
and society as a whole». 
183
 Directive 2011/77 /EU, Recital 4. 
184
 According to Recital 18 of the Directive 2011/77 /EU, this refers particularly to «musical genres such 
as jazz, rock and pop music, the creative process is often collaborative in nature». 
185
 Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the Legal 
protection of databases, OJ L 77, 27 March 1996, 20-28, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:31996L0009>. Recital 16, in particular, provides that «no criterion other than 
originality in the sense of the author's intellectual creation should be applied to determine the eligibility of 
the database for copyright protection, and in particular no aesthetic or qualitative criteria should be 
applied». Recital 15 anticipates indeed that «the criteria used to determine whether a database should be 
protected by copyright should be defined to the fact that the selection or the arrangement of the contents 
of the database is the author's own intellectual creation; whereas such protection should cover the 
structure of the database». 
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Directive also alludes to the element of investment, which lies behind the creation of a 
database and is by reflex hindered also by misappropriation.186  
Finally, the Infosoc Directive affords copyright protection in accordance with 
Recital 9 «to ensure the maintenance and development of creativity in the interests of 
authors, performers, producers, consumers, culture, industry and the public at large», 
while Recital 4 explicitly fosters «substantial investment in creativity and 
innovation».187  
In essence, we may conclude that the current applicable threshold of originality 
under EU law is the test of the author’s own intellectual creation, which seems to apply 
to any copyright subject matter, although not always with good and simple results. 
However, such a formula may likely be challenged by the concrete interpretation that 
Member States provide, especially in consideration of the range of various protections 
of each. To such an extent, one might wonder whether this test of originality as creative 
effort is capable of being the right point of convergence or whether it pursues actual 
harmonisation across the European Union.188 
This is made even clearer by the judicial application of the instant standard and 
the further clarification of the rules’ content, both within the EU judiciary and domestic 
courts, whether the latter have implemented the Directives in question or not, provided 
that the rules in question are compatible with their own legal systems. As a result, it is 
more than wise to investigate the assessment of originality and creativity from the 
perspective of the European judiciary, in particular the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (hereinafter CJEU). 
                                                          
186
 According to Recital 39 of Directive 96/9/EC, «in addition to aiming to protect the copyright in the 
original selection or arrangement of the contents of a database, this Directive seeks to safeguard the 
position of makers of databases against misappropriation of the results of the financial and professional 
investment made in obtaining and collection the contents by protecting the whole or substantial parts of a 
database against certain acts by a user or competitor». 
187
 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
Harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, OJ L 167, 22 
June 2001, 10-19, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32001L0029>.  
188
 On this point, see I. A. STAMATOUDI, P. TORREMANS (eds.), EU copyright law: a commentary, 
Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014, 1102 et seq; M. VAN EECHOUD (ed.), The Work of 
Authorship, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2014, 16, <https://archive.org/details/WorkOfAuthorship>;  
and S. VAN GOMPEL, Creativity, authonomy and personal touch. A critical appraisal of the CJEU’s 
originality test for copyright, in M. VAN EECHOUD (ed.), The Work of Authorship, cit., 95, 98-101; E. 
ROSATI, Originality in EU Copyright: Full Harmonisation through Case Law, Cheltenham, UK: Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2013. 
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Among the Court decisions in the matter of copyright, Infopaq International 
remains the most significant case for the establishment of the new standard of 
originality. In it, the Strasbourg judges suggested that copyright applies in relation to 
any works that are the result of the author’s intellectual creation, and hence original.189 
However, they come to this conclusion following an expected pathway. Recouping the 
provisions of the aforementioned Directives, and explicitly recalling the principle of EU 
harmonisation,190 they extended the standard of originality enjoyed by computer 
programs, databases and photographs to any «subject-matter which is original in the 
sense that it is its author’s own intellectual creation»,191 outlining that both the whole 
work and its various parts or elements enjoy protection as long as they are also 
original.192 
On such premises, the CJEU goes further, specifying that newspaper articles, 
which are intellectual creations in the sense provided, are original literary works, but 
their originality lays in «the choice, sequence and combination of those words that the 
author may express his creativity in an original manner and achieve a result which is an 
intellectual creation».193 Additionally, by indicating that the mere words composing the 
given piece are not elements or parts in the sense intended, and therefore not shielded, 
the Court constrained the protection.194  
However, it is remitted to the discretion of national courts to determine whether, 
in the eventuality of a reproduction of an extract of the original work, such an excerpt 
entails an element or part of the work that «expresses the author’s own intellectual 
creation».195  
                                                          
189
 Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening, case C‑5/08, 16 July 2009, CJEU, 2009 I-
06569, [2012] Bus LR 102, [2009] ECR-I-6569, [2010] FSR 495, ECJ, 
<http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&jur=C,T,F&num=5/0&td=ALL&parties=Infopaq>. 
190
 Infopaq International (C‑5/08), cit., which at Section 36, in fact, is reminded that «in establishing a 
harmonised legal framework for copyright, Directive 2001/29 is based on the same principle, as 
evidenced by recitals 4, 9 to 11 and 20 in the preamble thereto». 
191
 Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening, case C‑5/08, cit., at 37. 
192
 More precisely, it is stated that, with regard to the work’s parts, these should not be treated in a 
different and diminishing way when they «share the originality of the whole work», which is to say, «they 
contain elements which are the expression of the intellectual creation of the author of the work». Infopaq 
International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening, case C‑5/08, cit., at 38 and 39.  
193
 Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening, case C‑5/08, cit., at 44 and 45. 
194
 As it summarised, «words as such do not, therefore, constitute elements covered by the protection». 
Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening, case C‑5/08, cit., at 46. 
195
 Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening, case C‑5/08, cit., at 48. The same concept is 
repeated in the ruling of the Court.  
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This is recouped in Bezpečnostní softwarová or BSA, according to which 
copyright subsists in all the works that are intellectual creations, including user 
interfaces, on the condition that they are original.196 Interfaces, whose peculiarity 
consists in allowing users to interact with computer programs, indeed, represent a 
functional element of the program, but according to European law cannot be considered 
a computer program nor be protected as such.197 However, in observance of the 
originality standard set in Infopaq International, a graphic user interface may indeed 
only be protected if it is the intellectual creation of its author, which is still a 
discretionary call to be made by the domestic court before a case of this matter is 
brought.198 
This particular assessment of originality is thus remitted to the national court 
that, among other aspects, must consider the «specific arrangement or configuration of 
all the components which form part of the graphic user interface».199 In particular, when 
the technicality and functionality of the components prevail,200 the risk of merging the 
idea with its expression is tangible and as such must be refrained.201  
In this context, the creativity of the author is extremely compressed and the 
attainment of an original result in terms of intellectual creation that enjoys copyright 
protection is debarred.202 As the Court concluded, although graphic user interfaces do 
not represent a form of expression of the computer programs, and therefore do not 
themselves receive copyright protection like those programs, they can still be protected 
                                                          
196
 Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace - Svaz softwarové ochrany v Ministerstvo kultury, case C-393/09, 
22 December 2010, CJEU, 2010 I-13971, [2011] FSR 18, [2010] All ER (D) 309, [2011] ECDR 3, 
<http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&jur=C,T,F&num=393/09&td=ALL>.  
197
 Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace - Svaz softwarové ochrany v Ministerstvo kultury, case C-393/09, 
cit., at 40–42. 
198
 Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace - Svaz softwarové ochrany v Ministerstvo kultury, case C-393/09, 
cit., at 44–47. 
199
 Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace - Svaz softwarové ochrany v Ministerstvo kultury, case C-393/09, 
cit., at 48, which further specifies that such a «criterion cannot be met by components of the graphic user 
interface which are differentiated only by their technical function». 
200
 Against the protection of mere functional elements have ruled also SAS Institute Inc. v World 
Programming Ltd, case C-406/102, May 2012, CJEU, ECLI:EU:C:2012:259, [2013] Bus LR 941, [2012] 
WLR (D), 131, ECJ, [2012] 3 CMLR 4, [2012] RPC 933, [2012] ECDR 22, 
<http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-406/10>. 
201
 Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace - Svaz softwarové ochrany v Ministerstvo kultury, case C-393/09, 
cit., at 49, which explains that «where the expression of those components is dictated by their technical 
function, the criterion of originality is not met, since the different methods of implementing an idea are so 
limited that the idea and the expression become indissociable». Cf. Advocate General’s Opinion, at 75 
and 76. 
202
 Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace - Svaz softwarové ochrany v Ministerstvo kultury, case C-393/09, 
cit., at 50. 
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as copyright works on the condition that they can be defined as the author’s own 
intellectual creation.203 
A few years later, the identical principle of originality was replicated in the 
joined cases of Football Association Premier League and Karen Murphy, in which the 
European Court denied copyright protection to sports matches as such, on the grounds 
that they could not be considered copyright protectable works, being not «original in the 
sense that it is its author’s own intellectual creation».204  
This appeared clear to the CJEU with regard to any sporting event, but even 
more appropriate with football matches that, constrained by certain gaming rules, «[left] 
no room for creative freedom for the purposes of copyright».205 The instant case, 
therefore, in addition to the main threshold of protection, further adds the element of 
creative freedom, which must be understood as referring to the absence of constraint 
from rules that may impede the qualification as original copyright work. 
Nonetheless, the fact that European law does not grant copyright protection for 
the reasons thereby explained yet leaves Member States free to grant protection to 
sporting events, even though they are not protected under EU law. While 
acknowledging their uniqueness and their potential originality, the CJEU, however, did 
not foresee any chance of protection according to EU law, but at the same time 
conceded that, according to domestic laws, such potentiality may be converted in a 
worth-protected subject matter.206 
The concept of creative freedom was soon resumed in the case of Eva-Maria 
Painer, which focused the attention of the CJEU on the application of the originality 
                                                          
203
 Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace - Svaz softwarové ochrany v Ministerstvo kultury, case C-393/09, 
cit., at 51. 
204
 Football Association Premier League Ltd and Others v QC Leisure and Others and Karen Murphy v 
Media Protection Services Ltd, joint cases C-403/08 and C-429/08, 4 October 2011, CJEU, 2011 I-09083, 
[2012] Bus LR 1321, [2012] All ER (EC) 629, [2011] WLR (D) 286, ECJ, 
<http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-403/08&language=en>. Sections 96 and 97. 
Cf. Football Association Premier League Ltd v QC Leisure & Ors, 13 November 2008, Chancery, [2008] 
EWHC 2897 (Ch), [2009] 1 WLR 1603, Ch D (decided before the CJEU pronouncement) and following 
Football Association Premier League Ltd v QC Leisure & Ors (No. 2), 3 February 2012, Chancery, 
[2012] EWHC 108 (Ch), [2012] FSR 366, later appealed in Football Association Premier League Ltd v 
QC Leisure & Ors (No. 2), 20 December 2012, Court of Appeal, [2012] EWCA Civ 1708, [2013] BUS 
LR 866, [2012] WLR (D) 392, [2012] WLR (D) 392, <http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2012/1708.html>.  
205
 Football Association Premier League Ltd (C-403/08) and Others v QC Leisure and Others and Karen 
Murphy (C-429/08) v Media Protection Services Ltd, cit., at 98. Furthermore, at 99, the Court deliberately 
excluded that they could find protection in the EU law according to other fields of intellectual property. 
206
 Football Association Premier League Ltd (C-403/08)  and Others v QC Leisure and Others and Karen 
Murphy (C-429/08) v Media Protection Services Ltd, cit., at 100. 
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standard to the photographer.207 As the Court noticed, the creativity of the latter 
emerged by his/her own personality, which is expressed, for instance, in the peculiar 
choice of the subject or the use of light.208  
Retrieving once again the test for originality first delineated in Infopaq 
International, the Court reaffirmed the principle according to which «copyright is liable 
to apply only in relation to a subject-matter, such as a photograph, which is original in 
the sense that it is its author’s own intellectual creation».209 What is added, instead, is 
that the now well-known formula must be intended as a reflection of the author’s, and 
thus the photographer’s, personality,210 which is expressed in the various «free and 
creative choices» he/she makes,211 with the consequence that the resulting work 
certainly has his/her own «personal touch».212 Given these premises, the creativity of 
the portrait photograph shall be neither inexistent nor lower,213 but it will still be the 
decision of the domestic court to assess whether the photograph, case by case, has those 
illustrated features and is therefore entitled to copyright protection.214 
 Finally, to complete the circle, the most recent case, Deckmyn v Vandersteen, 
allows to bring into question the opportunity to apply the originality standard to 
parodies of works,215 namely whether the exception of parody has to fulfill certain 
conditions.216 Acknowledging the lack of a legal definition of parody in the EU 
framework, the Courts chose to consider it in its everyday use, and therefore in its 
                                                          
207
 In brief, the Luxembourg judges were asked to clarify whether realistic photographs such as a portrait 
photograph was likely to be protected by copyright, but also whether the level of protection had to be 
considered lower than the one applicable to other works, including photographic works. Eva-Maria 
Painer v Standard VerlagsGmbH and others, case C‑145/10, 12 April 2011, CJEU, 2011 I-12533, 
<http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&jur=C,T,F&num=145/10&td=ALL>, 86. 
208
 Eva-Maria Painer v Standard VerlagsGmbH and others, case C‑145/10, cit.  
209
 Eva-Maria Painer v Standard VerlagsGmbH and others, case C‑145/10, cit., 87. 
210
 Eva-Maria Painer v Standard VerlagsGmbH and others, case C‑145/10, cit., 88, referring to the 
contents of Recital 17 of Directive 93/98/EC. 
211
 A freedom that was instead excluded in Football Association Premier League Ltd (C-403/08)  and 
Others v QC Leisure and Others and Karen Murphy (C-429/08) v Media Protection Services Ltd, (C-
429/08), cit. Eva-Maria Painer v Standard VerlagsGmbH and others, case C‑145/10, cit., at 89–90.  
212
 Eva-Maria Painer (C‑145/10), cit., at 92. Possible choices include «the background, the subject’s pose 
and the lighting […] the framing, the angle of view and the atmosphere created [but also the] developing 
techniques the one he wishes to adopt or, where appropriate, use computer software», as exemplified at 
91. 
213
 Eva-Maria Painer v Standard VerlagsGmbH and others, (C‑145/10), cit., particularly at 98 and 99. 
214
 Eva-Maria Painer v Standard VerlagsGmbH and others, (C‑145/10), cit., at 93–94. 
215
 Deckmyn and another v Vandersteen and Others, case C-201/13, 3 September 2014, CJEU, [2014] 
EUECJ C-201/13, <http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&jur=C,T,F&num=201/13&td=ALL>. 
216
 Deckmyn and another v Vandersteen and Others, (C-201/13), at 18. 
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aptness to «evoke an existing work while being noticeably different from it, and […] 
constitute an expression of humour or mockery»,217 while considering the exact context 
and the scope of the regulation.218 From that, the CJEU, however, discerns the 
additional feature that it should certainly have «an original character of its own», which 
it refuted.219 
At the same time, the Court is concerned with its aim of preserving the necessary 
fair balance among the rights of the users and the entitlements of the rightholders, 
respectively with regard to the freedom of expression by the former and the interests in 
the highest protection of the work by the latter.220 This is a balance that domestic courts 
are also expected to seek when they have to assess whether or not the parody exception 
preserves it, with the characteristics thus far illustrated.221 
In conclusion, arguably the new common standard of originality attempts to 
indulge the convergence between the distinct standards of creativity as a reflection of a 
minimal personal contribution or effort, and that of minimum skill, labour and 
judgement inputs.222 Differences between the two, of course, still exist and should not 
be disregarded,223 but it is worth considering that, when examined in their careful 
                                                          
217
 Deckmyn and another v Vandersteen and Others, (C-201/13), at 20. 
218
 Deckmyn and another v Vandersteen and Others, (C-201/13), at 19. Cf. Diakité, C‑285/12, at 27. 
219
 Deckmyn and another v Vandersteen and Others, (C-201/13), at 21. In other words, as the Court 
stressed, «the concept of ‘parody’, within the meaning of that provision, is not subject to the conditions 
that the parody should display an original character of its own, other than that of displaying noticeable 
differences with respect to the original parodied work; that it could reasonably be attributed to a person 
other than the author of the original work itself; that it should relate to the original work itself or mention 
the source of the parodied work», at 33. 
220
 Deckmyn and another v Vandersteen and Others, (C-201/13), at 27-28, 32 and 34-35. 
221
 In its closing ruling, the Court of Justice held that the notion of parody is to be considered «an 
autonomous concept of EU law». However, it also made clear that its critical features are essentially to 
jog our memory with another work, from which the parodied work strikingly differs, also purporting an 
expression of humour or mockery with regard to the other work, which is the only one that needs to be 
ascertained as original. 
222
 See E. F. JUDGE, D. GERVAIS, Of silos and constellations: comparing notions of originality in 
copyright law, in Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J., Vol. 27, No. 2, 2009, 375, <http://www.cardozoaelj.com/wp-
content/uploads/Journal%20Issues/Volume%2027/Issue%202/Judge_and_Gervais.pdf>; R. C. NEWELL, Discounting the 
Sweat of the Brow: Converging International Standards for Electronic Database Protection, in IPLB, 
Vol. 15, 2011, 111, <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1709531>. 
223
 This point is well expressed by L. BENTLY, B. SHERMAN, Intellectual Property Law, cit., 99, who 
notice how the previous British standard will still apply to prior protected works and, thus, «for many 
decades to come». Besides, as the authors suggest (at 108), there seems to be no impediment for the 
United Kingdom to afford protection, under copyright or other areas of law, even to non-original works - 
with the sole exception of database that is now regulated by the CDPA - according to the EU intellectual 
creation standard. 
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analysis, both standards actually reach the same results.224 In the same way, the alleged 
coming together of the creativity and originality criteria makes one wonder whether a 
similar convergence may be appraised with explicit reference to authorship attribution. 
We shall soon see what the possible implications of this may be.
                                                          
224
 Cf. L. BENTLY, B. SHERMAN, Intellectual Property Law, cit.,102, who emphasise the identity of 
results, although not of methods, of the allegedly higher EU standard and the lower UK one.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE QUEST FOR INTERDISCIPLINARITY TO ADDRESS AND 
EXPLAIN PLAGIARISM 
 
 
1 Some insights from non-legal disciplines 
 
Before approaching the subject from a more structured perspective, which seeks to draw 
a clearer line between the approaches of the Italian and UK systems to the right of 
attribution, it is desirable to pursue a more general and far-reaching contemplation of 
the topic. This may be reached by looking at the contribution that some disciplines other 
than the law provide, especially considering their skillful and targeted picturing of 
misattribution, which a purely legal approach seems unable to provide on occasion. In 
this regard, therefore, resorting to interdisciplinarity appears decisive.1 
Indeed, it is acknowledged that the word “interdisciplinary” has a relatively 
wide-ranging denotation,2 entailing the participation or simply consideration of more 
                                                          
1
 What is hereby suggested is the adoption of an exact interdisciplinary method to appraise the 
phenomenon of authorship attribution and the concepts of creativity and originality, which undoubtedly 
demand the broadest approach in order to be fully comprehended. Such an intention, as we shall see, does 
not, however, come without consequences or difficulties.  
2
 At the same time, it is commonly known to be synonymous with multi-disciplinarity, trans-disciplinarity 
and the like. For the purpose of the present analysis, however, I will not linger on the exact definition of 
each.  
Besides, it is worth mentioning that some suggest certain distinctions, in particular with regard to the 
concepts of inter-disciplinarity, intra-disciplinarity and meta-disciplinarity. In the first case, evaluation 
remains confined to each considered discipline; in the second, what it evaluated is their interaction, and in 
the third, all disciplines are evaluated and enhanced. See G. DEL RE, Rapporto sul problema mente-corpo, 
in L. Cuccurullo, E. Mariani, (eds), Contesti e validità del discorso scientifico, Roma: Armando Editore, 
2005, 221, 253.  
Others, instead, emphasise one or the other meaning according to the exact context in which they are 
used. See A. WERTH, Unity in diversity: the virtues of a metadisciplinary perspective in liberal arts 
education. (2003) Journal of the National Collegiate Honors Council - Online Archive, Paper No. 118, 
<digitalcommons.unl.edu/nchcjournal/118>; C. HARDING, A. WEINBERG, Interdisciplinary teaching and 
collaboration in higher education: a concept whose time has come, in Wash. U. J.L. & Pol'y, 2004, 14. 
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than one field of knowledge,3 conceivably with the aim of ascertaining some kind of 
identity or unity, or of enabling a far-reaching analysis of phenomena that otherwise 
appear overlooked by single and isolated approaches.4 
Despite the ambiguity of its terminology,5 the appeal of interdisciplinarity 
encompasses all subjects that have something to learn from one another. This is also 
valid with regard to the discipline of law, although not necessarily with incontrovertible 
outcomes. In particular, some academics have wondered whether the other disciplines 
have profited more from the law’s contribution than vice versa, leaving open the 
question of whether interdisciplinarity had actually contributed to the accumulation of 
legal knowledge (in terms of having more and better knowledge).6 
Indeed, some convincing arguments in favour of interdisciplinarity in the context 
of legal academic thought have been advanced, among others, by Stancil, who suggests 
that effective interdisciplinarity needs scholars to engage in a mature dialogue or, by her 
own metaphor, to talk at the same table.7 
                                                          
3
 In its concise meaning, interdisciplinary concerns the instance of «relating to more than one branch of 
knowledge», while interdisciplinarity refers to «the quality or fact of involving or drawing on two or more 
branches of knowledge». Oxford University Press, English Dictionary (online), def. interdisciplinary, 
interdisciplinarity, <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english>. Cf. Cambridge International Dictionary 
of English, cit., def. interdisciplinary, 741. 
4
 See Treccani. L’enciclopedia italiana (online), Vocabolario, def. interdisciplinare, 
interdisciplinarmente, <http://www.treccani.it/vocabolario/interdisciplinare/>. Furthermore, the term 
«interdisciplinarity» denotes the complementarity, interaction and integration of different subjects that 
may converge into some common principles and methods, or share some similarities, analogies and 
parallels that overtake the general fragmentation of knowledge. At the same time, it indicates the aptness 
of research to identify a common denominator among different fields of knowledge, while also nurturing 
the singularity and multiplicity of each one. Treccani, L’enciclopedia italiana (online), cit., def. 
interdisciplinarità, <http://www.treccani.it/vocabolario/interdisciplinarita/>. 
5
 J. MORAN, Interdisciplinarity, London and New York: Routledge, 2010, viii, 165-166, 180 (first ed., 
2002), who defines it as a «buzzword» to be treated with particular caution, especially considering the 
entailed risk of fragmentation, but also acknowledges the advantages for researchers to adopt it, in primis, 
allowing the disciplines to gain new insights and perspectives on each area of research. 
6
 Alluding to the fact that fragmentation characterises the legal disciplines, given that they all employ 
distinct methods and models, Samuel discusses the influence of interdisciplinarity on the discipline of 
law, also providing some historical examples of reciprocal contribution between law and humanism. G. 
SAMUEL, Is legal knowledge cumulative?, in Leg. S., Vol. 32, No. 3, 2012, 448, 450-455, 471-472, 479. 
7
 In her view (cf. T. S. ULEN, The Impending Train Wreck in Current Legal Education: How We Might 
Teach Law as the Scientific Study of Social Governance, in U. St. Thomas L.J., Vol. 6, No. 2, 2009, 302,, 
<http://ir.stthomas.edu/ustlj/vol6/iss2/2/>), by looking outside its otherwise static environment, the law can only 
benefit from other disciplines’ perspectives, which are embodied in the view of the different guests that 
occupy their metaphorical chairs and are expected to have «a good dinner conversation» by talking and 
listening to each other. P. J. STANCIL, The Legal Academy as Dinner Party: A (Short) Manifesto on The 
Necessity of Inter-Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship, in U. Ill. L. Rev., No. 5, 2011, 1577, 1581 et seq., 
1589-91, <http://illinoislawreview.org/wp-content/ilr-content/articles/2011/5/Stancil.pdf>. 
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In any case, its growing relevance, particularly but not limited to the academic 
environment,8 predictably depends on the congeniality of the method, but also on the 
accuracy of its results. Deliberately referring to interdisciplinary legal research in terms 
of «legal research which incorporates insights from non-legal disciplines», it is also 
accurate to identify some principal disrupting elements. The latter can essentially 
become problems depending on the availability of data, especially if socio-empirical, 
but also on the accurate understanding and translating one another’s equivalent concepts 
or theories, and integrating them respectively into their own contexts.9 
  However, despite the intensification of interdisciplinary focus in the legal field,10 
this does not in any way suggest that any incorporation will occur, or that the law 
should renounce its typical authoritative function.11 In other words, it appears correct to 
predict that a cautious interdisciplinary analysis will not threaten the core of the legal 
discipline, especially if, in order to lessen or avoid the possible pitfalls to purse a 
genuine dialogue with non-legal science, actual collaboration with experts in the given 
field is pursued. 
 In this spirit, Samuel emphasises that the law is still largely motivated by 
authority rather than by a spirit of enquiry (as it is with social theory), with perhaps the 
exception of comparative law that facilitates an appreciation of both paradigms. The 
essential firmness and self-reference of the law as a doctrine would therefore sustain 
that it is not, at least in terms of rules, much affected by other disciplines, while on the 
                                                          
8
 For a broad and insightful reference to the academic and non-academic application of interdisciplinarity, 
see R. FRODEMAN, J. THOMPSON KLEIN, C. MITCHAM (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Interdisciplinarity, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012 (first ed., 2010). 
9
 On the complexities and problems that may arise in conducting interdisciplinary research, see the 
contribution of W. SCHRAMA, How to carry out interdisciplinary legal research: Some experiences with 
an interdisciplinary research method, in Utrecht L. Rev., Vol. 7, No. 1, 2011, 147, 151 et seq., 
<http://www.utrechtlawreview.org/index.php/ulr/article/view/152/151>, who defines the basic patterns of an 
interdisciplinary methodology. See also B. M. J. VAN KLINK, H. S. TAEKEMA (eds.), Law and Method. 
Interdisciplinary Research into Law, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2011. 
10
 An example of such increasing interest for this methodology is found in the recent trend in legal studies 
of the “Critical Analysis of Law”, sometimes simply referred to as CAL, which looks at law as one of 
many disciplines while not denying its intrinsic autonomy. M. D. DUBBER, Critical Analysis of Law: 
Interdisciplinarity, Contextuality, and the Future of Legal Studies, in C.A.L., Vol 1, No 1, 2014 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2385656>. 
11
 Quite confident in this respect seems to be D. W. VICK, Interdisciplinarity and the Discipline of Law, in 
J.Law & Soc., Vol. 31, No. 2, 2004, 163, 191-193.  
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other hand the latter seem not to be particularly convinced by an innovative contribution 
of the law.12 
On the contrary, the insightful perspective that empirical research and approaches 
of diverse expertise may bring to the new understanding of the law,13 particularly 
accentuating its affiliation with society and even expanding the involvement of a wider 
range of experts,14 indeed has the merit of highlighting the law’s uniqueness. 
Either way, a variegate appraisal of different fields of knowledge is likely to be 
very profitable for the law, as it is with other disciplines.15 This is particularly valid with 
regard to copyright law and intellectual property law in general. In such peculiar 
contexts, in fact, the interaction between the law and other disciplines becomes crucial, 
whether these belong to the social sciences or the humanities, or have their place in the 
natural sciences  
On the one hand, these branches of the law are regularly investigated by a 
multitude of disciplinary angles; on the other hand, they deal directly with a multitude 
                                                          
12
 Cf. G. SAMUEL, Interdisciplinarity and the Authority Paradigm: Should Law Be Taken Seriously by 
Scientists and Social Scientists? in J.Law & Soc., Vol. 36, No. 4, 2009, 431, 439-450, 458-459,  
Cf. R. COTTERRELL, Subverting Orthodoxy, Making Law Central: A View of Sociolegal Studies, in J.Law 
& Soc., Vol. 29, 2002, 632. 
13
 For a broad analysis of the matter, among others, see B. TAMANAHA, A General Jurisprudence of Law 
and Society, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001; M. HEISE, The Importance of Being Empirical, 
in Pepp. L. Rev., Vol. 26, 1999, 807, 817. 
14
 Cf. H. COLLINS, R. EVANS, The Third Wave of Science Studies: Studies of Expertise and Experience, in 
Soc. Stud. Sci. Vol.32, 2002, 235, 238-239, 244, 271, who suggest pursuing the Studies of Expertise and 
Experience (SEE) with the express aim to «widen participation in technical decision-making». To such an 
extent they promote collaboration with those who can be labelled “experience-based experts” (refuting 
the oxymoron of “lay expertise” that instead creates more confusion), but whose expertise has not been 
officially certified. At the same time, in consideration of the field of knowledge where experts might 
operate, they distinguish “contributory expertise” from “interactional expertise”: the former is more 
appropriate in the scientific field, while the latter better suits the context of the arts. However, despite this 
enthusiastic broadening of expertise, the authors also warn against the superficial attribution of expertise, 
thus endorsing preliminary and meticulous analysis of such acknowledgement.  
Cf. N. PRIAULX, M. WEINEL, Behavior on a Beer Mat: Law, Interdisciplinarity & Expertise, in JTLP, 
Vol. 2, 2014,<http://illinoisjltp.com/journal/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Priaulx_Weinel_Behaviour-on-a-Beer-Mat_130214.pdf>, 
who, following the logics of such a theory of expertise, reiterate the advantages and the risks related to 
the use of interdisciplinary analysis in legal studies. At the same time, they underline the potentiality and 
the value of other types of interdisciplinary engagement, although limited to a precursory function to 
more mature interactional research, such as «simulation (‘crash test’) research». 
15
 J. P. STANCIL speaks of this metaphorical bridge, The Legal Academy as Dinner Party: A (Short) 
Manifesto on The Necessity of Inter-Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship, cit., 1580, who recalls that 
«legal study is inherently normative, dynamic and interdisciplinary». Cf. F. T. ARECCHI, La complessità 
nella scienza, in L. CUCCURULLO, E. MARIANI (eds), Contesti e validità del discorso scientifico, cit., 279. 
As he emphasised, «a fertile interdisciplinary approach among different scientific disciplines, each with 
its own ranges, restores a mutual respect of their description of reality, without the presumption of 
reducing them into one single description», at 285 [my translation]. 
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of subjects that belong to different fields of knowledge. Therefore, the challenge of 
«building bridges between the legal discipline and other sciences» appears extremely 
real and tangible.16 
 The idea of interdisciplinary study as a lively dialogue and interactive relationship 
among various branches of knowledge, in other words, has a decisive impact on the way 
that scholars nowadays approach copyright law. Furthermore, as the interaction of the 
law with cultural and social theories is particularly emphasised,17 so is its liaison with 
literature, although not always without clatters.18 Finally, the particular affiliation with 
literature is also corroborated by the special interest that legal scholars have 
demonstrated for the penchant of using the figures, metaphors and language of literary 
studies to illustrate legal matters, even simply with the purpose of re-dressing their 
theories in new and more appealing clothes.19 
At the same time, one must understand that “it is not all a bed of roses”. In 
essence, the route to interdisciplinarity has its own glitches and perils and, as bizarre as 
this play on words might sound, it requires discipline.20 The risk of a rushed use of 
interdisciplinarity – particularly when it takes the shape of «turning the sum of human 
knowledge into an undisciplined hotchpotch disseminated by a chaotic babble of 
                                                          
16
 W. SCHRAMA, How to carry out interdisciplinary legal research: Some experiences with an 
interdisciplinary research method, cit., 161. 
17
 See D. T. GOLDBERG, M. MUSHENO, L. C. BOWER (eds.), Between law and culture: relocating legal 
studies, Minneapolis, US: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 2001, whose primary purpose is to map and describe 
the link that exists between contemporary socio-legal and cultural studies, and thus between the law and 
culture in general. Besides, their initial question on the actual latitude of the intersections among law, 
culture and identity (Introduction, XV) stimulates the broader question of how the law indeed sees culture 
and art, but also how and to what extent the latter are influenced and shaped by the law. 
18
 For an initial assessment of the topic, see, in particular, A. SANSONE, Diritto e letteratura. 
Un’introduzione generale, Milano: Giuffrè, 2001, 753 et seq.; J. B. BARON, (1999) Law, Literature, and 
the Problems of Interdisciplinarity 108 Yale L.J., 1059, 1061. Cf. G. ROSSI (ed.), Il diritto nella 
letteratura rinascimentale europea. Percorsi di ricerca interdisciplinare, Padova: Cedam, 2004. 
19
 The familiarity of law and literature is well described by I. WARD, From literature to ethics. The 
strategies and ambitions of law and literature, in O.J.L.S., Vol. 14, No. 3, 1994, 389-390, who recalls the 
difference between the views of law as literature and law in literature. While the former considers legal 
texts as «pieces of literature», the latter suggests «the use of literary texts and narrative fiction as a 
supplement to […] ‘legal’ texts, to better facilitate jurisprudential discourse and understanding». Cf. S. 
LEVINSON, Law as Literature, in Tex. L. Rev., Vol. 60, 1982, 273. 
20
 See H GADLIN, L. M. BENNETT, Interdisciplinarity without Borders, in G. BAMMER (ed.), Disciplining 
interdisciplinarity: integration and implementation sciences for researching complex real-world 
problems, Australian National University, Acton: ANU E-Press, 2013, 417, <http://press.anu.edu.au?p=222171>, 
who also give praise for being «careful [enough] not to slip into the elitist assumption that those who 
know the most know the best», at 425.  
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contending voices with erratic levels of authority and expertise» - is real and even seems 
exacerbated by technological inputs.21 
Additionally, when interdisciplinarity incidentally enters the courtroom, 
magistrates have indeed to evaluate expert findings and understand the actual meaning 
of different subjects’ theories.22 In this regard, it has been pointed out how expert 
technical and scientific knowledge has dramatically increased over recent decades and, 
conversely, the relevance of common knowledge that is expected to characterise the 
average person seems to have diminished.23 For instance, there is a tangible risk of 
misinterpreting evidence, which places the emphasis on the need to be extremely careful 
with too much confidence in non-legal findings.24 The idealisation of science can be as 
dangerous as its ignorance, but the same can be inferred with its misconstruction.25 
 
 
 
                                                          
21
 J. MORAN, Interdisciplinarity, cit., Preface.  
22
 See S. JASANOFF, What Judges Should Know about the Sociology of Science in Jurimetrics J., Vol. 32, 
1992, 345. 
23
 Cf. B. RADOS, P. GIANNINI, La consulenza tecnica nel processo civile, Milano: Giuffrè, 2013, 37–38, 
who, referring particularly to the Italian system, wonder whether it is correct to say that the judge is still a 
«peritus peritorum» or rather a «servus peritorum». See also M. TARUFFO, V. ANSANELLI, La prova nel 
processo civile, Milano: Giuffrè, 2012, 1052-1055, who ponder over the reliability and accuracy of expert 
knowledge, especially within the civil law procedural system. Cf. V. ANSANELLI, La consulenza tecnica 
nel processo civile: problemi e funzionalità, Milano: Giuffrè, 2011. 
On the role of expert witnesses, particularly with regard to the US system, see the earlier contribution of 
P. HUBER, Galileo's Revenge: Junk Science in the Courtroom, New York: Basic Books, 1993, who 
attempts to trace the origins of what he labels “junk science”, namely the pseudo-science of compromised 
or faulty findings of which lawyers often take advantage and which courts, by reflex, incorporate in their 
judgements.  
24
 See G. EDMOND, Constructing Miscarriages of Justice, in O.J.L.S.,  2002, Vol. 22, No. 1, 53, 69-70, 
who, despite focusing on the application of such caution in the context of criminal law, warns against the 
perilous extreme idealisation of natural science and consequently the handling of scientific evidence by 
magistrates. Similar conclusions are reached, again in the criminal law field, in J. DE KEIJSER, H. 
ELFFERS, Understanding of forensic expert reports by judges, defence lawyers and forensic professionals, 
in P.C. & L., Vol. 18, 2012, 191. 
25
 See E. MERTZ, Undervaluing Indeterminacy: Legal Translations of Social Science, in DePaul L. Rev., 
Vol. 60, 2011, 397, <http://via.library.depaul.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1132&context=law-review>., who notes how 
vagueness remains a challenging issue for an efficient dialogue between law and other social sciences, 
particularly when the former is mistaken in understanding the peculiar intrinsic indeterminacy of the latter 
but has no difficulty in acknowledging its own. To validate her arguments, focusing on translation 
difficulties that arise from interdisciplinary approaches, she suggests paying greater attention to the 
specific linguistic patterns that characterise each discipline. 
Cf. D. S. CAUDILL, Ethnography and the Idealized Accounts of Science in Law, in San Diego L. Rev., Vol. 
39, 2002, 269; H. M. COLLINS, Researching spoonbending: concepts and practice of participatory 
fieldwork, in C. BELL, H. ROBERTS (eds.), Social Researching: Politics, Problems, Practice, London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984, 54-69. 
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1.1  An interdisciplinary approach to misattribution of authorship 
 
All these premises serve well for the proposed aim of depicting and explaining 
authorship misattribution precisely from an interdisciplinary viewpoint. The 
controversial nature of plagiarism and the critical need for flexibility of approaches in 
fact appear to function as an additional trigger, insisting on a method of analysis that 
looks at more than one perspective, and suggesting new criteria of evaluation that are 
therefore required, and the interdisciplinary process appears to be not just appropriate 
but indispensable. 
Consequently, the uncertainty of the concept and its related issues advocates the 
idea of embracing plagiarism as a very interdisciplinary phenomenon, as genuine or 
reproachable as it could be.26 The salutation of a more conscious understanding of 
misattribution, in fact, on the one hand, welcomes an appropriate distinction among the 
many faces of imitation; on the other, it seems to convey a necessary distinctiveness 
between a copying conduct that solely affects the personal interest of proper authorship 
attribution and an act that additionally undermines the economic interests of the work.27  
These apprehensions certainly concern the jurists, particularly when plagiarism 
goes to trial, but they also directly regard literates, artists and, more generally, experts of 
different disciplines, who are often involved in misattribution controversies, all united 
by the contrasting attitude of establishing the basis for the applicable sanctions or 
offering the foundation for relieving the misattributing conducts from all constraints. 
There seems, in fact, to be adequate scope to appraise different instances of 
misattribution, which should not all be treated the same. As a result, it is conceivable 
that certain conduct may amount to an infringement of someone’s rights that the law 
should protect, even only as a mere violation of the moral right in the work, as well as 
                                                          
26
 To such an extent, some have suggested linking all its possible expressions to the model of 
«contrafactum», which would then include any taking or mocking that at the same time deliberately 
endorses or rejects the liaison with the original work. G. PERON, A. ANDREOSE (eds.), Contrafactum. 
Copia, imitazione, falso, cit., X-XI. 
27
 Those who strongly advocate an essential estrangement between plagiarism and counterfeiting certainly 
welcome this concluding recommendation, evidently as long as the conduct of either plagiarism or 
counterfeiting is directly and unmistakably identifiable as such. Nonetheless, the radical exclusion of any 
association between the two seems, however incorrect, will be better explained in Chapters 4 and 5. 
Cf. Z. O. ALGARDI, La tutela dell’opera dell’ingegno e il plagio, cit., 368-370, and 424. According to the 
author, such an approach is not flawless, since it only applies to those circumstances in which the conduct 
is easily identifiable and straightforward. 
  
92 
 
entailing a violation of the economic rights. However, the same conducts may indeed 
refute any illicitness and rather consists in a dishonest and unethical behaviour.28 
In other words, the interdisciplinary approach to plagiarism implies an 
understanding of the benefit that a wide-ranging and knowledge-based exploration of 
the issues related to attribution represents.29 To such a degree, it appears pertinent to 
examine the estimations provided by the experts of each applicable field, with reference 
both to the theories that accurately apply to plagiarism in those specific areas and to 
what they conjecture with regard to the legal assessment of the subject. 
Among all disciplines, contemporary art seems to be the perfect case in point; at 
least to the extent that it provides several examples in which attribution has either been 
celebrated or negated, providing the best environment for plagiarism conduct.30 
Regarding its celebration, starting from the view that it is vital to art, as well as to 
progress,31 there is a fairly widespread impression that plagiarism may be considered 
one of the many creative exemplifications of art, if not even a way of actually 
appreciating the original art.32  
The general considerations were previously made in relation to 
interdisciplinarity with respect to the artistic context.33 The relationship between law 
                                                          
28
 On this last point, see also R. POSNER, The little book of plagiarism, cit., 17-21, and 37-43.  
29
 Once more, similar confidence in the experts’ analysis is in part due to the incidence that a mere legal 
consideration of whichever copyright issue has been evaluated risks ignoring its multidimensional sides. 
This is particularly true with misattribution, where the firm lens of the law is likely to take an unnecessary 
and perilous distance from the actual representation of art and creativity. 
30
 The proclivity of art to justify and even proclaim misattribution may be summarised in the words of 
who believe that appropriation is the very basic artistic standard, to the point that reutilisation outreaches 
original creation and grants autonomous value to borrowed art. On this, see L. BLISSET, P per plagio, 
A.A. (eds.) Vero è falso. Plagi, cloni, campionamenti e simili, cit., 141. Cf. G. MARZIANI, 
Contemporanea-mente poplagiaristi, A.A (eds.) Vero è falso. Plagi, cloni, campionamenti e simili, cit., 
39–40. 
31
 As it was argued: «[…] le plagiat est nécessaire. Le progrès l’implique. Il serre de prés la phrase d’un 
auteur, se sert de ses expressions, efface une idée fausse, la remplace par l’idée juste». COMTE DE 
LAUTRÉAMONT, Poésies II, Paris: Librairie Gabrie, Balitout, Questroy et Cie, 1870, 6. 
32
 The multiple expressions of misattribution extend to the notion of it as diversion, which in the fifties 
will become an actual artistic movement of a passionate proclamation of plagiarism, called détournement. 
See S. OUTPUT, Plagiarismo, il mondo è nuovo, cit., 125. Cf. D. GUY-ERNEST, G. J. WOLMAN. Methods of 
Détournement in Les Lèvres Nues, 8 May 1956. Translated by Ken Knabb. 
33
 Cf. A. SARAT, Crossing boundaries: from disciplinary perspectives to an integrated conception of legal 
scholarship, in ID. (ed.), Law in the Liberal Arts, Ithaca, US: Cornell University Press, 2005, 84 et seq. 
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and art,34 in fact, is a perfect example of how legal and non-legal disciplines interact 
with each other’s rules and functioning, especially when their contrasting bond is 
brought before the court.35 Despite their manifest and logical autonomy, they often 
overlap, when we consider either the way the law aims to regulate and shape art, or how 
art wishes to depict and represent the law.36 Furthermore, eventually legal discourse on 
art may also enter the realm of ethics.37 In this regard, despite the instances in which 
artists themselves declare “an art of misattribution”, there are still some grounds to 
foresee certain boundaries, particularly when a creative selection of others’ material 
takes the place of a verbatim reproduction of their works.38  
  Similar considerations apply to other fields of knowledge. Moving from the 
world of fine arts to musical works, for instance, things do not change much. Borrowing 
                                                          
34
 Such intertwining therefore reduces the seeming distance, which becomes explicit when typical legal 
issues such as copyright and related rights in the work are considered. For a review of scholarly works 
that have investigated the various intersections of law and the arts, see C. H. FARLEY, Imaging the Law, in 
A. SARAT, M. ANDERSON, C. O. FRANK (eds.), Law and the Humanities: An Introduction, Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010, 292–312.  
These articulations of art and law’s interaction are efficaciously illustrated in C. DOUZINAS, L. NEAD, Law 
and the Image: The Authority of Art and the Aesthetics of Law, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1999, where the former is labelled “law’s art” and the latter “art’s law”, at 11. Cf., for an exemplification 
of such intertwining, A. YOUNG, Judging the Image: Art, Value, Law, London: Routledge, 2005.   
35
 Besides, even beyond the courtroom, the role of experts seems particularly relevant when dealing with 
works of art. See R. D. SPENCER, The expert versus the object: judging fakes and false attributions in the 
visual arts, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004, which focuses on the process of authentication, 
namely attributing a certain work to an artist, a movement or an epoch. 
Interesting contributions on the subject are not lacking. See, among the latest, B. BOESCH, M. STERPI 
(eds.), The Art collecting legal handbook, London: Thomson Reuters, 2013, with a manifest international 
perspective; J. B. PROWDA, Visual Arts and the Law: A Handbook for Professionals, London: Ashgate 
Publishing, 2013, for a narrower US perspective on visual art.  
36
 See, among earlier works on the topic, S. J. DRUCKER, G. GUMPERT, Museums without walls: property 
rights and reproduction in the world of cyberspace, in S. W TIEFENBRUN, Law and the arts, Contributions 
in legal studies, no. 87, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1999, 47-66, which also offers an 
interesting view of digitalisation of art. 
37
 This particular aspect will be better discussed in the next paragraphs. However, for a preliminary 
background, see, in particular, O. BEN-DOR, Law and Art: Justice, Ethics and Aesthetics, Abingdon, 
Oxon, UK; New York, US: Routledge-Cavendish, 2013 (first ed., 2011); J. H. MERRYMAN, A. E. ELSEN, 
Law, ethics, and the visual arts, London and New York: Kluwer Law International, 2002 (first ed., 1979), 
which also offers a dedicated analysis of the artist’s moral rights at 305-382. 
38
 S. HOME, Nessuno osi chiamarlo plagiarismo, A.A. (eds) Vero è falso. Plagi, cloni, campionamenti e 
simili, cit., 121-122. Besides, others claim that the true scope of creativity is to learn how to use and 
reproduce the creations of others. See, in this respect, C. MASI, L’iperestetica del plagio, cit., 36. 
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from others’ notes and using the same tune may seem not only natural, given the 
extreme derivative nature of compositions, but also sometimes inevitable.39  
 Nevertheless, compared to the more malleable outlook of art, in the musical 
context misattribution attracts a larger portion of the blame, certainly exacerbated by the 
concerted worries of the more lucrative concerns of the music industry.40 In addition, 
music allows a reconnection with the earlier discussed notions of the relationship that 
occurs between legal and non-legal approaches, where, in the end, their respective 
views may not collide. One example of this clash is foreseen in the dissimilar evaluation 
offered to music production, as well as the mechanisms of its protection, which seem to 
foster some theory of copyright unfairness.41 
In particular, according to some, the law seems to have forgotten that intellectual 
products are largely the result of appropriation practices. This concept is well and 
interestingly explained by Frith’s image of:  
An age of plunder in which music made in one place for one 
reason can be immediately appropriated in another place for 
quite another reason, but also that while music can be shaped 
                                                          
39
 Misattributing practices in the musical environment are in fact sometimes reconnected to psychological 
motives. For a first account of the issue, see R. BADER (ed.), Musical Acoustics, Neurocognition and 
Psychology of Music - Musikalische Akustik, Neurokognition und Musikpsychologie. Current Research in 
Systematic Musicology at the Institute of Musicology, University of Hamburg - Aktuelle Forschung der 
Systematischen Musikwissenschaft am Institut für Musikwissenschaft, Universität Hamburg, Frankfurt am 
Main, Berlin, Bern, Bruxelles, New York, Oxford, Wien: Lang, 2009. 
40
 D. SUISMAN, Selling sounds: the commercial revolution in American music, Cambridge, Mass.; 
London: Harvard University Press, 2012 (first ed., 2009), who revisits the history of music commodities 
and the music industry as a whole in order to make light of their contemporary meaning and function. 
41
 Such alleged unfairness may arise from the tendency to discourage certain methods of making music, 
such as improvisation, variation and sampling, or to foster disparity among musicians, especially between 
those who have greater commercial power. S. FRITH, L. MARSHALL, Music and Copyright, Hoboken: 
Taylor and Francis, 2013 (first ed., Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004), 124, who also argue 
that the law has essentially privileged Western compositional music production rather than the non-
Western traditional one. 
On the contrary, there seems to be greater awareness to shield more carefully music in the context of 
traditional knowledge. See, in this regard, B. BOATENG, The copyright thing doesn't work here: Adinkra 
and Kente cloth and intellectual property in Ghana, First peoples: new directions in indigenous studies, 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011. Cf. A. A. AGORDOH, African music: traditional and 
contemporary, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2005; M. RILEY, Indigenous intellectual property 
rights: legal obstacles and innovative solutions, Contemporary Native American communities Vol. 10, 
Walnut Creek, Calif., USA: Altamira Press, 2004. 
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by the people who first make and use it, as experience it has a 
life of its own».42  
Undoubtedly, the creative process in itself, regardless of the specific work at 
issue, has evolved and much of its evolution is due to the prominent interference of 
technological changes, as well as a more or less conscious endorsement by society.43 
However, authorship misattribution seems to receive a completely different type 
of attention from art and other intellectual disciplines than that which it receives from 
the law. This may also point towards the fact that if the law does not give proper 
account to the multiplicity of attitudes showed by other disciplines towards 
misattribution, there is a serious risk that, as happens with other subjects of copyright, 
an uncompromising approach would also facilitate the infringement of someone’s 
rights.44  
Consequently, the next coherent step would be pondering over the actual 
feasibility of consenting to an assorted approach to addressing authorship 
misattribution. In particular, the combination of expert guidelines and social norms, in 
addition to, or sometimes in place of, legal rules, appears to be a proper response, given 
that, on a larger scale, social norms for the acknowledgement of authorship support the 
moral expectation of artists that their works will be credited to them. In fact, as Ng 
suggests, «the goal of the copyright system ultimately is, and should be, about 
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 S. FRITH, Music and identity, in S. HALL, P. DU GAY (eds.), Questions of Cultural Identity, London; 
Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1996, 109, <http://faculty.georgetown.edu/irvinem/theory/Frith-Music-and-Identity-1996.pdf>.  
For an historical illustration on the controversial entanglement of music and law, see E. CUTLER, A 
manual of musical copyright law: for the use of music-publishers and artists, and of the legal profession, 
London: Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent, 1905, <https://archive.org/details/manualofmusicalc00cutl>. 
43
 See, in particular, S. GREENFIELD, G. OSBORN, Law, music and the creative process, in S. GREENFIELD, 
G. OSBORN (eds.), Readings in Law and Popular Culture, Routledge Studies in Law, Society and Popular 
Culture, London: Routledge, 2013, 310-324, who analyse the fundamental steps of such developments, 
also focusing on how new technologies (including digitisation) have increasingly altered not only the way 
people conceive and consume music products but also the manner in which the concept of authorship is 
understood. 
Cf. R. TARUSKIN, The danger of music and other anti-utopian essays, Berkeley and Los Angeles; 
London: University of California Press, 2010 (first ed., 2008), who also scrutinise the influence of 
external factors, such as the role of critics, in contemporary composition and performance. 
44
 Such a possibility, as we shall see, may not to be impeded by a more steady legal designation of 
plagiarism or any legal applicable rules. Nonetheless, a clearer stance of the law would be yet very 
welcome. 
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improving the social and educational conditions of individuals and society [thus] with 
strong moral and ethical undertones».45  
 
 
2 Understanding plagiarism through social norms 
 
Unquestionably, copyright and, more generally, intellectual property, play a significant 
role in society.46 Ascribing a clear and explicit social drive to copyright thus strengthens 
the perception that many of its aspects deserve an assessment that exceeds a strictly 
legal viewpoint. As a consequence, there seems to be enough latitude, even with regard 
to misattribution practices, to demand an approach that escapes an excessively rigorous 
mesh of the law, but not to the extent that its involvement should be entirely denied. 
In this regard, it is essential to understand the effect that social norms may have 
on copyright and in particular on misattribution. A proper estimation of social norms, in 
fact, seems to facilitate a more accurate understanding of people’s behaviour in the 
copyright environment and accordingly guide the interpreter towards conducts of 
plagiarism.  
To serve such purpose, it is first important to define the meaning and the scope 
of social norms in general and then see their specific connotation within the context of 
copyright and misattribution. A valuable definition of social norm, for instance, is 
provided by Posner who describes it as «a rule that distinguished desirable and 
undesirable behaviour and gives a third party the authority to punish a person who 
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 A. NG, Copyright law and the progress of science and the useful arts, Elgar Law, Technology and 
Society series, Cheltenham; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2011, 20, who underlines that these are the 
moral and ethical rules that define the acceptance or not of certain conducts. 
46
 With an emphasis on the Italian system, this assumption is confirmed by an express ruling of the 
Constitutional Court, which affirmed that creative works of the mind have a constitutional status, and so 
their protection is of constitutional interest (Soc. Emi it. c Soc. Cd Sound, 6 April 1995, Const. Court. n. 
108, [1995] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 81; [1995] Annali it. dir. autore 348, [1995] Foro it. I 1724, 
[1995] Impresa 758, [1995] Cons. Stato II 603, [1995] Giust. civ. I 1423, [1995] Arch. civ. 934, [1995] 
Dir. ind. 887, [1995] Dir. inf. 594, [1995] Giur. costit. 876, [1995] Riv. dir. ind. II 247, [1995] Dir. 
autore 421.). Cf., with regard to the constitutionality of Italian copyright law, V. CARIANELLO, Profili di 
legittimità costituzionale della legge sul diritto di autore nelle sentenze della Corte Costituzionale, Dir. 
radiodiff. telecom. 1988, 91, who analyses some of the most relevant case law on the subject. 
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engages in the undesirable behaviour», where the authority has a private and not public 
nature, as it is instead with the law.47 
The topic is among the most complex, and the literature dealing with social 
norms is copious.48 Preliminarily, leaving aside the theories that expressly deal with the 
dissimilar implication of choosing one or the other denomination,49 for the purpose of 
the present analysis, the terms social norm and social rule will be treated as 
synonymous.50  
Acknowledging the visible link between law and society,51 and the configuration 
of social norms in terms of «foundations of social order»,52 there is yet some latitude to 
foresee important distinctions and therefore to draw a few lines between legal and social 
                                                          
47
 E. A. POSNER, Law and social norms. Cambridge; London: Harvard University Press, 2000. 
48
 For a broad and recent recap, see the collection of essays edited by M. XENITIDOU, B. EDMONDS, The 
complexity of social norms, Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2014. See also S. A. HETCHER (ed.), 
Norms in a Wired World, Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Law series, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004, 1, 149 et seq., who places particular attention on the proximity of social norms 
and customary law, on the condition that the social practice of custom is obligatory. 
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 Regardless of the abundant contribution to the issue, there is still little consensus on it. See, for 
instance, C. HORNE, Sociological perspectives on the emergence of social norms, in M. HECHTER, K. D. 
OPP (eds.), Social Norms, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2001. Beyond their distinctiveness, for 
instance, from categories of norms that have a moral or religious basis, they are often seen as interrelated. 
According to Sayre-McCord, for example, morality in particular has a strong influence on social conduct. 
G. SAYRE-G. MCCORD, Normative Explanations, in D. BRAYBROOKE (ed.), Social Rules, Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1996, 36. 
50
 It is still important to acknowledge that there have been many attempts to give an exact meaning to the 
term norm as distinct from the term rule. On this, see P. ROBINSON, The Rise of the Rule: Mode or Node?, 
P. COLLETT (ed.), Social Rules and Social Behaviour, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1977, 74; R. LINDSAY, 
Rules as a Bridge between Speech and Action, P. COLLETT (ed.), Social Rules and Social Behaviour, cit., 
159-173. 
51
 See H. ROSS, Law as a social institution, Legal theory today series, Oxford: Hart, 2001, who retraces 
the fundamental passages of Weberian and Hartian theories, respectively in the Sociology of Law and the 
Concept of Law. See also M. BAIER, Social and legal norms: towards a socio-legal understanding of 
normativity, Farnham, Surrey: Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2013. 
52
 A. ETZIONI, The monochrome society, Princeton, N.J., USA: Princeton University Press, 2003 (first ed., 
2001), 163-165, who underlines the importance of understanding social norms in general, particularly 
considering their aptitude to challenging the law’s enactment and enforcement. 
With a similar aim, others concluded that «sociology is supposed to recover the social link of law from 
the invisibility to which lawyers had relegated it by the development of positive law». K. A. ZIEGERT, On 
Eugen Ehrlich, Fundamental principles of the sociology of law, in A. J. TREVIÑO (ed.), Classic writings in 
law and society. Second edition reviewed and expanded, New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 
2011 (first ed., 2007), 123, 132, expressly referring to Ehrlich’s theory that law is first a law of society 
and is appropriately enacted only when social patterns are known. Cf. E. EHRLICH, Fundamental 
principles of the sociology of law, translated by W. L. MOLL [orig. Grundlegung der Soziologie des 
Rechts, München: Duncker und Humblot, 1913], with an introduction by R. Pound, Harvard studies in 
jurisprudence, Vol. 5, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1936. 
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regulation, considering that each should maintain its own autonomy.53 In other words, 
interaction between the law and social norms is, to some degree, indisputable.54 While 
the former influences or enforces the latter, the impact of social norms may also extend 
to their sway to foster the observation or violation of a given legal rule.55  
Concisely, social norms, also described in terms of «informal social regularities 
that individuals feel obligated to follow because of an internalized sense of duty, 
because of fear of external non-legal sanctions, or both»,56 certainly influence people’s 
behaviour, and the established interest of scholars in the subject seems to confirm this 
assumption.57  
In addition, they play a crucial role in designing behavioural rules, although there is less 
consensus on the appropriateness that they may substitute the law,58 precisely when we 
move from single and relatively small communities to the larger concept of society as a 
whole. Accordingly, it can be maintained that such norms define the regular and 
informal conduct of individuals that respond to a natural sense of duty, which may also 
be triggered by the dread of being sanctioned when the rules in question are violated.59  
                                                          
53
 This is well summarised by those who, although acknowledging the foundation of law in social 
practice, do not deny its normativity (89–90), thus mostly recalling the uniqueness of the law. See J. RAZ 
(ed.), The authority of law: essays on law and morality, Oxford, UK; New York, USA: Oxford University 
Press, 2009, 2012 (first ed., 1979), 115 et seq. 
54
 As Ellickson emphasises, this inherent connection is also acknowledged by legal scholars who have for 
a long time barricaded themselves behind the self-referentiality of law. R. C. ELLICKSON, The evolution of 
social norms: a perspective from the legal academy, in M. HECHTER, K. D. OPP (eds.), Social Norms, 
New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2001, 62. On this, see also V. POCAR, Il diritto e le regole sociali. 
Lezioni di sociologia del diritto. Milano: Guerrini scientifica, 1997. 
55
 M. F. SCHULTZ, Copynorms: Copyright and Social Norms, P. K. YU (ed.), Intellectual Property and 
Information Wealth: Issues and Practices in the Digital Age. Vol. 1: Copyright and Related Rights, 
Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2007, pp. 8–9, 10–11. 
56
 R. H. MCADAMS, The origin, development, and regulation of norms, in Mich. L. Rev., Vol. 96, 1997, 
338. 
57
 See P. COLLETT, Social Rules and Social Behaviour. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1977, who offers a 
synthetic but valuable recapping of the main theorists who wrote on the subject, including Hume, Kant, 
Wittgenstein and Chomscky, Fillmore and Hymes. See also R. B. CIALDINI, C. A. KALLGREN, R. R. RENO, 
A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: A Theoretical Refinement and Reevaluation of the Role of Norms 
in Human Behavior, in Adv. Exp. Soc. Psychol. Vol. 24, 1991, 201. 
58
 The confident approach of Ellickson is, for instance, criticised by those who are more sceptical towards 
the theory that the law may not even be necessary to regulate individual conduct in society. See, for 
instance, J. BRIGHAM, Order without Lawyers: Ellickson on How Neighbors Settle Disputes, [reviewing] 
R. C. ELLICKSON, Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes, in Law & Soc'y Rev., Vol. 27, 
1993, 609. 
59
 In line with these assumptions and Ellickson’s definition of social norms in terms of «[the] rule 
governing an individual’s behaviour that is diffusely enforced by third parties other than state agents by 
means of social sanctions», where social sanctions may consist, for instance, of negative hearsay, 
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However, in order for them to function properly, individuals need to accept them 
as binding, at least within the group or community to which they relate.60 Furthermore, 
since their behaviour likely responds to other prompts that also depend on the 
consideration they have of others’ conduct,61 it is essential to look at the subjective 
latitude of a norm’s acceptance and its affinity to any particular group of people, as well 
as their personal motivation to act in a certain way.62 
The pronounced attention that society directs towards plagiarism seems to 
corroborate such an instance. In particular, we regularly witness the growing interest of 
the media in alleged cases of what it often labels literary stealing, which validates the 
assumption that misattribution has always had, and still has, a remarkable impact on 
public opinion.  
Whether fictionalised, veiled by romance or improperly termed, plagiarism still 
represents an extremely fashionable issue,63 as its historical roots demonstrate, which 
also know no territorial precincts.64 It involves the various and disparate fields of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
ostracism or banishment. R. C. ELLICKSON, The evolution of social norms: a perspective from the legal 
academy, cit., 35. 
60
 As Horne highlights, the acceptance of the norms in question also depends on the social status of their 
recipients and on the selection they operate among all available rules. C. HORNE, Sociological 
perspectives on the emergence of social norms, cit., 21-25. Furthermore, individual conduct also seems to 
be influenced by power and personal interests, which suggest an assessment of social norms from a 
social, economic and historical perspective. See, on this, D. BRAYBROOKE, The Representation of Rules in 
Logic and Their Definition, in ID. (ed.) Social Rules, cit., 11-13. 
61
 Of particular interest, in this respect, are Ellickson’s studies on the social dynamics that regulate the 
conduct of individuals within the agricultural community of Shasta County, California. He concludes that 
the members of this particular group were more prone to following social norms than legal prescriptions 
because they understood the former to be more efficient and influential on the conduct of the other 
members. R. C. ELLICKSON, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta 
County, in S.L.R., Vol 38, 1986, 623. See also R. C. ELLICKSON, Order without Law: How Neightbors 
Settle Disputes. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991. 
62
 M. F. SCHULTZ, Copynorms: Copyright and Social Norms, cit., 12-17, who describes as the main 
influencial factors: Perceptions Regarding Peer Behaviour; The Number of People Perceived to Follow a 
Norm; Relevant Peer Groups; Self Interest; Reciprocity; Deterrent Strategies vs Normative Strategies. 
63
 Among Italian daily reports that have expressly addressed the subject, see G. GAGLIARDI, Il plagio da 
Beethoven a Zucchero. Quando le 7 note coincidono troppo, in La Repubblica.it, 18 August 2006 
<http://www.repubblica.it/2006/08/sezioni/spettacoli_e_ cultura/plagio/plagio/plagio.html?ref=search>; C. MORETTI, Invictus 
sembra ‘O sole mio. Gli editori della Siae: è plagio, in La Repubblica, 9 April 2010: 63; E. TREVI, Da 
celan a littell la mania del plagio La Repubblica, 31 December 2011; A. OTTANI CAVINA, Da David a 
Picasso quel sottile confine tra ispirazione e plagio, in La Repubblica, 8 January 2012; S. TIBALDI, Il 
valore creativo del plagio, in La Repubblica, 25 May 2013. 
64
 With regard to the UK overview, see E. WAGNER, «Plagiarism? No - it’s called research», The Times, 
27 November 2006; Z. STRIMPEL, «Sounds familiar: the perils of plagiarism», The Times, 7 April 2010; 
C. Kenny, «Examiner in plagiarism probe», The Sunday Times, 9 October 2011; O. KAMM, «Sometimes 
be grateful for a spot of plagiarism», The Times, 24 September 2013; C. MIDGLEY, Nice letter, a pity it 
was copied from America, in The Times, 19 July 2014. 
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knowledge and is often detected in musical works, movies, novels and other literary 
products, even politics. What's more, it seems that the inaccuracy of lexis, even by 
reporters, is in some measure explained by the strain of describing a subject that is by 
nature polychromatic.65 The voice of journalists, however, speaks also for the ordinary 
person, so it is in some sense the voice of society. 
It is worth saying that people seem to be less indulgent when misattribution 
affects literature and, in most cases, the predominant reaction is disapproval and 
condemnation towards an act that not only damages the work and its creative kernel but 
also directly harms the public and impairs culture.66 Inversely, the typically tolerant 
answer to alleged musical or artistic plagiarism reveals a different attitude. Perhaps this 
also reflects the impression that in the field of literature it is more probable that a 
deliberate substantial and verbatim copy occurs, while in music and the fine arts there 
seems to be more space for imitation and tolerable borrowing.67 
On the other hand, to describe the understanding of plagiarism by the average 
person, it may be useful to look at its definition in dictionaries, similarly to what has 
been done with regard to the concepts of creativity and originality, and 
interdisciplinarity. Very briefly, English dictionaries describe it as «the practice of 
taking someone else’s work or ideas and passing them off as one’s own»,68 or using part 
of their work and pretending it is his/her own,69 while regularly indicating it to be 
synonymous copying, infringement of copyright, piracy, theft, stealing, and 
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 Nonetheless, whether any inexactitude may to some extent be exempted, there is still a likelihood of 
enabling dangerous distortions that may instead result in hindering a proper understanding of the issue.  
However, despite this general trend of inaccuracy that features the attitude of reporters and more 
generally the media, there are also some diffused doubts as to whether the term plagiarism has been used 
in the proper way or received the right attention, as well as whether it should be a matter for the law at all. 
On this, see V. BERRUTI, Ma il problema sono le regole: si può parlare di plagio?, in La Repubblica.it, 4 
September 2007; D. GALATERIA, Furti d'autore la letteratura un immenso campo di grandi falsari, in La 
Repubblica.it, 7 July 2010. 
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 See N. BOWERS, Words for the Taking: the Hunt for a Plagiarist. New York: London: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 1997, 26, 29, who explains how, rhetorically speaking, the issue of plagiarism does not seem 
to represent a serious threat, to the point at which it becomes concrete and practically affects the author, 
who, from that exact moment, will not welcome it anymore and perhaps would even deny that he/she had 
ever suggested that imitation is in the nature of culture.  
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 J. WALKER, A. Copy This! A Historical Perspective on the Use of the Photocopier in Art, in J. P. Lesko, 
Plagiary: Cross-Disciplinary Studies in Plagiarism, Fabrication and Falsification, Michigan, USA: 
University of Michigan, 2006, 22. 
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 Oxford University Press, Oxford English Dictionary (online), cit., def. plagiarism, 
<http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/plagiarism> 
69
 Cambridge International Dictionary of English, cit., 1074, def. plagiarize. 
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appropriation. With analogous connotation in the Italian context, plagiarist conduct is 
recognised in «the publication or reproduction of others’ works», but also in the 
usurpation of the paternity of the work or even a too-close imitation that is intended to 
attribute such paternity to him/her.70 
Even so, there is a subtle awareness that, in consideration of the mutable nature 
of plagiarism, whichever measures the law may provide to regulate the phenomenon; 
these might not be sufficient or adequate to apprehend it.71 This cognisance noticeably 
opens therefore the debate about the possibility that other measures may be used 
alongside the law.72 In addition, the clash between forbearing and hostile attitudes is 
often transferred to the courtroom, where justices often find themselves enfolded in 
conflicting rulings, in which a severe deliberation of the subject alternates with a pliable 
response to the requests of the claimants.73  
All these illustrated thoughts give the idea that uncertainty is the key word of 
plagiarism;74 on the contrary, one of the main ambitions of the law is to provide 
certainty. As a consequence, alongside with a specific and needed legal response,75 
there is increasing receptiveness to welcoming more flexible responses to plagiarism, 
including recourse to a dedicated analysis by a single discipline in which misattribution 
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 Treccani, L’enciclopedia italiana (online), Vocabolario, cit., def. plagio, 
<http://www.treccani.it/vocabolario/plagio/>, <http://www.treccani.it/vocabolario/plagiare/>. 
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 These postulations additionally suggest pondering over the possibility that unconscious plagiarism may 
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that is the product of an usually conscious creative effort. See, on the latter reflection, M. BRANDER, The 
Duty of Imitation, Gateways and other essays, New York: C. Scribner’s sons, 1912.  
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 The same worries indeed emerged from searching for an exact and unequivocal meaning of creativity 
and originality, which are the crucial parameters to evaluating misattribution. However, even within this 
cautious and apparently uniform approach there are contentious situations. In fact, depending on the case, 
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 I. ALEXANDER, Inspiration or Infringement: the plagiarist in court, in L. BENTLY, J. DAVIS, J. C. 
GINSBURG (eds.), Copyright and Piracy. An Interdisciplinary Critique, cit., 3.  
Furthermore, anticipating what will then be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5, such a contrasting 
outlook of the court is, to some extent, prompted by the findings of expert witnesses, whether they are 
called to support the claims and defences of the parties or whether they are supposed to deliver an 
independent and unbiased report to the case in question. 
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 According to Bower, this peculiar uncertainty is worsened by the increasing fear of having 
unconsciously taken someone else’s work. N. BOWERS, Words for the Taking: the Hunt for a Plagiarist. 
New York: London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997, 103. 
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 See infra, Chapter 4. 
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occurs, but also resorting to social norms that may help to regulate it, in particular to 
those norms that are contextualised in copyright and commonly known as copynorms.76 
 
 
2.1 The social (and moral?) expectancy of attribution 
 
The value of copynorms consists precisely in their aptitude to embody the most 
effective and pertinent application of social rules into the realm of copyright, offering a 
new perspective on the conduct of those who engage with copyright matters. At the 
same time, this also suggests new responses to potential copyright infringement, other 
than those strictly prescribed by the law.77 Nevertheless, although copynorms are less 
visible in comparison with copyright legal rules, being «the sea we swim in when we 
think about copyright law. We don’t see them, except when they begin to break down or 
change»,78 acknowledging their role in the broader field of intellectual property and 
their capacity to work alongside the law becomes crucial, especially to the instant 
analysis. 
Their relevance seems even to grow when social norms are channelled towards 
the narrower discourse on ethics and morality. Indeed, looking at the Kelsenian 
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 The term originates from the stringent relationship that theorists have asserted between copyright and 
social norms. See M. F. SCHULTZ, Copynorms: Copyright Law and Social Norms, in P. K. YU (ed.), 
Intellectual property and information wealth: issues and practices in the digital age, cit., 203–225, who 
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 L. B. SOLUM, The Future of Copyright, cit., 1164. However, although often understood as the opposite 
of legal rules, social norms interact with the law in various way and not always conflictingly. On the one 
hand, it seems feasible to establish informal attitudes that are compliant with the conducts the law 
prescribes, and on the other, social norms may eventually suggest divergent conducts that “normalise 
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distinction between legal and non-legal norms,79 where the latter include both moral and 
social rules that adjust «the behavior of men to each other»,80 it seems advisable to try 
sifting the topic of plagiarism through the lens of some social or moral expectancy of 
attribution.81 Furthermore, even with the predictable scepticism that this conclusion may 
attract, social norms, whether they include or complement moral standards, within the 
copyright context are still deeply entangled with legal principles and detailed legal 
parameters.82 
With exact reference to plagiarism, it seems pertinent to look at what Kwall has 
emphasised, explaining that a legal violation may be foreseen when a violation of 
copyright is found. Inversely, what could still emerge if no copyright infringement was 
established is the undisputable «concern for giving credit where credit is due», given 
that:  
Even within our current framework, attribution in particular 
exists as an authorship norm even if it is not explicitly codified 
in the copyright statute. Attribution violation in general and 
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 H. KELSEN, Pure theory of law. Translation from the second German edition [Reine Rechtslehre: 
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81
 An interesting example of how these concepts find an explicit field is the operation of social norms in 
stand-up comedy. See on this D. OLIAR, C. SPRINGMAN, Intellectual property norms in stand-up comedy, 
in M. BIAGIOLI; P. JASZI, M. WOODMANSEE (eds.), Making and unmaking intellectual property: creative 
production in legal and cultural perspective, Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 2011, 385–
398. See also D. OLIAR, C. SPRINGMAN, There’s no free laugh (anymore): The emergence of property 
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 Cf. D. LYONS, Ethics and the rule of law, Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
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plagiarism in particular are viewed as moral wrongs in our 
society by both authors and audience.83 
Particularly when inconsistencies between formal and informal conduct are identified, it 
yet imperative to understand what causes a similar discrepancy.84 This postulation also 
implies an acceptance of the essential part played by social rules within the complex net 
of personal interactions that feature in the law of copyright.85 
In addition, focusing on the conduct of users, the expectation of a given 
behaviour by others, which connotes social comportment in general, is significantly 
accentuated.86 When such expectancy is frustrated, social sanctions apply and, although 
informal or conventional, they still react to the anticipated violation of the norm.87 
Whether infringement is deliberate or unwanted, a response of sanctioning may, but not 
necessarily, occur,88 also depending on the instance that individuals know the rule in 
question.89  
In brief, society has, in itself, the capacity to foist and eventually enforce the 
rules that affect the behaviour of its members, which is consistent with the idea that 
formal legal rules are not the only source of regulation.90 Moreover, if the intervention 
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of the law is neither always necessary nor appropriate, this does not imply that the law 
is never welcome. Nonetheless, in cases where informal contrivances are more effective 
and efficient to ensure that certain rules are followed, there seems to be less necessity to 
advocate the intervention of the law. On the contrary, the law’s inquisitive attitude may 
be needed when informal regulation is not capable of providing effectiveness and 
efficiency towards observance of the norms.91 
With regard to the acknowledgement of authorship, which has its legal 
countenance in the right of attribution, the correspondent social rule is embodied by the 
social norm of attribution. First, this norm grants authors the social praise of being 
credited for their works of mind. Second, it allows other people to borrow someone 
else’s works insofar as they always acknowledge authorship of the taken works to their 
original author.92 However, while the former attitude of the norm seems to be of a more 
immediate understanding, the latter instead requires further specification. Embracing a 
connotation of copynorm as an instrument to moderate and integrate formal copyright, 
on the topic of plagiarism in particular it can be inferred that they may contribute to 
filling the current gaps in the law.  
When such social expectancy is voided because there is disagreement about 
recognising the authorship of the proper author, a violation of the norm of attribution 
occurs taking the shape of plagiarism, which Schultz thoroughly defines as a serious 
breach of this exact norm.93 Therefore, the favourable situation in which the norm is 
respected is a balanced one, since it embodies the standard behaviour for borrowing or 
copying someone else’s work. Contrarily, such balance appears broken when the parties 
do not share the same endorsement or even interest in the norm and, overall, one of 
them infringes it, although not surprisingly for the very same reason that motivates the 
former: acknowledgement.94 
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2.2 The role of ethics and the hesitant close for right and wrong 
 
As we have seen, the norm of attribution originates from the individual aspiration to be 
credited for the work he/she has created and therefore from his/her craving for 
reputation. With the careful attention that this requires, we may argue that both social 
and moral expectations support the ethical acknowledgement of authorship,95 here 
assuming the meaning of ethical as referring to the relations that occur between 
individuals.96  
In other words, individuals are encouraged to create because recognition 
functions as an incentive for creation. However, when the result of this process is 
hindered by conducts of misattribution, the marvel of creation indeed seems weakened 
and, regardless of any definite reference to the law, some thoughts and feelings may 
straight away enflame our sense of right and wrong. 
Additionally, detailed enquiries on ethical issues in the milieu of copyright seem 
not to be lacking, especially in their explicit link to technology and electronic 
information.97 Some have placed great emphasis on this exact argument, especially 
when one considers the million-dollar question of whether technology has actually 
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changed our moral perception, and thus social normativity, of what is right and wrong 
with regard to intellectual property and property rights in general.98  
Indeed, the fear that morality may intentionally be abused to justify certain 
behaviour that otherwise would be reproached appears less remote and unrealistic.99 
Nevertheless, it appears equally logical to fear that the potential abuse may work the 
other way round. In fact, a cry for morality could also hide an equally abusive attempt to 
push copyright law to sanctioning conducts that would otherwise be acceptable. 
 Likewise, considering the slowness of the law to adapt to technological changes 
and its fallacy in responding to non-legal demands, in the meantime a settled expansion 
of ethics may be a possible next step forward, bringing back onto the scene some 
familiar concepts, such as that of imitation, which we have seen dominating the broader 
literary context. Genuine imitation, in fact, seems to virtually exclude any serious 
allegations of plagiarism or copyright infringement, but there could be instances in 
which the borrowing may still imply «an ethical loss of credibility».100 
In this sense, plagiarism truly appears in its ethical apparel, particularly when 
one focuses on the values that appear to have been frustrated, which seems not to be 
limited to the individual sphere of the person that is allegedly plagiarised, but also 
                                                          
98
 This seems even more convincing when morality is beckoned to sustain typical legal arguments, and 
therefore when moral considerations are added to the legal ones, not necessarily in their substitution. See 
A. KEEN, The cult of the amateur: how blogs, Myspace, YouTube and the rest of today's user-generated 
media are destroying our economy, our culture, and our values, London Nicholas Brealey Publ., 2011, 
145, who argues that «passing off others’ writings as one’s own is not only illegal, in most cases, but 
immoral». 
Moreover, on what is generally known as computer ethics, see, in particular, D. A. SEALE, Why do we do 
it if we know it’s wrong? A structural model of software piracy, in A. SALEHNIA (ed.), Ethical issues of 
information systems, Hershey, Pa.; London: IRM Press, 2002, 120, 135-136, who foresees social norms 
as a «predictor of pirating behavior», at the same time evaluating the different attitudes that people appear 
to show towards the “theft” of tangible or intellectual property. See also M. DURANTE, Il futuro del web: 
etica, diritto, decentramento. Dalla sussidiarietà digitale all’economia dell’informazione in rete, Torino: 
Giappichelli, 2007; and M. Warren, W. Hutchinson, Cyberspace ethics and information warfare, in A. 
SALEHNIA (ed.), Ethical issues of information systems, cit., 154, explaining why cyberspace poses new 
ethical dilemmas. 
99
 See on this R. SPINELLO, Beyond copyright: a moral investigation of intellectual property protection in 
cyberspace, cit., 27, 28, who also believes that «moral norms send a much clearer signal that must be 
heard», at 44.  
100
 J. E. PORTER, Rhetorical ethics and internetworked writing, cit., 122, who expressly demands «an ethic 
for electronic writing», at xiii. Besides, he also suggests (at 1-2) that the inadequacy of the law is due to 
the fact that the copyright system depends very much on assumptions that, since it was first created to 
regulate traditional print, there may be some inevitable difficulties in accomplishing futher digital 
instances. 
  
108 
 
looking at the overall interest of the public not to be deceived by misattributing 
practices.101 
On similar grounds, there has been a diffused attempt to use the arguments 
illustrated above to support a connotation of plagiarism in terms of stealing. Indeed, 
beginning with the provocative assumption that plagiarism would take the shape of 
literary theft, the immediate and unavoidable question would then be, however, what 
exactly is stolen by this conduct. Among others, Green wonders if one can affirm that 
plagiaristic conduct fulfills the concept of theft in its strictly legal meaning or if instead 
it conceivably satisfies an ethical definition of burglary.102 
Some have suggested that the object of stealing could be the consideration that 
people have of a certain author, namely the reputation that such an author has acquired 
through the work. Besides, even accepting its etymological affinity to theft, the latter 
should indeed merely be regarded as a metaphor, without broadening improperly its 
precise criminal meaning to the extent of plagiarism. This conclusion appears 
additionally supported by the fact that the law had many opportunities to punish it 
precisely as theft, but never did; possibly because it was indeed aware of the limits that 
its criminalisation would have entailed.103 
Nevertheless, there is still a considerable inclination by the general public to 
regard plagiarism as criminal conduct, which is perhaps encouraged by the fictional 
outlawing of the act of copying that is narrated in novels, scripts and movies.104 In many 
instances, in fact, plagiarism has indeed been labelled as a crime and the person who has 
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copied someone else’s work as the perpetrator of such offence.105 Stuart P. Green, in 
particular, gives a detailed elucidation of the issue, explaining how the scope and 
defence of the archetype of theft with respect to misattribution are extremely limited.106  
Even beyond the express details of his theory, a potential firm felonious 
sanctioning of the phenomenon still unquestionably demands certain clarifications, 
especially since it is placed in a criminal setting that by its nature would require extreme 
caution. Indeed, aside from the query of what precisely is appropriated, more doubts 
arise when we envision the possible legal consequences of foreseeing it as a criminal 
offence.107 
At the same time, this does not infer that the notions of creativity and originality 
should always be sacrificed, or that any conduct may be deemed admissible.108 On the 
contrary, it may be inferred that the promotion of learning, also through the protection 
of creative contribution, is precisely the reason that misattribution should be the object 
of a more cautious and mature assessment, which begins with the recognition of the 
relevant role played by social norms on this regard. 
There are at least two main reasons why this is accurate. First, the informal 
network of copynorms encounters the legal boundaries, particularly when more than one 
system is considered. Second, the inherent element of the incentive process that 
traditionally features copyright systems can easily be stretched to reach the embrace of 
authors’ rights systems, even if not necessarily with the exact same contours. The 
incentive, truthfully, may take the outline of the economic reward, but it may also have 
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a personal nature, with, consequently, its violation having certain moral 
consequences.109 
Such a careful approach, indeed, is deliberately endorsed by the suggestion that 
plagiarism may be first seen as a social or ethical wrong, before being considered in its 
legal dimension. Informal norms, in fact, prescribe specific conducts and provide certain 
sanctions for their violation, which may conversely affect the reputation of the same 
infringer. According to Cooter, such sanctions include ostracism, banishment and 
contempt, but also condemnation and blame – all measures that may also become of 
interest for the court that will eventually be handling it.110 
Indeed, it is not always a perfect and flawless picture, and informal sanctions 
may not be sufficient to solve the conflict, especially in cases of established indifference 
towards other peers’ judgement or towards the possibility of receiving an informal 
punishment. The efficacy and efficiency of norms, which guarantee the full success of 
the norm itself,111 moreover, seem to be strictly dependent on personal or social 
benefits. Therefore, if an individual has no interest in following it, the chances that the 
norm would reach its goal is apparently lower and, in such instances, the social norm 
will most likely, fail.112 
As a result, one may wonder what happened when informal norms do not reach 
their potential efficacy and, in that case, whether there are other possible measures to 
take in order to protect the rights or the simple expectancies of creators. Above and 
beyond the legal dimension, a different response may be found in the realm of 
technology and its multifarious set-up of measures.  
This resort, moreover, is particularly expected when one considers the range and 
influence of technological change that have increasingly either permitted or banned a 
number of acts that were previously unknown by copyright. Technological 
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transformation, in fact, increases the uncertainty that already features copyright and 
misattribution, urging a careful reassessment of the applicable setting. Therefore, a 
watchful assessment of technological inference on attribution and plagiarism, including 
the analysis of the interaction between ethics and technology, appears essential. 
 
 
3 The impact of new technologies on the creative process 
 
The interaction that exists between ethics and technology is mainly discussed in the 
analysis of what is summarised in the notion of cyber ethics, which characterise the 
conduct of users and their lively expenditure of technological instruments. More to the 
point, cyber ethics may integrate and sometimes even substitute the formal involvement 
of the law, but also take the place of a similar firm and rigid regulation through 
technology.113 This, of course, does not imply that the ethical or the technological 
responses are the only possible answer. Indeed, it rather suggests that a responsible mix 
of all types of rules must be contemplated.114 
Such reflections are even more compelling when one considers the extreme 
likelihood in which technology evolves, which clearly demands a constant reassessment 
of the rules envisioned to apply to it. This is also explained by observing how the 
conduct of individuals and users has changed over time.115 Indeed, artists deliberately 
use technology as a powerful instrument of creation.116 Moreover, the great expansion 
of technology seems to have shaped a new concept of creativity, which may not be 
confined to any traditional categorisation, but have been labelled artistic but can easily 
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also be linked to the particular way in which the artist uses a certain technique and 
technology.117 
However, the possibilities offered by the new digital world, including the chance 
that a conventional and, to some extent, limited handling of the text could be substituted 
by a more personalised and unexpected use thereof are even likely to increase, to some 
extent suggesting that something like a revival of orality is taking place.118 In particular, 
as Lessig suggests, orality is still an essential component of some cultures, where the 
rise and development of traditional knowledge are characterised by a continuous 
exchange of cultural information. In such a context, borrowing seems to be a predictable 
practice and the increasing use of digital instruments indeed appears to promote citation 
and the remix of creative works with separate and sometimes indistinguishable 
authorship.119 
Consequently, an epoch of conscious misattribution could be foreseen, although 
not necessarily and always reproached. In this regard, the interaction between 
technology and society first, and between technology and law second, is undeniable.120 
Technology represents, in fact, one of the means through which society operates. 
Besides, it represents an instrument to pursue determinant goals but it could also be a 
powerful danger.121  
Pushing for continuous transformations in terms of the informal and legal rules 
surrounding it, technology indisputably offers several opportunities to engage with the 
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cyberspace of information.122 Similar considerations apply in the narrower field of 
plagiarism, which is certainly affected by this changed behaviour. The ease with which 
users can copy and paste other individuals’ work is a symptom of the phenomenon. 
However, if what has been previously argued has any relevance herein, this does not 
necessarily entail that they are infringing the rule for good. 
Besides, it can be assumed that the rules have also changed. In fact, there might 
be greater flexibility among users towards the usage of their works, which reminds of 
the previous postulation on the peculiar attitude towards misattribution by certain 
disciplines. However, until it is not clear whether individuals embolden the violation of 
the norms, or deliberately ban it, even on the mere grounds of morality or ethics alone, 
this should in any case drive the attention of the jurist to bearing in mind these trends. 
 
 
3.1 A double-edged sword: the threats and benefits of technology in copyright law 
 
Technological change has always driven the law and its development in certain 
directions, although the exact outcome of these is unclear.123 It is commonplace that the 
discovery of writing, and then the printing revolution, had a prodigious influence on 
cultural practices and learning. Similar conclusions apply to the persistent evolution that 
digital technologies operate on information. 
In particular, the standardisation of text and the possibility of obtaining multiple 
identical copies of the same text have determined considerable change, but it was only 
through the rise of informatics and digital devices that such an evolution took a different 
turn. The enhanced use of electronic and digital devices, in fact, has radically changed 
the way we interact with the work and greatly increased the chances of its alteration and 
reproduction.This is an indisputable assumption, especially in light of the flowing 
nature of both laws and technology,124 which makes the role of the interpreter, who has 
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to give the correct assessment of such an interrelation, quite challenging. Nevertheless, 
although information continually changes, the law does not always follow.125 
Such considerations appear to be perfectly applicable to copyright, where the 
technological handling of the information has a central relevance, and so to plagiarism, 
which represents one of the possible and, to some extent, undesirable outcomes of the 
digital usage of information. On similar grounds, we can observe these transformations 
with regard to the concepts of authorship and creativity, which have become both more 
advantageous and certainly more controversial than they were before such 
transformations occurred. A higher degree of versatility makes it easy to access, modify 
and use creations of the mind, which sometimes also imply omitting proper authorship 
credit.  
Besides, the challenging nature of technology noticeably augmented in the 
digital era. In fact, as has been observed, «digital technology has been changing the 
rules of the game dramatically, and users are increasingly confronted with copyright 
restrictions, which are said to conflict with norms of behaviour and general conventions 
about acts that are lawful and acts that are not».126 As one can imagine, here the gap 
between law and informal norms significantly increase.127 The extreme potentiality 
offered by the digital world, in essence, fosters a unique opportunity for the creation of 
intellectual products, which can be of an individual or collaborative nature. At the same 
time, however, it seems also effectively to weaken “the expressive diversity” of 
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intellectual creations,128 particularly when copyright enforcement is called into 
question.129 
Besides, some may want to shield the creative technological chances of 
appropriation,130 while others may instead judge them to be harmful and undesirable. 
The position of the latter is well pictured in the words of Keen, who argues that an 
undiscriminating use and re-use of others’ works essentially fails to acknowledge that 
such works were «composed or written by someone from the sweat of their creative 
brow and disciplined use of their talent».131  Recalling the metaphorical image of 
plagiarism as theft, in fact he utters: 
One can’t blame digital technology alone for (the) explosion of 
plagiarism and illegal downloading. The Web 2.0 culture grew 
up celebrating file sharing; and now it has provided, on a mass 
scale, the tools that make cheating and stealing so much easier 
and so much more tempting. Addictive, almost. After all, as 
any shoplifter will tell you, it’s a lot easier to steal if you don’t 
have to look the shopkeeper in the eye.132 
Furthermore, perhaps somehow unwittingly, his colourful articulations put the accent on 
whether plagiarism is indeed more than a mere consequence of undisciplined 
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technology, but rather the result of a more complex and robust phenomenon of our 
society, with much more distant historical origins.133  
Given these premises, it becomes necessary to strike a proper balance between 
the enthusiastic attitude towards the many possibilities offered by technology and the 
inherent risks that such potentiality comprises.134 Besides, there are many responses to 
any of these risks, which include the recourse to remedies that are typically designed 
and managed by private order.135 Such measures may entail a different kind of remedy, 
of either a formal or informal nature, where the latter includes ethical rules and codes of 
conduct on the Internet, sometimes referred to as “netiquette”.136 
The recourse to informal remedies is indeed encouraged by the doubts of those 
who explicitly argue for an insufficient and perhaps inefficient role of formal regulation 
alone, advocating a more active interaction with informal remedies,137 including those 
specially designed by technology.138 In line with such doubts, there seems to be 
increasing concern that it may be more appropriate to regulate the conduct of 
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see C. J. MILLARD, Legal protection of computer programs and data, London: Sweet & Maxwell limited, 
1985. 
136
 See, in particular, U. SIEBER, The Emergence of Information Law: Objects and Characteristics of a 
New Legal Area, cit.; but also U. SIEBER, Legal Regulation, Law Enforcement and Self-regulation: A New 
Alliance for Preventing Illegal and Harmful Contents in the Internet, Protecting our children on the 
internet: Towards a new culture of responsibility, Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000. 
137
 This belief originates from the salutation that cyberspace has its rules and consequently its own 
remedies to apply in the case that these rules are violated by users. Therefore, the intervention of the law 
is not always necessary, especially when the rules that belong to cyberspace are adjusted with the 
informal social rules that we have previously analysed. On this see, among others, C. REED, Internet Law. 
Text and Materials, London: Butterworks, 2000. 
138
 N. ELKIN-KOREN, Copyright in Cyberspace: The Rule of Law and the Rule of Code, Law, in E. 
LEDERMAN, R. SHAPIRA (eds.), Information and Information Technology, cit., 131-137. On the 
importance of necessary interaction, see U. SIEBER, The Emergence of Information Law: Objects and 
Characteristics of a New Legal Area, cit., 21. 
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individuals who interrelate in cyberspace rather than interfering with the technological 
devices that may also become instruments to perpetrate such conducts.139 
Furthermore, it seems incontestable that the traditional approach of the law in 
the pre-digital context may not fully operate in a much more multifaceted digital 
environment.140 This assumption additionally validates the idea that other rules might be 
taken into consideration. The first thought goes to the norms that include the system of 
regulation by code,141 which mostly refer to the self-regulating measures that are 
encompassed in technologies.142  
Such measures, indeed, must be discerned from those offered by law and other 
private order contexts, although they still share some common features with them.143 A 
first significant difference, for instance, is denoted in the specification that codes of 
conduct are designed to impede bad behaviour before it occurs, while generally the 
pursuit of law is more to match the infringement.144 In any case, when a particular code 
of conduct seems not to be working, there is still the prospect that a counter code 
applies, often demonstrating greater effectiveness.145 
Additionally, embracing a broader connotation of “regulation by code”, it is 
possible to include any codes or system of rules that apply to the digital environment.146 
Therefore, instead of limiting these peculiar controls to the measures offered by the 
technological means, it could be also accurate to consider it as also including social 
                                                          
139
 Cf. H. L. MACQUEEN, Copyright and the Internet, in L. EDWARDS, C. WAELDE (eds.), Law and the 
Internet. A Framework for Electronic Commerce, Oxford and Portland, Oregon: 2000, 181. 
140
 H. L. MACQUEEN, Appropriate for the Digital Age'? Copyright and the Internet: 2. Exceptions and 
Licensing, in L. EDWARDS, C. WAELDE (eds.), Law and the Internet, Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart 
Publishing, 2009, 203. 
141
 N. ELKIN-KOREN, Copyright in Cyberspace: The Rule of Law and the Rule of Code, Law, cit., 134-
135. 
142
 Similarly to what has been illustrated with reference to social norms, «constraints imposed by the 
natural and technological environment may […] effectively displace laws, and changes in technology can 
undercut a law’s effectiveness even if the law’s text remains unchanged». B. VAN SCHEWICK, Internet 
architecture and innovation, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2012 (first ed., 2010), 26. 
143
 Precisely, it is here important to anticipate that the law may, on the one hand, uphold technical 
constraints by sanctioning, for instance, attempts to circumvent them, or, on the other hand, may also 
dwindle their effectiveness by prohibiting their usage. B. VAN SCHEWICK, Internet architecture and 
innovation, cit., 26. 
144
 N. ELKIN-KOREN, Copyright in Cyberspace: The Rule of Law and the Rule of Code, Law, cit., 135. 
145
 As Spinello highlights, «correcting technology with other technology has been far more effective» R. 
SPINELLO, Cyberethics. Morality and Law in Cyberspace. Sudbury, Massachusetts: Jones and Bartlett 
Publishers, 2000, 1. 
146
 With regard to the meaning of “code”, see also U. PAGALLO, Teoria giuridica della complessità. Dalla 
“polis primitiva” di Socrate ai “mondi piccoli” dell’informatica. Un approccio evolutivo. Torino: 
Giappichelli, 2006, 153. 
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norms, economic as well as legal rules.147 At the same time, the express inclusion of 
social norms therein corroborates the earlier assumption that the role played by ethics is 
in this context one of a kind.148 
 
 
3.2 A device to protect or violate attribution 
 
Thinking of the technology factor, in particular, the first immediate concern relates to 
digital rights management (DRM),149 which allows strict control over the work and is 
essentially designed to regulate the work’s use, also by means of restricting, even 
impeding, access to it.150 Nevertheless, despite the latent downside aspects emerging 
from this outcome, there is still potential for positive implications, as such measures 
were also designed to protect the interests of individuals that put all their efforts into the 
works to which these standards apply.  
Indeed, looking strictly at the role they may have in protecting the authorship of 
the authors’ works, it is inevitable to notice that they could effectively supply what the 
conventional systems of regulation are not providing. The latter postulation, in any case, 
                                                          
147
 The power of self-regulation, which is inherent to the code to the extent that it can be considered the 
law itself, clearly encounters this issue.  
On the persistence to include more factors in the debate, see L. LESSIG, Code. Version 2.0, in New York: 
Basic Books, 2006; L. LESSIG, Free culture: «how big media uses technology and the law to lock down 
culture and control creativity», New York: the Penguin Press, 2004, 143-150. 
148
 Understandably, the law applicable to cyberspace has an intrinsic uniqueness, but not to the extent that 
it should be treated as unrelated to other areas of the law or from other fields of knowledge. This puts 
forward the need to ponder over interdisciplinary, pursuing a wise consideration of social norms and other 
modes of regulation. 
In particular, I here refer to the informal norms that appear particularly suitable for the digital world. 
Morever, concerning the subject of computer ethics, as has been already pointed out, many scholars have 
contributed to its development. See, among others, N. WIENER, Cybernetics: or Control and 
Communication in the Animal and the Machine. Cambridge, Massachusett: MIT Press, 1948, the first 
who elaborated a theory on the issue; and, among later contributions, D. JOHNSON, Computer Ethics. 
Upper Saddle River. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1994.; L. LESSIG, Code: and Other Laws of Cyberspace, 
cit.; J. MOOR, What is computer ethics?, B. TERREL WARD (ed.), Computer and Ethics,. Malden, 
Massachusett: Blackwell, 1985; M. DURANTE, Il futuro del web: etica, diritto, decentramento. Dalla 
sussidiarietà digitale all’economia dell’informazione in rete, cit. 
149
 R. CASO, Digital Rights Management - Il commercio delle informazioni digitali tra contratto e diritto 
d’autore, cit., 69-72, 75 et seq. 
150
 T. APLIN, Factoring the public interest into private enforcement of copyright: the role of TMs and 
exceptions in the EU, di M. LILLÀ MONTAGNANI, M. BORGHI (eds.), Proprietà digitale. Diritti d’autore, 
nuove tecnologie e digital rights management, Milano: Egea, 2006, 166. 
  
119 
 
is valid insofar as such measures are not a substitute for the law or other types of 
socially shared norms.  
In fact, the greater risk of endorsing a system of strict technical regulation is to 
promote what has been defined as paracopyright, in the sense that it has all the features 
of conventional copyright legal rules, but yet avoids its core and protective principles.151 
This risk plausibly also applies to misattribution, where the necessity of a proper 
balance between distinct and potentially opposing interests needs to be sought. As 
formerly explained, digital technologies allow a unique interactive relationship with the 
work, which is indeed very different from the one we used to have before 
digitalisation.152 This involves contrasting attitudes towards it. 
On the one hand, digital technologies allow new creative doings, such as, in the 
musical context, the act of sampling or mixing musical compositions, which imply an 
intervention of the work and often its alteration that may also have certain effects on the 
original way the author conceived it. On the other hand, the right of the author to be 
credited as such might be at stake, especially when there is no intention by the user who 
interacts with the original work to acknowledge authorship, or in the case that this 
acknowledgment is made extremely difficult by the very nature of the creative act. 
It is indeed ascertained that digital work, either digitalised or born, can be the 
recurrent object of misattribution.153 Technologies, in fact, together with the diffusion of 
the Internet, have brought new challenges for copyright.154 These may affect the right of 
                                                          
151On this warning, see R. CASO, Il Signore degli anelli nel ciberspazio, cit., 146 et seq. Besides, as Elkin-
Koren suggests, «Some level of free access to information is essential for further creation. Information is 
developed incrementally. Existing information stimulates the creation of more information, so extensive 
use of information may increase the likelihood of further innovation. That is because innovative 
developments are not necessarily tied to any financial resources. Some innovations may depend on 
intellectual capability, circumstances, level of cooperation and luck». N. ELKIN-KOREN, Copyright in 
Cyberspace: The Rule of Law and the Rule of Code, cit., 143. See also J. LITMAN, The Public Domain, in 
Emory LJ, Vol. 39, 1990, 965. 
152
 See, on this, M. RICOLFI, Gestione collettiva e gestione individuale in ambiente digitale, in M. LILLÀ 
MONTAGNANI, M. BORGHI (eds.), Proprietà digitale. Diritti d’autore, nuove tecnologie e digital rights 
management, cit., 183-189. 
153
 P. SAMUELSON, Digital Media and the Changing Face of Intellectual Property Law, in RUT Computer 
& Tech LJ, Vol. 16, 1990, 323. 
154
 S. STOKES, Digital Copyright: Law and Practice (3rd edition). Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart 
Publishing, 2009, 10. 
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attribution, which appears infringed every time the reproduction of the work or any 
other uses thereof omit the identification of its author.155 
In other words, the prospect of print and reproducing an infinite number of 
copies of a work is followed by the even more contentious likelihood that the works in 
question may easily be modified and reutilised. The former aspect, indeed, is not always 
encouraging and may have an adverse consequence instead, especially when the 
acknowledgement of credit is deliberately missing from the picture and the attribution 
norm has been consequently voided. 
However, even when a violation of the norm in question is established this does 
not mean that the rule against misattribution is functioning properly, given that there 
might not be any consequence for the breach. On the contrary, the rule of attribution is 
effective when there is sufficient room to foresee the possibility that some sanctions, 
either formal or informal, may apply, especially when linked to the risk that people 
would otherwise find it costless to take other works and pass them off as their own 
instead of creating something new and original. However, before considering the 
specific sanctions that may apply, it appears necessary to understand the variability that 
characterises the many possible approaches to misattribution, which are a reflection of 
the many variable attitudes towards copyright matters in general.156  
All these considerations seem to be in line with the growing relevance of 
specialist studies on authorship attribution, which also increase the significance of 
misattribution. Indeed, starting with the analysis of texts expressed in natural language, 
                                                          
155
 S. STOKES, Digital Copyright: Law and Practice (3rd edition), cit., 74-79. 
Besides, the spread of multiplying information has made cases of misattribution even more frequent, even 
in the academic and education field. Cf. N. J. AUER, E. M. KRUPAR, Mouse Click Plagiarism: The Role of 
Technology in Plagiarism and the Librarian’s Role in Combating it, in Libr. Trends, Vol. 49, No. 3, 
2001, 415, <https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/bitstream/handle/2142/8353/librarytrendsv49i3d_opt.pdf>, 
who lists some factors that contribute to the occurrence of plagiarism. Such contributory factors include 
the lack of proper information, namely the ignorance of the norms of attribution; the desire to reach 
certain results without spending energy or time to create his/her own work; the lack of interest towards 
culture and learning in general; and, finally, the mutability of a given social and ethical environment. 
156
 A critical aspect of such an issue can also be found again in the propensity of technologies to clash 
with one of the core elements of copyright, namely the idea-expression dichotomy, implying the 
inadequacy of the standard system of regulation and rather suggesting the adoption of different rules. 
Rules that, it must be recalled, should be a careful combination of all the factors that rotate around 
copyright, namely law, contracts, technology (or code) and social norms. On this last aspect, see R. CASO, 
Il Signore degli anelli nel ciberspazio: controllo delle informazioni e Digital Rights Management, in M. 
LILLÀ MONTAGNANI, M. BORGHI (eds.), Proprietà digitale. Diritti d’autore, nuove tecnologie e digital 
rights management, cit., 110-113. 
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these studies were soon shaped to meet the requirements of new technologies,157 finding 
also detailed application in the broader field of copyright infringement.158 Besides, the 
intensifying relevance of electronic texts seems to have greatly concentrated studies on 
authorship attribution, in the context of computer-based creations, where «a text is 
classified according to whether it was written by a specific author or not»,159160  
In brief, verbatim or literary reproduction is unquestionably made easier by 
digital technologies, especially if one considers the lenience of using copy and paste in 
digital creation. So far, there is not a great deal of concern insofar as authorship is 
acknowledged. On the contrary, when this does not happen, the reaction of authors and 
the public in general might be different, and contrasting claims may arise. Some appear 
to promote disheartening campaigns against the infringers, while others believe it is a 
one-way direction and simply overlook it. Still, when such a violation occurs, 
technology may itself provide certain measures against it, with all its controversial 
implications.  
                                                          
157
 V. P. BHATTATHIRIPAD, Judiciary-friendly forensics of software copyright infringement, Hershey PA: 
Information Science Reference (IGI Global), 2014, 112, who also guides the reader along the history of 
authorship analysis. Cf. D. H. CRAIG, A. F. KINNEY, Shakespeare, computers, and the mystery of 
authorship, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012 (first ed., 2009); A. GALEY, The 
Shakespearean archive: experiments in new media from the Renaissance to postmodernity, Cambridge; 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014. 
158
 On the specifics of computational analysis applied to authorship attribution, see K. LUYCKX, 
Scalability issues in authorship attribution, Brussel: ASA Publishers, 2010; P. Juola, Authorship 
attribution, Hanover, Mass.: Now Publishers, 2008 (first ed., 2006); J. BELZER, A. G. HOLZMAN, A. KENT 
(eds.), Encyclopedia of computer science and technology, New York; Basel: Marcel Dekker, 1975 (2002). 
159
 See also E. LEOPOLD, M. MAY, G. PAAß, Data mining and text mining for science and technology 
research, in H. F. MOED, W. GLA ̈NZEL, U. SCHMOCH (eds.), Handbook of quantitative science and 
technology research: the use of publication and patent statistics in studies of S&T systems, Dordrecht: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004 (2012), 187, who speak of «special case of text classification», which 
entails various approaches, depending on the used technique, for example, statistics (at 205). 
160
 See, in particular, S. M. HOCKEY, Electronic texts in the humanities: principles and practice, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2014 (first ed., 2000), who provides a detailed analysis of attribution 
studies in line with the growing expansion of computing in humanities.  
More specific on forensic applications are, among others, the contributions of S. LARNER, Forensic 
authorship analysis and the world wide web, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014; C. T. LI, Handbook 
of research on computational forensics, digital crime, and investigation: methods and solutions, Hershey, 
PA: Information Science Reference, 2010. 
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Among the various instruments of such a technological response,161 the most 
striking example is represented by software, which is purposively designed to address 
the conduct of plagiarism. Commonly known as a plagiarism detector or plagiarism 
detection system and initially used by schools and universities,162 it now finds regular 
application in various contexts of digital media. Here, in fact, the inference that «among 
the most interesting opportunities to protect contents is emerging software that will 
enable editors to detect plagiarism and attribution issues quickly and easily» appears to 
be definitely fitting.163 
However, although such a measure seems to have received welcoming 
acceptance, there are still many concerns regarding its actual feasibility to address and 
effectively regulate the phenomenon of plagiarism, particularly when new works 
pertaining to unconventional subject matters are involved.164 In particular, the automatic 
functioning of software poses inevitable doubts about its practical capacity to correctly 
ascertain plagiarism.165 Furthermore, how its evaluation should be concretely carried out 
by the court is another matter altogether.166 
These conclusions also remain valid when the object of misattribution is a 
digitally born work. Among the numerous exemplifications of conduct that imply 
                                                          
161
 These may relate to search engines, systems of indexisation, and reverse engineering. On the last 
concept, in particular, and its inference with the concepts of creativity and originality, see W. WANG, 
Reverse engineering: technology of reinvention, Boca Raton, FL, USA: CRC Press, 2011, 11, who 
defines engineering design as «the process of devising a system, component or process to satisfy 
engineering challenges and desired needs [that] focuses on creativity and originality», while «reverse 
engineering focuses on assessment and analysis to reinvent original parts, complement realistic 
constraints with alternative engineering solutions». 
Concerning the relevant literature on the issue, see U. GASSER, Regulating Search Engines: Taking Stock 
and Looking Ahead, in Y.J.L.T., 2006, 201; J. GRIMMELMANN, The Structure of Search Engine Law, in 
Iowa L. Rev., Vol. 93, 2007, 1; P. SAMUELSON, S. SCOTCHMER, The Law and Economics of Reverse 
Engineering, in Yale L. J., 111, 2002, 1575.; S. VAIDHYANATHAN, The Googlization of Everything and 
the Future of Copyright, in U.C. Davis L.Rev., Vol. 40, 2007, 1207; M. SAG, Copyright and Copy-Reliant 
Technology, in NULR, Vol. 103, 2009, 1608. 
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 For a recent survey on plagiarism detection software and citation-based similarity methodology to 
detect plagiarism, see B. GIPP, Citation-based Plagiarism Detection Detecting Disguised and Cross-
language Plagiarism using Citation Pattern Analysis, Wiesbaden Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2014. 
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 J. V. PAVLIK, Media in the digital age, New York: Columbia University Press, 2008, 210, who 
considers the examples of «pattern-matching [or] content-identification systems» and, while questioning 
their actual reliability, counts on the development of future and more effective systems. 
164
 On this, see S. MOSHER STUARD, W. J. CRONON, How to Detect and Demonstrate Plagiarism, in Am. 
Hist. Rev., 2006, <http://www.historians.org/governance/pd/plagiarism.htm>. 
165
 This appears to be properly summarised in the warning: «even electronic tools are no panacea for the 
problem of plagiarism». B. MURRAY, Technological tools to detect dishonesty, in APA Monitor, Vol 33, 
No. 2, 2002. 
166
 Cf. C. GEYH, What's Law Got to Do With It? : What Judges Do, Why They Do It, and What's at Stake, 
Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2011, 126-137. 
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authorship misattribution in cyberspace, one could mention the reproduction of website 
content or blog posts. In such contexts, in fact, reproducing in full or in excerpts has 
become common practice, undoubtedly being facilitated by instant access to the Web 
and the natural resort to technological instruments that quickly duplicate them. 
At first sight, it could be determined that what was discussed before with regard 
to the norm of attribution in general is logically also valid for these peculiar works of 
the mind. Therefore, it should follow that their authors are entitled to the same 
protection that conventional authors have enjoyed, such as those who write novels or 
compose symphonies. 
However, the peculiar nature of these works is that they often originate from the 
arrangement and combination of other works,167 in which authorship attribution may not 
have been acknowledged. The latter circumstance, indeed, clearly complicates the 
picture but also confirms the fundamental principle that, aside from the subject matter 
considered or the peculiarity of certain process of creation, the expectancy to follow the 
norm of attribution still has crucial relevance.168 
In conclusion, considering the characteristic linkage of law, society and 
technology that has thus far been illustrated, it is also appropriate to acknowledge that 
the subject of copyright remains deeply intertwined with definite legal rules.169 
Therefore, it is time to bring to the foreground the analysis of misattribution within the 
Italian and UK legal systems. Nevertheless, this does not imply that the weapons of 
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 L. LESSIG, Remix. Making Art and Commerce Thrive in the Hybrid Economy, cit., 35-36, and 46. 
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 Accordingly, other digital practices such as Internet linking and framing provoke contrasting reactions. 
On the one hand, while they pursue their specific aims, they also have positive social implications, as they 
enhance the communication and sharing of information. On the other hand, they may also implicate acts 
that could be ascribed to infringing conducts, especially when their misuse consists of the deliberate 
avoidance of a ban of linking or in the omission of the source. See R. SPINELLO, Cyberethics. Morality 
and Law in Cyberspace, cit., 90-92, and 98. 
This particular attitude, indeed, is clearly reflected in the ambiguity regarding the way in which such 
activities are understood in common language, once again through the provocative lens of news reporters. 
Cf. C. S. KAPLAN, Lawsuit May Determine Whether Framing Is Thieving, in N.Y. Times Cyber L. J., 29 
May 1998, <http://partners.nytimes.com/library/tech/98/05/cyber/cyberlaw/29law.html>; A. DUNN, Hey, You! Who You 
Pointin’ At?, in N.Y. Times Cyber L. J., 21 May 1997, 
<http://partners.nytimes.com/library/cyber/week/060697totalnews.html>; M. RICHTEL, Big News Media Companies Settle 
With Web Site in Suit on Linking, in N.Y. Times Cyber L. J., 6 June 1997, 
<http://partners.nytimes.com/library/cyber/surf/052197mind.html>. 
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 Cf. S. BALGANESH (ed.), Intellectual Property and the Common Law, New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013, in which this view is made explicit. 
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interdisciplinarity should or will be put away. On the contrary, they will be of a great 
help for the comparative exploration that follows.170
                                                          
170
 As has been noticed, in fact, comparative law should concern not only other legal fields, but also other 
non-legal disciplines. See, on this, P. GILLES, Aspetti metodologici e teorici dell’armonizzazione del 
diritto processuale [traduzione dal Tedesco a cura di A. Verzì], in Annali del Seminario giuridico 
dell’Università di Catania (2005-6), Facoltà di Giurisprudenza, Milano: Giuffrè, 2007, 462. On this, see 
also D. S. CLARK, Comparative law and society, Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, Mass., USA: Edward 
Elgar, 2014 (first. ed., 2012). 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE LEGAL FACADE OF AUTHORSHIP ATTRIBUTION  
IN ITALY AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
 
1 A brief overview of authorship and its contentious acknowledgment 
 
Interdisciplinarity is a powerful instrument of analysis, but likewise it can be tricky 
when there is an actual risk of drifting the enquiry away from the law, particularly when 
the legal assessment is an essential feature of the study. Besides, despite the fabulous 
and socially driven envisioning of plagiarism, the act of misattributing attribution still 
has its exact roots in the law. 
 Authorship, meant as both the act of creating an intellectual work and the source 
or origin of such creation, has indisputably evolved over time. Retracing its historical 
development and recalling what has initially been illustrated regarding the expansion of 
the creative process,1 it appears reasonable to assume that the story of authors, as 
originators of their own intellectual works, has been characterized by alternating periods 
of both selfhood and collectiveness. Sometimes their works were the result of virtuous 
originality, but most of the time they were the product of a mutualistic effort or the fruit 
of cumulative knowledge originating from previously established subjects. 
 Besides, with the spread of the Romantic ideals, the fervent figure of the solitary 
author conceivably reached its zenith, yet with some wariness that depends upon a 
careful reading of the actual literary and artistic practices of that unique epoch.2 
Nonetheless, such an idiosyncratic picture has often been greeted with disparagement, 
mainly with the aim of refuting the idea that authorship should be reduced to a front-
                                                          
1
 We have seen how historical, cultural, social and technological changes have significantly affected 
copyright and, accordingly, the concepts that traditionally characterized it, such as creativity and 
originality. In a similar manner, all the above factors had a clear impact on authorship.  
2
 It is commonly argued that the Romantic era vividly fashioned the author, as never seen before, like a 
sole or lone creator in his/her unique world. Regardless of the full accuracy of these arguments, it is, 
however, correct to notice that at that time the emphasis placed on the creative process was particularly 
resilient. 
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running figure.3 At the same time, however, even such criticism ultimately resulted in 
confirmation of the authorship paradigm, either in terms of an allegorically «joint 
enterprise» between the author and the public,4 or an actual shared authorship emerging 
from the collective creative nature of many contemporary works. 
 Studies on the attribution of authorship seem to have existed long before the 
invention of writing, even when the practice of passing on tales and melodies aloud was 
conveyed by the contextual transmission of their acknowledged authors.5 However, it 
was with the engraved words and the need to archive them in durable repositories that 
those studies more formally began to address and eventually settle more or less 
controversial acknowledgments of authorship.6 
 At the same time, the subsequent evolution of these studies into a scholarly 
discipline is intrinsically related to the approach that both academia and society took 
towards plagiarism. In other words, «a growing cultural disapproval of plagiarism [had] 
important implications for the future of both authorship and attribution».7 This 
apparently allow increasing endeavours to disentangle uncertain or controversial 
acknowledgements of authorship,8 but at the same time fostering dangerous restraints 
on the autonomy of the creative process, especially when imposing restraints on 
collaborative or cumulative creation: 
                                                          
3
 Against the idea of solitary authorship is, for instance, L. ZEMER, The idea of authorship in copyright, 
Applied legal philosophy series, Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2007, who describes it literally as a fiction and 
holds that «there is, as I argue, only one form of authorship: the joint authorship between public and 
authors» (at 97). 
4
 Advocating the role of the public in the creation of intellectual products, Zemer suggests «a model of 
public authorship» and accordingly asks to rethink the way the copyright system allocates rights by 
acknowledging the public authorial role and emphasizing the strong dependence linking copyright and the 
public contribution to the creation of intellectual works. L. ZEMER, The idea of authorship in copyright, 
cit., 2-6. 
5
 Cf. supra, Chapter 3. 
Furthermore, it is worth repeating that the interest demonstrated by scholars towards questions of 
authorship attribution varies from literary to technical studies, such as the statistical application of 
language studies and computer-applied sciences. Similarly, it has been the subject of controversies, which 
have proved how acknowledging the authorship of intellectual works has often been problematic. 
6
 H. LOVE, Attributing authorship: an introduction, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010 
(first ed. 2002), 14-26, who provides a detailed historical recount of attribution studies, explaining how 
writing has implied the need to give texts a certain identification, especially when they had to be stored in 
libraries, and how the meticulous work of librarians greatly contributes to their systematic development, 
together with the initial establishment of a methodology. 
7
 H. LOVE, Attributing authorship: an introduction, cit., 28. 
8
 Many of these concerns originated from attempts to clarify contested authorship, which often depend on 
the improper attribution to homonyms or anonymous works, or even false attribution that could, on the 
other hand, increase profits regardless of booksellers. H. LOVE, Attributing authorship: an introduction, 
cit., 18-20.  
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In cases where an author makes extensive unacknowledged use 
of the words of other authors we have what is now called 
plagiarism (still a form of authorship, albeit a discreditable 
one) [but also] disarming acknowledgment of quasi-plagiarism 
[ascertained] in appropriation practices.9  
As anticipated, solitary and exclusive authorship has been extensively demeaned as 
unfortunate and unrealistic. Nevertheless, even its denial seems to have proved, and 
even accentuated the real survival of the author, who died and resurged intermittently 
according to the fashions of commentators of the time.10 
In his now classic study The death and return of the author, for instance, Burke 
is
 quite critical towards the seemingly linear portrayal of anti-authorial discourses, such 
as those emerging in the theories of Barthes, Foucault and Derrida, craving for greater 
caution towards the alleged fading or death of the writer, and rather implying that what 
was really at issue was the inconsistency of certain authorial categories.11 Opening his 
study with an analysis of perhaps the most notorious essay of Barthes, The Death of the 
author,12 which he describes as «the single most influential meditation on the question 
of authorship in modern times»,13 Burke places the accent on the “birth of the reader”, 
who lives and breathes in the factual realm of authorship.14 
In other words, in his composition, Barthes is mostly concerned with the 
limitation that seems to be imposed on a text by a closing link to the author. Indeed, 
                                                          
9
 H. LOVE, Attributing authorship: an introduction, cit., 32-34, 39-40 (quotation at 41), explaining how, 
on the one hand, authorship includes a number of activities that require collaboration more than a single 
individual author, and, on the other hand, a relatively large number of works are created under the 
influence, imitation and incorporation of other preceding works. 
10
 S. BURKE, The death and return of the author: criticism and subjectivity in Barthes, Foucault and 
Derrida, cit., who explains how, similarly to the death of God, the theory of the author’s disappearance 
instead hinders its exact vitality. See also, of the same author, a collection of essays on the subject of 
authorship from classic times to the twentieth century: S. BURKE (ed.), Authorship: from Plato to The 
Postmodern: A Reader, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000 (first ed. 1995). 
11
 S. BURKE, The death and return of the author, cit., 8 et seq. While he acknowledges that those theorists 
brought anti-authorialism to its most extreme point, he also suggests the essentiality of a cautious reading 
and evaluation of their anti-authorial discourses (at 16-18). 
12
 R. BARTHES, The Death of the Author [1967, 1968], in Image, music, text. Translated by S. Heath, 
London: Fontana Press, 1977. 
13
 S. BURKE, The death and return of the author: criticism and subjectivity in Barthes, Foucault and 
Derrida, cit., 19. 
14
 In fact, as he utters, «everywhere, under the auspices of its absence, the concept of the author remains 
active, the notion of the return of the author being simply a belated recognition of this critical blindness 
[so that the] direct resistance to the author demonstrates little so much as the resistance of the author» S. 
Burke, The death and return of the author, cit., 172. 
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rather than uttering that he completely refused the author, it seems more accurate to 
argue that he indeed refuted the oppressiveness of a rigid characterization of authorship 
on texts and, more generally, on culture. Give this purported dictatorship, what counts 
most is the reader, who is also the addressee of the text, while the author could mostly 
to be regarded as a «scriptor» rather than a «creator».15  
Like authorship, the notion of the author has also changed over time,16 
particularly when his/her mission became inherently intertwined with a specialized and 
marketable profession that inevitably altered the nature and form of many creative 
works.17 Such instances, furthermore, lead the concepts of authorship to intersect with 
topics that may, at this point, be quite familiar, such as the ethical and technological 
repercussions of new practices and various ways of engaging with copyright works. 
To some extent, these difficulties are correlated to the problems that more 
broadly affect copyright, which are in large part caused by its misreading and the 
consequent fallacies of some arguments on its defence.18 Indeed, the constant brawl to 
find a compromise between private instances and the public interest has often resulted 
in a firm advancement of the former at the expense of the latter.19 An example of such 
an imbalance seems to be envisioned in the disavowal of the essential role that the 
                                                          
15
 R. BARTHES, The Death of the Author, cit., 142. 
In this sense, the link that has traditionally fused authorship and authority appears to be extremely 
weakened, particularly to the extent that the former relies on the figure of a sole individual originator, 
which must be considered a mere invention in itself. Nevertheless, despite what the essay’s title literally 
may suggest, it would be improper to conclude that Barthes’ aim was to erase entirely the author from the 
picture, but rather to suggest that greater emphasis should be placed on the reader, as he/she had taken 
part in the construction of the text. On this, see also his other work: The Pleasure of the Text (1971). 
16
 A. BENNETT, The author, London and New York: Routledge, 2005, who investigates and explores the 
origins and evolution of such a notion, considering its influence on literacy by also analysing the related 
concepts of authority, originality and ownership.  
17
 See M. NEWBURY, Figuring authorship in antebellum America, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 
1997, who explains how authorship changed, particularly during the nineteenth century, and how the new 
industrially driven establishment of culture influenced the creation of a new understanding of being an 
author.  
D. O. DOWLING, explores the same topic in a later contribution:Capital letters: authorship in the 
antebellum literary market, Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 2009, which additionally considers how 
technological change determined this alteration and how the figure of the (now professional) author 
started being pressured by the market but also by a more conscious and interactive readership. 
18
 Cf. G. S. LUNNEY JR., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and the DMCA in 
Va. L. Rev., Vol. 87, 2001, 813. 
D. NIMMER, The End of Copyright, (1995) Vanderbilt Law Review 48, 1385. 
19
 L. ZEMER, The idea of authorship in copyright, cit., 96–97. 
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society or community plays in the creation of knowledge,20 but also in respect to 
collaborative and joint authorship.21 
Some wonder whether the answer is therefore to proclaim the end of copyright,22 
as Litman seems to suggest,23 or whether there should be one or more other viable 
answers, such as a more effective interaction with the broader set of human rights24 or 
the expansion of some public interest defences. On the one hand, this opens up possible 
ethical predicaments that may concern misattribution practices;25 and on the other hand, 
                                                          
20
 According to Zemer, Foucault «informs us that an author is an ideological figure [eroding] the concept 
of the individual writer [and denying it] is the originator of a text [but rather] a social construction». L. 
ZEMER, The idea of authorship in copyright, cit., 144. 
Alleging that copyright works are not an exclusive private property, but are first of all a social product, 
see S. SCAFIDI, Intellectual Property and Cultural Products, in Bost ULR, Vol. 81, 2001¸793. Of the same 
author, see also S. SCAFIDI, Who owns culture? Appropriation and authenticity in American law, Rutgers 
series on the public life of the arts, New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2005. 
On the collaborative authorship dimension, see, in particular, M. WOODMANSEE, P. JASZI (eds.), The 
construction of authorship: textual appropriation in law and literature, Post-contemporary interventions, 
Durham: Duke University Press, 2006 (first ed. 1994). 
21
 Looking at these particular instances, they have also directed some attention towards the requirement of 
intention; however, given that no explicit reference is made in the CDPA, some wonder whether it may be 
found elsewhere. L. ZEMER, The idea of authorship in copyright, cit., 203–204, who also cites the earlier 
case law of Levy v Rutley, circa 1871, Common Pleas, [1871] LR 6 CP 523, as well as the more recent 
Stuart v Barrett, circa 1994, Chancery, [1994] EMLR 448, in which the need for an actual contribution 
was, in any case, to be essentially required. 
Cf. D. NIMMER, Copyright in the Dead Sea Scrolls: authorship and originality, in Hous. L. Rev., Vol. 38, 
2001, 1, <http://www.houstonlawreview.org/archive/downloads/38-1_pdf/HLR38P1.pdf>; M. WOODMANSEE, Response to 
David Nimmer, ‘Copyright in the Dead Sea Scrolls: Authorship and Originality’, in Hous. L. Rev., Vol. 
38, 2001, 231, <http://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications/234>. 
22
 Zemer sustains that there is surely no necessity to proclaim the death of copyright. Accordingly, what 
should be pursued is not the refusal of all copyright theories, but instead the extreme individualism and 
disavowal of the social dimension. L. ZEMER, The idea of authorship in copyright, cit., preface and 7. 
23
 J. LITMAN, Digital Copyright, New York: Prometheus, 2006 (first ed. 2001) 
<http://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=books>. 
24
 The idea of the public as joint author seems to support the need for rethinking copyright. Furthermore, 
if the answer is not to be found in disobeying copyright rules, there could be other options. One 
possibility is a better dialogue with the human rights community (P. DRAHOS, Intellectual property and 
human rights, in I.P.Q., Vol. 3, 1999, 349, 
<https://www.anu.edu.au/fellows/pdrahos/articles/pdfs/1999iPandhumanrights.pdf>), which, according to Zemer, may 
effectively be an instrument to ensure compliance with the freedom of expression. L. ZEMER, The idea of 
authorship in copyright, cit., 221. 
See also N. LEE, G. WESTKAMP, A. KUR, A. OHLY (eds.), Intellectual property, unfair competition and 
publicity: convergences and development, European Intellectual Property Institutes Network series, 
Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar, 2014 (first ed. 2013), 300. 
Cf. H. LADDIE, Copyright: over-strength, over-regulated, over-rated? in EIPR, Vol. 18, No. 5, 1996, 253. 
25
 Questions concerning authorship have taken the route of ethics, for instance, when the analysis of the 
composition process has comprised the investigation of ethical accountability towards authors and 
readers. See, in particular, a more recent work of Sean Burke who, following the traces left by his two 
contributions to the field, has added some interesting pieces to the scenery with the aim of developing a 
model of authorial ethics. S. BURKE, The ethics of writing: authorship and legacy in Plato and Nietzsche, 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010 (first ed. 2008). 
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it investigates the impact of technology on the process of creation within the larger 
discourse of intellectual authorship and ownership.26   
This last aspect, moreover, pushes for taking into full consideration all monetary 
and non-economic aspects of copyright. For instance, the issue of considering 
borrowing legitimately, or not, should not depend merely on the exclusive assessment of 
a right infringement; on the contrary, it deserves broader consideration that takes into 
account its cultural, social, economic and technological sways. The same is true of the 
concepts of copyright ownership and authorship, the appreciation of which ideally 
should always aim to strike a balance between private and public interests.27  
All the arguments above imply a corroboration of what has previously been 
inferred with regard to the advantages of adopting an interdisciplinary approach to 
better appreciating the manifold shades of copyright and authorship attribution in 
particular.28 This appears particularly true when resorting to a legal but comparative 
analysis, which appears even more advantageous taking into exact consideration the 
legal schemes of two seemingly very different countries, namely, Italy and the United 
Kingdom.  
 
 
2 The contemporary latitude of moral rights in copyright law: a comparative line 
 
It has been sustained that an interdisciplinary approach may help the interpreter to 
appraise the issue of authorship attribution, as well as that of copyright generally. 
However, interdisciplinarity is not the only instrument that deserves attention. Another 
relevant tool is in fact represented by comparative studies that forthrightly enter the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
For a broader analysis of moral predicaments, see H. E. MASON (ed.), Moral dilemmas and moral theory, 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, which explores the subject and tries to find a rational way out. 
26
 E. HEMMUNGS WIRTÉN, No trespassing: authorship, intellectual property rights, and the boundaries of 
globalization, Studies in book and print culture, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004, who also 
underlines the unique role of the translator and the delicate argument of protecting traditional knowledge. 
27
 These arguments are particularly explicitly articulated in S. VAIDHYANATHAN, Copyrights and 
copywrongs: the rise of intellectual property and how it threatens creativity: with a new afterword, Media 
studies, Legal studies, New York [etc.]: New York University Press, 2003 (first ed. 2001), who is 
extremely critical towards the current approach of Western and particularly US copyright law. Moreover, 
he believes that its exceedingly punishing and restraining attitude undoubtedly frustrates the creative 
process and thus impedes the expected progress of arts and culture. 
28
 Yet, as will be explained, many copyright issues remain (deliberately?) unsettled. 
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world of legal analysis. In particular, assuming that the study of copyright is an analysis 
of both the legal environment and the complex dynamics that regulate it, the role of the 
law in any case appears to be overriding. 
In this way, however, if comparative law may be regarded, like 
interdisciplinarity, as another viable option to overcome the hitches arising from the 
characteristic involvedness of contemporary intellectual property, it should also be 
carefully considered whether it might be desirable to establish any boundaries. 
Consequently, there seems to be sufficient latitude to withstand the fact that an exact 
comparative legal approach deserves its own peculiar space in the debate.29  
Even so, interdisciplinary and comparative law discourses are reciprocally 
intertwined.30 Indeed, what seems to elevate comparative law even further from its 
recourse to interdisciplinarity is the fact that a fruitful assessment and estimation of 
other legal and non-legal disciplines may help it to overcome the perils of comparative 
research.31 This may be of great aid for the comparatist, who – said with a metaphor – 
must put him/herself in the shoes of the other system, which nevertheless can be more 
rigid than expected. 
 Looking for a definition of comparative activity in general terms, this can be 
summarized in the act of estimating, measuring or examining a plurality of things, 
                                                          
29
 This, however, may also imply a tendency to hide behind the firm fences of the law when it appears 
that no other option is practicable; or it may even signify a clear-cut choice to affirm the dominance of the 
law among all other disciplines that may eventually cross its path. 
Some, for instance, have supported the recourse to common law – meant in its broadest sense – to 
overcome the difficulties that intellectual property nowadays presents, S. BALGANESH (ed.), Intellectual 
Property and the Common Law, cit. One of the conclusions that emerges from such a collection of essays 
is that «despite the degree of interdisciplinary specialization that the field today sees, intellectual property 
is fundamentally a creation of the law; therefore, the basic building blocks of the law can shed important 
light on what intellectual property can, should, and was perhaps meant to be» (at 12). 
30
 See S. ROY, Privileging (Some Forms of) Interdisciplinarity and Interpretation: Methods in 
Comparative Law, in Int’l J Const. L., No. 3, 2014,, <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2483289> (draft version), who 
explains how comparative law effectively engages with other disciplines, particularly within the social 
sciences, without having to renounce to the centrality of the law and its authority. 
This reconnects with the related argument that the law should not be considered in inescapable isolation 
from other disciplines, although, at the same time, there seems equally to be the need for a cautious 
approach to the use of interdisciplinarity. Cf. R. BERCEA, How to Use Philosophy When Being a 
(Comparative) Lawyer, in Procedia Soc. Behav. Sci., Vol. 71, 2013, 160, 
<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1877042813000232>. 
31
 Cf. D. S. CLARK (ed.), Comparative law and society, cit., which provides a very interesting contribution 
to the subject, explaining the main conceptualizations and principles emerging from different disciplinary 
angles. 
Indeed, the dangers that may be foreseen in comparative analysis will be illustrated in the following 
paragraphs. 
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primarily, but not limited to, establishing similarities and dissimilarities.32 The 
significance of such activity in the region of the law is great and has both theoretical and 
practical implications.33 In addition, focusing primarily on intellectual property law, it is 
difficult to refute that comparative studies have contributed to providing a better 
description of copyright, in particular within its contemplation in a global and 
international dimension,34 although some pessimism about its current capacity to reach 
this goal has not either fallen short.35 
 Nonetheless, academics still need to wave their arms to explain why a civil law 
jurist, even within the narrower context of copyright, should look at the common law 
system, and vice versa.36 Their arguments and theorizations indeed go back a long 
                                                          
32
 See, for instance, Cambridge International Dictionary of English, def. compare (v.), cit., 273. 
33
 P. GILLES, Aspetti metodologici e teorici dell’armonizzazione del diritto processuale, cit., 459-450, 
469, whose focus is comparative procedural law, but makes interesting references that apply to 
comparative law in general. As he explains, the importance of comparative studies, which attract the label 
of a «fundamental legal discipline» is also proven by the fact that, particularly alluding to its common 
meaning, the act of comparing phenomena is a particular mode of human action and human thought (at 
456).  
Cf. R. DAVID, De l’importance d’études comparatives relatives a la procedure, in Estudios jurídicos en 
memoria de Eduardo J. Couture, Universidad de la República (Uruguay). Facultad de Derecho y 
Ciencias Sociales, Montevideo: Martín Bianchi Altuna, 1957, 929 et seq. 
34
 For a stimulating view of some of the most critical aspects concerning the development of intellectual 
property worldwide, see G. DUTFIELD, U. SUTHERSANEN (eds.), Global Intellectual Property Law, 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing ltd, 2008 (first ed. 2005), with wide-ranging contributions to the 
subject and a particularly attentive concern for the comparison of several legal approaches and 
jurisdictions. 
See also, albeit with explicit reference to the Japanese experience, P. GANEA, C. HEATH, S. HIROSHI 
Japanese copyright law: writings in honour of Gerhard Schricker, Max Planck series on Asian 
intellectual property law, 12, The Hague [etc.]: Kluwer Law International, 2005, especially with regard to 
the difficulty of striking a genuine balance between private and public interests and, particularly for the 
purpose of the current research, also with reference to moral rights. 
35
 With the same cautions that have accompanied the analysis of the author’s disappearance, there have 
been suggestions about declaring the death of comparative law. See, in particular, M. M. SIEMS, The End 
of Comparative Law, (2007) The journal of comparative law, Vol. 2, No. 2, 133, 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1066563>, who considers the symptoms of what may be the end of comparative law to 
be a discipline, after its initial success began during the early twenty-first century. At the same time, as 
even Siems seems to grant, there could be a chance for comparative law to experience a resurgence and 
return to its glorious times.  
36
 See, among others, U. MATTEI, Il modello di common law. Con la collaborazione di E. ARIANO, Sistemi 
giuridici comparati, 2, Torino: G. Giappichelli, 2014 (first ed. 1996), who provides an insightful account 
of the Anglo-American system with a constant reference to the civil law model. Cf. J. H. LANGBEIN, R. 
LETTOW LERNER, B. P. SMITH (eds.), History of the common law: the development of Anglo-American 
legal institutions, Austin: Wolters Kluwer Law & Business; New York, NY: Aspen Publishers. 2009. 
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way,37 but recent attempts to draw the state-of-the-art portrait of comparative legal 
studies are not lacking either,38 thus suggesting innovative approaches but, at the same 
time, still providing a more general appraisal and review of the already established 
theories of comparative law.39 
However, even these warm welcomes and praise are not without their hazards, 
similarly to what has been envisioned with the earlier description of interdisciplinarity.40 
Indeed, law comparatists must face additional challenges, such as being able to 
understand fully a different legal system, a problem that may relate to translation, but 
not necessarily limited to simple linguistic barriers.  
In particular, it becomes essential to achieve an adequate bearing of the 
applicable methods to comparative analysis.41 If methodology has an overriding place in 
any field of legal research,42 it surely has a significant impact on comparative law, 
although its cognizance is sometimes simply taken for granted. However, the intrinsic 
                                                          
37
 See, in particular, the contribution of R. DAVID, Les grands systèmes de droit contemporains: (droit 
comparé), Précis Dalloz series, Paris: Dalloz, 1964; A. GAMBARO, R. SACCO, Sistemi giuridici comparati, 
Trattato di diritto comparato, Torino: UTET giuridica, 2009 (first ed. 1996); R. SACCO, Introduzione al 
diritto comparato, Trattato di diritto comparato, Torino: Utet, 2002 (first ed. 1980). 
See also the Trento Manifesto on comparative law that Sacco and other prominent Italian scholars signed 
in 1988, promoting the five theses that soon acquired worldwide diffusion. 
As the first thesis sustains, in particular, «comparative law, understood as a science, necessarily aims at 
the better understanding of legal data. Further tasks such as the improvement of law or interpretation are 
worthy of the greatest consideration but nevertheless are only secondary ends of comparative research».  
For further reading on the Trento thesis and the development of comparative law as a legal discipline, 
with particular reference to the Italian scholarly contributions, see E. GRANDE, Development of 
comparative law in Italy, in M. REIMANN; R. ZIMMER (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, 
Oxford Handbooks in Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, 107, 117. 
38
 This attempt is expressly pursued by the collection of essays on the subject edited by P. G. MONATERI 
(ed.), Methods of comparative law, Research handbooks in comparative law series, Cheltenham, U.K.; 
Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar Pub., 2014 (first ed. 2012), which alternates both theoretical and 
empirical explorations on the topic related to the now very broad discipline of comparative law, including 
a dedicated analysis of judicial interpretation. 
39
 See, for instance, the distinct survey of what has been defined as numerical comparative law, but also a 
relatively new trend of socio-legal approaches to the study of comparative law. M. M. SIEMS, 
Comparative law. The law in context series, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2014. 
40
 P. GILLES, Aspetti metodologici e teorici dell’armonizzazione del diritto processuale, cit., 471-472, 
who also advises the interpreter or the comparatist to try not to look too much with his/her own eyes, 
possibly avoiding any cult of a particular legal tradition, either of common or civil law. 
41
 In any case, the exact type of link between comparative law and interdisciplinarity must be ascertained 
on a case-by-case basis; and so it is with their respective methodologies. 
42
 For a valuable in-depth examination of the methodology of legal research in general, see M. VAN 
HOECKE (ed.), Methodologies of legal research: what kind of method for what kind of discipline, 
European Academy of Legal Theory series, Vol. 9, Oxford, UK: Hart Publishing, 2013 (first ed. 2011), 
who, appraising several options in terms of applicable methods, still questions the practicability and 
extent of some approaches, including the comparative and interdisciplinary methods, at the same time 
wondering whether this would mean a firm constraint of the traditional legal doctrine or even its 
assimilation into non-legal disciplines. 
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complexity and extent of comparative studies, which in part depends on the variety of 
distinct subjects to which it extends, make it quite implausible to foresee a unitary 
methodology,43 consequently leaving the problem of methods still open and exposed.44 
Nonetheless, reconnecting with what has been argued in the preceding 
paragraphs, there seem to be sufficient grounds to focus the comparative analysis 
envisioned in the current chapter on the crucial role of the law.45 It is in fact the law that 
from now on will escort us to the detailed enucleating of the legal facade of attribution, 
first looking at the moral rights standards and the applicable rules on copyright 
infringement and then considering the other possible alternatives that the law may offer 
to explain and regulate the attribution of authorship. 
 
 
2.1 The Italian moral right of paternity: an unbreakable entitlement to authorship? 
 
The rules pertaining to moral rights are first embodied in Section II of Chapter VI of the 
Italian copyright law (LA 1941),46 which are expressly dedicated to the safeguarding of 
the personal interests of the author.47 Within this setting, moral rights are distributed 
                                                          
43
 See M. ADAMS, D. HEIRBAUT, M. VAN HOECKE (eds.), The method and culture of comparative law: 
essays in honour of Mark Van Hoecke, Oxford, UK: Hart Publishing Ltd, 2014. 
44
 This argument deserves further and dedicated analysis, which, however, cannot be addressed in the 
current research but will require a distinct appraisal elsewhere. On the importance of the methodology in 
comparative law theory, see S. GEOFFREY, An Introduction to Comparative Law Theory and Method, 
European Academy of Legal Theory, Oxford, UK: Hart Publishing, 2014. 
45
 Cf. S. ROY, Privileging (Some Forms of) Interdisciplinarity and Interpretation: Methods in 
Comparative Law, cit. 
46
 Moreover, as we shall see, aside from criminal provisions, in which misattribution matters as an 
aggravating element for punishing conducts that amount to a criminal offence, the law affords explicit 
civil defence to the moral rights of the author, and first to the right of attribution. 
47
 For a brief historical account, the first Italian statute, before the unification, that considered the rights of 
authors was a 1801 law. Although it granted the author the economic rights to the work of the mind, the 
statute has represented a valuable preliminary safeguard of intellectual creations and defined them as the 
most precious and sacred property. Some years later, in 1840, the Austrian–Sardinian Convention was 
welcomed as a more comprehensive law on copyright matters and was the first to mention the conduct of 
counterfeiting. Indeed, it was only in 1925 that works of the mind received official recognition beyond 
economic rights, including the conduct of appropriating authorship of the work as an aggravating factor 
of counterfeiting. 
See, in chronological order, the Law of 7 May 1801 (19 floral year IX), on the Exclusive right to sell the 
works of authors, musicians, painters and illustrators within the Cisalpine Republic; Austro-Sardinian 
Treaty for the Safeguarding of property rights with regard to the literary and artistic works (sealed in 
Vienna, on 22 May 1840 and entered into force on 14 July 1840; Law No. 2337 of 25 June 1865), on the 
Rights of the authors of intellectual works; Royal Decree-Law No. 1950 of November 1925, Norms on 
Copyright, converted into Law No. 562 of 18 March 1926. 
  
135 
 
across three essential types: the right to claim authorship,48 the right to integrity and the 
right to have the work withdrawn from the market.49  
The most contentious of these is certainly the last, for reasons that are easy to 
understand, especially when we consider the inherent economic dependency that has 
above all described copyright. However, since its very early history, the law itself 
concedes the peculiar nature of such a right by granting it more limited protection than 
that afforded to the first two moral rights. In particular, only they enjoy perpetuity and 
statute barring, inalienability and only these are mortis causa transmissible to the 
author’s heirs. 
The most distinguishing feature of the Italian system of moral rights is that they 
are perpetual, inalienable and cannot be waived.50 These traits make them clearly 
distinguishable from the economic rights relating to the work, which instead have a 
definite term of protection. However, they are also a peculiarity of the civil law system, 
as will become even more noticeable when compared with the common law system of 
the UK.51 Besides, before moving on to such analysis, it is preferable first to consider 
broadly the normative framework that applies to the right of attribution.52 
The Italian copyright law dedicates Section II of Chapter III to the Protection of 
rights in the work in defence of the person of the author (into brackets, moral rights).53 
The first right considered is the entitlement of the author to claim authorship of his/her 
work, also considering that he/she may have chosen to be publicly identified with a 
pseudonym or remain anonymous. Such a prerogative, which operates regardless of the 
subsistence of any economic rights even otherwise allocated, is immediately followed 
                                                          
48
 In particular, according to this provision, authors have a moral right to be acknowledged as such by 
everyone. 
49
 Such entitlement is granted on the condition that serious circumstances may harm the author’s 
personality. In addition, considering the peculiarity of a right of this nature, the law prescribed certain 
formalities, especially when a plurality of authors is involved, including, but not limited to, the consent of 
each author in the case of joint authorship where the individual contribution cannot be distinguished. 
50
 Other relevant provisions are, in fact, contained in the Italian Civil Code, cit., particularly articles 2575-
2583.  
51
 Unlike Italy, for instance, the UK does not protect the right to have the work withdrawn from the 
market. 
52
 This aspect will be better explicated in (the following) Chapter 5. 
53
 Chapter III LA 1941, on Content and duration of copyright, however, also includes Section I (Articles 
12-19), which is dedicated to the Economic exploitation of the works. 
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by the right of integrity,54 which gives the author the possibility to reject, anytime,55 any 
alteration of the work56 that may result in harming the author’s honour or reputation: 
Independently of the exclusive rights of exploitation of the 
work […] and even after the transfer of such rights, the author 
shall retain the right to claim authorship of his work and to 
object to any distortion, mutilation or any other modification 
of, and other derogatory action in relation to, the work, which 
would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.57 
The right of the authors to have their authorship acknowledged extends to the liberty 
that they have to disclose anytime their identity despite a previous choice for anonymity 
or pseudonymity.58 This last aspect, in line with the general rule of inalienability 
regarding moral rights under Italian law,59 is strictly related to the very favourable 
provision that the author, or his/her heirs, may assert the right with no time limits.60 
                                                          
54
 In this way, as the literary reading of the provision suggests, is it crucial to recognize the existence of a 
tangible or even potential prejudice to the honour or reputation of the author. Besides, an alteration of the 
work could also entail objectively positive changes that, however, result in some harm to the work’s 
author.  
E. SANTORO, Onore e reputazione nell’articolo 20 della legge sul diritto d’autore in Dir. radiodiff., 1980, 
561, who emphasizes how the concepts of honour and reputation tend to converge, as both having the 
shared function to protect the integrity of the author’s thought as a person and then as the creator of a 
work of the mind. 
55
 This however finds some constraint to avoid abuse, for instance, in the pre-emption of refuting 
modifications to which the author had indeed consented.  
Article 22 LA 1941, in particular, succinctly precises that «the rights referred to in the preceding Articles 
shall be inalienable. However, if the author was aware of and has accepted modifications to his work, he 
shall not be entitled to intervene to prevent the performance thereof or to demand its suppression». 
56
 Any alteration of this kind that brings prejudice to the author’s very personal interests is yet 
differentiated from the exclusive right to modify a work with the consent of the author that has transferred 
his/her economic rights.. 
57
 Article 20 LA 1941. The same Article, nevertheless, limits its latitude when prescribing that «in the 
case of works of architecture, the author may not oppose modifications deemed necessary in the course of 
construction. Further, he may not oppose other modifications which may be necessary in any such 
completed work. However, if the work is recognized by the competent State authority as having an 
important artistic character, the author shall be entrusted with the study and execution of such 
modifications».  
58
 According to Section 1 of Article 21 LA 1941, «the author of an anonymous or pseudonymous work 
shall at all times have the right to reveal his identity and to have his position as author recognized by 
judicial procedure. Notwithstanding any prior agreement to the contrary, the successors in title of an 
author who has revealed his identity shall be required to indicate the name of the author in publications, 
reproductions, transcriptions, performances, recitations and broadcasts, or in any other form of 
manifestation or announcement to the public». 
59
 In addition, other references to moral rights are variously disseminated in the LA 1941. Article 63 LA 
1941 mentions that «the record or like device shall be made or utilized in such a manner that the moral 
rights of the author are respected within the terms of Articles 20 and 21 of this Law»; while Article 85 ter 
provides that «without prejudice to the author’s moral rights, any person who, after the copyright 
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Besides, having anticipated that «copyright shall be acquired on the creation of a 
work that constitutes the particular expression of an intellectual effort»,61 it is 
ascertained that the requirement of creativity is essentially relevant to determining 
copyright protection, given that copyright law explicitly safeguards moral rights.  
However, evoking a well-known Foucalian work,62 one may reasonably query 
who the author according to Italian copyright law is after all. In this way, the law 
identifies and distinguishes the holders of the rights, either of an economic or moral 
nature. The law explicitly presumes that, in the absence of contrary proof, the author of 
an intellectual work is the person that is shown or announced as such, even during any 
kind of performance,63 and yet has chosen to reveal his/her identity, or has preferred to 
use a pseudonym or even to remain anonymity.64 
Other, more specific provisions regulate the more complex condition of 
collective and derivative works, establishing that, with regard to collective works, the 
author is considered to be the person who organizes and leads their construction, while 
in the case of derivative works the author is the person that has, by his/her own effort, 
created that work from another work (the original one).65 Furthermore, if the 
requirements of joint authorship are satisfied, the work will be regulated as common 
                                                                                                                                                                          
protection has expired, for the first time lawfully publishes or communicates to the public a work that has 
not been published previously shall enjoy the exploitation accorded by the provisions of Section I of 
Chapter III of Part I of this Law to the extent that those provisions are applicable». Article 85 quarter, 
finally, specifies that «without prejudice to the author’s moral rights, any person who in any way or by 
any means publishes critical and scientific editions of works in the public domain shall enjoy exclusive 
exploitation rights in the work resulting from the critical and analytical assessment». 
60
 Such favour is then expressed in detail by Article 23 LA 1941, according to which, «after the death of 
the author, the right referred to in Article 20 may be asserted, without limitation of time, by his spouse 
and children and, in the absence thereof, by his parents and other direct ascendants and descendants, and 
in the absence of such ascendants and descendants, by his brothers and sisters and their descendants. If 
the public interest should so require, such action may also be taken by the President of the Council of 
Ministers after hearing the competent professional association». 
61
 Article 6 LA 1941, which has been already considered when analysing the concept of creativity. Cf. 
supra, Chapter 2. 
62
 M. FOUCAULT, Qu'est-ce qu'un auteur ? Dits et Écrits, Vol I. (1969), Paris: Gallimard, 1994. 
63
 Article 8 LA 1941, which further prescribes that «any pseudonym, professional name, initials or 
customary sign, well-known as being equivalent to a true name, shall be deemed to have the same value 
as such true name». 
64
 Besides, following Article 9 LA 1941 regulates the situation in which «any person who has performed 
or published in any manner an anonymous or pseudonymous work shall be entitled to assert the rights of 
the author until such time as the author reveals his identity». 
65
 Article 7 LA 1941.  
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property, with the additional inference that each contributor is entitled, as an author, to 
assert his/her moral rights at any time.66  
Indeed, the work’s authorship is one thing; its ownership is another altogether, a 
partition that emerges when the original owner, the author, transfers to someone else the 
exclusive economic or exploitation rights to the work. This general scheme, however, 
has certain limitations. A concluding provision of Chapter I LA 1941 is in fact 
dedicated to the parameters of allocating ownership of works that have been created and 
published under the public domain. A partition that, however, is limited to exploitation 
rights and not moral rights, which would still belong to the authors.67 
With limited exceptions,68 the bundle of economic and non-economic rights 
originally belongs to the author, alias the creator, of the intellectual work.69 Indeed, in 
terms of exploitation rights, there may be transferred to others and, by doing so, a 
dissociation of authorship and ownership will occur. On the contrary, non-economic or 
moral rights will still belong to the original author, thus posing an important distinction 
between the Italian and the UK system of allocating copyrights. However, before 
considering this, or the related mechanisms of exploitation rights assignment, it is 
imperative to explore in greater detail the nature of moral rights and their historical 
                                                          
66
 As the law utters in detail, «if the work has been created by the indistinguishable and inseparable 
contributions of two or more persons, the copyright shall belong to all the joint authors in common. In the 
absence of proof of written agreement to the contrary, the indivisible shares shall be presumed to be of 
equal value. The provisions that regulate property owned in common shall be applicable. Furthermore, 
moral rights may be asserted at any time by any one joint author […]». Article 10 LA 1941. 
67
 According to Article 11 LA 1941, in fact, «copyright in works created and published under the name 
and at the expense of the State, the provinces or the communes shall belong to them. In the absence of 
agreement to the contrary with the authors of the works published, the same right shall also belong to 
private legal entities of a non-profit-making character, as well as to academies [it. accademie] and other 
public cultural organizations, in respect of records of their proceedings and their publications». 
68
 One is precisely the above-mentioned provision of Article 11 LA 1941 (to be read in conjunction with 
Article 29 LA 1941, concerning the consequent limitation of the term of protection for such peculiar 
case), which, for instance, affects scholarly works. On this specific aspect, see V. MOSCON, Academic 
Freedom, Copyright, and Access to Scholarly Works: A Comparative Perspective, in R. CASO, F. 
GIOVANELLA (eds.), Balancing Copyright Law in the Digital Age: Comparative Perspectives, Berlin: 
Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2015, 99, 113.  
69
 Conventionally, copyright (here referred to in its wider sense) comprises rights of an economic and 
non-economic nature. The former encompass the category of exploitation rights, while the latter are 
commonly defined as moral rights. This initial bipartition, however, is subsequently complemented by a 
third category of rights that are related and accessories to copyright, sometimes labelled as neighbouring 
rights. This tridimensional articulation of copyrights is well explicated in R. CASO, Lineamenti normativi 
del copyright statunitense e del diritto d’autore italiano, in G. PASCUZZI, R. CASO (eds.), I diritti sulle 
opere digitali. Copyright statunitense e diritto d’autore italiano, Padova: Cedam, 2002, 170 
On the dual appraisal of economic versus non-economic rights in copyright law, see instead Z. O. 
ALGARDI, La tutela dell’opera dell’ingegno e il plagio, cit., 31-52. 
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development, starting from their acknowledgment in international law, and then 
proceeding with the systems of Italy and the United Kingdom. 
Formal recognition of moral rights entered Italian legislation only after the 
revision of the Berne Convention in 1928 on the Rome Conference of 2 June 1928. 
Before that, as in other countries such as France and Germany, moral rights found 
however certain recognition through doctrinal and judicial practice.70  
The Rome symposium was the perfect occasion to pursue a kind of homogenous 
attempt to protect the non-economic rights associated with the creation of intellectual 
works.71 Besides, one of the reasons that motivated such efforts was linked to the 
dismay that excessive reliance on economic rights pertaining to intellectual creations 
would have overcome non-economic interests in the same works. Even more so 
considering the phantom of technology, already feared as a possible double-edged 
sword that could enhance the possibilities of creation, but also dramatically control and 
limit the power of creators over their intellectual products.72 In this way, beyond the 
controversial debates and distinct positions that emerged during the Conference, the 
mutual interest to protect the universal intellectual inheritance evidently prevailed.73 
 Focusing on the resulting text of the Berne Convention after the Rome revision, 
the novel Article 6bis on moral rights resulted in the form we know today, as to the 
                                                          
70
 E. ADENEY, The moral rights of authors and performers, cit., 97, who recalls how particularly French, 
but also German, courts and scholars greatly contribute to elaboration of the fundamental basis of moral 
rights. 
71
 The need for some regulation, or at least the establishment of basic standards of protection, was to a 
great extent shielded by the need to find for instance a proper solution to authorship misattribution in 
works that, created in one country, were then circulated and distributed in other territories. At the same 
time, it cannot be denied that there had been also great pressure from lobbies, such as the Association 
littéraire et artistique internationale (ALAI), which pursued the same systematic protection endorsed by 
the Inter-American Convention of Buenos Aires in 1920, later revised in 1928 in Havana. E. ADENEY, 
The moral rights of authors and performers, cit., 98-102. 
72
 In particular, many reservations have been made with regard to the abuse of technology by publishers 
and, more generally, by those who held the economic rights to the work. E. ADENEY, The moral rights of 
authors and performers, cit., 106-107. 
73
 E. ADENEY, The moral rights of authors and performers, cit., 108, who also cites the German delegate 
Osterrieth, who said: «we labour not solely for the individual authors who appear and disappear, but 
above all for the work which remains. We labour for the grandeur of literature and of art, which are 
immortal», in Union Internationale pour la Protection des Oeuvres Littéraires et Artistiques, Actes de la 
conférence réunie à Berlin du 14 octobre au 14 November 1908, Berne: Bureau de l'Union internationale 
littéraire et artistique, 1909 (1910), 172. 
However, it is worth mentioning that not every country participating in the Rome Conference shared the 
same concern or, more precisely, the same degree of concern. As imaginable, civil law countries such as 
Italy were stronger supporters of what we might call “the moral problem”, while common law countries 
such as the UK belittled its importance. 
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right to claim authorship and to object to certain modifications and other derogatory 
treatment that could impair the author’s integrity,74 which may endure even after the 
author's death but at least as long as copyright subsists.75 
 However, if finding some kind of agreement to acknowledge the right of 
authorship attribution appeared feasible,76 certainly more problematic was reaching a 
compromise solution for the actual exercise of such rights, especially with regard to the 
term of its duration. Therefore, it is not surprising to learn of the very broad formula 
adopted by Sections 2 and 3 of Article 6bis of the Convention, which laconically refers 
it to the discretion of each national legislation.77 
 Furthermore, there is no mention of the right of the author to have the work 
eventually withdrawn after being published, an entitlement that, on the contrary, is 
expressly acknowledged by Italian copyright law. Understandably, this aspect appeared 
perhaps too complex to be addressed in the first instance by the whole international 
community, also given the intrinsic difficulty of defining unanimously the act of 
publication.78 Similarly, the Berne Convention does not take an unequivocal position on 
                                                          
74
 According to the first section of Article 6bis Berne, in fact, «independently of the author's economic 
rights, and even after the transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of 
the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in 
relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation». 
75
 Section 2 of the same Article, instead, provides that «the rights granted to the author in accordance with 
the preceding paragraph shall, after his death, be maintained, at least until the expiry of the economic 
rights, and shall be exercisable by the persons or institutions authorized by the legislation of the country 
where protection is claimed. However, those countries whose legislation, at the moment of their 
ratification of or accession to this Act, does not provide for the protection after the death of the author of 
all the rights set out in the preceding paragraph may provide that some of these rights may, after his death, 
cease to be maintained». 
76
 As Adeney recounts, in fact, the Italian delegation pushed forward also because of the recent enactment 
of the 1925 legislation. E. ADENEY, The moral rights of authors and performers, cit., 116. 
77
 The third section of Article 6bis of the Convention, in fact, provides that «the means of redress for 
safeguarding the rights granted by this Article shall be governed by the legislation of the country where 
protection is claimed». Cf. E. ADENEY, The moral rights of authors and performers, cit., 122-125. 
78
 E. ADENEY, The moral rights of authors and performers, cit., 115. Cf. S. STRÖMHOLM, Le droit moral 
de l’auteur (vol. 1). Stockholm: Norstedte Söners Forlag, 1967, 86. 
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unpublished works,79 on which, even with regard to Italian law, there has been some 
hesitancy.80 
In any case, the centrality of authorship attribution found further confirmation in 
following international conventions and declarations,81 which, by their very nature, have 
a tendency to be descriptive rather than prescriptive, as well as in the enactment of the 
national statutory that one after the other succeeded.82 Generally speaking, the 
autonomy that moral rights enjoy from the other economic right lies precisely in the fact 
that neither a mere transfer of the physical work nor a legal assignment of the exclusive 
exploitation rights in the work imply a consequent alienation of the non-economic 
rights, or the faculty to add modification that may harm the integrity of the work.83 
Concerning the described independence, arguably this allows moral rights to 
exercise some kind of balancing function against the otherwise preponderance of 
exclusive economic rights, but also to some extent against the risk of deceiving the 
public by providing improper information regarding authorship of the work. At the 
same time, it is also recognizable that there are some manifest hindrances to their full 
                                                          
79
 Article 24 LA 1941 indeed provides that «the right to publish unpublished works shall belong to the 
heirs of the author or to the legatees of such works, unless the author has expressly forbidden publication 
or has entrusted it to other persons. If the author has fixed a period of time to precede publication, 
unpublished works shall not be published before the expiration of such period. If more than one person is 
concerned by the first paragraph and there is disagreement between them, the matter shall be decided by 
judicial authority after hearing the public prosecutor. The wishes of the deceased person, when expressed 
in writing, shall in all cases be respected. The provisions of Part III, Chapter II, Section II, shall apply to 
such works». 
80
 See L. C. UBERTAZZI (ed.), Commentario breve alle leggi su proprietà intellettuale e concorrenza, 
Breviaria iuris, Padova: Cedam, 2012 (fifth edition), Article 11 [LA 1941], 1370 et seq. 
81
 Accordin to Article 11 of the 1946 Washington Inter-American Convention, «the author of any 
copyrighted work, in disposing of his copyright therein by sale, assignment, or otherwise, retains the right 
to claim the paternity of the work and to oppose any modification or use of it which is prejudicial to his 
reputation as an author, unless he has consented or consents, before, at the time, or after the modification 
or use is made, to dispose of or waive this right in accordance with the provisions of the law of the State 
where the contract is made». Inter-American Convention on the rights of the author in literary, scientific 
and artistic works, signed in Washington, on 22 June 1946, entered into force on 14 April 1947, 1438 
UNTS 28, <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201438/volume-1438-I-24373-English.pdf>. 
Two years later, Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, provided that «everyone has 
the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in 
scientific advancement and its benefits. Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material 
interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author». Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, General Assembly resolution No. 217A (III), U.N. Document A/810 at 71 
(1948), <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Pages/Language.aspx?LangID=eng>. 
82
 P. GOLDSTEIN, P. B. HUGENHOLTZ (eds), International copyright: principles, law, and practice, cit., 10, 
noticing how «copyright law remains essentially national law». 
83
 R. CASO, Lineamenti normativi del copyright statunitense e del diritto d’autore italiano, cit., 189. 
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autonomous functioning, the first being the costs that may be hindered in their separate 
legal protection.84 
As a consequence, the normative structure concerning the transfer of 
exploitation rights cannot be disregarded.85 Besides, very often the author whose work 
has allegedly been plagiarized would bring legal action for a moral right violation 
together with allegations of copyright infringement. Furthermore, their obvious 
entanglement is after all reinforced by the letter of the LA 1941, which makes clear that, 
despite the autonomy of moral rights from economic ones, provisions concerning the 
latter will be applied wherever possible to the former. Besides, the law prescribes the 
mechanism according to which economic rights may be allocated,86 additionally 
précising that generally the legal transfer of the rights to the work, which should be set 
out in writing,87 is not implied in the act of transferring a physical copy of the work.88 
However, although the current Italian copyright law represents the arrival point 
of a contentious normative route that included the debate over the prevalence of 
economic and non-economic interests embodied in the work, it still remains an obsolete 
law. The amendments and collateral detailed provisions that have flourished do not 
really challenge this. There is, therefore, growing praise for pursuing a genuine reform 
of the law, not just its mere redecoration, which would take into account better the 
social and technological transformations that have taken place since its enactment more 
than seven decades ago.89 
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 R. CASO, Lineamenti normativi del copyright statunitense e del diritto d’autore italiano, cit., 192-193. 
85
 Finding its main body of regulation in Chapter II of Part III LA 1941 on Common Provisions. 
86
 According to Article 107 LA 1941, «the exploitation rights belonging to the authors of intellectual 
works, together with related rights of an economic character, may be acquired, sold or transferred in any 
manner or form allowed by law, subject to application of the provisions contained in this Chapter», while 
Article 108 provides that «an author who has reached the age of 16 shall be deemed capable of 
accomplishing all legal acts relating to works created by him and of instituting any action in respect of 
them». 
87
 Article 110 LA 1941. As has been noticed, this may be a fine example of the limitations that are 
imposed over the freedom of the right-holder to exercise his/her own rights that arise from the intellectual 
work, but (I add) they might well function as a good balance against the possible abuses. See R. CASO, 
Lineamenti normative del copyright statunitense e del diritto d’autore italiano, cit., 182-183. 
88
 Article 109 LA 1941 utters that «in the absence of agreement to the contrary, the transfer of one or 
more copies of the work shall not imply transfer of the exploitation rights afforded by this Law. However, 
the transfer of a mold, an engraved plate or any similar medium used to reproduce a work of art shall be 
deemed, in the absence of agreement to the contrary, to include the right to reproduce the work, provided 
such right belongs to the transferor». 
89
 Although this may be deemed a general consideration, it also applies with exact regard to regulating 
authorship attribution. 
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Indeed, the Italian copyright law of 1941 has undergone several changes that 
occurred after various legislative interventions,90 especially under the influence of 
European law,91 some of which had a more consistent implication for moral rights.92 
However, it was never entirely and systematically reformed.93  
Therefore, many have promoted the need for an adequate reform of copyright 
legislation that, in a more comprehensive and systematic way, could adapt the law’s 
system of rules to the new and ever-changing needs of society and technology. This, 
                                                          
90
 See, among them, Law No. 866 of 22 November 1973, Ratification and implementation of the 
International Convention for the Protection of performers, signed in Rome, 26 October 1961; Law No. 93 
of 5 February 1992, setting out Provisions for the benefit of phonographic companies and remuneration 
for private, non-profit-making reproduction (as amended up to Decree-Law No. 64 of 30 April 2010); 
Legislative Decree No. 685 of 16 November 1994, implementing the Council Directive 92/100/EEC of 19 
November 1992, on Rental right and lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the field of 
intellectual property; Legislative Decree No. 154 of 26 May 1997, implementing Council Directive No. 
93/98/EC of 29 October 1993, Harmonizing the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights; 
Law No. 248 of 18 August 2000, New norms protecting authorship rights, amending Law No. 633 of 22 
April 1941; Legislative Decree No. 68 of 9 April 2003, implementing Directive 2001/29/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001, on the Harmonization of certain aspects of 
copyright and related rights in the information society (as amended up to Decree-Law No. 7 of 31 January 
2005); Law No. 109 of 25 June 2005, Conversion into Law, with amendments of the Decree-Law No. 63 
of 26 April 2005, containing Urgent provisions for the development and territorial cohesion, as well as for 
the Protection of copyright provisions concerning the adoption of single texts on compulsory and 
supplementary insurance; Legislative Decree No. 118 of 13 February 2006, implementing Directive 
2001/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September 27, on the Resale right for 
the benefit of the author of an original work of art.  
91
 For a first reasoning on the implementation of EU copyright law into the Italian system, see, among 
others, A. GRAZIANO, Il diritto d’autore tra legge nazionale e principio del trattato CEE (art. 30 e 36) 
nella giurisprudenza della corte di giustizia. Spunti per una riflessione, in Riv. it. dir. pubbl. com., 1993, 
261, who also considers the explicit judicial nature of the EU influence. 
92
 See, in particular, Law No. 399 of 20 June 1978, Ratification and implementation of the Berne 
Convention on the Protection of literary and artistic works, of 9 September 1886, amended on 28 
September 1979 (followed by Decree No. 19 of 8 January 1979 for its application), which introduced the 
protection of photographic works which certainly features among creative intellectual works. 
Regarding the protection of computer programs, see the amendments introduced by Legislative Decree 
No. 518 of 29 December 1992, implementing the Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991, on the 
Legal protection of computer programs; Legislative Decree No. 205 of 15 March 1996, on Amendments 
to Legislative Decree No. 518 of 29 December 1992, concerning the Legal protection of computer 
programs. 
On database, see Legislative Decree No. 169 of 6 May 1999, implementing EC Directive 96/9/EC of 11 
March 1996, relating to the Legal protection of databases. 
Concerning copyright enforcement, see instead Law No. 650 of 23 December 1996, amending the 
Decree-Law No. 545 of 23 October 1996, containing Urgent provisions for the exercise of radio and 
television broadcasting and communications, which aimed at promoting more stringent controls and 
focused on repression of infringing conducts. On this aspect, see also Decree-Law No. 72 of 2 March 
2004, converted into Law No. 128 of 21 May 2004, relating to Interventions to oppose the illegal 
diffusion of audiovisual works, and to support movie and entertainment activities (as amended up to 
Decree-Law No. 7 of 31 January 2005); Legislative Decree No. 140 of 16 March 2006, implementing 
Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004, on the 
Enforcement of intellectual property rights. 
93
 S. ERCOLANI, Un inventario (provvisorio) delle modificazioni alla legge sul diritto d’autore, in Dir. 
autore, 1997, 300. 
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additionally, is especially appreciated by the consideration of all supporting arguments 
in favour of a proper normative appraisal and regulation of practices that were unlikely 
envisioned by the original legislator of 1941.94 
Given this articulated normative framework, the fierce antagonist of 
misattribution is essentially the observance of the right of attribution, because it is 
precisely the usurpation of such a right that puts into effect, yet in more flamboyant 
words, plagiarism. Indeed, it is accurate to notice that a non-observance of this kind 
may also encompass other moral rights – in the first place, the right of integrity. This 
could happen, for instance, when misattribution of authorship accompanies an alteration 
of the misattributed work that afflicts prejudice on its author’s right of integrity. 
More generally, moral rights identify the entitlement recognized to the authors 
of an intellectual work to protect their personal interests linked to the creation of an 
intellectual work. Besides, it is correct to say that the fullest enactment of moral rights is 
a typical prerogative of the Continent.95 As we will see when considering the UK 
approach, in fact, moral rights still receive some protection, albeit in a more limited 
manner.96 
In conclusion, for what concerns the Italian legal system of moral rights, at the 
very beginning of its historical development, even there copyright was essentially 
limited to the protection of economic interests, which directly depend upon the 
commercial dissemination of intellectual works. It was only afterwards that a more 
qualified relationship between the work and the author came into being within a wider 
conception of intellectual property, by emphasizing features that may abstract from pure 
monetary aspects, but instead are related to the essential nature of the work as a creation 
                                                          
94
 Some attempts to come to a systematic reform were made during the middle of 1970s. Cf. M. ROTONDI, 
Un progetto di legge tipo per brevetti, modelli e marchi e proposta di una legge tipo in materia di diritto 
di autore, in Dir. autore, 1977, 89; M. FABIANI, Per una revisione della legge sul diritto di autore, in Dir. 
autore, 1987, 1; M. FABIANI, Quale revisione della legge sul diritto di autore? in Dir. autore, 2006, 101. 
See also S. ERCOLANI, Il diritto d’autore: la legge italiana e le linee di evoluzione nella società 
dell’informazione, in Dir. autore, 2001, 19.; G. GALTIERI, I quaranta anni della legge italiana sul diritto 
d’autore, in Dir. autore 1982, 123. 
95
 See, in particular, the French and German systems. 
96
 Even lesser and much more limited protection is granted by the United States that only explicitly 
affords statutory moral rights to works of visual art. 
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of one’s mind and a reflection of its creator’s personality.97 Therefore, while Italy 
confirmed and reinforced its favourable approach to moral rights in the copyright law in 
force, as we shall see in greater detail, the United Kingdom followed with cautious and 
sceptical footsteps in the CDPA of 1988. 
 
 
2.2 A shady UK response to Berne enacting its moral rights legislation 
 
Notwithstanding the previous considerations made in relation to the need to protect 
authorship attribution on the record by the international community, it is generally 
accepted that, at least concerning their autonomous and extensive protection, moral 
rights have traditionally been a privilege of civil law countries. Common law countries, 
                                                          
97
 Within these premises, a theory of “moral sovereignty” over the intellectual product of the mind has 
made inroads in a noisier manner. See U. IZZO, Alle radici della diversità tra copyright e diritto d'autore, 
in G. PASCUZZI, R. CASO (eds). I diritti sulle opere digitali. Copyright statunitense e diritto d’autore 
italiano, Padova: Cedam, 2002, 124-125, who (at 126) recalls R. SAVATIER, Les métamorphoses 
économiques et sociales du droit privé d’aujourd’hui. Paris, 1959, 12, as to the influence of French 
revolutionary instances to the inclusion of the author’s immaterial patrimony precisely through the notion 
of personality, but also (at 125-126) J. M. PARDESSUS, Cours de droit commercial, Bruxells: Tarlier, 
1836, as to the theorization that, beyond exclusive exploitation rights, other inalienable personal rights 
have contributed to affording greater protection to the work. Cf. C. A. RENOUARD, Traité des droits 
d’auteurs, dans la littérature, les sciences et les beaux-arts. Paris: Jules Renuard, 1839.  
Of particular interest, indeed, is also the reference to the dual nature of economic and non-economic 
rights that will later develop into the dualistic (as opposed to monistic) theory. See, on this regard, A. 
MORILLOT, De la protection accordée aux oeuvres d’art, aux photographies, aux dessins et modèle 
industriels et au brevets d’inventions dans l’empire d’Allemagne. Paris: Cotillon, 1878, 95, also cited by 
U. IZZO, Alle radici della diversità tra copyright e diritto d'autore, cit., 128-130. 
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on the contrary, remained tangled with the economic facets of copyright, cautiously 
refuting any sentimental involvement with personality in the creative process.98 
  The strong personalist significance that may be clinched in affording the 
unlimited and fullest protection to moral rights seems in fact to clash with the ultimate 
shield of exclusive exploitation rights, which is indeed cherished by many legislations 
and at EU level, particularly when the holder of the right is someone other than the 
author.  
  Nonetheless, it is likewise indisputable that a growing interest in moral rights 
has now also pervaded common law countries such as the United Kingdom.99 The 
relevance of this fairly recent approach is expressed well by Adeney, who depicts it 
referring to the imagine of the creator of the work, the author, as a new player in the 
game of copyright, who has a number of additional prerogatives that appear distinct 
from economic interests, which are therefore worthy of consideration.100 
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 Cf. E. ADENEY, The moral rights of authors and performers, cit., 1-2. 
This appears confirmed also by the statutory setting that preceeded the CDPA 1988. 
The Copyright Act 1801, 41 Geo. III, c. 107, An Act for the further encouragement of learning, in the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, by securing the copies and copyright of printed books to 
the authors of such books, or their assigns for the time herein mentioned; The Copyright Act 1842, 5 & 6 
Vict, c. 45; The Fine Art Copyright Act 1862, cit., and the Bill for amending Law relating to Copyright in 
Works of Fine Art, 1862; The Copyright Act 1911, cit.; The Patents, Designs, Copyright and Trade 
Marks (Emergency) Act 1939, of September 21, 1939. An Act to make such special provision with 
respect to patents, registered designs, copyright and trade marks, as is expedient to meet any emergency 
which may arise as a result of war; The Copyright Act 1956, of 5th November 1956. An Act to make new 
provision in respect of copyright and related matters, in substitution for the provisions of the Copyright 
Act, 1911, and other enactments relating thereto; to amend the Registered Designs Act, 1949, with respect 
to designs related to artistic works in which copyright subsists, and to amend the Dramatic and Musical 
Performers' Protection Act, 1925; and for purposes connected with the matters aforesaid; The Copyright 
Act, 1956 (Transitional Extension), Order No. No. 103, 1959, of 19th January 1959; The Copyright 
(International Organisations), Order No. 1524, 1957, of August 23, 1957 (followed by later 
Amendments); The Copyright Royalty System (Records) (Amendment) Regulations 1973 No. 409; The 
Copyright Royalty (Records of Musical Works) (Inquiries Procedure) Regulations 1974 No. 2190; The 
Copyright (Customs) (Amendment) Regulations 1982 No. 766; The Copyright (Computer Software) 
(Extension to Territories) Order 1987 No. 2200. 
99
 Over the years, many words have been spent on the doctrine of moral rights and its development, 
focusing on the peculiar relationship that links the author with the work he/she had created. See, in 
particular, with regard to their feasibility in the context of common law jurisdictions, E. J. DAMICH, The 
Right of Personality: A Common Law Basis for the Protection of the Moral Rights of Authors, in Ga. L. 
Rev., Vol. 23, 1988, 1; G. DWORKIN, The moral right of the author: moral rights and the common law 
countries, in Colum.-VLA J.L.& Arts, Vol. 19, 1995, 229.; J. C. GINSBURG, Moral Rights in a Common 
Law System, in UCLA Ent. L. Rev., Vol. 121, No. 4, 1990; L. ZEMER, Moral rights: limited edition, in 
Bost ULR, Vol. 91, No. 4, 2011, 1519. 
100
 E. ADENEY, The moral rights of authors and performers, cit., 4. 
Besides, the attention for the personal aspects of copyright is not yet clear and should not be equal to that 
reached by civil law countries such as Italy. However, it is correct to envision a new way of interpretative 
development, and perhaps even new normative opportunities. 
  
147 
 
  Besides, the increasing curiosity towards moral rights seems, to some extent, to 
be linked to their capacity to exercise the same balancing function that has been 
envisioned within the Italian debate. Explaining accordingly this valuable role within 
the broader setting of copyright law may perhaps decrease the severe hostility that has 
been demonstrated towards their further development. This seems even more applicable 
in light of the tremendous changes that technology, particularly digital technology, has 
brought to the main framework, thus affecting many traditional concepts of copyright, 
including copyright ownership, authorship and originality.101 
 All this considered, some have suggested that a streamlined approach to moral 
rights may effectively help, to some extent, in redesigning copyright, especially in terms 
of its digital ramifications.102 Furthermore, as already pointed out, the reasons behind a 
favourable position towards the protection of moral rights are attributable to the 
opportunity to contrast conduct that undermines authorship, which may be relevant not 
only on ethical grounds but also from an actual legal copyright perspective, especially 
when it collides with the general interest of society to identify the work with its author. 
  Therefore, the aims pursued appear not to be limited to the protection of the sole 
individuality or personality of the author, which is just one consequence of such an 
interpretation. Furthermore, there is even adequate space for envisioning pure economic 
reasons in such protection, which comes from the simple but significant presumption 
that the market itself may also benefit from a transparency of information.103  
 Moreover, the lack of a definition of plagiarism, which we have seen is also 
characteristic of the Italian system, does not in any way support the notion that there is 
no space for sanctioning misattribution in the law. Indeed, the lack of a precise 
                                                          
101
 See, among others, P. PRESCOTT, H. LADDIE, M. VITORIA, A. SPECK, L. LANE (eds.), Laddie, Prescott, 
and Vitoria: The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs, LexisNexis, Butterworths Law, 2011 (first ed. 
1980). 
102
 M. T. SUNDARA RAJAN, Moral rights: principles, practice and new technology, Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2011 (2010), who expressly calls for a necessary elucidation of what the legal 
status of moral rights should be, also adopting an expressly comparative perspective, taking into account 
the example of a few distinct jurisdictions. 
On the many challenges that contemporary copyright law has faced, particularly after the digital 
revolution, thus requiring new viewpoints, see the essays edited by P. TORREMANS (ed.), Copyright law: a 
handbook of contemporary research, Research handbooks in intellectual property series, Cheltenham: 
Elgar, 2009 (first ed. 2007). 
103
 E. ADENEY, The moral rights of authors and performers, cit., 50. This last consideration however, may 
be however easily contradicted by pointing out the practices of publishers and booksellers to accept and 
promote misattribution. 
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designation of the phenomenon finds its best explanation in the understandable fear of 
the legislators of both systems to confine it to strict and firm boundaries, but there seem 
to be scarce arguments that the law’s intention is to renounce to any protection of the 
right.104 Otherwise, there would not have been a statutory enactment of moral rights at 
all.105 
  Indeed, the customary absence of a robust moral rights doctrine in the 
framework of common law tradition has indeed clashed with the opposite craving 
within the international framework for careful consideration of non-economic 
interests.106 The United Kingdom had initially expressed their perplexity towards the 
enactment of moral rights since Berne, but then ultimately found the compromise 
solution that the Convention’s provisions on the matter would have remained general 
principles or standards and never an obligation.107  
 The belief that moral rights are «no more than entitlements guaranteed by the 
Berne Convention and certain domestic enactments»,108 did not, in fact, impede the 
development of a different feeling towards them, which is expressed by those who 
praised their fullest enactment. Of course, it is one thing accomplishing the interest to 
acknowledge the intellectual origin of the work; it is another altogether leaving it 
boundless, something that the UK law expressly wants to avoid, as it emerges from the 
details of the provisions in force on the matter. 
                                                          
104
 This seeming confidence in the capacity of legislators may appear to many to be unrealistic. It would 
certainly be easier to remark upon the often hysterical attitude of the lawmaker, which has often 
accompanied the copyright path. However, let us for once believe in its cautiousness and judgement. 
105
 Hiding behind the alleged pressure of the Berne Convention, moreover, appears equally unreasonable. 
106
 However, even at Berne there is still some diffidence among common law countries. E. ADENEY, The 
moral rights of authors and performers, cit., 282. 
107
 As we shall see, the UK choice to give authors the entitlement of having their authorship 
acknowledged was soon balanced by the possibility that they may waive such a right. E. ADENEY, The 
moral rights of authors and performers, cit., 280. 
108
 E. ADENEY, The moral rights of authors and performers, cit., 281-282. 
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 The prevalence of economic instances is indeed supported by the traditional 
resilient power that stationers have had in the English copyright system.109 However, 
even before the enactment of the Statute of Anne, some endeavours to recognize the 
non-economic rights of the author have indeed found some grounds in preceding 
normative documents,110 or in case law,111 although in other instances the judiciary has 
conversely contradicted this conclusion by explicitly fading the relevance of moral 
rights.112 Since then, many changes occurred and the law has tried to keep in step with 
                                                          
109
 The mechanism of privileges inevitably put authors in a feeble position, with the exception of few 
entitlements that mostly concerned the faculty to oppose acts that could have damaged their reputation 
and a more general opportunity to contest occasionally some alteration to the work. E. ADENEY, The 
moral rights of authors and performers, cit., 366-367. 
For a primary reference on historical copyright in the UK, see W. A. COPINGER, The law of copyright, in 
works of literature and art: including that of the drama, music, engraving, sculpture, painting, 
photography and ornamental and useful designs: together with international and foreign copyright, with 
the statutes relating thereto, and references to the English and American decisions, with a new 
introduction and notes by R. Deazley, Clark, NJ: Lawbook Exchange, 2008, 2012, (first ed., Stevens and 
Haynes, 1870, <https://archive.org/details/lawcopyrightinw00copigoog>). 
110
 The preliminary draft of the Statute of Anne, in particular, alluded to the «undoubted property» of the 
author over his/her work, although the definite version of the act preferred the more stony expression 
«sole right and liberty of printing» to feature copyright.  
Furthermore, other erstwhile acts gave the impression that some protection to the author was pursued. 
See, for instance, the Engraving Act of 1735, which essentially protected the reputation of the artist, and 
the Fine Arts Copyright Act 1862, cit., which is considered the precursor of modern legislation in the 
matter of false attribution of authorship, a practice that was particularly persistent among publishers, but 
still has to be considered distinct from the conduct of non-attribution or improper attribution of 
authorship. Cf. E. ADENEY, The moral rights of authors and performers, cit., 368, 375. 
111
 See Pope v Curll, 17 June 1741, Chancery, [1741] 2 Atk 342, 26 ER 608 (Ch). See also Millar v 
Taylor, 20 April 1769, King’s Bench, [1769] EngR 44; [1769] 4 Burr 2303; [1769] 98 ER 201, and its 
description of «incorporeal right to print a set of intellectual ideas or modes of thinking» (at 2336), on the 
attempt to recognize a common law right of the author originating from the act of creation. However, the 
idea of privileges soon returned denying the idea of a common law copyright in Donaldson v Becket, 22 
February 1774, House of Lords, [1774] 2 Bro PC 129; [1774] 1 ER 837, holding that copyright is a matter 
of statute and the right was held either by the author or by the person that otherwise had the economic 
rights in the work. 
Cf. E. ADENEY, The moral rights of authors and performers, cit., 368-371 
112
 See the discussion within the Gregory Committee, which stated how moral rights were «unknown to 
[the] jurisprudence» Copyright Committee of the Board of Trade. Report of the Copyright Committee 
(Chairman, HS Gregory), Cmd 8662. London: HMSO, 1952. Cited by E. ADENEY, The moral rights of 
authors and performers, cit., 375. 
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it, enacting the main body of legislation and subsequently intervening with amendments 
or more or less detailed reforms.113 
Originally, the author is also generally the first owner of the copyright, with the 
fundamental exceptions of a work created in the course of an employment relationship 
or other peculiar instances.114 Additionally, the peculiarity of the UK system of moral 
rights can be appreciated exactly in the hypotheses of an employment relationship, 
where the employer is considered the first owner of the work. Similar consideration 
affects the context of films, in which additionally it is also essential to notice the 
peculiar legislative choice of allocating authorship to the person of the producer or 
principal director, to whom the moral right of attribution is expressly granted. 
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 After the enactment of the CDPA 1988, in fact, there have been - similarly to the Italian LA 1941 – 
several changes, but still not yet a complete and systematic reform of the whole body of copyright law. 
The Copyright (Recording for Archives of Designated Class of Broadcasts and Cable Programmes) 
(Designated Bodies) (No. 2) Orders 1989 No. 1011 and 2510; The Copyright (Librarians and Archivists) 
(Copying of Copyright Material) Regulations 1989 No. 1212; The Copyright (Material Open to Public 
Inspection) Orders 1989 No. 1098 and 1099; The Copyright (Copying by Librarians and Archivists) 
(Amendment) Regulations 1989 No. 1069; The Copyright (Educational Establishments) Order 1989 No. 
1068; The Copyright (Application of Provisions relating to Educational Establishments to Teachers) 
Order 1989 No. 1067; The Copyright (Sub-titling of Broadcasts and Cable Programmes) (Designated 
Body) Order 1989 No. 1013; The Copyright (Recordings of Folksongs for Archives) (Designated Bodies) 
Order 1989 No. 1012; The Copyright (Copying by Librarians and Archivists) Regulations 1989 No. 1009; 
The Copyright and Rights in Performances (Notice of Seizure) Order 1989 No. 1006; The Copyright 
(International Conventions) (Amendment) Order 1989 No. 157; The Copyright (Material Open to Public 
Inspection) (Marking of Copies of Plans and Drawings) Order 1990 No. 1427; The Copyright Tribunal 
(Amendment) Rules 1991 No. 201 and 1992 No. 467; The Copyright (Computer Programs) Regulations 
1992 No. 3233; The Copyright (EC Measures Relating to Pirated Goods and Abolition of Restrictions on 
the Import of Goods) Regulations 1995 No. 1445; The Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 1996 
No. 2967; The Copyright and Rights in Databases Regulations 1997 No. 3032; Copyright, etc. and Trade 
Marks (Offences and Enforcement) Act 2002 c. 25; The Copyright and Rights in Databases (Amendment) 
Regulations 2003 No. 2501; The Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 2003 No. 2498; The 
European Communities (Definition of Treaties) (WIPO Copyright Treaty and WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty) Order 2005 No. 3431; The Copyright (Educational Establishments) Order 2005 No. 
223; The Copyright and Performances (Application to Other Countries) Order 2006 No. 316; The 
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (Amendment) Regulations 2010 No. 2694; The Copyright 
Tribunal Rules 2010 No. 791; The Copyright and Duration of Rights in Performances Regulations 2013 
No. 1782 and Amendment Regulations 2014 No. 434; The Copyright and Rights in Performances 
(Licensing of Orphan Works) Regulations 2014 No. 2863; The Copyright and Rights in Performances 
(Certain Permitted Uses of Orphan Works) Regulations 2014 No. 2861; The Copyright and Rights in 
Performances (Extended Collective Licensing) Regulations 2014 No. 2588; The Copyright and Rights in 
Performances (Personal Copies for Private Use) Regulations 2014 No. 2361; The Copyright and Rights in 
Performances (Quotation and Parody) Regulations 2014 No. 2356; The Copyright and Rights in 
Performances (Research, Education, Libraries and Archives) Regulations 2014 No. 1372; The Copyright 
(Regulation of Relevant Licensing Bodies) Regulations 2014 No. 898 
114
 As the second part of Section 11 CDPA 1988 provides, «(2) where a literary, dramatic, musical or 
artistic work [F26, or a film,] is made by an employee in the course of his employment, his employer is 
the first owner of any copyright in the work subject to any agreement to the contrary. (3) This section 
does not apply to Crown copyright or Parliamentary copyright (see sections 163 and 165) or to copyright 
which subsists by virtue of section 168 (copyright of certain international organisations)». 
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The concepts of authorship and ownership of copyright find express regulation 
in Sections 9 CDPA 1988 onwards. Accordingly, the author of a work is, first, «the 
person who creates it». However, the law also introduces a clear legal fiction when it 
utters that «that person shall be taken to be», depending on the type of works listed in 
the same provision, «the producer, the principal director, the person making [the] 
broadcast, the publisher [or] the person by whom the arrangements necessary for the 
creation of the work are undertaken».115 Furthermore, in the case of joint authorship, 
when «a work produced by the collaboration of two or more authors in which the 
contribution of each author is not distinct from that of the other author or authors», a 
common allocation is foreseen.116 
 In essence, in distinguishing the rights subsisting in copyright works, UK 
copyright law provides more limited protection to moral rights than it is with regard to 
economic rights, first confining the scope of protection to certain types of work while 
expressly excluding others, and then precisely defining the cases of who is entitled to 
claim the right in question.117 Referring to what has been explicated with regard to 
copyright subsistence and recalling that the law also protects original works provided 
that they have been fixed,118 it is worth repeating that UK copyright law establishes a 
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 Section 9 CDPA 1988. The same provision also covers cases of unknown authorship: «(4) For the 
purposes of this Part a work is of ‘unknown authorship’ if the identity of the author is unknown or, in the 
case of a work of joint authorship, if the identity of none of the authors is known. (5) For the purposes of 
this Part the identity of an author shall be regarded as unknown if it is not possible for a person to 
ascertain his identity by reasonable inquiry; but if his identity is once known it shall not subsequently be 
regarded as unknown». 
In this way, there may be a general entitlement to have the author’s identity appropriately individuated, 
which would additionally support the arguments in favour of a proper acknowledgment of authorship. 
116
 Section 10 CDPA 1988. 
117
 According to Section 2 CDPA 1988, «(1) The owner of the copyright in a work of any description has 
the exclusive right to do the acts specified in Chapter II as the acts restricted by the copyright in a work of 
that description. (2) In relation to certain descriptions of copyright work the following rights conferred by 
Chapter IV (moral rights) subsist in favour of the author, director or commissioner of the work, whether 
or not he is the owner of the copyright - (a) section 77 (right to be identified as author or director), (b) 
section 80 (right to object to derogatory treatment of work), and (c) section 85 (right to privacy of certain 
photographs and films)». 
118
 Recalling the contents of Section 1 CDPA 1988, «(1) Copyright is a property right which subsists in 
accordance with this Part in the following descriptions of work - (a) original literary, dramatic, musical or 
artistic works, (b) sound recordings, films [or broadcasts], and (c) the typographical arrangement of 
published editions. (2) In this Part ‘copyright work’ means a work of any of those descriptions in which 
copyright subsists. (3) Copyright does not subsist in a work unless the requirements of this Part with 
respect to qualification for copyright protection are met (see section 153 and the provisions referred to 
there)». 
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number of limitations and qualification requirements,119 which apply precisely to moral 
rights and the right of attribution in particular.120 Therefore, and contrary to Italian law 
that affords moral rights protection to any creative original work protected by copyright, 
under UK law computer programs and computer-generated works are excluded from the 
range of protection, on the grounds that there seems to be no identifiable human author 
and therefore no reason to afford a right to claim either attribution or integrity.121  
Chapter IV of the CDPA 1988 expressly regulates moral rights and the first right 
to consider is that of being identified as author (or director).122 The right’s content is so 
concisely articulated: 
The author of a copyright literary, dramatic, musical or artistic 
work, and the director of a copyright film, has the right to be 
identified as the author or director of the work in the 
circumstances mentioned in this section; but the right is not 
infringed unless it has been asserted in accordance with section 
78.123 
The immediate observation that should be made regards the centrality of the 
requirement of assertion, given that its absence eliminates any chance to action the 
right, since this would refute any allegation of infringement.124 
                                                          
119
 On the qualifications requirement for, and the extent of, copyright protection, see Chapter IX, starting 
with Section 153 CDPA 1988. 
120
 On the procedural side, presumptions apply in proceedings brought according to the provisions 
contained in Chapter VI CDPA 1988. In general terms, the name of the author appearing in the work is 
presumed to be true, it also being conceivable to suppose that the work whose author is dead or unlikely 
to be identified in his/her actual identity is an original work. See Section 104 CDPA 1988. See also 
Section 105 of the same Act, concerning the presumptions relevant to sound recordings and films. 
121
 Cf. E. ADENEY, The moral rights of authors and performers, cit., 393. 
122
 Despite the clarity of the provision, however, as will be explained, the law also indicates all the 
instances in which attribution will not be guaranteed. 
123
 Section 11 Part 2 CDPA 1988. 
124
 Before assessing in detail the significance of such a condition, it is necessary to consider the additional 
limitations that operate in the right’s defence, with regard to the conduct in which the right to be 
identified may be infringed. 
According to Section 77 CDPA 1988, the right is infringed, for instance, in the case of literary or 
dramatic works «whenever - (a) the work is published commercially, performed in public [or 
communicated to the public]; or (b) copies of a film or sound recording including the work are issued to 
the public»; in the case of musical works or a work to be sung or spoken with music, «(a) the work is 
published commercially; (b) copies of a sound recording of the work are issued to the public; or (c) a film 
of which the sound-track includes the work is shown in public or copies of such a film are issued to the 
public»; in the case of artistic works, «(a) the work is published commercially or exhibited in public, or a 
visual image of it is [communicated to the public]; (b) a film including a visual image of the work is 
shown in public or copies of such a film are issued to the public; or (c) in the case of a work of 
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 The requirement of assertion noticeably attracts great attention. Besides, when 
asserting the right, the author (or director) may choose a pseudonym or any other 
reasonable form of identification, which is expected to be used afterwards.125 The right 
has to be asserted in view of the requirements set forth by Section 78 CDPA 1988; thus, 
it may be asserted in a general manner or through a specific act, for instance, through a 
dedicated statement when assigning copyright in the work, or by any instrument in 
writing signed by the author or director.126  
The importance of assertion as a fundamental prerequisite rests on the fact that 
upon it depends the possibility to seek redress in the case of an infringement deriving 
from the failure to attribute the work to the author (or director). Indeed, if it may be 
argued that the requirement of assertion leads back to the «claiming» to which the Berne 
Convention refers, at the same time it may sound much more like a formality, which the 
Convention on the contrary expressly bans.127 
 However, if such a requirement may easily be satisfied by the author of a literary 
work, for instance, by including the locution that “the moral right of the author has been 
asserted according to the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988” on the title page of 
a book, it is also accurate to foresee that it could be less easy to assert the right in a 
different type of work, such as a musical work or its lyrics. 
 Just as important as Section 77 is Section 79 CDPA 1988, which contains 
detailed exceptions to the right to be identified as the author (or director) of the work. 
As has been anticipated with regard to computer programs and computer-generated 
                                                                                                                                                                          
architecture in the form of a building or a model for a building, a sculpture or a work of artistic 
craftsmanship, copies of a graphic work representing it, or of a photograph of it, are issued to the public». 
The provisions continue illustrating other illustrations of infringing acts. Neverheless, it is worth noticing 
that the same specification applies to the first three types of work, that is to say, «whenever any of those 
events occur in relation to an adaptation of the work as the author of the work from which the adaptation 
was made». 
125
 Section 77 Part 8 CDPA 1988. 
126
 With regard to publicly exhibited artistic works, the right may also be asserted «(a) by securing that 
when the author or other first owner of copyright parts with possession of the original, or of a copy made 
by him or under his direction or control, the author is identified on the original or copy, or on a frame, 
mount or other thing to which it is attached, or (b) by including in a licence by which the author or other 
first owner of copyright authorises the making of copies of the work a statement signed by or on behalf of 
the person granting the licence that the author asserts his right to be identified in the event of the public 
exhibition of a copy made in pursuance of the licence». Section 78 Part 3 CDPA 1988. 
Despite the outward severity of the provision, however, the same provision holds that, when an action of 
infringement is brought before the court, the latter may also take into account any delay in asserting the 
right. 
127
 E. ADENEY, The moral rights of authors and performers, cit., 398-401. 
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works, the design of a typeface is equally excluded from such protection. Similarly, the 
right does not subsist to works produced in the course of employment. Furthermore, the 
right is not infringed by conducts that under certain circumstances would not infringe 
copyright in the work. These instances are, for example, ascribable to fair dealing for 
certain purposes; to certain incidental insertions of works; to examination questions; and 
to parliamentary and judicial proceedings.128 In any case, the applicability of the right is 
excluded with regard to works reporting current events, as well as certain publications 
with specific divulgating purposes,129 or special works of a royal, legislative or similar 
nature.130 
Given the presence of a detailed list of types of conduct that would be exempt 
from infringement and would consequently be discharged from the violation of the 
moral right of attribution, indeed there does not seem to be a general formula of 
exemption that would impede the bringing of any action for the infringement of the sole 
moral right in question. With the exception of the listed acts, therefore, the path of an 
autonomous legal action may still be foreseeable, even if, as in practice, actions against 
the infringement of economic rights have significantly prevailed.131 
Such conclusions appear confirmed by the recent 2014 legislative amendments 
that have, among other aspects, addressed the parody copyright exception that allows a 
limited use of copyright protected material, regardless of the copyright holder’s consent, 
insofar as such use is fair and proportionate. 
 The second moral right to be considered is the right to object to derogatory 
treatment of work, which finds its regulation in Section 80 CDPA 1988. Provided that 
the author (or director) is entitled «not to have his subjected to derogatory treatment», 
the provision in question specifies that for treatment is meant any addition to, deletion 
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 Section 79 CDPA 1988. 
129
 In detail, «the right does not apply in relation to the publication in (a) a newspaper, magazine or 
similar periodical, or (b) an encyclopaedia, dictionary, yearbook or other collective work of reference, of 
a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work made for the purposes of such publication or made available 
with the consent of the author for the purposes of such publication». Section 79 (6) CDPA 1988 
130
 As Section 79 (7) CDPA 1988 continues, «the right does not apply in relation to - (a) a work in which 
Crown copyright or Parliamentary copyright subsists, or (b) a work in which copyright originally vested 
in an international organization by virtue of Section 168, unless the author or director has previously been 
identified as such in or on published copies of the work». 
131
 A recent case in which the plaintiff brought a claim of breach of statutory duty together with 
infringement of copyright is, for instance, Sullivan (aka Soloman) v Bristol Film Studios Ltd, 3 May 2012, 
Court of Apeal, [2012] EWCA Civ 570; [2012] WLR (D) 145. 
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from or alteration to or adaptation of the work», with the exception of translations, 
arrangements (or transcriptions of a musical work involving no more than a change of 
key or register). The law also defines the meaning of derogatory, which is intended to 
discern the situation in which the treatment «amounts to distortion or mutilation of the 
work or is otherwise prejudicial to the honour or reputation of the author or director».132 
 As foretold, unlike Italian law, moral rights are not perpetual in the United 
Kingdom. On the contrary, their duration is limited to the duration of the general 
subsistence of copyright in the work.133 In contrast with Italian law, moreover, UK 
moral rights may be waived. The waiver, according to Section 87 CDPA 1988, may 
befall «by instrument in writing signed by the person giving up the right», and being 
related to the generality of works or to a specific work, whether actually existing or 
forthcoming. At the same time, the instant provision concedes that the waiver may be 
conditional and also eventually be subject to revocation.134 Furthermore, if the right-
holder has given his/her consent to the act that otherwise would have infringed the right, 
such consent would impede the infringement of the right.135 
 The other moral right to consider within the UK copyright framework is the one 
regulated by Section 85 CDPA, which concerns the right to privacy of certain 
photographs and films. Very briefly, according to the instant provision, anyone who 
arranges the making of a film or photographs for personal and private use, as long as 
copyright subsists in the work in question, is entitled not to have the work distributed, 
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 Similarly to Section 77 CDPA 1988, Section 80 specifies the acts that may lead to infringement, while 
the following Section 81 considered the exceptions to right, and Section 82 the qualification of right in 
certain cases.  
133
 Section 86 CDPA 1988. 
134
 Even so, the law establishes that «if made in favour of the owner or prospective owner of the copyright 
in the work or works to which it relates, it shall be presumed to extend to his licensees and successors in 
title unless a contrary intention is expressed». In addition, it does not foresee any impediment for the 
operation of «the general law of contract or estoppel in relation to an informal waiver or other transaction 
in relation to any of the rights mentioned in subsection (1)». Section 87 CDPA 1988. 
135
 In line with this, in the hypothesis of joint works, each author has the right to be identified and must 
him/herself assert the right. Similarly, each joint author may exercise his/her waiver without being 
affected by the other joint authors’ possible waivers, and vice versa. 
Section 88 CDPA 1988, which also relates to the application of other previous provisions to works of 
joint authorship, including the moral rights of integrity and privacy of certain photographs and films 
(Sections 80 and 85) and the right against false attribution (Section 84). 
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shown or otherwise communicated, unless he/she has consented to it or when the act is 
legitimated by other specific instances.136 
Finally, another right that is arguably associated with authorship, but to be 
treated as a distinct issue, is the right against false attribution of authorship. Although 
the law does not expressly include it in Section 2, together with the other three 
provisions on moral rights, it does collocate it in the same chapter dedicated to the 
provisions regulating moral rights.137 Leaving aside its exact denotation as a moral right 
in strict terms,138 it is still possible to evaluate it in connection with the provisions thus 
far considered.139 Regulated by Section 84, which gives anyone the right not to have a 
copyright work falsely attributed to him/her as author (or director), it counters the 
occurrence of any «false statement (express or implied) as to who is the author or 
director».140 
Moreover, an important distinction regarding the different rights thus far 
considered is the applicability of the aforementioned provisions to the integral work or 
its parts. The law, in fact, clarifies that the right to be identified as author or director and 
the right to privacy of certain photographs and films may spread over «the whole or any 
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 According to Section 85 Part 2, CDPA 1988 in fact, «the right is not infringed by an act which by 
virtue of any of the following provisions would not infringe copyright in the work - (a) section 31 
(incidental inclusion of work in an artistic work, film [or broadcast]); (b) section 45 (parliamentary and 
judicial proceedings); (c) section 46 (Royal Commissions and statutory inquiries); (d) section 50 (acts 
done under statutory authority); (e) [F3section 57 or 66A (acts permitted on assumptions as to expiry of 
copyright, &c.)]». 
137
 The alleged but yet controversial collocation of the right against false attribution within the larger 
category of moral rights has also risen some perplexities in the Italian context. There, however, the right 
in question does not find place in any of the sections reserved to moral rights. For this simple reason, it 
has been omitted from being explictly considered in the preceeding paragraphs. 
138
 See D. BAINBRIDGE (ed.), Intellectual property, Harlow: Longman, 2008 (2012), 129, who 
additionally notes how even the right of privacy to certain photographs and films is somewhat unfamiliar 
to the traditional conception of moral rights. 
139
 In support of a distinct consideration the instance that it has an even more limited duration than 
copyright and moral rights may also operate. See Section 86 Part 2 CDPA 1988, according to which, «the 
right conferred by section 84 (false attribution) continues to subsist until 20 years after a person’s death». 
140
 Section 84 CDPA 1988, which also indicates the acts or conduct leading to its infringement. 
Such a situation may also find regulation under the law of copyright, defamation or malicious falsehood, 
and passing off if other requisites (e.g. being an established author) coexist.  
In the matter of false attribution of authorship, see in particular Clark v Associated Newspapers Ltd, 1 
January 1998, Chancery, [1998] 1 WLR 1558, [1998] 1 All ER 959, [1998] RPC 261, [1998] 07 LS Gaz 
R 31, [1998] NLJR 157. 
This serves as an additional element to consider against the attempt of the defendant to make use of the 
plaintiff’s reputation to assist the defendant to market his/her own work. In Samuelson v Producers’ 
Distributing Co, 15 October 1931, Court of Appeal, [1932] 1 Ch 201, [1931] 48 RPC 580, for instance, a 
playwright was able to prevent the maker of a film from advertising the film as having been based on the 
playwright’s original theatre sketch. 
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substantial part of a work», while the right to object to derogatory treatment of work 
and the right against false attribution may concern «the whole or any part of a work».141 
 Another important limitation, in which the difference, especially when compared 
with the Italian system, is particularly striking, is the possibility for the right to be 
identifies as the author or director of the work to be subject to contractual relationships. 
In this way, the opportunity of a waiver, by which the author concretely gives up his/her 
right/s, is exemplary.  
Yet, emphasizing the centrality of the freedom of contract, this option may be 
seen as a counterbalance for the possible disequilibrium that a greater protection of 
moral rights may provoke.142 However, if the incentive of waiving converges into this 
potentially advantageous scheme, such an inducement may not be deliberate, as in the 
instance of subordinated position, where the surrendering of the right is indeed set ab 
initio. At the same time, while the waiver is symptomatic of the will of the UK 
legislator to underline the relevance and preponderance of economic copyright rights, it 
may also be an echo of the general fear of moral rights that seems to persist. 
 Nonetheless, it is worth anticipating that a violation of this kind, that is to say 
authorship misattribution, is arguably still dependent on the contextual violation of 
economic rights, given that most of the time, as also takes place in the Italian practice, 
moral rights are ultimately brought into the context of a legal action that seeks redress 
against copyright infringement. Furthermore, as it has been previously argued, even 
considering the lack of an explicit reference in the UK law to the possibility that moral 
rights find autonomous protection, there may still be a chance to foresee a distinct 
action. 
 
 
3 Infringing the right of attribution: conditions and remedies 
 
Despite the distinctions thus far illustrated between exclusive exploitation rights and 
moral rights in the work, the intellectual creation remains a product of the mind and it is 
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 Section 89 CDPA 1988. 
142
 Furthermore, recognizing the possibility for the author to bargain any of his/her rights may further 
support such a consideration. The problem in supporting such conclusion could indeed rest on the 
probable unabalanced standing of the author in the typical copyright setting.  
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therefore indispensable to consider both sides of the coin, namely the typical shield of 
monetary interests in the work and the moral interest of who creates it and that indeed 
appears the most emblematic, and indeed pristine, feature of any copyright system. 
Therefore, in considering the elements of infringement and the apparatus of remedies 
that both the Italian and UK laws provide, adequate emphasis will be placed on the 
precise violation of the moral right of attribution, but also on the breach of norms first 
related to the economic rights in the work,143 which most of the time will be addressed 
conjointly. 
 Considering the variability of the phenomenon of misattribution, from its 
abundant definitions to the eclectic conducts that may amount to it, it certainly results in 
a very convoluted subject for exploration. Besides, it should be maintained that it may 
occur not only in the integral or substantial reproduction of the original work, but also 
in its partial copy. The plagiarist’s work, in addition, may also be entail variations or 
modifications with the aim of concealing the taking, or it could be turned into a 
completely different genre of work.144  
 Moreover, the conducts or acts that may lead to an infringement of copyright 
and/or moral rights are variable and spread over a number of cases. Among these, 
however, the conduct that most recurrently and effectively appears to infringe the right 
to be identified as the author of the work is copying. Therefore, greater attention will be 
given to this particular act.  
                                                          
143
 Unquestionably, enucleating both the economic and moral sides of authorship misattribution, and 
focusing on the historical association of plagiarism, counterfeiting and piracy, plagiarism has often been 
seen as a first indicator of the infringement of economic rights in copyright works, particularly before, but 
also after, receiving distinct attention as a defilement of the right of the author to be acknowledged as 
such. 
144
 All these instances will find better illustration in Chapter 5, where the case law on the issue will be 
considered. 
Moreover, it seems significant to clarify that misattribution may encompass even more perplexing 
situations, for instance, when it involves unpublished works or works in the public domain, or even when 
it is confined to the narrower context of private use.  
The last aspect seems to be particularly controversial and certainly requires closer examination. For the 
time being, it is sufficient to anticipate that even when misattribution does not cross the faint boundaries 
of private copy; it still urges consideration of whether there may still be a public concern for foreseeing a 
potential deception, and thus the need for the law to intervene in sanctioning the alleged violation. Z. O. 
ALGARDI, among others, has addressed the topic in La tutela dell’opera dell’ingegno e il plagio, cit., 451. 
For a more comprehensive and recent analysis of private copy, see S. KARAPAPA, Private copying, 
Routledge-Cavendish Research in Intellectual Property, London and New York: Routledge, 2012 (2014). 
Cf., of the same author, S. KARAPAPA, A copyright exception for private copying in the United Kingdom, 
(2013) European Intellectual Property Review 35, No. 3, 129. 
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In general, looking at the mechanisms of establishing infringement, it can be 
argued that copying may be literal or non-literal, elsewhere referred as textual and non-
textual,145 where the former essentially consist in an integral or verbatim reproduction 
and the latter generally implies a substantial copying. This concerns both the Italian and 
the UK systems, although with some noticeable distinctions. Furthermore, as we shall 
see, albeit that this sentence may sound confusing, there would be infringement when a 
substantial part of a given work were copied, even if the copying in itself were not 
substantial. In essence, what counts most is that the violation affects the kernel of the 
allegedly copied work.146 
 The concept of substantiality, however, raises several perplexities around its 
actual scope and meaning. It may be more difficult, for instance, to appraise the 
substantiality of certain works, such as musical works, particularly but not limited to the 
cases in which some kind of satire is made.147 At the same time, the concept is also 
deeply entangled with the aforementioned idea–expression dichotomy, with the 
consequent considerations that have previously been envisioned and those that will 
emerge when approaching the case law on the matter.148 
 Either way, its appraisal is never easy, even in literary works, where there seems 
to be greater latitude for infringement and confidence to detect copying. Therefore, the 
role of expert evidence acquires particular emphasis, but even before this, a cautious 
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 In this way, it may be anticipated that similarities can be a pointer of copying, but not necessarily of 
infringement. 
146
 However, there is little doubt that such an instance may be controversial. Besides, the risk of defying 
what has ever since been purported with regard to the idea-expression dichotomy could also be possibly 
appraised. 
Looking at the UK case law on the matters, see for instance Designers Guild Limited v Russell Williams 
(Textiles) Ltd (Trading as Washington Dc), 23 November 2000, House of Lords, cit., which addresses the 
thorny question of whether protection of the plot may be considered a substantial part of the work. 
147
 Concerning the treatment of parody by the UK judiciary, see, in particular, Glyn v Weston Feature 
Film Company, 21 December 1915, Chancery, [1916] 1 Ch 261, 32 TLR 235; Joy Music Ltd v Sunday 
Pictorial Newspapers (1920) Ltd, 25 February 1960, Queen's Bench, [1960] 2 QB 60; Schweppes Ltd and 
Others v Wellingtons Ltd, circa 1984, High Court, [1984] FSR 210; Williamson Music Ltd v The Pearson 
Partnership Ltd, circa 1987, Chancery Division, [1987] FSR 97; Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd v 
Marks and Spencer Plc, 12 July 2001, House of Lords, cit.; Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd v Marks 
and Spencer Plc, 26 May 2000, Court of Appeal, cit.  
On scholars’ contribution, see M. SPENCE, Intellectual Property and the Problem of Parody, in L.Q.R., 
114, 1998, 594.; Cf. A. BRIDY, Sheep in Goats' Clothing: Satire and Fair Use After Campbell v. Acuff 
Rose Music, Inc., (2004) Journal of the Copyright Society of the U.S.A. 51, No. 2, 257, 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1071056>. 
148
 Cf. supra, Chapter 5. 
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and scrupulous reading of the works or texts in question by the interpreter, including but 
not limited to the judge, is crucial.149 
To further complicate the picture, in relation to copyright infringement, the role of 
digital technologies is brought back into question. In such a context, already 
controversial by nature, the concern that technology may significantly enhance 
infringing conducts has in fact attracted even greater attention.150  
Additionally, particularly within the unique framework of the Internet, many 
practices have acquired a different weight than they had in the pre-digital age and, in 
turn, this portrays copyright infringement as more or less dreadful, depending on the 
actual refuting or welcoming of those practices.151 These concerns raise important 
questions such as whether, and to what extent, the strength of technology should be used 
towards or against the enforcement of rights, and whether this may indeed risk inflicting 
a more severe and troublesome burden on the public interest.152  
In essence, the law reacts in different ways to a violation or infringement of the 
rights that are shielded by copyright. Among them, plagiarism functions as the manifest 
violation of the remarkable right of the author to claim his/her attribution on the work 
and its protection has found manifest space at the international level since the Berne 
Convention, which both Italy and the United Kingdom have signed.  
However, the exact nature of the mechanisms of protection and the related 
remedies established by the law, to contrast the phenomenon depend on the sovereignty 
of the single legislation. As has been anticipated, despite the common international 
milieu, each country has set its own system of preventive and corrective measures, 
which may be limited to the civil dome or even involve, yet with very contentious and 
likely disappointing consequences, the criminal arena. 
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 A. DURANT, ‘Substantial similarity of expression’ in copyright infringement actions: a linguistic 
perspective, in L. BENTLY, J. DAVIS, J. C. GINSBURG (eds.), Copyright and Piracy. An Interdisciplinary 
Critique, cit., 147, 166, who suggests seeking some help from linguistic description, but at the same time 
warns against excessive reliance on it, which may indeed be exaggerated, as may also happen with regard 
to an absolute confidence in the expertise contribution, given that the latter may eventually even conflict 
with the role of the court, which must always maintain its independence and capacity of reasoning 
regardless of the experts’ findings. 
150
 I. A. STAMATOUDI, Copyright enforcement and the internet, cit., who wonders whether private 
interests are superseding the limitations posed by the law, especially placing emphasis on piracy in the 
digital environment. 
151
 On the double-edged function of technology, see supra, Chapter 3. 
152
 Cf. J. GRIFFITHS, Copyright Law After Ashdown. Time to Deal Fairly with the Public, in I.P.Q., Vol. 3, 
2002, 240; 
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3.1 Italy 
 
The Italian copyright law system of protection considers therefore both a civil and 
criminal set of norms, which, taken as a whole, aims to determine, execute and even 
prevent the continuation of the infringement. Among them, there are norms that will be 
applicable to moral rights, including, and particularly for the purpose of this research, 
the right to claim authorship, in addition to those provided to regulate exploitation 
rights.  
 Looking at the apparatus of legal remedies, indeed, its provisions relating to 
infringement of the rights flow into both civil and criminal penalties,153 with the 
distinctions that we shall soon see. On the civil side in particular, the legal actions 
brought against infringement have a preventive or corrective basis,154 where the latter 
extends to the entitlement of the right-holder to request not only the termination of the 
infringing act but also the removal or destruction of the work, as well as the payment of 
damages arising from the infringement.155 
Besides, the sanction of eliminating the object of violation deserves some 
additional considerations.156 In fact, it is important to notice that the removal or 
destruction of the work will be considered only if no other option is achievable, for 
instance, with express reference to the moral right of attribution, by remedying the 
violation of the right in question by adding or modifying the information regarding 
authorship.157 Moreover, the power of the judicial authority includes the possibility to 
order records, assessment by experts, and seizure of what amounts to the infringement 
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 See Chapter III of Section I of the LA 1941, together with the provisions provided by the Italian Civil 
code and the Code of civil procedure. 
154
 Article 156 LA 1941 provides that «any person having reason to fear the infringement of an 
exploitation right belonging to him under this Law or who seeks to prevent the continuation or repetition 
of an infringement which has already occurred, may institute legal proceedings to ensure that his right be 
recognized and the infringement forbidden. The proceedings shall be governed by the provisions of this 
Section and by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure». 
155
 Articles 158 LA 1941. Additional information is provided by following Articles 159 and 160 LA 
1941, which also determine the terms for the exercise of such rights. 
156
 It is worth noticing that it may be otherwise conferred to the person whose right has been violated as 
accounted for damages. 
Articles 158 and 159 LA 1941. Cf. Z. O. ALGARDI, La tutela dell’opera dell’ingegno e il plagio, cit., 315, 
321. 
157
 This purpose may also be reached through targeted publicity, as with publication of the judgement. Z. 
O. ALGARDI, La tutela dell’opera dell’ingegno e il plagio, cit., 316-317. 
  
162 
 
(or its related profits),158 which can also have a precautionary purpose, as with the 
possibility to place a restraining order on the alleged violating activity.159 
 The first set of civil provisions, which applies to all copyrights, either economic 
or  moral, concludes with paragraph § 1 bringing into the Italian context the formula of 
assertion that, contrary to what we have seen with regard to the UK system that 
prescribes it as a prerequisite to exercising moral rights in the work, is here referred to 
as the possibility that anyone who is legitimately entitled to economic rights may assert 
them.160 The subsequent paragraph § 2, instead, opens the set of provisions that are 
specifically craved for proceedings involving the infringement of moral rights.  
  As stated beforehand, insofar as the nature of moral rights consents to it and with 
the limits provided onwards, moral rights may be protected also by reference to the 
preceding provisions established for the infringement of economic rights.161 Such 
parallelism, indeed, is albeit subject to some limitations. In particular, with exact 
reference to the right of attribution, the remedy of removal or destruction of the 
infringing work may be provided if no other remedies reach the same result of 
redress.162  
  Moreover, apart from civil sanctions, the law also explicitly affords penal 
remedies and penalties against the infringement of copyright, which are illustrated in 
Section II of Chapter III of the LA 1941. Its opening provision, Article 171, lists in 
detail all the different types of infringement conduct that have a criminal consequence 
and are therefore sanctioned by apposite penalties. The spectrum of such conduct 
includes the reproduction, transcription, recital, dissemination, also through 
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 Article 161 LA 1941. 
159
 Article 162 LA 1941, which is complemented by the provisions of the Code of civil procedure. 
160
 As Article 167 LA 1941 utters, «the exploitation rights afforded by this Law may also be asserted in 
law by any person legitimately entitled to such rights». 
161
 Article 168 LA 1941. 
162
 According to Article 169 LA 1941, «actions in defense of the rights relating to the authorship of a 
work shall give rise to removal or destruction only if the damage cannot be remedied by means of the 
addition or suppression of notices on the work which refer to its authorship or by other means of 
publicity». In addition, Article 170 provides that «actions in defense of the rights relating to the integrity 
of a work shall give rise to removal or destruction of the deformed, mutilated or otherwise modified copy 
of the work only when it is not possible to restore such copy to its original form at the expense of the 
party wishing to avoid removal or destruction». 
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performance, selling, as well as any other commercial distribution, and disclosure of an 
unpublished work or diffusion contrary to Italian law of copies produced abroad.163  
The law prescribes a range of fines for such violations, but the related penalty 
may additionally lead to imprisonment when the perpetration of such acts includes some 
additional undesirable elements. In particular, the second part of Article 171 LA 1941 
imposes harsher treatment when: 
The acts referred to above are committed in relation to a work 
of another person which is not intended for public disclosure or 
by usurpation of the authorship of the work or with 
deformation, mutilation or other modification of the work and 
such acts constitute an offense against the honor or reputation 
of the author.164 
More generally, in the eye of the law, certain unlawful acts may be regarded as 
particularly serious, if committed with a concurrent violation of, for instance, the right 
of attribution in the work, and consequently are deemed to deserve a harsher penalty, in 
addition to the application of a proportionate fine.165 Criminal sanctions, in conclusion, 
apply to instances in which the violation of exploitation rights that amounts to a 
criminal offence is perpetrated together with a concomitant violation of moral rights.  
Nonetheless, contrary to the civil systems of provision, where moral rights have 
an explicit autonomous existence for the law, this cannot be said with regard to the 
criminal penalties, given that, in order for them to apply, a felony must be perpetrated. 
The criminal relevance of an infringement of the moral right of attribution, therefore, 
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 Such acts may also be committed «by means of any form of transformation» and their unlawfulness 
may be exceeding what is consented by the right-holder, and thus not radically unlawful, by also using 
specific devices. 
164
 Article 171 Part 2 LA 1941. 
165
 See, for further specifications, Articles 171 bis, 171 ter, 171 quarter, 171 quinquies, 171 septies LA 
1941. Besides, Article 171 novies LA 1941 allows a reduction of the penalties in the case of a 
spontaneous report or other collaboration by the offender prior to the charges brought against him/her.  
Nevertheless, as a general principle of criminal law, all the above provisions apply insofar as the 
infringing conduct does not lay the basis for a more serious offence. See Article 173 LA 1941, which 
refers to the provisions of the Italian Criminal code or other special laws. 
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will be pertinent only if, contextually, there has been a criminal offence such as, but not 
limited to, the conduct of unlawful copying.166 
 
 
3.2 The United Kingdom 
 
Similar to the Italian system, the UK law provides remedies of a different nature against 
copyright infringement and, by reflex, the violation of the right of attribution. The right-
holder may in fact seek redress by requesting injunctive relief, seeking damages or other 
pertinent remedies. Concerning the system of rules there envisioned for copyright 
infringement, while civil and criminal provisions apply to the breach of economic 
rights, no reference is made in UK law, contrary to the Italian approach, to criminal 
penalties for a violation of the moral right of attribution. 
Looking at the UK set of rules provided against infringement, as previously 
anticipated, some prerequisites of copyright protection need to be established before 
even considering allegations of any rights’ breach, such as the one that relates to the 
subsistence of copyright.167 
Besides, on the grounds of essential prerequisites, UK law still poses additional 
limitations to the explicit enforcement of moral rights, given that the right of attribution 
must be asserted in order for it to be actionable.168 We have seen how such a mandatory 
element, however, risks clashing with the banning of the Berne Convention to impose 
formalities. Moreover, it sounds perplexingly uneven when one considers that, on the 
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 This was already envisioned in the Law of 1925 (Royal Decree-Law No. 1950 of November 1925, 
cit.), which at Article 61 considered usurpation of the work’s paternity to be an aggravated element of the 
offence of abusive reproduction or diffusion. On this, see also Z. O. ALGARDI, La tutela dell’opera 
dell’ingegno e il plagio, cit., 326. 
167
 It follows that such requisite must be accomplished also to the extent of detecting, punishing and 
remedying the infringement of any rights shielded by the copyright law. 
168
 On this, see C. COLSTON, Principles of intellectual property law. Principles of law series, London: 
Cavendish, 1999, 264. 
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contrary, there is no such requirement with regard to the enforcement of exclusive 
exploitation rights.169  
In view of this, the first provision to consider is Section 17 CDPA 1988, which 
illustrates the various types of conduct of copyright infringement. The first act that may 
lead to a breach of rights of the copyright owner is essentially represented by copying 
the work, which is defined as «an act restricted by the copyright in every description of 
copyright work» and is meant by the law as the conduct of:  
Reproducing the work in any material form [including] storing 
the work in any medium by electronic means [;] the making of 
a copy in [multiple] dimensions [;] making a photograph of the 
whole or any substantial part of any image forming part of the 
film [or broadcast] [;] making a facsimile copy of [a 
typographical] arrangement [and] making of copies which are 
transient or are incidental to some other use of the work.170 
Beyond copying, which is arguably perhaps the most recurrent conduct in copyright 
infringement, but especially the most probable to involve a violation of the right of 
attribution, other infringing conducts entail issuing copies of the work to the public,171 
by renting or lending of work to the public;172 performing, showing or playing of the 
work in public;173 communicating it to the public;174 and making an adaptation or doing 
acts in relation to adaptation.175 All conducts that are likely to conflict with the 
exclusive rights of the copyright holder. 
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 Additionally, the other limitations that apply clearly curb at length the latitude of moral rights’ 
violations. Within the boundaries envisioned by applicable provisions, some acts that are reckoned not to 
infringe copyright would not infringe the moral right of attribution either. 
See, in particular, Section 79 CDPA 1988. Cf. E. ADENEY, The moral rights of authors and performers, 
cit., 401. 
170
 Section 17 CDPA 1988. 
171
 According to Section 18 CDPA 1988, such conduct includes «(a) the act of putting into circulation in 
the EEA copies not previously put into circulation in the EEA by or with the consent of the copyright 
owner, or (b) the act of putting into circulation outside the EEA copies not previously put into circulation 
in the EEA or elsewhere», but not «(a) any subsequent distribution, sale, hiring or loan of copies 
previously put into circulation (but see section 18A: infringement by rental or lending), or (b) any 
subsequent importation of such copies into the United Kingdom or another EEA state». 
172
 Section 18A CDPA 1988. 
173
 Section 19 CDPA 1988. 
174
 Section 20 CDPA 1988 
175
 Section 21 CDPA 1988 
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Henceforth, the law sets forth a set of provisions that acknowledge and protect 
the entitlement of the right-holder to seek remedies for infringement. Similar to what 
he/she is entitled to seek in the case of a violation of any other property right, the owner 
may find redress «by way of damages, injunctions, accounts or otherwise».176  
Moreover, some of these provisions regulate the single mechanism of relief, for 
instance with regard to damages, which also gives an idea of how the court exercises its 
control in actions of infringement.177 Its authority extends to the possibility to grant an 
order for delivery up such that «the infringing copy or article be delivered up to him or 
to such other person as the court may direct», and yet does not inhibit any other power 
of the court,178 which may extend also to the seizure of the infringing work.179 
  Coming to the criminal provisions that are applicable to copyright infringement, 
Section 107 CDPA 1988 in particular articulates criminal liability that may arise from 
making or dealing with infringing works, without the licence of whoever owns the 
copyright, for example by selling or hiring, importing, possessing in the course of 
business with the aim to infringe copyright, exhibiting in public or distributing an 
«article which is, and which he knows or has reason to believe is, an infringing copy of 
a copyright work».180  
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 Section 96 CDPA 1988. 
177
 According to Section 97 CDPA 1988, «(1)Where in an action for infringement of copyright it is shown 
that at the time of the infringement the defendant did not know, and had no reason to believe, that 
copyright subsisted in the work to which the action relates, the plaintiff is not entitled to damages against 
him, but without prejudice to any other remedy. (2) The court may in an action for infringement of 
copyright having regard to all the circumstances, and in particular to - (a) the flagrancy of the 
infringement, and (b) any benefit accruing to the defendant by reason of the infringement, award such 
additional damages as the justice of the case may require». 
178
 Section 99 CDPA 1988 provides that «(1) Where a person (a) has an infringing copy of a work in his 
possession, custody or control in the course of a business, or (b) has in his possession, custody or control 
an article specifically designed or adapted for making copies of a particular copyright work, knowing or 
having reason to believe that it has been or is to be used to make infringing copies […] (2) An application 
shall not be made after the end of the period specified in section 113 (period after which remedy of 
delivery up not available); and no order shall be made unless the court also makes, or it appears to the 
court that there are grounds for making, an order under section 114 (order as to disposal of infringing 
copy or other article)». 
179
 In line with Section 100 CDPA 1988, the right to seize and detain is exercisable subject to the 
conditions that are set forward. 
Furthermore, see Section 114 concerning the order to dispose of the infringing work. 
180
 Section 107 et seq. CDPA 1988. 
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  The penalties applicable to such offences include imprisonment, application of a 
fine, or both.181 Furthermore, just as with civil proceedings, criminal proceedings 
include the prospect of application for orders for delivery up,182 as for the disposal or 
forfeiture of the infringing work.183 Besides, as further explained echoing the caution in 
the Italian law with regard to the choice of the best possible remedy, «in considering 
what order (if any) should be made, the court shall consider whether other remedies 
available in an action for infringement of copyright would be adequate to compensate 
the copyright owner and to protect his interests».184 
 
 
4 Beyond the copyright dimension, the law of contracts, torts and other defences 
 
After having illustrated the different sets of rules that Italy and the United Kingdom 
provide against copyright infringement and, when applicable, moral rights violation, we 
can now recap with the legal thread of authorship acknowledgment. Attribution appears 
to have a clear relevant role in the process of creating an incentive, since it aims to 
reward the author, providing credit for his/her work. This assumption is perceptibly 
agreed by civil law jurisdictions, although it is certainly true with respect to common 
law systems.185 
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 Section 107 CDPA 1988, according to which an offence is also committed when a person «(a) makes 
an article specifically designed or adapted for making copies of a particular copyright work, or (b) has 
such an article in his possession, knowing or having reason to believe that it is to be used to make 
infringing copies for sale or hire or for use in the course of a business».  
Criminal liability also arises when a person «infringes copyright in a work by communicating the work to 
the public - (a) in the course of a business, or (b) otherwise than in the course of a business to such an 
extent as to affect prejudicially the owner of the copyright, commits an offence if he knows or has reason 
to believe that, by doing so, he is infringing copyright in that work» and «where copyright is infringed 
(otherwise than by reception of a [communication to the public]) - (a) by the public performance of a 
literary, dramatic or musical work, or (b) by the playing or showing in public of a sound recording or 
film, any person who caused the work to be so performed, played or shown is guilty of an offence if he 
knew or had reason to believe that copyright would be infringed». 
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 Section 108 CDPA 1988. 
183
 Sections 114, 114A and 114B CDPA 1988. 
184
 Section 114 Part 2 CDPA 1988. 
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 Explicit to this extent is Kwall, who suggests that what intimately connects copyright and the right of 
attribution is their theoretical aim to provide certain and obvious incentives for authors. R. R. KWALL, The 
Attribution Right in the United States: Caught in the Crossfire Between Copyright and Section 43 (A), in 
Wash. L. Rev., Vol.77, 2002, 989. 
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Despite the differences between the two traditions, it can indeed be said that they 
share a related intention to protect the tie between the author and the work.186 Besides, it 
has also been suggested that such intention, for what concerns common law 
jurisdictions may be related to the indisputable emphasis that appears to be placed on 
the intention of authors to be associated with their work but also not to be associated 
with it.187 
Furthermore, as we have seen in previous paragraphs, particularly from a 
cultural, but also social and ethical standpoint, the acknowledgement of authorship is 
likely to be indisputable,188 while the same cannot be said of its translation into 
conclusive and formal legal brackets. Nevertheless, technological change praises 
reconsideration of authorship and ownership, which supports the argument in favour of 
a more definite legal and non-legal perspective, in line with a distinctive 
interdisciplinary approach.189  
In particular, concerning the latter approach, social norms, but also specific 
contextual knowledge applicable to a particular type of work, appear to be indisputably 
valuable. Regarding the former, instead it seems worthwhile to look at the other 
dimensions of contract law, torts and other legal stances on which different defences 
against misattribution may be based. 
In any case, even beyond this confident representation, there may also be some 
drawbacks.190 Focusing on the resort to social norms, for instance, Tushnet identifies the 
                                                          
186
 In this way, it appears also helpful to look at the Israeli hybrid approach, with the recent enactment of 
a statutory attribution right under the heading of personality rights, which has been integrated by the 
judiciary description of the work as the author’s child. Besides, this peculiar system portrays a clear 
preference for a limited (existing until copyright duration) and more flexible right (non-transferable, but 
waivable), which resembles the UK model. On the contrary, although it does not also require assertion, 
and thus avoids putting further burden on the authors to act against the rights’ violation. M. F. MAKEEN, 
G. ORON, The Right of Paternity under the Copyright Laws of Egypt and Israel, in EIPR, Vol. 33, No. 1, 
2011, 26. 
187
 However, once the author has deliberately distanced him/herself from the work it is perhaps plausible 
that any further contrasting claim would not be allowed. M. F. MAKEEN, G. ORON, The Right of Paternity 
under the Copyright Laws of Egypt and Israel, cit. 26. 
188
 See, among others, J. C. GINSBURG, The Right to Claim Authorship in the U.S. Copyright and 
Trademarks Law, in Hous. L. Rev., Vol. 41, No. 2, 2004, 263; R. TUSHNET, Payment in Credit: Copyright 
Law and Subcultural Creativity, in Law & Contemp. Probs., Vol. 70, 2007, 135. 
189
 See M. KRETSCHMER, L. BENTLY, R. DEAZLEY, The History of Copyright History (revisited), in 
W.I.P.O. J., Vol. 5, No. 1, 2013, 35., concisely retracing the history of copyright, also recalling their 
previous work on the subject, R. DEAZLEY, M. KRETSCHMER, L. BENTLY (eds.), Privilege and Property: 
Essays on the History of Copyright, Cambridge, U.K., OpenBook (2010).  
190
 Cf. infra, Chapter 3. 
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main difficulties related to the mechanism of translating social and ethical rules into 
legal provisions.191 First, it seems difficult to determine which subject matter should 
benefit from attribution rights, given that not all types of work appear to justify general 
protection.192 Second, even when feasible, proper attribution is not guaranteed, also 
calling into question the practicability of legal enforcement. Finally, the inevitably 
different perception of attribution by the public implies enquiring about the different 
attitudes of the public towards a possible deception that would derive from 
misattribution, especially when the picture is complicated by the author’s preferences 
for anonymity or pseudonyms.193 
On the other hand, considering other potential schemes of relief against the 
breach of the right to be identified as the author of a work, which still belong to the 
legal facade of attribution but exceed the limited context of copyright, these are 
principally ascribable to contracts, tort (although the latter is evidently confined to the 
UK context), and other defences related, for instance, to some way of protecting the 
public interest against the potential deceptive consequences of misattributing 
conducts.194 
Focusing in particular on the UK framework, before the CDPA 1988 was 
enacted, moral rights appeared to have received some protection through what has been 
called «an amalgam of the law of contract and tort».195 In particular, contracts have 
always played a central role in copyright and this reasonably extents to the potentiality 
of granting some degree of protection to moral rights. To prove this point, Stamatoudi 
emphasizes the proclivity of contracts efficiently to satisfy the interests of individuals 
and the distinctive propensity of UK courts to shield the parties' rights and obligations.  
                                                          
191
 Therefore, there may be less confidence that the incorporation of an independent right of attribution in 
the current copyright environment would not end up in a hazardous solution that overshadows the 
rewarding latitude of authorship credit, even resulting in an unclear legal representation of authors’ 
interests. R. TUSHNET, Naming Rights: Attribution and the Law, in Utah L. Rev., 2007, 795-816. 
192
 Besides, in some cases, it could be even more difficult to follow attribution rules, for example, joint 
authorship, which would require a case-by-case approach that implies a dangerous and discretionary 
application of the rules. 
193
 R. TUSHNET, Naming Rights: Attribution and the Law, cit., 816 et seq. 
194
 Focusing on the latter it is also reasonably accepted that attribution may provide consumers with 
valuable information and thus serve the general public interest. On the inference between attribution and 
consumer protection, see J. K. WINN (ed.), Consumer Protection in the Age of the 'Information Economy', 
Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006. 
195
 I. A. STAMATOUDI, Moral Rights of Authors in England: the missing emphasis on the role of creators, 
in I.P.Q., 1997, 478. Cf. R. DWORKIN, The moral right of the author: moral rights and the common law 
countries, cit., 251. 
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However, as she makes clear, «contract works better, as long as it enhances the 
moral right protection already afforded to authors by law and not as a substitute for 
moral right».196 Here conclusions appear so far shareable and applicable also to the 
Italian context, where – although with more limited scope, essentially due to the fact 
that moral rights are not transferable and not waivable – the role played by contracts in 
copyright is undeniable. 
In addition, attempts to justify shielding the right of attribution have also run 
across the potential recognition of a general interest by society to receive proper 
information regarding identity and authorship in intellectual creations, to be understood 
as having a general and broad-spectrum approach,197 or be convulsed to the more 
explicit and articulated common law defence.198 
The latter, which is indeed a peculiarity of common law jurisdiction, is an 
independent defence and is not limited to a copyright application. It essentially gives 
courts «a wider interpretative space where codified law cannot solve specific 
situations».199 According to Zemer, it represents «an escape clause»,200 which some 
                                                          
196
 I. A. STAMATOUI, Moral Rights of Authors in England: the missing emphasis on the role of creators, 
cit., 488. 
197
 On this point, it urges proper consideration of the different interests involved. With regard to the 
complex relationships between private individual interests and general public interest, see M. BORGHI, Il 
diritto d’autore tra regime proprietario e “interesse pubblico”, in M. LILLÀ MONTAGNANI, M. BORGHI 
(eds.), Proprietà digitale. Diritti d’autore, nuove tecnologie e digital rights management, cit., 1-3, 16-18, 
who also emphasises how the concept of public interest in copyright is yet highly vague. 
The issue of public interest, in particular, which has been the subject of extensive literature (see, for 
instance, J. C. GINSBURG, Essay - How Copyright Got a Bad Name For Itself, in Colum.-VLA J.L.& Arts, 
2002, 26.; and P. AUTERI, Il paradigma tradizionale del diritto d’autore e le nuove tecnologie, in M. 
LILLÀ MONTAGNANI, M. BORGHI (eds.), Proprietà digitale. Diritti d’autore, nuove tecnologie e digital 
rights management, cit., 23-25) also emerges in the context of plagiarism. 
198
 See infra, Chapter 5. 
199
 L. ZEMER, The idea of authorship in copyright, cit., 69, who recalls how in any case this defence has a 
very limited scope, citing the relevant case law and particularly Ashdown v Telegraph Group Ltd, 18 July 
2001, Court of Appeal, [2001] EWCA Civ 1142, [2002] Ch 149, [2001] 3 WLR 1368, [2001] 4 All ER 
666, [2001] 2 All ER 370, [2002] RPC 5, [2001] EMLR 44, 
<http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2001/1142.html>; Ashdown v Telegraph Group Ltd, 11 January 2001, 
Chancery, [2001] Ch 685, [2001] 2 WLR 967, [2001] RPC 34, [2001] EMLR 20; Hyde Park Residence 
Ltd v Yelland and others, 10 February 2000, Court of Appeal, [2000] EWCA Civ J0210-2, [2001] Ch 
143, [2000] 3 WLR 215, [2000] RPC 604, [2000] EMLR 363, [1999] RPC 655, [1999] EMLR 654. 
200
 L. ZEMER, The idea of authorship in copyright, cit., 221. Cf. P. JOHNSON, The public interest: is it still 
a defence to copyright infringement? ? in UCLA Ent. L. R., Vol. 16, 2005, 1. 
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courts have expressly discouraged,201 while others foresaw it as a chance to overcome 
incompatibility between copyright and freedom of expression.202 
With regard to the Italian system, indeed, such defence can only foresee in wider 
terms as suggesting that an accurate and proper attribution of authorship in intellectual 
works would certainly satisfy the general interest of the public to receive truthful 
information.203 
Recapping with the UK system, another factor that is a peculiarity of common 
law jurisdiction is the possibility of resorting to torts, in particular, the tort of passing 
off, and its form of “reverse passing off”, to approach misattribution of authorship. 
Related to the conduct of misrepresentation that damages someone else’s goodwill, it 
often applies to unregistered trademarks and unmistakably it has a stringent commercial 
substance.204  
The applicability of such tort to plagiarism, indeed, finds fairly recent but 
controversial support from commentators.205 According to Isabel Alexander, who 
expressly defines it as «a possible legal avenue for the plagiarized author», a 
conceivable benefit of this defence is that it takes into account the reputational element, 
even if in terms of goodwill, of the fabricated and deceitful misattribution of the original 
authorship. The utilization of such claims, in fact, appears to pursue illegitimate 
revenue, since he/she takes advantage of the labour of the real author.206 
Even more, given its limited and only abstract applicability, there seems not to 
be enough evidence to support its extension to cover the violation of authorship credit, 
especially when extracted from its typical commercial denotation, since it is purposely 
                                                          
201
 Beloff v Pressdram Ltd, circa 1973, Chancery, [1973] 1 All ER 241, [1973] FSR 33, [1973] RPC 765. 
Hyde Park Residence Ltd v Yelland and others, cit., in which the Courts consider the basis of such a 
defence within an action for infringement of copyright as different from its application outside copyright. 
Douglas & Ors v Hello! Ltd and others, 11 April 2003, Chancery, [2003] EWHC 786 (Ch), [2003] 3 All 
ER 996, <http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2003/786.html>; Douglas & Ors v Hello! Ltd and others, 11 May 
2005, Court of Appeal, [2005] EWCA Civ 595, [2006] QB 125, [2005] 3 WLR 881, [2005] 4 All ER 128, 
[2005] EMLR 28. 
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 Ashdown v Telegraph Group Ltd (CA 2001), cit. Cf. L. ZEMER, The idea of authorship in copyright, 
cit., 221. 
203
 This argument, therefore, appears here only sustainable in a very general and perhaps abstract sense. 
However, there seems to be some potential in engaging in a further in-dept analysis that includes different 
areas of the law, which however cannot be pursued in the instant research. 
204
 Besides, in the United Kingdom it is a product of the judiciary and not of statutory enactment, while in 
the USA it finds an express statutory enactment in the Lanham (Trademark) Act (15 U.S.C.). 
205
 On the complexity of applying such tort in instances of misappropriation of intangibles, see M. 
SPENCE, Passing off and the misappropriation of valuable intangibles, in L.Q.R., 1996, 1. 
206
 I. ALEXANDER, Inspiration or Infringement: the plagiarist in court, cit., 3, 11, 12. 
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regard trademark and not copyright. Therefore, for now it seems more practicable to 
regard the mentioned definition of plagiarism, as the act of passing someonelse’s work 
off as one’s own, as having an ordinary meaning. Otherwise, there could be the actual 
risk of narrowing too much the scope of a legal protection against misattribution. The 
moral rights framework, therefore, remains the preferential route.207 
In any case, given the complexity of the picture thus far illustrated, there might 
be sufficient arguments to consider the necessity of a modification in the law, which 
would take into consideration, among other things, the changes in the arts as well as in 
technology that day-by-day allow greater engagement with the work. This in order to 
find some clearer guidelines to treat those particular violations that may not amount to 
existing legal sanctions, but still harm the author’s rights. At the same time, however, 
there is also a chance that this may lead to new perils and abuses, even considering the 
growing fear that works will eventually escape the control of their own author or owner, 
which is why – again – a more definite approach of the law is needed. 
Either way, in order to establish the recurrence of any conduct that may refer to 
plagiarism as a violation of the norm of attribution, it is still unclear whether we can use 
the same unique parameter to assess it on legal and non-legal grounds. Similar doubts 
concern the feasibility of a unique test of copyright infringement in the case of exclusive 
protection rights. Therefore, we should be very careful about what we wish for, but 
above all, we should be careful to understand how to do it, merely resorting to the law, 
which could even fall outside copyright, or with the aid of other disciplines that seem to 
better explain the complex dynamics of plagiarism.  
In fact, from whatever perspective we look at plagiarism, it is difficult to 
appraise and define it in strict terms. Consequently – and this is valid for both the Italian 
and the UK interpreter – we could wait for legislators to get involved with statutory 
provisions that would differently affect misattributing practices, or make peace with the 
ambiguity that has always surrounded it and has thus far entrusted it to the hands of the 
judiciary.  
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 At the same time, it still seems worth investigating further the actual feasibility of such an alternative 
approach and, at least in theory, consider the possibility of applying a similar interpretation even in the 
Italian context, albeit with a very extreme caution. Such an experiment, however, deserves a better and 
more dedicated analysis, which may be pursued in a separate research. 
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We – civil and common law interpreters – may also wish to find peace with our 
reciprocal ghosts. Moral rights and economic rights should not be seen as enemies, 
whether the former is not the ultimate annihilator of the latter, or vice versa. Indeed, 
they should be able to coexist peacefully and rather support one another, particularly 
when the infringing practices go before the court, where, as we shall soon see, the fight 
of the author is often a skirmish for both personal credit and monetary takings, which 
seems not to have ineludibly national colours. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
PLAGIARISM BEFORE THE COURT: EXPLORING JUDICIAL 
APPROACHES 
 
 
1 Applying legal categories for non-legal concepts: a mystifying task 
 
The substance of all concepts thus far recounted in relation to the complex and 
multifaceted context of authorship and its misattribution is undeniably one of a kind. 
Delineating what the expressions creative, original, essential or substantial mean is just 
one example of the challenging task that occupies the interpreter.1 Early commentators, 
who on many occasions found it difficult to distinguish a copy from the original, 
already envisioned this complexity.2 Recalling what White illustrated with regard to the 
idea of originality over time, for instance, we may agree that what has actually changed 
is essentially the type of creative effort.3  
Either way, it is worth repeating that it is precisely with an indulgent attention to 
the significance and scope of all applicable, although fleeting, concepts that any mature 
consideration of authorship misattribution may take place. Furthermore, in order to 
reach this aim, neither their historical development nor the non-legal contextualisation 
that refers to the different types of works in which they may apply should be 
disregarded.4 Likewise, since plagiarism mirrors the opposite image of creativity and 
                                                          
1
 See, on this, A. RAHMATIAN, Copyright and Creativity. The Making of Property Rights in Creative 
Works, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2011, 35, 53-54. 
2
 L. A. SENECA, Ad Lucilium epistulae morales, cit., who explains: «I think that sometimes it is 
impossible for it to be seen who is being imitated, if the copy is a true one, for a true copy stamps its own 
form upon all the features which it has drawn from what we may call the original, in such a way that they 
are combined into a unity» (at 281). 
3
 Referring to the early nineteenth century, White noticed: «the ancients were as eager for originality in 
their way as writers of today [although] the type of originality desired by classical writers is different, 
that’s all» (at 7). Besides, if the particular combination of old and new material through the process of 
selection and reinterpretation may have founded originality, this was soon accompanied by the need to 
improve what had indeed paved the way. H. O. WHITE, Plagiarism and imitation during the English 
Renaissance, cit., 11-12.  
4
 D. LANZA, L’autore e l’opera, F. ROSCALLA (ed.) Attribuzioni, appropriazioni, aprocrifi nella Grecia 
antica, cit. 11. 
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originality, its historical depiction and further progression is of countless bearing.5 This 
inference appears to be proved by the precise concern that the judiciary has had for it, as 
exemplified since older case law, also considering the considerable attention that it has 
reserved too many of the concepts typically forged by the arts and literature.6 
In line with these considerations, the lack of an explicit reference to the word 
“plagiarism” does not impede its explicit consideration, as it has previously argued, by 
the ordinary language, by specialised fields of knowledge and, finally, by the wiles of 
the judiciary.7 This is not to suggest that any of them provide a clear and consistent 
interpretation of misattribution, but this demonstrates that the subject may be of a great 
interest also for the law, either with the aim to sanctioning it or discouraging its legal 
treatment. In addition, the missing consistency of related theories and of judicial 
decisions on the matter should not be frightening. 
The lack of a clear intention to promote a definite system of rules and sanctions 
to be exactly applied to the phenomenon explains the difficulty in appraising its 
complexity in full; however, it does not either imply renouncement of its definition and 
regulation. On the contrary, the lack of a strict definition may be seen as an opportunity 
for the judiciary, allowing it to fill in the gaps in the statutory framework, but also to 
find a more balanced solution to misattribution practices, especially insofar as the 
legislator does not take a clearer position on the matter. 
If praise for genuine imitation against the broader background of originality has 
characterised the literary debates, indeed this has cautiously extended to the courtroom. 
Departing from the very basic but fundamental principle, hardly contested, that 
                                                          
5
 Even if, for practical reasons, it has been so far given preference to the analysis of literary works , which 
must indeed be regarded as an exemplifying illustration. Cf. Chapters 1 and 2. 
6
 Cf. R. TERRY, The plagiarism allegation in English literature from Butler to Sterne, Basingstoke, UK: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. P. KEWES, Plagiarism in Early Modern England, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2003. 
7
 As we have seen, its exact denotation does not appear explicitly in any provision of statutory law, either 
in Italy or in the United Kingdom. However, briefly recapping with what has been illustrated in Chapter 
4, the Italian Copyright law mentions the conduct of usurping authorship attribution over an original work 
of the mind (usurpazione di paternità), particularly as an aggravated element to the principal conduct of 
copyright infringement. The UK Act, instead, simply acknowledges the right to attribution and the 
possibility that it may be infringed, under certain circumstances, following specific requirements and 
allowing a number of exceptions. Furthermore, without an express reference in the Act to such an 
occurrence, it essentially refers to the general rules that apply to the infringement of copyright. 
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copyright implies the entitlement of the author to reap the profits of his/her labour,8 
while ideas are not protected,9 the tendency to reproach and sanction servility and 
outright piracy that clash with the canons of creative imitation has greatly diffused.10 
Given these premises, a constant reference to both the above-illustrated patterns 
and to their explicit treatment by the arts and literature should not be overlooked, 
particularly in the areas of copyright, which is by its very nature extremely convoluted, 
requiring miscellaneous knowledge and a high degree of erudition by those who 
exercise judicial power. Yet, such an expectation is often moderated by the aid of 
experts who are asked to filter certain intricate and highly specialist (or professional,11 
as some courts have uttered) matters. 
As will be addressed, the courts may in fact rely on the findings of the latter or 
support some of their theories and discard others; however, they may also elaborate 
their own principles solely based on their learned understanding of the subject. 
Certainly, many of these outcomes depend on the type of subject matter, which by its 
nature may be easier or more difficult to apprehend without the mediation of an expert. 
Literary and dramatic works, in which most of the judges have confidence, normally 
exemplify the latter case, while artistic and musical works represent a typical example 
of the former.12  
Even before late 1800s, departing from which the analysis that follows has been 
necessarily restricted, there have been several cases dealing with the borrowing or 
taking of intellectual creations, so it is improbable that the law had considered the 
phenomenon as unutterably legitimate and lawful. However, as it is with any cultural 
                                                          
8
 See, in particular, Millar v Taylor, 20 April 1769, King Bench, cit.; Donaldson v Beckett, 22 February 
1774, House of Lords, [1774] 2 Bro PC 129, [1774] 1 ER 837, in practice an appeal of Millar v Taylor, 
which, however, refused to recognise the existence of a common law copyright beyond the terms 
provided by the statute. 
9
 Hollinrake v Truswell, 8 August 1894, Court of Appeal, cit., (on appeal of Hollinrake v Truswell, 18 
March 1893, Chancery, cit.). 
10
 H. O. WHITE, Plagiarism and imitation during the English Renaissance, cit., 201-202, who provides 
many examples from Classic and Renaissance literature to prove this point. 
11
 See Francis Day & Hunter Ltd and another v Bron and another, 25 February 1963, Court of Appeal, 
[1963] Ch 587, [1963] 2 WLR 868, [1963] 2 All ER 16, in which Justice Wilberforce explained that some 
points of evaluation may be described as «‘professionals’' points and one must resist the temptation, 
which I think some of the defendants' witnesses did not fully resist, to atomise what is a living phrase. 
One must not lose sight of the musical character and the aural appeal of the sentence as a whole». 
12
 Despite this obvious difference, the tests for infringement appear to be the same. There may be, 
therefore, some latitude to foresee a different regulation on the matter. Such an argument is undoubtedly 
interesting and is currently being considered in further detail as the basis for a subsequent research 
project. For the purpose of the present analysis, however, it will necessarily be treated succinctly. 
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and broadly social concept that is viewed through the eyes of the law, there have always 
been grey areas, in which it has been particularly debatable to establish whether or not a 
violation of the right has occurred, and such a controversial aspect is clearly accentuated 
by the lack of a definite legislative guide.13 
What the courts have to face is nothing less than challenging and it becomes 
even more difficult when one considers the significant influence of technology and the 
variable functioning of social norms,14 particularly in their operation as an incentive for 
protecting attribution and reputation.15 However, some help may come from a general 
understanding of the phenomenon of misattribution and all the concepts that surround it 
against the general and ordinary background.16 One pertinent application of this 
possible orientation is set in the criteria of both evaluating legal phenomena according 
to the average person’s standards and by referral to the skilful knowledge of experts that 
are called to help the judge define his/her ruling.  
Still, as the Lord Chancellor in D'Almaine v Boosey said, «where material is 
borrowed from a previous work, it is a nice question, depending on circumstances, 
whether there is a plagiarism».17 There could be no better formula to explain the 
arduous task of the courts, thus the following paragraphs will be dedicated entirely to 
                                                          
13
 However, this should not imply that a severe and harsh approach is the only viable option, particularly 
considering what literature and arts may have thus far suggested when illustrating the historical 
dimension of literary imitative practices. In particular, recalling the metaphor of the laborious bee that we 
encountered in the first part of the study (cf. Chapters 1 and 2), there have certainly been instances in 
which the conduct has rather found a collocation in the realm of genuine imitation. These were, to use an 
expression that has already been used, among others, by E. PIOLA CASELLI, «larcines imperceptibles» in 
Del diritto di autore secondo la legge italiana comparata con le leggi straniere, cit., 531. 
14
 In addition to the considerations illustrated in Chapter 3, see also S. OUTPUT, Plagiarismo, il mondo è 
nuovo, Various Authors (eds.) Vero è falso. Plagi, cloni, campionamenti e simili, cit., 125, who 
emphasise how technology, particularly when culture was passed down through manuscripts, made clear 
that the act of copy has restricted the opportunity to blame the appropriation of others’ words. 
15
 On normative and social change, see, in particular, V. POCAR, Il diritto e le regole sociali. Lezioni di 
sociologia del diritto, cit., 41-42, who underlines the effectiveness of social norms according to their 
inclination to influence individual behaviour; R. H. MCADAMS, The origin, development, and regulation 
of norms, cit., 338; L. A. KORNHAUSER, Notes on the Logic of Legal Change, in D. BRAYBROOKE (ed.) 
Social Rules, cit., 169-170, 178; C. HORNE, Sociological perspectives on the emergence of social norms, 
cit., 19, according to whom informal sanctions undoubtedly play a determinant role as an incentive for the 
observation of the norm. 
16
 Referring to common language in order to understand the concept of originality, as we have seen in 
Chapter 2, may have its advantages. Sometimes, however, even the common language may entail some 
very specialist hint, so offering a more limited aid. See, for instance, the French scholar Larousse, 
describing originalité as the main and most important artistic quality. P. LAROUSSE, Grand dictionnaire 
universel du XIXe siècle, Vol. 11, 1866, 1471, 
<https://archive.org/stream/LarousGrdictionnXIX11bnf#page/n1473/mode/2up>, also cited by M. RANDALL, Pragmatic 
Plagiarism: Authorship, Profit, and Power, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001, 51. 
17
 D'Almaine v Boosey, 3 March 1835, Exchequer, [1835] 160 ER 117, [1835] 1 Y & C Ex 288. 
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look at the attempt of the Italian and the UK judiciaries to provide the best possible 
answers to such a nice circumstantial question. 
 
 
1.1 The average person vs expert standards, with the learned judge in the middle 
 
The need for the courts to consider copyright-related issues, such as misattribution of 
authorship, from as many angles as possible and particularly according to specialised 
fields of knowledge, extends to the consideration of their significance according to the 
common language and, in turn, according to the perception that the average person may 
have of copyright issues.  
As we shall see, courts find themselves right in the middle. On the one hand, 
they need to account for how society understands and interprets such concepts, 
particularly when the statutory law does not provide specific definitions or reference. 
On the other hand, they inevitably become the spokesperson of a very specialist 
understanding, which arises directly and indirectly from the exact involvement of 
experts in judicial decisions.18  
As some have observed, the concept of the average or ordinary person in 
copyright began to receive greater attention when the rise and development of 
technology forced right-holders to take into better account the interests of the public, 
which may be endangered or extremely limited in the traditional private-based structure 
of copyright engagements.19  
However, for the purpose of the present analysis, the concept of the average 
person generally is intended to reflect both the typical or expected conduct of an 
ordinary individual who engages with copyright and the perception that an average 
                                                          
18
 However, their roles should not merely take one side or the other. Judges are in fact expected to deliver 
knowledgeable rulings. 
19
 See, in particular, G. LASTOWKA, Virtual Justice: The New Laws of Online Worlds, Yale University 
Press, 2010.  
Traditionally, the construct of reasonable person had defined the predictable conduct of any ordinary 
person in certain circumstances. Subsequently, its recurring use in criminal law, torts and contract law to 
help determining negligence has then found a broader application in law, including copyright. More 
generally, it refers to the standard behaviour that society assumes should occur in a given situation, as 
well as the expected consequences that certain events have on the average person’s sensitivity, which 
respectively also echoes other conventional notions such as the Latin paradigm of bonus pater familias 
and the French figure of l'homme moyen sensuel.  
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person may have of copyright-related issues. This formula, which, among several 
definitions, has been written off as the behaviour of the ordinary, average (Joe/Jane, 
John Doe or Smith) person, but also simply of the man on the street, attempts to 
encompass the typical behaviour of the public in copyright matters including copyright 
infringement. 
To add some complexity to the picture, such a concept is likely to apply to any 
average player on the copyright scene. In fact, it may describe the conduct not only of 
the copyright user but also the copyright holder, especially when the court that has to 
balance their potentially conflicting interests. Either way, regardless of the angle from 
which one looks at it, the average or ordinary person formula helps to explain a 
particular conduct or view of copyright, including authorship attribution and 
plagiarism.20 
Having this in mind, also explicated in some rulings, there could be instances in 
which a simple reference to the ordinary person criterion is not sufficient. Therefore, 
when the complexity of evidence requires it, judges will often seek the help of experts 
in a given field, although this aid should never be used as a substitute for their 
independent judgement.21  
Some legal fields, in particular, such as expressly copyright law, may require the 
aid of an expert approach more than others, given the envelopment of the various 
disciplines that convolute it. Experts, in fact, may lead the judge to conclusions that, 
based only on his/her own experience or a mere legal training, he/she would not 
otherwise have reached.22 Besides, the court itself may stretch the scope of certain 
specialist concepts to the extent that they become, in turn, ordinary. 
Such considerations apply to both the Italian and English courts. Focusing on the 
latter, in Wood v Boosey, for instance, in his concurring opinion Justice Bramwell 
                                                          
20
 In fact, courts often refer to this special construct to develop their reasoning, particularly when they 
take into account the typical demeanour of the ordinary user in order to illustrate the functioning of 
copyright dynamics, but also when they expressly adopt the canon of the average person’s opinion as 
their own and so validate their holding. 
21
 The useful and sometimes essential aid of a given expertise, however, should not take precedence over 
legal reasoning, but rather reasonably assist the court in the difficult task it has to face bringing into the 
picture, and so into the legal process, those opinions and considerations that will help the magistrate to 
evaluate the pieces of evidence brought before its bench, without consequently implying the superseding 
of its fundamental juridical establishment. 
22
 This is of course true for many other fields of law but when limited to the context of intellectual 
property law, and copyright in particular, it appears even more accurate than ever. 
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describes the concept of opera to explain that, when one considers the part written for 
instruments such as the pianoforte, the role of the arranger is essential, and this is a very 
basic principle that anyone having a basic knowledge of orchestra may know.23 
Besides, he goes even further. The work of who arranges the music is to be 
considered distinct from the work of who composes the music. In fact, the judge 
believes that the pianoforte arrangement or accompaniment resumes in a process that is 
not purely mechanical. At the same time, while recognising that any person familiar 
with the art of music or an experienced composer could do it, it cannot be denied that 
such an arrangement results in a “work of great merit and skill”, as it surely was with 
great musicians such as Mozart and Mazzinghi.24 This inference, in his view, is 
something that anyone playing an instrument should discern. Hence, as he further 
considered, «anybody who plays any musical instrument knows it is a very common 
expression to say, such a piece is very well arranged, such a piece is very ill arranged; 
this is a very difficult arrangement; that is an easy arrangement».25 
In line with these considerations, it is worth recalling the metaphorical image of 
the eye that becomes the real evaluator of many creative phenomena and in this way 
impersonates the judge:  
Now, in the case of those things as to which the merit of the 
invention lies in the drawing, or in forms that can be copied, the 
appeal is to the eye, and the eye alone is the judge of the identity 
                                                          
23
 In detail, he emphasises: «anybody who knows anything of the orchestral score and of the pianoforte 
arrangement, would know that. It is a physical impossibility that fingers could play upon the pianoforte 
every note as it is written in the orchestral core. For example, where there is a tremolando in the music - 
that is when the violins play the same notes backwards and forwards continually, of course that cannot be 
done on the piano, and sometimes for a substitute an octave is played with the thumb and finger». Wood v 
Boosey and another, 4 February 1868, Exchequer, [1868] 3 LR QB 223 (on appeal of Wood v Boosey and 
another, 12 January 1867, Queen's Bench, [1867] LR 2 QB 340). 
24
 A work like that therefore receives copyright protection and if pirated its infringer would be 
consequently liable. Besides, this music example well explains the extreme specificity and 
convolutedness of the subject that rotates around copyright, which is also expressed in the current case by 
the definition the judge provided of piano arrangement: «But what is the pianoforte arrangement? It is an 
arrangement of the whole of the music of this opera for the pianoforte, a part of which is the ordinary 
pianoforte accompaniment, the bass and the treble played with both hands, and which is independent of 
the melody. There may be, as it appears, the line of music for one voice, or two or three voices, as the 
case may be; and there are separate and distinct lines for the accompaniment for the pianoforte; and, no 
doubt, here and there throughout this accompaniment, and by going line by line through the score of the 
original opera, there may be found the same notes; but there are other parts of the accompaniment which 
are merely the pianoforte accompaniment, the notes forming which are nowhere to be found in the score 
at all». Wood v Boosey and another, 4 February 1868, Exchequer, cit. 
25
 Wood v Boosey and another, 4 February 1868, cit. 
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of the two things. Whether, therefore, there be piracy or not is 
referred at once to an unerring judge, namely, the eye, which 
takes the one figure and the other figure, and ascertains whether 
they are or are not the same.26 
This precious eye often takes the shape of an ear when it comes to musical works, 
where it often needs, maintaining the metaphor, an external device that is mostly 
provided by expert witnesses who technically analyse the evidence for the judge.27  
In the Francis Day musical case, in particular, their role is undisputed in the 
examination of the songs that were brought before the court. Additionally, the strain of 
«put[ting] into words what is ultimately a matter for the ear»28 was acknowledged, 
which could also depend on the different approaches taken by each individual witness 
who analysed the tunes.29 
Nonetheless, what seems to be hardly disputable in the context of musical works 
is the resemblance of many tunes. Subject to the emphasis on the considerable or 
minimal degree of likeness that may be established, the attention of the court will be 
directed to the similarities or differences that exist between the songs under scrutiny. 
Therefore, witnesses called to the stand may likely take the side of one or the other 
litigant, unless they are independent experts chosen by both parties.30  
                                                          
26
 William J. Holdsworth And Others Plaintiffs In Error; And Henry C. M'crea Defendant In Error, 25 
June 1867, House of Lords, [1865] 2 LR HL 380, concerning an infringement of design drawings. 
27
 Cf. D'Almaine v Boosey, 3 March 1835, Exchequer, cit., in which Lord Chief Baron explained: 
«substantially the piracy is where the appropriated music, though adapted to a different purpose from that 
of the original, may still be recognized by the ear», at 302. 
28
 Francis Day & Hunter Ltd and another v Bron and another, 25 February 1963, Court of Appeal, cit. 
In addition to the circulation of printed copies of the allegedly infringing chorus (reproduction of the first 
eight bars of the chorus), during the hearing musical experts gave evidence, performing the songs vocally 
and by pianoforte. Moreover, recordings of various versions of the tunes were also played to the court. 
29
 Following the scrutiny of the witnesses, Justice Wilberforce provided a very detailed analysis of each 
work, occasionally underlining the source of his convincement (especially when he was unsure of some 
aspects). On the whole, he believed that he had given a fair description and comparison of the songs 
(what is not clear, however, is whether he actually and fully understood such a description), also allowing 
himself to give personal evaluations such as: «after a final version of the theme, the song ends with quite 
a different movement, mainly in crotchets, which I hope I may be forgiven for saying was of a somewhat 
lame character». The trial judge, in fact, tried to compare and contrast the two tunes himself. Francis Day 
& Hunter Ltd and another v Bron and another, 25 February 1963, Court of Appeal, cit. 
30
 As recalled in the judgement, expert witness Leslie Gordon Murchie seems to have taken the following 
oath: «I swear by Almighty God that I will, to the best of my ability, skill and knowledge, well and truly 
interpret and illustrate to the court the music and all such matters and questions as may be required of 
me». Francis Day & Hunter Ltd and another v Bron and another, 25 February 1963, Court of Appeal, cit. 
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The appellate court in Francis Day v Byron, indeed, acknowledged the great 
importance of hearing directly, or “at first hand”, the illustration of technical evidence 
from the musical experts who delivered meticulous vocal and instrumental examples. 
This is particularly true when the case to be decided is essentially a matter of facts, as it 
was in the case in question. However, when such direct engagement is not possible, the 
court still has a chance to form its conviction observing also other works that may be 
brought for comparison.31  
This resort to other compositions, in particular, has made possible the inference 
that in both considered tunes the opening phrase is developed using the same and 
commonest tricks of composition of «repetition followed by a pause, followed again by 
further repetition with a slight variation [that exactly] produces the degree of similarity 
between the two compositions [and therefore should not] be taken as in any sense proof 
of copying. There is at least an equal probability that his choice of these devices was the 
result of coincidence».32 
At the same time, the judiciary warns about being particularly careful in the 
interpretation of statutory law, especially when even the desire for a precise 
consideration of specialist and contextualised fields of knowledge risks to 
misunderstand or even ignore what the statute exactly regulates and what it does not 
(perhaps not yet) consider. An example of this is foreseen in the alerted concern towards 
new mechanisms of copying brought by novel technologies, and possibly already 
established in the arts, but not expressly envisioned by the statutory norms.33 
                                                          
31
 As Lord Justice Willmer explains: «I have already referred to the fact that the six quavers which form 
the opening bar of “Spanish Town” are, as the judge observed, a commonplace series to be found in other 
previous musical compositions. Our attention was drawn, for instance, to an Austrian dance tune 
composed in the early nineteenth century by Von Lichnowsky, the opening bar of which is identical with 
that of “Spanish Town”. The same sequence of notes is also to be found in a song entitled “Let Us Sing 
Merrily”, although in this case there is a difference of tempo. In these circumstances, the fact that “Why” 
begins with an opening bar containing a similar, though not identical, phrase is of no special 
significance». Francis Day & Hunter Ltd and another v Bron and another, 25 February 1963, Court of 
Appeal, cit. 
32For this reason, Willmer L.J. is of the opinion that the trial judge reached the correct decision and thus 
avails the dismissal of the appeal. Francis Day & Hunter Ltd and another v Bron and another, 25 
February 1963, Court of Appeal, cit. 
33
 This was the case in Graves v Ashford and another, 5 February 1867, Exchequer, [1865] LR 2 CP 410, 
where the Exchequer Chamber, in the opinion of Kelly J., affirmed that «in order to determine whether a 
copy obtained by means of photography is within those acts, we must look at their particular words; for, 
however clearly we can see that it is within the mischief those acts were designed to remedy, unless the 
words which the legislature has used point to copies thus effected, we should not be at liberty to extend 
their operation for the purpose of including them». 
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However, and here the letter of the norm may also clash with the letter of 
general language,34 it was soon foreseen that the reference to an open clause such as “or 
otherwise or in any other manner copy” implied that «the legislature had contemplated 
that there might be some other hitherto undiscovered mode of copying works of art 
which they were unable at the time to describe in apt words», without necessarily 
inferring that any subsequently discovered mode of reproducing had to be automatically 
considered applicable.35 
Besides, «the ordinary sense of the word» is sometimes explicitly advocated by 
the judiciary, as it was in Dicks v Brooks when Justice James L., referring to the 
allegedly piratical imitation of engravings, specified that, even «without going into any 
etymological definition of the word ‘copy,’ and using the word in the ordinary sense of 
mankind as applied to the subject matter, the question is, Is this a copy, is it a piracy, is 
it a piratical imitation of the engraving [?] The alleged copy is not a thing intended as a 
print in the ordinary sense of the word».36 
Therefore, he excluded the possibility that, regardless of any similarity, it can be 
inferred that, in any sense of the word, it is a piratical copy whereby there is «the 
attempt not to reproduce the print, but to produce something which has some distant 
resemblance to the print [and accordingly,] nobody would ever take it to be the print, 
nobody would ever buy it instead of the print, nobody would ever suppose that it was 
[especially when] it is a work of a different class, intended for a different purpose».37 
Furthermore, recapping the issue of expertise, especially with regard to literary 
works, a more autonomous role of the judge must be allowed. The court admits the 
implication of its own crucial and definite contribution in Pike v Nicholas, when Sir W. 
M. James V. C. so elucidated: 
In endeavouring to reach an approach which is neither too 
superficial nor unduly academic or technical, I think I must to 
                                                          
34
 Indeed, as it was questioned, «upon what reasonable ground can it be contended that a photographic 
copy of a print, which presents to the eye a complete and accurate copy of the original, does not fall 
within these general words ‘or otherwise or in any other manner copy?’ Unless the ordinary rules for the 
interpretation of language are to be disregarded, I can come to no other conclusion than that this is a 
‘copy’ within that statute». Graves v Ashford and another, 5 February 1867, Exchequer, cit. 
35
 Graves v Ashford and another, 5 February 1867, Exchequer, cit. 
36
 Dicks v Brooks, 4 May 1880, Court of Appeal, cit. 
37
 Dicks v Brooks, 4 May 1880, Court of Appeal, cit. 
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some extent rely on my own aural judgment, instructed as it 
has been by these various experts. As it was put by Professor 
Nieman, “The public has a purer approach to music than the 
critics.” That, of course, does not mean that one must discount 
the help that the critics can give, but I think I must rely on the 
ear as well as on the eye, and on the spoken words of the 
witnesses.38 
Besides, as the defendant seems to advance, any similarity that may occur is essentially 
owing to the nature of the common subject and the treated topics, «which such an object 
would suggest to any persons who had followed the course of modern historical 
criticism, and of ethnological and anthropological research and speculation, and the like 
obviousness of the authorities which such persons would refer to and quote».39 
The opportunity for the judge to compare the works at first hand is of essential 
relevance, particularly when the court is expected to consider the evidence of 
independent creation that would allow sparing accusations of infringement. In any 
circumstances, as has previously been anticipated, it is mostly with a certain kind of 
works that an extensive and careful examination would be conducted by the court 
independently, as in the case of comparing a book with a film script. A different 
approach, instead, seems to be more probably sought in dealing with the category of 
works that by their nature require the aid of a dedicated expertise, as it is usually with 
music compositions and paintings. 
Either way, in pursuing the examination, some common details, such as one or 
more characters of their stories, may easily attract the attention of the interpreter. 
Similarities, however, even if they may be striking and thus initially support a prima 
facie copyright violation, can still be justified by the existence of a common source, 
                                                          
38
 Something that Sir W. M. James, V.C. had the chance to do, construing his convincement from the 
meticulous reading of the contended books, by reaching the ultimate conclusion that some parts of the 
book of the defendant were «a palpable crib from the Plaintiff's, transposed, altered, and […]. I would 
add, skilful in appropriative the labours of another, and in disguising, by literary artifices, the 
appropriation». Pike v Nicholas, 24 November 1869, Court of Appeal, [1869] LR 5 Ch App 251. 
39
 However, as Sir James emphasised, he felt that he could still make his own evaluations in the matter, 
after carefully reading of the notes, being «bound by [his] own judicial oath to well and truly try the issue 
joined between the parties, and a true verdict give according to the evidence: that is to say, according as I, 
weighing all the evidence by all the lights I can get, and as best I may, find the testimony credible or 
incredible, trustworthy or the reverse. The law which admitted the testimony of the parties and of 
interested persons was passed in full reliance on the Judges and on juries that they would carefully 
scrutinize such testimony, and would give it such weight as it deserved and no more, or no weight at all». 
Pike v Nicholas, 24 November 1869, Court of Appeal, cit. 
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which could even explain the omissions and/or alterations between the two works under 
consideration,40 or indulge the inference of independent conception.41 
Moreover, with recurring references to the aid of experts, which also seem to be 
justified by the intent not to allow an abuse of infringement claims, it cannot either be 
disregarded that, beyond the help that a specialist reading of the facts may bring to the 
case, it is still necessary to assess the exact bearing of a given work by a non-expert. As 
emerged in Dorling v Honnor Marine, for instance, «the courts are well used to matters 
depending on the evidence of experts, whose opinion can thus be readily obtained, even 
if they are not often in agreement. But how is the impact of the appearance of an object 
on a non-expert (perhaps ‘the man on the Clapham' bus’ be) to be ascertained?»42 
As a final consideration, going into evidence, courts generally acknowledge the 
difficulty of approaching a subject that, albeit arising from the appraisal of copyright 
protection, belongs to very distinct and specialist fields. This may in fact bring the risk 
for the court «to sit as a tribunal of literary criticism», an instance that should be mostly 
rebuked, even considered the specificity of some works over others.43  
Another issue that is greatly influenced by the emphasis that one may place on 
the capacity of the judiciary to make its own evaluations in matters that are extremely 
                                                          
40
 Harman Pictures, N. V. v Osborne and others, 20 March 1967, Chancery, [1967] 1 WLR 723, [1967] 2 
All ER 324. As here the Court in fact notices, «all l I have to determine at this stage is whether the 
plaintiffs have made out a prima facie case […] all I have is a bare assertion that he did not base the script 
upon the book». 
41
 Therefore, in the case of musical works, the court will consider in the broadest sense the influences that 
may have determined the similarities. In the aforementioned case of Francis Day v Hunter, in particular, 
it was alleged by the defendant that he had been mainly influenced by the music of Puccini, Ravel and 
Debussy, but radically denied having ever heard the (sic!) well-known tune of the plaintiff.  
Francis Day & Hunter Ltd and another v Bron and another, 25 February 1963, Court of Appeal, cit. 
42
 Dorling v Honnor Marine Ltd, 10 April 1963, Chancery, [1964] Ch 560, [1963] 3 WLR 397, [1963] 2 
All ER 495, [1963] 1 Lloyd's Rep 377; Dorling v Honnor Marine Ltd, 13 December 1963, Court of 
Appeal, [1965] Ch 1, [1964] 2 WLR 195, [1964] 2 All ER 241, [1963] 2 Lloyd's Rep 455. 
The case in question concerned the drawings of boat plans and yet the judge admitted knowing nothing 
about boats. However, as he concluded, «that some of the parts – sufficient together to constitute a 
substantial part of the whole boat – would have appeared to a non-expert, who did not know that they 
were in fact based on the plans, to be reproductions of the corresponding drawings on the plans, but that 
he would not have felt any strong conviction that the completed boat was a three-dimensional version of 
the plans». 
Dorling v Honnor Marine Ltd, 13 December 1963, Court of Appeal, cit. 
43
 Wood v Chart. Wood v Wood, 29 April 1870, Equity, [1865] LR 10 Eq 193, which affirmed that 
undoubtedly «much depends upon the nature of the work. A mathematical treatise would probably have 
to be translated literally; a political history less accurately, but still closely; a romance more freely; the 
main object being to make the foreign work intelligible. Poetry, as we know from the instances of Pope's 
‘Homer,’ and Dryden's ‘Virgil,’ is allowed a still wider range, and a drama, it is submitted, may be 
rendered with still greater latitude when the meaning is addressed to the eye, and the scenic effect is one 
of the main elements». 
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and specifically knowledge-based, is substantiality, which, as we shall see in the 
following sections, is a crucial element in assessing copyright infringement. As the 
Court of Appeal clarified in Designers Guild, the judge may be in good position to form 
a view on substantiality, which is a question of judgment.44  
Moving from these considerations, in the same case the House of Lords gave its 
own elucidation and Lord Hoffman, in particular, examined in detail the reasoning of 
the appellate judges. Among other aspects, he conceded that substantiality is a question 
of impression: 
When judges say that a question is one of impression, they 
generally mean that it involves taking into account a number of 
factors of varying degrees of importance and deciding whether 
they are sufficient to bring the whole within some legal 
description. It is often difficult to give precise reasons for 
arriving at a conclusion one way or the other (apart from an 
enumeration of the relevant factors) and there are borderline 
cases over which reasonable minds may differ.45 
However, if one focuses exclusively on the impression, there will be always some 
margins of error, alias fallacies, in the evaluation of the judge,46 which may also imply 
                                                          
44
 As a result, there was little difficulty, in the Court’s view, that it was in the natural position to make 
certain evaluations, which would be summarised in the following points: visual comparison between the 
works to assess whether one of them was seemingly the copy of a substantial part of the other; and 
dissection, or the analysis of the component parts of the design, for example, the layout or effects that 
may be considered a substantial part of the work. More generally, the court believed it could easily 
discern the expression of the work from its idea, which is in itself not entitled to any monopoly. 
Designers Guild Limited v Russell Williams (Textiles) Limited, 14 January 1998, Chancery, [1998] 
EWHC Patents 349, [1998] FSR 275, [1998] FSR 803, 
<http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Patents/1998/349.html>; Designers Guild Limited v Russell 
Williams (Textiles) Limited, 26 March 1999, Court of Appeal, [1999] IP & T Digest 4, [2000] FSR 121. 
45
 Designers Guild Limited v Russell Williams (Textiles) Limited (Trading as Washington Dc), 23 
November 2000, House of Lords, cit. 
46
 In particular, His Lordship also warned that there might be a risk of sidetracking from the actual 
significance of the query of substantiality, whether of impression or otherwise, when, once the similarities 
of the works at issue are secluded, such a query is simply referred to the previously explored test of 
similarity. The issue of substantiality, in fact, goes one-step further, consisting of assessing whether the 
act of copying (contingent to the similarities) has concerned a substantial part of the protected original 
work. Designers Guild Limited v Russell Williams (Textiles) Limited (Trading as Washington Dc), 23 
November 2000, House of Lords, cit. 
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overlooking certain aspects and dodging others, even under the direct influence of the 
witnesses on the stand.47  
Therefore, in Lord Hoffman’s view, it seemed more accurate to consider the 
question of substantiality as «one of mixed law and fact», which requires the application 
of legal standards to facts. Hence, beyond being an issue of mere impression that 
implies an overall evaluation of the works, but often too estranged from any legal basis, 
should be rather conceived as a composite criterion of factual and legal elements, also in 
order to avoid dangerous oversimplification.48 
The last aspect additionally brings back for consideration the notion of whether 
such examination, especially in the artistic field, but likewise extended to other 
disciplines, should be made by an expert in the field who has in-depth knowledge of the 
field in question, or whether a fleeting view of the whole may indeed be sufficient, 
which is normally expected from the average or ordinary person, who may also 
sometimes be the potential buyer of the artefact. The problem of what should be the 
criterion of assessment is therefore particularly stringent.49 
Controversies of artistic plagiarism, for instance, have mainly regarded 
figurative arts and photographic works. In such a field, the analysis of the court 
appeared to be greatly focused on the analytic and comparative scrutiny of the works, 
taking into account all the possible elements of evaluation, comparing not only the 
works as a whole, but also all the elements that compose each of them. The analysis of 
such elements, considered within the context in which they belong and particularly 
when there is the possibility of a partial copy, appears even more conceivable.50 
Moving into the realm of music, the timeworn Gramophone case held that music 
does not exist if not for the hearing and it is thanks to conventional signs that musicians 
                                                          
47
 The exercise of dissection, in fact, should imply careful consideration of any individual parts allegedly 
similar, but also their cumulative effect. Designers Guild Limited v Russell Williams (Textiles) Limited 
(Trading as Washington Dc), 23 November 2000, House of Lords, cit. 
48
 In any case, as Lord Hoffman concluded, the Court of Appeal should not have reversed the trial judge’s 
finding when it appeared that there was indeed no error in principle.  
Designers Guild Limited v. Russell Williams (Textiles) Limited (Trading as Washington Dc), 23 
November 2000, House of Lords, cit. 
49
 Perego c Soc. Ceramica Canova, 27 November 1963, Trib. Padova, [1964] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore 
n. 778; [1963] Riv. dir. ind. II 213. 
50
 In other instances, however, courts have preferred first to sort a comprehensive analysis and only 
thereafter proceed with the analytical examination. Perego c Soc. Ceramica Canova, 27 November 1963, 
Trib. Padova, cit. 
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can materially translate their own conceptions, reveal their thoughts and communicate 
them to others, in this way translating into sound the typical signs of the scores.51 
At the same time, it may be sustained that virtually any judgement on musical 
copyright infringement should be better conducted through the help of experts, given 
the extreme specialisation that such fields require. In fact, this may unmistakably help 
the court to have a broader and possibly more objective view than that offered by the 
parameter of the ordinary person or of an imprecise audience, also admitting the 
difficulty of proving how exactly a song is assimilated by the public.  
Indeed, it has been also soon considered that some tunes tend to impose on the 
public the feeling of being a product of immediate enjoyment, which may particularly 
depend on the power of its melodic element that is often the most simple and catchy 
element to memorise.52 Moreover, it has been acknowledged on the contrary that the 
ordinary person may instead more easily recall the rhythm, which would be more 
straightforward to identify.53 
However, there is no uniformity of thought even on this aspect. In particular, it 
could additionally be observed that the ordinary person may actually be capable of 
recognising the most distinctive element of a song and so contribute to determining its 
originality, even without the interaction with music experts, especially when the 
featuring element of the piece is widely used.54 According to the Court of Appeal in 
Rossi c Fiorello, such capacity indeed belongs to the communal experience of anyone 
who has a certain degree of education and has read, in school or for his/her own 
                                                          
51
 Gramophone company limited c Ricordi, 5 December 1908, Cass. Torino, [1909] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. 
autore n. 332; [1909] Foro it. I 603. 
52
 Soc. Sony Music Entertainment Italy c Carrisi, 18 December 1997, Trib. Milano, [1999] Rep. Foro it. 
v. Dir. autore n. 171; [1999] Dir. aut. 132, [1998] Annali it. dir. autore 713, [1998] Annali it. dir. autore 
718. 
This aspect, indeed, is of critical relevance, but it seems yet debatable to conclude with any certainty that 
only resorting to experts would guarantee objectivity. 
53
 Carrisi c Jackson, 24 November 1999, App. Milano, [2000] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 152; [2000] 
Giur. it. 777, [2000] Dir. aut. 127. 
54
 Branduardi c Soc. Buitoni Perugina, 12 May 1993, Trib. Roma, cit. 
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personal enjoyment, poetic works.55 
Besides, in cases in which it appears less immediate to formulate a judgement of 
non-originality, for instance, when the trifle of the song is not that manifest, expert 
evidence may be unavoidably required.56 Resorting to expert standards, in fact, re-
emerges in cases that are particularly complex or perhaps only driven by the media, 
such as the Carrisi c Jackson saga,57 where several expert witnesses offered a wide 
range of case records, citing numerous songs of different genres, all of which showed 
coincidences and distinctions when compared to the songs of the claimants.58 
Furthermore, the occurrence of copyright infringement in the arts requires 
further consideration. First, there are cases in which the boundary between plagiarism 
and genuine imitation is particularly narrow and hurried conclusions should be avoided. 
Therefore, the help of expertise here is even more necessary and yet the judge should be 
particularly careful when approaching the matter to base the judgement only on his/her 
knowledge of the field. In addition, given the extreme development of arts’, which is 
also enhanced by technological evolution, courts may have to face a considerable 
variety of hypotheses and possible violations.59 
                                                          
55
 Indeed, when the court finds the absolute triviality of a work, such as inspirational themes, which does 
not even require further assessment, it may consider the recourse to expertise knowledge to be useless, 
resorting to the notions of experience belonging to any average person of ordinary knowledge, which thus 
appear being sufficient. See Rossi c Fiorello, 1 June 2004, App. Milano, [2005] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. 
autore n. 12; [2004] Annali it. dir. autore 891. 
In this particular case, however, the standard to which the Court refers may not be that ordinary, but it has 
a specific connotation that elevates it to a higher degree of knowledge or experience (when it alludes to a 
not better defined “certain degree of education”), which seems instead to be closer to an expert rather than 
average standard. 
56
 M.P. c Fornaciari, 16 January 2006, Trib. Milano, [2006] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 179; [2006] 
Dir. aut. 254, which concerned the alleged insertion of a poetical theme in a song. 
57
 Carrisi c Jackson, 24 November 1999, App. Milano, cit. 
58
 The songs I cigni di Balaka and Will you be there were analysed in detail and even small variants in 
rhythm and melody were fully considered. It is worth noticing that, in the first instance, the Praetor ruled 
in favour of Carrisi, but without taking into consideration any technical elements, which were indeed 
considered on the subsequent grounds. 
59
 This included artistic rough sketches that gave a distinct imprint to the intellectual creation, therefore 
requiring a relatively modest degree of creativity, which, however, still protected it from the occurrence 
that others could appropriate it (Mauzan c Magagnoli, 18 July 1925, Trib. Milano, [1925] Rep. Foro it. v. 
Dir. autore n. 470; [1925] Temi lomb. 609); the traits of the comic-strip writer (Watterson c Sama 
Diffusioni s.r.l., 21 January 2008, Trib. Milano, [2009] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 91; [2009] Riv. dir. 
ind. II 117); artistic project included in a mock-up (Valente, 4 November 1993, Pret. Pesaro, [1996] Rep. 
Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 138; [1996] Dir. aut. 109); jewellery with a certain artistic value (Gerosa c 
Marconi, 18 February 1929, Trib. Milano, [1929] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 380; [1929] Riv. dir. 
comm. 308, [1929] Mon. trib. 830); paintings transposed into books (F. Haufstaengel c Soc. Ed. 
Modernissima, 13 November 1922, Trib. Milano, [1923] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 324, 325; [1923] 
Riv. dir. comm. 266, [1923] Studi dir. ind. 252, [1923] Riv. dir. comm. 266). 
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Particularly disputed are those instances in which the artistic work may also 
have an industrial application. In this case, it becomes essential to discern the artistic 
element from the product in which it is then infused; it is in fact the former that must be 
creative and original regardless of its industrial or artisanal application.60 
 
 
2 Plagiarists on trial. A survey of the case law in Italy and the United Kingdom 
 
It has been lengthily argued that the violation of the right to attribution greatly depends 
on the proper appraisal of the concepts of creativity and originality. Besides, it has also 
been explained that before even considering any allegation of a breach of such right, it 
is essential to ascertain whether the work that is allegedly plagiarised is worth 
protecting under the law of copyright.61 
Likewise, we had the chance to explain the importance of considering the role of 
the judiciary in reaching a mature assessment of plagiarism-related issues, on the one 
hand filling the openings of statutory law, while on the other hand aiming at 
guaranteeing a better balance among the interests of the various subjects involved, 
which may in one way or another be affected by the judgement. Apart from the obvious 
resort to the judiciary with regard to the United Kingdom, which, like other common 
law countries has a preeminent case law approach, the interest in looking at the judicial 
context almost naturally extends to the Italian counterpart, even being regarded as a 
purely civil system where the legal precedents are not binding.  
                                                          
60
 See Tagliapietra c Soc. Componenti Donà, 21 April 2000, Trib. Venezia, [2001] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. 
autore n. 164; [2001] Foro it. I 1404, [2000] Annali it. dir. autore 980, regarding glass gondolas, in which 
what counted was the form in itself, the form being the expression of the work's originality. The most 
complete protection shall be afforded to right-holders with reference to both the economic and moral right 
dimension, against counterfeiting and usurpation of paternity.  
Cf. Bonanomi c Gemma di Cereda, 20 April 1984, Trib. Lecco, [1986] Rep. Foro it. v. 1510 n. 113; 
[1984] Giur. dir. ind. 445, where nuptial panels were deemed original, since originality qualified not 
merely the artistic form or expression, but also the capacity to individuate and discern the work from 
others. 
61
 This inference was soon accepted by courts that had to appraise on preliminary grounds whether the 
work in question deserved legal protection at all, the first essential question that the court needs to pose 
being whether the work was original or not. Ideally, it is only once this issue is appraised that the court 
may proceed further and spend its time and energy assessing whether there has been, in point of fact and 
of law, a breach of the asserted right/s. 
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Indeed, the contribution of the Italian courts has had a very influential and 
determinant impact in the matter of copyright law, particularly with reference to the 
misattribution of authorship.62 Any cognisant analysis of its related matter therefore 
seems to benefit from following this pattern. However, even within the Italian system, 
magistrates have been swinging, particularly in their judgements on authorship 
misattribution, in line with the difficulties of providing a clear definition of the 
phenomenon. Besides, it is hard to conclude that a definite and indisputable structure 
and mechanism of regulation has been found, but this should only encourage a further 
judicial analysis of this kind. 
As anticipated, plagiarism-related discourses have been traditionally and more 
historically entangled with the concepts of counterfeiting and piracy. This peculiar 
linkage emerges particularly in the judicial context, especially in the earliest period 
hereby considered (from late 1800 to early 1950), but is occasionally found even in 
more recent decisions.63  
Likewise, it is also accurate to argue that, for what concern the Italian 
framework, courts have not been always prone to affording the same protection to moral 
rights to any type of intellectual creation.64 This helps to demonstrate that even within 
the Italian context there has not always been unanimity of thought in terms of what 
concerns the moral right protection of authors, which to some extent apparently clashes 
with the recurrent idea that moral rights have always been absolutely protected in the 
Continent. It is instead worth considering that it has not always been such a flawless 
picture, but has rather gone through some evolution that has in part aligned with the 
similar development of creativity. 
Moreover, and this is again a mutual observation that concerns both systems 
considered, the explicit resort to the interpretation of the matter by magistrates, which is 
particularly evident in the wary and, most important, first-hand reading of the decision, 
                                                          
62
 Being determinant, especially with regard to the last aspect, the fact that, as has often been recalled, the 
law does not offer much ground to address the issue explicitly and clearly. 
63
 This has also received attention by commentators such as P. DECHERNEY, Hollywood's copyright wars: 
from Edison to the internet, New York: Columbia University Press, 2012, who, focusing on the US 
cinematographic field, explores some of the most well-known legal disputes on copyright infringement, 
including the early controversies on piracy, also providing an interesting view of its social self-regulating 
response. 
64
 This concerned, in particular, photographic works, which, unlike other works, as we have anticipated, 
only later received equal protection. 
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allows to take into account some aspects that one would not perhaps consider if the 
analysis had been limited to a mere theoretical conception.65 Finally, as the analysis of a 
crucial case that follows will depict, there seems to be a constant round of patterns 
hiding behind the process of creation that the judiciary often and deliberately recall.66 
Furthermore, as also established in the previous paragraph, the resort to some 
old cases allows a valuable and perhaps even new perspective, although this to some 
may appear paradoxical, in addition to the natural resort to the authorities to which 
courts give their imprimatur. Furthermore, their careful reading shows how certain 
issues and problematic aspects of copyright law were known and beckoned by the 
judiciary long before today.  
A good example of this last inference is represented by the anomaly that, 
according to the House of Lords, emerged, for instance, when «the composer who, at 
the keyboard, composes an unforgettable melody, the poet who creates an inspired 
poem and the orator who produces a memorable speech do not obtain copyright 
protection […] unless the melody, poem or speech are reduced to writing or other 
material form». Despite signalling the glitch, the House clarified that any change in this 
concern should be made by the “rational legislator”. Yet, there seems to be sufficient 
latitude to appreciate the role of the judiciary in also signalling copyright statutory 
anomalies,67 thus explicating their typical balancing function. 
 
                                                          
65
 It may be reasonably argued that there may be discrepancy in terms of a number of decisions, 
particularly with a preponderance on the Italian side, being the UK decisions generally more limited in 
number, in part according to the principle of stare decisis and in part in consideration of the fewer 
instances in which moral rights have been considered by its courts. However, bearing in mind this 
possible misbalance, the choice of limiting the consideration of Italian case law to a few cases, deemed 
the most relevant, hopefully aims to find a trade-off. Besides, it should also be recalled that, in any case, 
several Italian cases on the specific matter hereby analysed are, largely, repetitive, the ruling sometimes 
being a mere replica of another court’s ruling. 
66
 It may be useful to recall the circle referred to by White who, defining the imitative literary practices 
over the time, said, «the study has completed a circle. It began with the enunciation of a classical ideal; it 
concludes with the triumphant application of that ideal by Englishmen», so proving that the patterns of 
genuine imitation have been recurrently repeated age by age. H. O. WHITE, Plagiarism and imitation 
during the English Renaissance, cit., 201. See supra, Chapters 1 and 2. 
67
 The same indication seems to arise today with regard to the likely ambiguous requirement of fixation, 
which may also go along with actual doubts about the rationality of the legislation. 
British Leyland Motor Corporation Ltd. and another Respondents and Armstrong Patents Co. Ltd. and 
another Appellants, 27 February 1986, House Of Lords, [1986] AC 577, [1986] 2 WLR 400, [1986] 1 All 
ER 850, [1986] UKHL J0227–1; British Leyland Motor Corporation Ltd. and another Respondents and 
Armstrong Patents Co. Ltd. and another Appellants, 27 February 1986, Court of Appeal, [1984] 3 CMLR 
102, [1984] FSR 591. 
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2.1 Italian case law from late 1800 to early 1950 
 
The fact that the legislator avoided a definition of plagiarism does not mean that the law 
had no interest in the subject. On the contrary, it can be inferred that it is particularly 
because of the dearth of a clear denotation of the phenomenon, which has always had a 
tangible social extrication, that the judiciary has proved its duty to consider the claims 
of those who held being prejudiced by the infringing conduct of others who had 
allegedly copied their work by usurping their authorship. 
Concerning the Italian context, one of the earliest cases in which Italian courts 
considered the usurpation of someone else’s work is Mascagni Sonzogno c Verga,68 
which established that anyone who appropriates another’s works, even adding or 
varying something of his/her own, but without surpassing the original work, violates the 
right of the author in the intellectual creation that is essentially reflected in the 
infringing work.69 Indeed, the case in question defined such conduct only in terms of 
contraffazione, which has, for a long time, gone along with the concept of piracy and 
plagiarism,70 while in other instances the latter found its autonomous collocation.71 
                                                          
68
 Mascagni Sonzogno c Verga, 16 June 1891, App. Milano, [1892] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 388; 
[1892] Foro it. I 41. 
69
 This conclusion clearly reminds the established literary canons of imitation that have been illustrated in 
Chapters 1 and 2. 
70
 Cf., among other earlier judgements, Angelelli c Ditta Paravia e Terrigi, 2 December 1876, App. 
Ancona, [1877] Giur. it. I 2 15; Fallo c Morando, 23 October 1880, Cass. Torino, [1881] Rep. Foro it. v. 
Dir. autore n. 420; [1881] Mon. trib. Mil. 92; Regina Gabriele, 24 May 1889, Cass. Napoli, [1889] Rep. 
Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 335; [1889] Dir. giur. 106; Invernardi c Trevisini e Paravia, 7 February 1895, 
App. Roma, [1895] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 399; [1895] Bett. 220; Annoscia, 16 May 1898, App. 
Trani, [1898] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 429; [1898] Rass. giur. Bari, 188, [1899] Mon. trib. 34; Porcu, 
3 March 1903, Trib. Sassari, [1903] Foro sardo 236, [1903] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 334; [1903] Riv. 
prat. 599, [1903] Foro sardo 236. 
71
 Some courts of that epoque, in fact, seemed indeed to have a clearer vision of plagiarism as an 
independent infringement. See Casa musicale Sonzogno c Castelli, 6 April 1932, Cass. Regno, [1932] 
Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 434; [1932] Mon. trib. 324, [1932] Giur. it. 561, [1932] Riv. dir. comm. 277, 
[1932] Sett. cass. 728; Dominici c Vecchio, 7 November 1932, App. Torino, [1933] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. 
autore n. 369; [1933] Giur. Tor. 234, [1933] Mon. trib. 511; Cordovado, 30 June 1934, Cass. Regno, 
[1935] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 483; [1935] Giur. it. 98, [1935] Giust. pen. III 222, [1935] Mon. Trib. 
357, [1935] Dir. aut. 88; Gronda, 5 April 1935, Cass. Regno, cit.; Mosco c Soc. Metro Goldwin Mayer, 4 
June 1937, Trib. Roma, [1937] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 475; [1937] Foro it. I 948; Traldi c Ditta 
Uniformi fasciste, 27 January 1941, Cass. Regno, [.] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. [1941] Dir. aut. 27, 
[1941] Mon. trib. 520, [1941] Riv. dir. comm. II 445; Salgari c Soc. App.V.E., 3 August 1942, Trib. Roma, 
[1942] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 401; [1942] Dir. aut. 278; Pagliai c Simoni, 23 May 1947, App. 
Roma, cit.; Campanile c Zavatini, 31 March 1952, Pret. Roma, [1952] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 705-
706; [1952] Foro it. I 673; Grimaldi c Soc. Ponti de Laurentis, 23 June 1954, Trib. Roma, cit; Pertici c 
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In fact, plagiarism was soon to receive explicit mention in a number of cases 
since late 1800, which also distinguished the hypothesis of reproachable and legally 
sanctionable plagiarism from those instances considered tolerable.72 Both plagiarism 
and counterfeiting were denied, for instance, in Scarpetta,73 provided that a foreign 
work, which was adapted to the Italian stage and also translated into an Italian dialect, 
with additional modifications, could eventually only amount to a non-authorised 
representation of a copyright play.74 
Some courts were particularly careful to differentiate between conduct that could 
amount to plagiarism, counterfeiting or simple imitation. In this way, they demonstrate 
particular attention to the literary and artistic patterns of creative imitation, whose 
relevance has marked, in particular, the first part of the research. In line with the 
mechanisms illustrated therein, they attempt to distinguish the instances in which the 
conduct of appropriation was hidden by some modifications or alterations that 
nonetheless did not amount to any infringement (plagio or contraffazione 
mascherato/a). On the contrary, other courts who foresee little distinction between 
plagiarism and counterfeiting focused on their shared elements, such as the intention of 
the perpetrator to copy the work of someone else for his/her own benefit and at the 
expense of the other person.75 
Looking at one of the earliest theories elaborated by the judiciary and 
concurrently expounded by scholarly works, three main elements seemed to stand out in 
a claim of that sort: first, the monetary prejudice that the genuine author of the allegedly 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Flora film, 1 September 1954, Trib. Roma, [1955] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 690; [1955] Temi rom. 
143; Innocenzi c Borello, 21 February 1955, Pret. Roma, [1955] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 695; [1955] 
Foro pad. I 1366. 
72
 Nonetheless, the contingent link between plagiarism and counterfeiting has not been limited to the 
earliest case law, but occasionally re-emerged in more recent disputes, in which the presence of the latter 
has never completely left the side of the former. This aspect – if it is to some extent influenced by the 
recurrent practice of bringing an action before the court for both an alleged infringement of the works’ 
economic rights of exploitation and a breach of the moral right of attribution – is still very controversial 
and may lead to missing the point that the two dimensions should rather remain distinct. 
73
 Scarpetta, 16 August 1892, App. Napoli, [1892] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 388; [1892] Gazz. proc. 
281, [1893] Mon. trib.  17, [1893] Riv. pen. XXXVII 67. 
74
 Other cases that individuated the instances in which plagiarism was considered unlawful. See Carrara 
e Rechiedei c Bernardi, 4 November 1896, App. Parma, [1897] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 415; [1897] 
Foro it. I 180; Bemporad e Vecchi c. Carozzi, 30 June 1897, Trib. Milano, [1897] Mon. trib. Mil. 690; 
Benelli c. Savoia film, 17 giugno 1914, Trib. Torino, [1915] Mon. trib. Mil. 113. 
75
 See, for instance, Soc. Poligrafica ed. sacre c Soc. Salvo e Bagni, 1 March 1939, App. Brescia, [1939] 
Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 476; [1939] Foro it. I 1644. 
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infringed work had suffered;76 second, the awareness that the illegitimate nature of the 
conduct of copying has often been accompanied by various alterations aimed at 
concealing the infringement; and, third, the criterion of the considerable or otherwise 
substantial entity of the copy.77  
Yet, such a theory has several inadequacies and limitations. First, the automatic 
inference that an economic suffering had to be established clearly clashed with the idea 
that the right of the author to be acknowledged as such shall be protected regardless of 
any economic damages. Then, the conscious intention to deceive, which often assumed 
the forms of animus nocendi, could easily be rebuked by the consideration that the 
infringer might indeed not have any intention to cause prejudice to the other person, 
also because this is often difficult to prove. Finally, the reference to a considerable 
quantity of copying someone else’s work remained too vague or narrow, depending on 
how one understood it, and so implying excessive discretion by the judiciary.78 
In P.M. c Grimaldi, which concerned the issue of the alleged plagiarism of an 
ecclesiastical legal textbook into a subsequent similar work, the copying had allegedly 
regarded the identity of the subject's order, choice and title of paragraphs, and the actual 
insertion of numerous passages from the earlier book.79 In both instances, the trial judge 
and appellate court were for the dismissal of the case, since the allegedly infringing 
book was deemed a mere synthesis of the other, even though the reproduction of some 
exact passages was brought in as evidence. The main point held was indeed that to have 
actual infringement in terms of counterfeiting there had to be complete and accurate 
reproduction in the substance and form of the other work.80 
Besides, another fundamental concern for the court was to assess whether the 
                                                          
76
 Indeed this immediately brings our attention to the inevitable association with the economical 
dimension of copyright. 
77
 See E. PIOLA CASELLI, Del diritto di autore secondo la legge italiana comparata con le leggi straniere, 
cit., 533. 
78
 E. PIOLA CASELLI, Del diritto di autore secondo la legge italiana comparata con le leggi straniere, cit., 
533-534. 
79
 Grimaldi, 17 September 1898, Cass. Roma, [1899] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 404; [1898] Foro it. II 
17. 
80
 Besides, in Pietri c Fonzo the discriminating criterion seemed to reside in the unlawful appropriation, 
which occurs when the copied piece has the extension and importance to be considered a clear substantial 
and material reproduction of the intellectual work of others. Pietri c Fonzo, 15 April 1932, App. Milano, 
cit., in which it was held that facts, feelings and ideas are the common material of art, and therefore 
anybody can use them. It is a recurrent practice that every author, whether consciously or not, uses 
expressions or phrases used by others, to a greater or lesser degree, so that one may see a mere fleeting 
reminiscence or, on the contrary, an actual medley of others’ pieces extracted from their own works. 
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allegedly plagiarised work deserved any copyright protection. In Angelelli c Paravia, 
although anticipating that the logic of numbers is common to those who understand the 
science of numbers, a table of report on arithmetic calculation was considered an 
intellectual creation that deserved protection,81 given that certain calculations require 
some intellectual effort.82 
Within the artistic field, instead, protection has been afforded to 
chromolithographic works, as having the form of works of art, on the condition that 
their extrication in the outer world could be appreciated by senses, and thus the express 
creativity from whom they originated. The counterfeiting of chromolithography that 
reproduced paintings was yet considered illicit when reproduced, even with slight but 
possibly malicious variations.83 
Moreover, recalling what has previously been argued with regard to the 
recognition of certain types of works, the protection of photographs has not indeed been 
automatic. The development of technology, in fact, has for some time raised doubts 
about whether photography was entitled to be protected as an artistic form like others or 
whether it was instead a simple mechanical and chemical reproduction. However, even 
when the former opinion prevailed, it still remained still the problem of deciding 
whether the evaluation about whether a photograph had to be considered original and 
only then protected had to be ascertained by experts or could be evaluated, according to 
                                                          
81
 Angelelli c Ditta Paravia e Terrigi, 2 December 1876, App. Ancona [1877] Giur. it. I 2 15. 
82
 No protection was granted to expressions that belong to the common language, such as the poetical 
verse “è già domani”, which was found to be indeed subject to a recurrent exploitation in Corsale c Soc. 
Snia Viscosa, 18 October 1974, App. Milano, [1975] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 710; [1975] Giur. it. I 
2 477, [1975] Giur. Merito I 444, [1975] Dir. aut. 387. Cf. Baratta c Opera Parrocchiale S. Quintino e 
Morgari,23 November 1925, App. Bologna, [1925] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 469; [1925] Foro it. I 
1033, in which the Court held, confirming the lower judgements, that the Dannunzian poem had been 
illicitly taken and obviously transposed in a hackneyed way into the work of the infringer, without any 
intellectual effort, by merely reproducing its content and yet spoiling its original beauty and richness of 
forms. 
83
 See Istituto di Bergamo c May Söhne, 31 December 1900, App. Torino, [1901] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. 
autore n. 409; [1901] Foro it. I 1294, which ascertained that inspiration from paintings, not mere copy, 
given that novelty (rectius originality) could result in an even better expression of the figures there 
depicted, a better arrangement and drawing of the details in the picture, a more harmonic combination of 
colours, and more intensity of shades. 
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the ordinary person criterion, by anyone.84 
In Lessiak c Ditta Naya, the Supreme Court made it clear how it was likely that 
photographic works could be entitled to protection,85 but it was a matter for the 
judiciary to distinguish, after having evaluated all the circumstances and the evidence 
brought, between protectable and non-protectable works.86 In the other earlier 
judgement of Pandimiglio the court held that, by virtue of his artistic ability and 
intuition,87 the photographer deserved protection of his economic and moral rights in the 
works, and foremost that the work had been properly attributed. The few alterations 
made to hide the plagiarism were not sufficient to deny this simple fact.88 
In art, as with other fields, the subject of the work does not have to be new or 
absolutely novel,89 and it may indeed already be used many times. Moreover, even the 
fact that the subject itself is a commonplace element of art, or belongs to the public 
domain, does not in itself suffice to exclude protection. One should instead focus on the 
originality of its expression and representation.90  
In Soc. Poligrafica c Salvo, a case of works representing sacred images, there 
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 See Huesch, 18 January 1901, Trib. Napoli [1901] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 409; [1901] Filangieri 
504, where it was ascertained that the work of the photographer is a work of patience that can be executed 
with certain instruments. The main requirement, however, remained that the work had to have a minimum 
degree of creativity.  
Cf. Mauri c Confalone, 21 May 1906, Trib. Napoli, [1907] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 390; [1907] 
Filangieri 310, [1907] R. universale 441, according to which photographic drawings could be the result 
of a certain thought, spirit, artistic taste and intelligence of their maker. 
85
 Lessiak c Ditta Naya, 12 March 1891, Cass. Roma, [1891] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 374; [1891] 
Foro it. II 198. 
86
 At the same time, it was also understood that leaving this evaluation to the court could result in 
potential abuse, since there was the possible risk of leaving such an important evaluation to the 
discretionary power of a judge who could simply but wrongly take into account only the artistic value of 
the work. Mauri c Confalone, 21 May 1906, Trib. Napoli, cit. 
87
 The protection thus afforded to photographs derived from the ability of the photographer to choose, 
assemble and describe the photos, for instance, inserted in a catalogue of modern art, which was reckoned 
to be compiled with care and love, intelligence and patience. Visentini, Rubinato, Garbisa, 15 December 
1897, App. Venezia, [1898] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 428; [1898] Filangieri 132, [1898] Temi ven. 
25, [1898] Mon. trib. 147, [1898] Bett. 82, [1898] Annali 25, [1898] Legge I 92. 
88
 Pandimiglio, 28 May 1928, App. Roma, [1928] Foro it. II 233. Summarising the facts of the dispute, 
the photographer Pandimiglio appeared to have found a negative of his colleague Ferri, picturing 
Mussolini on a horse, and, having put his name on it instead, sold it by also inserting the caption “all 
rights reserved”. 
89
 As it emerged in Mauri c Confalone, 21 May 1906, cit., what indeed counts is that the work must be a 
product of the mind that originates from the artist, and therefore an original creation. It does not matter 
that the work is a new work, a reproduction, a copy of the previous artefact. 
90
 Here we come back to the consideration that we have previously made with regard to literature 
(Chapters 1 and 2). What is most significant is that there has to be an individual or personal imprint of the 
author in that subject. 
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seemed to be sufficient latitude to foresee some degree of originality. Even if the theme 
were known, they were presented in a new and original manner.91 Besides, works of art 
may also have a didactic feature in addition to their creative primary function. In this 
case, the opportunity to insert some extracts of previous works has to be considered licit 
insofar as the rights in the original work are protected, which is first guaranteed by 
acknowledging their source.92 
 
 
2.2 UK case law from late 1800 to early 1950 
 
Apart from the subsistence of copyright and therefore from the necessary evaluation of 
whether the work allegedly copied receives protection in the first place, both Italian and 
UK courts have, since the beginning, faced the question of what constitutes 
infringement of the rights in the protected work, but also the exact latitude of such a 
potential infringement. For instance, one of the first problems considered was the 
definition of the degree or amount of copy of others’ works that would have led to 
infringement. 
In particular, with reference to the UK case law, the interrogation of the court is 
divided into two main sub-questions, which may be summarised as follows: Has the 
defendant copied or taken the plaintiff’s work? If he/she has allegedly copied only part 
of the plaintiff’s creation, is such part of a material or substantial nature?  
Besides, even considering these instances, the court appears always to be in a 
position to see whether the similarities between the works in question indeed refer to 
common places. No piracy seems to be easily ascertained when the works share the 
same common sources.93 In particular, the fact that a common subject is foreseen in a 
                                                          
91
 Soc. Poligrafica ed. sacre c Soc. Salvo e Bagni, 1 March 1939, App. Brescia, cit. 
The Court of Appeal indeed refers to a minimum of novelty and originality, but without attributing to it 
absolute significance. The images of Jesus were in their concrete form completely different from other 
works that still deal with the same subject. What the court found to be copied was the central graphic 
group, which was to be understood as the main and essential substantial kernel of the work and which 
could be seen even by a mere look and comparison between the two works, such that a simple inspiration 
had to be conclusively excluded. 
92
 Hoepli c Mancini, 24 November 1905, App. Milano, [1906] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 342; [1905] 
Foro it. I 244. 
93
 Morris v Ashbee, 10 November 1868, Equity, [1865] LR 7 Eq 34, which considered the case of a 
plaintiff, who, despite the labour and expense to conceive the work, had yet suffered some prejudice by 
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work always seems to ring a bell and possibly help the interpreter not to over-assess 
similarities that may arise from a straightforward comparison of the works.  
In fact, particularly in this case, one should first wonder whether the instant 
likenesses are, to some extent, explicable by the implication that both intellectual 
creations share, on the one hand, the same subject and, on the other hand, the same 
sources, all of which considered consent to conclude that there has not been a “slavish 
copying”.94 In such cases, in fact, magistrates have always been extremely cautious to 
afford protection to the work. This point is well expressed in Chatterton v Cave, which 
considered dramatic works by Justice Grove, who contested that there could be an 
infringement of copyright in the case of the repetition of mere common forms.  
As he further explains, the purpose of copyright protection is to shield the 
“original merit” in the work; it would have meant, «going too far», protecting a 
«common-place expedient of scenic art to the end of a version of a drama». Referring to 
the case in question, he thus articulated: 
A very striking stage situation or important novel scenic effect 
might very well be, under some circumstances, the subject of 
dramatic copyright. But I see nothing of the sort here. The 
effect was an ordinary stage effect, such as every one familiar 
with melodramatic pieces constantly sees […] the two versions 
being substantially independent, can it be said because in the 
last scene an expedient is adopted which is identical with that 
adopted by the plaintiffs' drama, but which may be said to be 
‘common form’ in all such plays.95 
                                                                                                                                                                          
someone else’s appropriation of his work, so plainly frustrating the principle that «no one has a right to 
take the results of the labour and expense incurred by another for the purposes of a rival publication, and 
thereby save himself the expense and labour of working». 
Cf. Kelly v Morris, 8 March 1866, Equity, [1866] LR 1 Eq 697; Lewis v Fullarton, 16 July 1839, 
Chancery, cit. 
94
 Pike v Nicholas, 24 November 1869, Court of Appeal, cit. 
As Lord Hatherley noticed, «a case of alleged piracy like this was obviously very difficult to determine 
when the authors took a common subject and depended upon authors open to both of them, and when 
portions of the one work, which were said to resemble portions of the other work, might be then from 
those common authors to which each was at liberty to resort». On the contrary, although the judge of first 
instance focused too much on similarities, «there was a common subject propounded, a common mode of 
treating that subject which was open to both. With regard to all the various passages, with the exception 
of Retzius, the Defendant had been to the common source, had worked out of that common source, had 
laboured there, and had produced something of his own in addition». 
95
 Chatterton and another v Cave, 26 May 1875, Divisional Court, [1875] LR 10 CP 572 (later discussed 
in Chatterton and another v Cave, 30 November 1876, Court of Appeal, [1876] 2 CPD 42). 
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Yet, it is exactly availing that the principle of sole quantity cannot be determinant to 
assess infringement that their Lordships punctuate how, in any case, regardless of the 
instance that both works were taken from a common source, «it was the original 
adaptation that constituted authorship, and that was not to be imitated and 
plagiarised».96  
Especially in consideration of this concluding phrase, the case in question 
becomes particularly relevant, not only for the fact that it posits, even in the first 
instance, the very basic principle that copyright should only protect original works, but 
also because, in the words of the House of Lords, we can see an earlier application of 
the term plagiarism and its direct inference with the concept of authorship. Likewise, in 
Wood v Boosey the court admitted that, although not inventing the tune or the harmony, 
it was still possible to foresee some kind of invention in the adaptation of another work, 
even simply referred to the minimal effort in the adaptation of orchestra work for the 
piano, which conceded authorship.97 
Authorship, on the other hand, may still be an ingenuous act,98 and the 
recurrence of common subjects appears to some extent to confirm this.99 
                                                                                                                                                                          
This case was later considered before the House of Lords, which again had to reconsider explicitly the 
significance of materiality or substantiality of the allegedly copied works. According to the appellants, in 
particular, the Divisional Court overlooked the facts and failed to consider that «the scenes, or ‘points,’ as 
they were called, were material, valuable, and striking points, and affected considerably the attractiveness 
of the drama, and no one doubted that they had been copied from the Plaintiff's production». Chatterton 
and another v Cave, 28 March 1878, House of Lords, [1878] 3 AppCas 483, which found how, although 
it could be said that the drama of the defendant was taken from the plaintiffs, these parts were not of a 
material or substantial character.  
The case also referred to a number of other authorities, including Planche v Braham, 7 November 1837, 
Common Pleas, [1837] 173 ER 402, [1837] 8 Car & P 68, [1837] 4 Bing NC 17; Bramwell v Halcom, 
1836, Chancery, [1836] 3 My & Cr 737; [1836] 40 ER 1110, in which Lord Cottenham had stated that «it 
is not quantity, but value, that is to be looked to». 
96
 Frederick B. Chatterton and Benjamin Webster, Appellants; and Joseph Arnold Cave, Respondent, 28 
March 1878, House of Lords, [1875] 3 App Cas 483. 
Cf. D'Almaine v Boosey, 3 March 1835, Exchequer, cit.; Leader and Cock v Purday, 11 January 1849, 
Common Pleas, [1849] 7 CB 4, [1849] 137 ER 2; Lover v Davidson, 6 November 1856, Common Pleas, 
and Exchequer [1856] 1 CB NS 182, 140 ER 77; Chappell v Sheard, 3 August 1855, Chancery, [1855] 2 
K & J 117, [1855] 69 ER 717; Chappell and others v Davidson, 5 May 1856, Common Pleas, and 
Exchequer, [1856] 18 CB 194, [1856] 139 ER 1341. 
97
 A conclusion that was yet contested by the plaintiff, who insisted for declaring that «still [the 
defendant] is not the author; he has shewn no inventive power, he has not created a single melody», so 
claiming that musical arrangement was «purely mechanical [did] not require much skill, therefore the 
arranger was not in any sense to be considered author, given that he did not create anything new that 
would entitle to claim authorship, but he simply copied for the piano what the original composer did for 
the whole orchestra». Wood v Boosey and another, 4 February 1868, cit. 
98
 Toole v Young, 26 May 1874, Queen's Bench, [1865] LR 9 QB 523, in which Justice Blackburn, 
acknowledging the entitlement of the author of the drama, and so his assignees, to restrain the piracy of 
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On similar grounds, Tate v Fullbrook, regarding dramatic works, further 
corroborated this point, when Justice Kennedy observed how: 
I do not say that, for the purpose of judging whether one 
dramatic piece is a plagiarism from another, where words of 
pieces deal with more or less similar subject-matters, it is not 
legitimate to look at dramatic situations and scenic effects, in 
order to see whether, taking them in conjunction with the 
words, they do not help to shew that there has been a 
borrowing of an idea or of an expression of an idea from 
another piece [but] a jury might properly be directed that they 
might consider such things, is not that they could by 
themselves form an infringement, but that they might be 
considered as some evidence of the substantial identity of the 
two productions.100 
At the same time, it has also occasionally emerged that, in order to prove that an 
infringement has occurred and needs to be punished, some trace of misbehaviour, such 
as the so-called animus furandi, which would also contradict an honest or fair treatment 
of others’ works, must be established. As cleared out in Kelly v Morris,101 in fact, one 
                                                                                                                                                                          
the work, admitted: «I do not see any reason why both Mr. Hollingshead and Mr. Grattan are not to be 
considered as authors to the extent to which they have exercised their ingenuity in turning the novel into a 
drama». 
99
 Toole v Young, 26 May 1874, Queen's Bench, [1865] LR 9 QB 523, concerning two works that 
dramatised the same novel (of which the plaintiff was also the author), although in different form. 
Accordingly, Cockburn, C.J found them independent of each other and the defendant did not have any 
knowledge of a previous dramatisation. To reach this conclusion, he also referred to the authority of other 
cases, in primis, Reade v Conquest, 19 January 1861 and 17 January 1862, Common Pleas, [1861] 9 CB 
(NS) 755, [1861] 142 ER 297, [1862] 142 ER 883, [1862] 11 CB NS 479, according to which «an author 
has a right to convert a novel written by another person into a drama without infringing the copyright 
existing in the novel. It follows that two persons may dramatise the same novel, for that is common 
property. […] When an author has once given his novel to the world, he cannot take away from other 
persons the right to dramatise it by himself transforming it into a drama, subject to this, that they must not 
borrow from his drama but only from his novel. The author of a drama is not protected by the common 
law, and what the defendant has done is not forbidden by any statute». 
100
 Tate v Fullbrook, 14 February 1908, Court of Appeal, [1908] 1 KB 821. In his view, Kennedy J., also 
referring to Chatterton and another v Cave, 28 March 1878, House of Lords, [1878] 3 AppCas 483, to 
some extent being very critical towards the reading of the trial judge, believed «that the learned judge, so 
to speak, viewed those facts through the wrong spectacles for the purpose of determining whether there 
had been an infringement by the defendant of the plaintiff's copyright. He treated the make-up and 
gestures of particular actors and such things as being matters which, quite apart from the words, might 
constitute the subject of infringement, because they had occurred in the representation of the plaintiff's 
piece». 
Furthermore, as he additionally uttered, «The question is whether an expression of a thought or design has 
been made the subject of plagiarism». 
101
 Kelly v Morris, 8 March 1866, Equity, [1866] LR 1 Eq 697, which regarded the piracy of a directory or 
guide-book (following Lewis v Fullarton, 16 July 1839, Chancery, cit.) and where Sir W. Page Wood, 
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should not be mistaken in assuming that he/she may freely and unlimitedly deal with the 
labour and property of others.102 
Besides, even allowing a fair use of another’s work, there seemed not to be any 
doubt that taking without proper acknowledgment does not amount to any fairness, but 
may only suggest an intention to profit – here in the broadest meaning – from someone 
else’s labour hidden by a declaimed purpose of enhancing learning and knowledge.103 
Therefore, even considering the applicability of the animus furandi criterion, 
when the source is acknowledged there seem to be limited grounds to foresee any 
concealment. Even so, if the defendant’s work has indeed been appropriated a 
substantial part of the plaintiff’s work, «by the mere use of paste and scissors, and 
without the exercise of any of that labour [since] the mere honest intention on the part of 
the appropriator will not suffice, as the Court can only look at the result, and not at the 
intention in the man's mind».104 
The concept of copy is expressly considered in Graves v Ashford, in which 
Justice Mellor, having to decide whether statutory law prohibited copying also by 
means of photography, said that «the notion of piracy can hardly attach to that which is 
not a deceptive imitation: it means the taking advantage of another man's labour. It 
cannot be said that every sort of imitation would be within these acts; for instance, a 
                                                                                                                                                                          
V.C. explained: «what [the defendant] has done has been just to copy the Plaintiff's book and then to send 
out canvassers to see if the information so copied was correct. The work of the Defendant has clearly not 
been compiled by the legitimate application of independent personal labour, and there must be an 
injunction to restrain the publication of any copy of the [infringing] Defendant's work [at least in 
consideration of the parts] he shall have expunged from such portions all matter copied from the 
Plaintiff's work». 
102
 Scott v Stanford, 7 February 1867, Equity, [1865] 3 LR Eq 718. 
However, as further articulated in a similar case, in which the court considered appropriate granting an 
injunction against the appropriation of the plaintiff’s work, if there were «no doubt these cases sometimes 
present extremely nice and difficult questions as to what is a fair commentary or a fair use for scientific 
purposes of the labours of another man», this should be confined to the cases in which the taking is 
followed by a distinct exercise of labour that would produce itself an original result.  
103
 Cary v. Kearsley, 11 June 1801, High Court, [1801] 170 ER 679, [1801] 4 Esp 168, in which he quotes 
what Lord Ellenborough affirmed: «That part of the work of one author is found in another is not of itself 
piracy, or sufficient to support an action: a man may fairly adopt part of the work of another; he may so 
make use of another's labours for the promotion of science and the benefit of the public; but having done 
so, the question will be, was the matter so taken used fairly with that view, and without what I may term 
the animus furandi? […] While I shall think myself bound to secure every man in the enjoyment of his 
copyright, one must not put manacles upon science». Kelly v Morris, 8 March 1866, Equity, [1866] LR 1 
Eq 697. Campbell v Scott, 8 February 1842, Chancery, [1842] 11 Sim 31, [1842] 59 ER 784; D'Almaine v 
Boosey, 3 March 1835, Exchequer, cit.; Lewis v Fullarton, 16 July 1839, Chancery, cit. 
104
 Scott v Stanford, 7 February 1867, Equity, [1865] 3 LR Eq 718. 
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photograph an inch square of a large picture. No one could mistake the one for the 
other».105 
The case in question adds another element to the picture, when it underlines the 
relevance of a deceptive intention and the actual aptitude of the infringing work to 
ingenerate consequent confusion. However, this factor does not actually find unanimous 
consideration by the judiciary; therefore, it should be evaluated case by case and only 
incidentally. 
Moving to another level of analysis, when dealing with the legal aspect of 
attribution, another relevant point to consider is the linkage that has typically existed 
between authorship and formalities. In fact, when some critical formalities are not met, 
the UK law has always been categorically reluctant to afford any protection at all.106 
This was made clear in Wood v Boosey, when Justice Kelly C.B. regretfully considered 
that, although it seemed clear that «the merits of the case [were] with the plaintiff [,] the 
proprietor of the work», the fact that he did not register his right properly impeded any 
further consideration of its shield.107    
                                                          
105
 Copying there meant imitating in whole or in part any other work. According to the Court, therefore, 
«the piracy of a picture or engraving by the process of photography, or by any other process, mechanical 
or otherwise, whereby copies may be indefinitely multiplied» could not be foreseeable. Graves v Ashford 
and another, 5 February 1867, Exchequer, cit. Cf. West v Francis, 15 May 1822, King’s Bench, [1822] 5 
B & A 737, [1822] 106 ER 1361, where copy is defined by «that which comes so near to the original as to 
give to every person seeing it the idea created by the original».  
106
 Like the current case, other controversies were decided precisely because of whether the required 
formalities had been correctly followed. 
Apart from consideration of procedural elements regarding cases that had an international dimension, it 
seems here sufficient to notice that «the question, whether a work [was] an imitation or a piracy, shall in 
all cases be decided by the Courts of justice of the respective countries according to the laws in force in 
each» (Wood v Chart. Wood v Wood, 29 April 1870, Equity, cit.), similarly to what the CJEU now 
précises regarding the need to give actual meaning to the concepts of creativity and originality. 
107
 Wood v Boosey and another, 4 February 1868, Exchequer, cit., in which it was recounted that N. 
composed and published an opera in full score in Germany and, after his death, B. arranged the same 
score for the sole pianoforte, which was registered in England with only the name of N. as composer. In 
particular, the plaintiff failed to record the correct description of the piano arrangement with the name of 
its actual author, inserting instead the name of the composer of the opera for which the arrangement was 
made, given that the two works in question must be considered separately as two distinct creations. 
These elements were clearly articulated in the concurring opinion of Justice Bramwell, who said: «I 
repeat, therefore, that if, instead of this music being called a ‘pianoforte score,’ it had been called ‘an 
arrangement for the pianoforte and voices,’ it would have been manifest that the name of the author of 
that was not Otto Nicolai but Brissler, who made this arrangement; and it might be a prudent thing, for 
aught I know, to state that the author of the opera was Otto Nicolai, and the arranger or the adapter was 
Brissler».  
It is worth noticing, in this particular case, that the formalities were those of the International Copyright 
Act of 1844, 7 & 8 Vict., c.12, which afford protection to foreign authors. 
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Indeed, ascertained the respect of formalities, a case of express plagiarism, or 
«literary piracy», was well pictured in Pike v Nicholas.108 Appealing against the first 
judgement that granted the plaintiff an injunction for the defendant having taken «a 
material and substantial portion of his work», it also considered the issue of whether 
there was an explicit duty to acknowledge the source from which one has borrowed or 
copied, depending on the perspective from which such conduct was seen.  
Besides, it was explicitly considered whether such acknowledgment however 
had to be fair and open, with the further consequence that if proper credit had been 
made there would not have been the need to go before the court.109 In fact, as Vice-
Chancellor James explained: 
Plagiarism does not necessarily amount to a legal invasion of 
copyright. A man publishing a work gives it to the world, and, 
so far as it adds to the world's knowledge, adds to the materials 
which any other author has a right to use, and may even be 
bound not to neglect. The question, then is between a 
legitimate and a piratical use of an author's work.110 
At the same time, it was soon understood that there were controversial cases that lied 
«on the border land between piracy and no piracy».111 The Bradsbury case consents 
precisely to restating the foremost principle that «where one man for his own profit puts 
into his work an essential part of another man's work, from which that other may still 
derive profit, or from which, but for the act of the first, he might have derived profit, 
there is evidence of a piracy».112 
                                                          
108
 Both works were on the same subject and the plaintiff brought a claim of piracy and unfair use of his 
work, arguing that the defendant’s creation was not an original work. The defendant, on the contrary, 
contested all allegations, claiming that he had fairly acknowledged his sources, including the plaintiff, 
who was one of many. Pike v Nicholas, 24 November 1869, Court of Appeal, cit.  
109
 However, even that inference did not appear to be sufficient to dismiss the claim. In fact, despite open 
acknowledgment and allowing that «there is no monopoly in the main theory», this does not still 
necessarily imply the welcoming of any unlawful taking. Pike v Nicholas, 24 November 1869, Court of 
Appeal, cit. 
110
 Pike v Nicholas, 24 November 1869, Court of Appeal, cit. 
111
 Bradbury and others v Hotten, 14 November 1872, Exchequer, [1872] LR 8 Exch 1, concerning the 
copy of a substantial part of the plaintiff’s work, cartoons and images of a periodical transposed into 
caricatures in a different work, which was treated as a clear case of infringement. 
112
 As Judge Pigott explained, «the question is, whether a substantial part of the plaintiffs' publication has 
been appropriated, and I cannot doubt that it has. The pictures are a vital part of Punch; they are the result 
of labour, originality, and expenditure, and from their great merit are of permanent value. That being so, 
the defendant has reproduced nine pictures, and with the same object as the plaintiffs had in their original 
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Moreover, even when infringement was proved and established, the next 
difficult question concerned the definition of what amounts to infringement. As it was, 
for instance, stated in Chatterton v Cave, to establish infringement, for example in 
dramatic copyright, «a material and substantial part of the plaintiff's dramatic 
production must be pirated. Though an appreciable part be taken, it does not follow as a 
consequence of law that the plaintiff's right is infringed, if such part be of a very 
unessential nature, or very unimportant and trifling in relation to the effect of the whole 
composition».113 
Likewise, since a part of a work, rather than the whole, might be copied, it was 
soon deemed that such part or section of the work must have been considered «a 
material and substantial part».114 The issue of quantity has been relatively well explored 
by many authorities,115 which suggest the applicability of the criteria of quantity, value 
and the like, all converged in the shared concept of substantiality, otherwise in terms of 
materiality or essentiality. However, it was also, acknowledged that a general and 
univocal rule could not be simply defined, but the issue was likely to be ascertained 
case by case.116 
                                                                                                                                                                          
publication. That appears to me to amount to a piracy». Bradbury and others v Hotten, 14 November 
1872, Exchequer, [1872] LR 8 Exch 1. 
Cf. Bogue v Houlston, 23 February 1852, Chancery, [1852] 64 ER 1111, [1852] 5 De G & Sm 267. 
113
 Chatterton and another v Cave, 26 May 1875, Divisional Court, [1875] LR 10 CP 572. 
More precisely, according to Justice Brett, «the question, therefore, that arises is, what is the proper 
definition of an infringement of dramatic copyright? When there is a taking of what must be admitted to 
be appreciable parts of the plaintiff's drama, is the plaintiff necessarily entitled to a verdict in point of 
law? Or if the jury may properly find, and have found, that the parts so taken, though appreciable, are in 
point of quantity or quality not material or substantial, is the result that there is no infringement of 
copyright? It seems to me that unless there is a taking of a material and substantial part there is no 
infringement of copyright». 
114
 Chatterton and another v Cave, 26 May 1875, Divisional Court, [1875] LR 10 CP 572. 
115
 See, in particular, Bramwell v Halcomb, circa 1836, Chancery, [1836] 3 My & Cr 737, [1836] 40 ER 
1110, in which this aspect was so discussed: «it is not only quantity, but value, that is always looked to. It 
is useless to refer to any particular cases as to quantity. He, therefore, says that though the quantity copied 
may be small, it may be so material as to be a substantial part; but this obviously shews that the question 
of the value and quantity of the part is to be considered». Cf. also Pike v Nicholas, 24 November 1869, 
Court of Appeal, cit. 
See also Jarrold v Houlston, 9 July 1857, Chancery, [1857] 69 ER 1294, [1857] 3 K & J 708, providing 
that in an action for infringement of copyright it was necessary to prove at least that some essential part of 
the work was copied. 
116
 In other words, the taking of an infinitesimal part would not be sufficient. So in Bradbury and others v 
Hotten, 14 November 1872, Exchequer, [1872] LR 8 Exch 1, which, however, cleared out that «it is said 
that to copy a single picture, at all events, could not be an infringement of the plaintiff's copyright, but it 
is impossible to lay that down as a general rule. I can easily conceive a case where such an act would not 
be piracy». 
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Moreover, it is precisely with regard to such a controversial issue that the 
previous discourses on the standards of the ordinary person and those of the expert 
return.117 Again, in the Chatterton case, Lord Coleridge held that two points or 
situations in particular were imitated, but «the extent to which the one was taken from 
the other was so slight, and the effect upon the total composition was so small, that 
there was no substantial and material taking of any one portion of the defendant's drama 
from any portion of the plaintiffs'», concluding that it had to be «a question of fact and 
of common sense whether the part taken is of such a substance and value, or used in 
such a way, as to amount to an infringement of the plaintiffs' right».118 
The so-defined principle of substantiality was later confirmed on appeal, when it 
was restated that the plaintiff, in order to prove the occurrence of piracy, needed to 
show that a material and substantial part of his/her work had been taken. Besides, as 
Court Justice Cockburn considered, given that no taking is reproached or sanctioned by 
the law, it is, however, still not clear from the language of the statute what exactly the 
material or substantial quantity should be. As he recalls, «the Act must receive a 
reasonable construction; and, whilst we are anxious to protect the property of authors, 
we must be careful not to withdraw from the common stock of literature or art that 
which is of no substantial value».119 
Furthermore, regarding the definition of material taking, even the type of work 
appeared to have been taken into some consideration, although this did not extend to the 
resort to different tests for each type’s infringement,120 thus leaving the principle open 
                                                          
117
 Besides, as Justice Brett, believing that a jury should be instructed to take into explicit account 
whether the part taken was material or substantial, however, poses another important doubt: «the 
question, then, that remains in the present case is, whether a jury could properly find that the parts copied 
were not material or substantial», especially when – as in the case under consideration – the language of 
the work is a foreign tongue. Chatterton and another v Cave, 26 May 1875, Divisional Court, [1875] LR 
10 CP 572. 
118
 Although it could not be said that the defendant’s work was entirely independent, «the points taken are 
not sufficiently substantial to make it necessarily result, as a matter of law, that there was an infringement 
of copyright, and therefore the rule will be discharged». Chatterton and another v Cave, 26 May 1875, 
Divisional Court, [1875] LR 10 CP 572. 
119
 Chatterton and another v Cave, 30 November 1876, Court of Appeal, [1876] 2 CPD 42, affirming the 
judgement of the Court of Common Pleas. The case was later considered in Frederick B. Chatterton and 
Benjamin Webster, Appellants; and Joseph Arnold Cave, Respondent, 28 March 1878, House of Lords, 
[1875] 3 App Cas 483. 
120
 As Lord Hatherley noticed, «there is indeed one obvious difference between the copyright in books 
and that in dramatic performances. Books are published with an expectation, if not a desire, that they will 
be criticised in reviews [etc.] It is not, perhaps, exactly the same with dramatic performances. They are 
not intended to be repeated by others or to be used in such a way as a book may be used, but still the 
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to evaluation on a case-by-case basis: «the question as to its materiality being left to be 
decided by the consideration of its quantity and value, which must vary indefinitely in 
various circumstances».121 
The reflection upon the differences existing among different types of intellectual 
creation also suggested considering whether infringement may occur between two 
works of a different kind. An interesting case of alleged copyright infringement 
involving an oil painting, a chromolithograph and a photography, was Lucas v Cooke.122 
The case also consented to affirm, in general terms, the principle according to which all 
original works deserve the same equal treatment before the law: 
The spirit and the policy of the copyright Acts are clear and 
beyond all doubt. It is for the public benefit that the authors of 
all literary works should have the exclusive enjoyment and 
profit of their labours  [in] all productions which assume a 
literary form from works of the highest genius in poetry, 
science or art, down to the humblest productions of intellectual 
industry; all are placed upon the same footing, and in the eye of 
the law are entitled to equal protection.123 
On similar grounds, engravings were deemed to be works that merited protection.124 
Upon these premises, in Dicks v Yates, Lord Justice James held that literary property 
could essentially be invaded in three ways: open piracy; literary larceny, which occurred 
when a «man pretending to be the author of a book illegitimately appropriates the fruit 
                                                                                                                                                                          
principle de minimis non curat lex applies to a supposed wrong in taking a part of dramatic works, as well 
as in reproducing a part of a book». Frederick B. Chatterton and Benjamin Webster, Appellants; and 
Joseph Arnold Cave, Respondent, 28 March 1878, House of Lords, [1875] 3 App Cas 483. 
121
 Frederick B. Chatterton and Benjamin Webster, Appellants; and Joseph Arnold Cave, Respondent, 28 
March 1878, House of Lords, [1875] 3 App Cas 483. L. O'HAGAN. 
122
 Lucas v Cooke, 25 February 1880, Chancery, [1880] 13 ChD 872. For the Court, it was evident, even 
from a simple look or inspection of the works, that no infringement had occurred. 
123
 Lucas v Cooke, 25 February 1880, Chancery, [1880] 13 ChD 872. 
124
 Dicks v Brooks, 4 May 1880, Court of Appeal, cit., in which Lord Justice James affirmed: «the art of 
the engraver is often of the very highest character, as in the print before me. It is difficult to conceive any 
skill or art much higher than that which has by a wonderful combination of lines and touches reproduced 
the very texture and softness of the hair, the very texture and softness of the dress, and the expression of 
love and admiration in the eyes of the lady looking up at her lover. That art or skill was the thing which, 
as I believe, was intended to be protected by the Acts of Parliament». 
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of a previous author's literary labour»;125 and passing-off, where the first two directly 
involve copyright law, while the third did not, being in fact a common law fraud.126 
Moreover, what counts is the substance of the infringement and not the form that 
the copy assumes in infringing the original work, as already explained in Warne v 
Seebohm.127 With reference to the possibility that infringement may also occur when the 
work is only partially taken, focusing on dramatic works, attention must be drawn to the 
most relevant elements of the work, which in a sense may connote the work in its 
individuality and originality, with the further consequence that «accessorial matters, 
such as scenic effects, make-up of actors [and the like]» are not protected.128 
In Tate v Fullbrook,129 it emerged that the scenes of a work could be protected 
«as part of a whole [but] in order to obtain protection there must be matter capable of 
being printed and published, and the plagiarist must copy a material part thereof».130 
Recalling Lord Farwell’s words, which clearly seems to put plagiarism and copyright 
infringement on the same plate: 
                                                          
125
 What appeared to be most relevant was the distinction made between the concept of literary 
larceny, which, with very little doubt, appears to be plagiarism, and open piracy. Dicks v Yates, 
24 May 1881, Court of Appeal, [1881] 18 ChD 76. 
126
 As he indeed further specified in that regard, «where a man sells a work under the name or title of 
another man or another man's work, that is not an invasion of copyright, it is Common Law fraud, and can 
be redressed by ordinary Common Law remedies, wholly irrespective of any of the conditions or 
restrictions imposed by the Copyright Acts». Dicks v Yates, 24 May 1881, Court of Appeal, [1881] 18 
ChD 76. 
127
 Warne & Co. v Seebohm, circa 1888, Chancery, [1888] 39 Ch D 73, [1888] 57 LJ Ch 689, [1888] 36 
WR 686, [1888] 58 LT 928, [1888] 4 TLR 535, in which Justice Stirling explained: «I have satisfied 
myself by actual comparison, that very considerable passages in the play have been extracted almost 
verbatim from the novel. Thus, in the first act there are 674 lines, of which forty-seven consist of stage 
directions. Deducting them, there are 627, of which 125 (or about one-fourth) are taken from the novel. 
Some of the passages so extracted are prominent and striking parts of the dialogue contained in the 
novel». 
128
 In fact, «each of the pieces, which were termed ‘dramatic sketches’ and were of a very slight character, 
intended for performance in music-halls, consisted of a dialogue between persons, accompanied by comic 
‘business,’ in the one case taking place round a motor car, and in the other in connection with a 
telescope». Tate v Fullbrook, 14 February 1908, Court of Appeal, [1908] 1 KB 821.  
129
 Tate v Fullbrook, 14 February 1908, Court of Appeal, [1908] 1 KB 821. Furthermore, the case allows 
one to extend briefly the discussion about what constitutes authorship of a work of the mind. On a 
preliminary ground, it assessed whether the plaintiff could be considered the author of a dramatic piece 
based on the evidence brought at trial. 
CF Chatterton and another v Cave, 30 November 1876, Court of Appeal, [1876] 2 CPD 42. 
130
 Tate v Fullbrook, 14 February 1908, Court of Appeal, [1908] 1 KB 821, in which Lord Justice Farwell 
also believed that the learned judge who first tried the case confused passing-off with a case of copyright 
infringement. 
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I am far, however, from saying that, in dealing with the 
question of infringement of copyright in the case of two pieces, 
the words of which are more or less alike, similarity of scenic 
effects and the make-up of the actors, and such like matters, 
may not be regarded, though not by themselves subjects of 
protection under the Act, as being evidence of an animus 
furandi on the part of the defendant; which, though it is not a 
necessary element in such cases, may have an important 
bearing on the view taken by a Court on the question whether 
the defendant has been guilty of plagiarism and has thereby 
infringed the rights of the plaintiff.131 
Furthermore, recapping the true intention of copyright «to protect original merit», Tate 
v Fullbrook showed the absurdity of protecting «the application of a commonplace 
expedient of scenic art to the end of a version of a drama». Such conclusions, in the 
court’s view, could be reached upon the mere impression of the pieces, which, «upon 
being read, appear to be so materially different that the defendant's piece cannot be said 
to be a plagiarism of the plaintiff's [so] we are in as good a position as the learned judge 
below for the purpose of forming a judgment whether one of these documents is a 
plagiarism from the other».132 
Taking into account the intersection of different genres, for instance, in the case 
of the reproduction of a novel by a cinematograph film, consideration was also given to 
whether it mattered that the works at issue were, on the one hand, a serious work and, 
on the other hand, a burlesque work. Indeed, saying that «a genuine burlesque can never 
be an infringement of the copyright in a serious work» appeared to the Court in Glyn v 
Weston to be too wide a proposition.133 In fact, the most relevant element for 
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 Tate v Fullbrook, 14 February 1908, Court of Appeal, [1908] 1 KB 821. 
A the same time, he does not deny that, in theory, some scenic effects may find protection as being part of 
the whole dramatic work, protected as part and parcel of the drama […]. It is essential, however, to such 
protection that there should be something in the nature of a dramatic entertainment, for a mere spectacle 
standing alone is no more within the Act than a singer who sings in character costume is within it». Cf. 
Fuller v Blackpool Winter Gardens and Pavilion Company, circa 1895, Court of Appeal,  [1895] 2 QB 
429, [1895] 11 TLR 513. 
132
 Tate v Fullbrook, 14 February 1908, Court of Appeal, [1908] 1 KB 821. 
133
 In delivering the judgement, Justice Youger, after careful analysis of all the work’s essential parts and 
viewing of the film under scrutiny, held that «similarity of incident those of the film are so altered in 
effect and feeling and surrounding as to reproduce no element of any situation described in the novel 
[concluding] that the film does not constitute any infringement of the plaintiff's copyright in the novel». 
Glyn v Weston Feature Film Company, 21 December 1915, Chancery, [1916] 1 Ch 261, [1916] 32 TLR 
235. 
Moreover, according to the defendant, who focused on the intention, which he believed to be the true test 
for infringement, a burlesque work would never infringe a serious work’s form precisely «if the intention 
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consideration is still whether the work of the defendant has taken a substantial part of 
the plaintiff’s creation, regardless of «the framework on which the representation is 
built, and the purpose for which the framework is taken is immaterial».134 
Furthermore, an explicit reference to plagiarism is also found also in Toole v 
Young, dealing with common subjects, when Justice Blackburn observed that, even if 
some parts of a novel were taken and put in another’s drama, this would not necessarily 
amount to an illicit appropriation of the work.135 As he further articulates, «if [the 
plaintiff’s] drama had been plagiarised the defendant would have been liable to an 
action»; however, it being a dramatic work, a jury could only ascertain the alleged 
plagiarism if the work were indeed represented. Since this appeared not to be the case, 
the defendant did not indeed plagiarise.136 
 
 
2.3 Italian case law from early 1950 onwards 
 
Focusing on the limits of the notions of substantial, material and so on, similarly to their 
British cousins, Italian courts have often dealt with the problem of defining what could 
be considered a “considerable quantity of copying” for the purpose of establishing 
infringement, and so with the discretional appeal that such concepts may imply.  
Converging on the work’s form of representation indeed appeared to satisfy the 
exigency of the most. What counted in the end were not the contents themselves (or the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
was to produce a mere caricature or burlesque» (cf. Hanfstaengl v Empire Palace, 17 December 1894, 
Court of Appeal, [1894] 2 Ch 1, [1894] 10 TLR 299). Glyn v Weston Feature Film Company, 21 
December 1915, Chancery, [1916] 1 Ch 261, [1916] 32 TLR 235), while the plaintiff insisted: «the 
defendant has not only stolen but besmirched the original». 
134
 Glyn v Weston Feature Film Company, 21 December 1915, Chancery, [1916] 1 Ch 261, [1916] 32 
TLR 235. 
135
 Concerning dramatic works, some have emphasised that the UK law of copyright in dramatic works 
was greatly influenced by Charles Reade’s direct and often personal involvement in legal suits that led 
directly to affording them protection. B. LAURIAT, Charles Reade's Roles in the Drama of Victorian 
Dramatic Copyright, Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 05/2010 (December 8, 2009), [2009] 
Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 33, No. 1, <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1520332>. 
136
 Toole v Young, 26 May 1874, Queen's Bench, [1865] LR 9 QB 523. 
  
212 
 
ideas there embodied) but the forms in which these contents found expression.137 
Moving on from this point, the judiciary later supported the stricter rule or theory of the 
identity of representation.138 
However, before considering the scrutiny of the single elements of the work, it 
has always been critical to determine whether the work that is allegedly plagiarised was 
in itself original. On preliminary grounds, in fact, the court needed and still need to 
assess whether the work in question is creative and therefore deserving of copyright 
protection at all.139 Such an inquiry over the merits of protection seems to have played a 
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 See, among others, Amedeo c De Filippo, 19 January 1976, App. Roma, [1976] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. 
autore n.764; [1976] Foro pad. I 24; [1976] Giust. civ. I 1848. 
It is worth noticing, however, that there have been cases in which this criterion has been disregarded. On 
some occasions, in fact, Italian courts have deliberately held that protection may also extend to the 
substance of the work, for instance, in consideration of all the precise elements that compose the stories 
narrated within (Marino c. Soc. Ponti De Laurentis, 8 June 1959, App. Roma, [1960] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. 
autore n. 735; [1960] Rass. dir. cinem. 61), or by referring to the very controversial double figures of the 
internal and external forms of representation (see De Angelis c Soc. cinem. Milanese Ariel, 11 June 1957, 
Trib. Milano, [1957] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 766; [1957] Foro pad. I 859, [1957] Dir. aut. 526; 
Cutolo e Pozzi c Napolitano, in Dir. aut., 9 March 1979, Cass.  n. 1472, [1979] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. 
autore n. 654; [1980] Dir. autore 425; Salvagno c Soc. Finarco, 25 February 1969, Pret. Roma, [1969] 
Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 768; [1969] Rass. dir. cinem. 163).  
In these cases, the main difficulty lies in the complexity of establishing a clear edge between what can be 
considered internal and external in the form of representation. Therefore, it soon seems more advisable to 
focus simply on the form, which embodies the expression of the idea. 
138
 Namely, individualità rappresentativa or forma individuale di rappresentazione. 
Such a theory has essentially considered that the two works under consideration are extremely similar, to 
the point that they appear to entail a unique representation; all considered their unfolding of facts, value 
of the creation, and type of contents, originality of form and expression and peculiarity of characters. This 
has often implied a consideration of what it meant to look at the work in its complex and essential gist, 
according to which the whole structure of the work had to lead the analysis on the similarities between the 
works. See, in particular, Basso c Soc. Orsa Maggiore cinem., 28 November 1986, Trib. Napoli, [1924] 
Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 103; [1987] Dir. aut. 522; [1987] Giur. merito 35; Vasile c Soc. N.i.n.b.o 
film, 30 June 1961, Pret. Roma, [1961] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 740; [1961] Rass. dir. cinem. 131; 
Soc. Michel Arthur productions c. Soc. Rofima, 5 June 1975, Trib. Milano, [1976] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. 
autore n. 765; [1976] Mon. Trib. 202, [1976] Dir. aut. 462. 
139
 See also Saglietto c Soc. Ri-Fi Record, 13 April 1971, Trib. Milano, [1971] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore 
n. 822; [1971] Mon. trib. 776, which also held that the more a work was considered original the more 
strict the criteria had to be in order to assess whether the work in question was plagiarised. 
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prominent role in cases of plagiarism and copyright infringement in general,140 often 
entailing a specification of what might, in principle, be protected and what, instead, did 
not deserve such protection.141 
Another element for consideration has been the possible modification and 
alterations made to the original work. These have also received a contrasting response 
from the judiciary. Sometimes they have been evaluated as minimal, and therefore with 
no or scarce incidence of the actual copy of the work.142 Nonetheless, the difficulty of 
the judiciary’s task lies precisely in providing the most comprehensive analysis of the 
work, which would take into account all of its elements, with the ultimate aim of 
establishing with reasonable confidence that the work in question has been plagiarised, 
that is to say that the authorship of its author has been misattributed.  
However, beyond the form of expression or representation described earlier, 
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 M.P. c Fornaciari, 16 January 2006, Trib. Milano, cit.; Carrisi c Jackson, 24 November 1999, App. 
Milano, cit.; Casile c Soc. Rti, 26 May 1994, Trib. Monza, [1995] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 107, 108, 
109; [1995] Dir. aut. 263, [1995] Riv. dir. ind. II 211, [1994] Annali it. dir. autore 595.. 
Besides, it is worth remembering that in some limited instances the courts have also considered novelty to 
be a criterion for protection. (See Bacalov c Endrigo, 23 November 2005 n. 24594, Corte Cass., [2006] 
Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 101; [2006] Dir. aut. 213, [2006] Nuova giur. civ. comm. I 1146; Sarita 
Esquenazi c Rai-Tv, 1 March 1991, Trib. Roma, cit.; Fugazza c Moietta, 27 November 1958, Cass. n. 
3791, [1959] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 685; [1959] Rass. dir. cinem. 66, [1959] Dir. aut. 229). For the 
most part, however, magistrates have been more prone towards evaluation of the creativity and originality 
of the work’s expression, which would therefore refute absolute novelty (see, in particular, Gambarini c 
Pisano, 19 November 1964, Trib. Milano, [1965] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 818; [1965] Mon. Trib. 
1024). 
141
 This does not seem to be contested by the exclusion of protection of commonplace elements, 
inspirational themes (see Grieco c Soc. Mediaset, 29 January 1996, Trib. Milano, [1998] Rep. Foro it. v. 
Dir. autore n. 172; [1997] Annali it. dir. autore 695; Soc. Morgan c Soc. Cecchi Gori Group Tiger cinem., 
7 January 1994, Trib. Roma, [1994] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 257; [1994] Foro it. I 2541, [1994] 
Nuovo dir. 175; Scovuzzo c Soc. Italian International Film, 20 July 1989, Trib. Roma, [1990] Rep. Foro 
it. v. Dir. autore n. 99; [1992] Dir. aut. 284, [1990] Foro it. I 2997; Montanelli c Arbore e Mattone, 22 
August 1985, Pret. Roma, [1987] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 106; [1986] Dir. radiodiff. 120) or 
recurrent expressions of common language, or even poetic verses that amount to a very common 
expression and thus could not reach any creative status (Corsale c Soc. Snia Viscosa, 18 October 1974, 
App. Milano, cit.). 
The same is true of methods such as the methodical illustration of a psychological test (Soc. organizz. 
Speciali c Soc. Mondadori, 1 February 1962, Cass. n. 190, [1962] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 823; 
[1962] Foro it. I 1127, [1962] Giust. civ. I 897, [1962] Dir. aut. 219, [1962] Sett. Cass. 148, [1962] Riv. 
dir. Comm. II 314), but also information and facts belonging to the public domain (Paternostro c Vides, 1 
February 1960, Pret. Roma, [1961] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 736; [1961] Dir. aut. 377, [1961] Rass. 
dir. cinem. 37). 
142
 Masino c Colonnello, 29 July 1968, Trib. Milano, [1969] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n.765; [1968] 
Rass. propr. ind. 246, for which copying the translation of a work, even with some alteration, leads to 
infringement. Cf. Soc. internaz. pubblicità c Soc. ed. Sanguinetti, 10 May 1993, Cass. n. 5346, cit. See 
also Rossi c Fiorello, 1 June 2004, App. Milano, cit.; Masala, 29 April 1999, Pret. Modena, [1999] Rep. 
Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 176; [1999] Dir. inf. 954, which both held that camouflage plagiarism may occur 
when the copying is disguised by variations that, however, do not challenge the lack of originality. 
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Italian courts have also focused on the expressive completeness of the work, which to 
some extent prays on its prompt aptitude to provoke some feeling in the audience, but 
also lies in the expressive solutions, choice and organisation of some material that 
amounts to a creative result.143 The structure of the work as a whole, however, remains a 
central issue, and so, although with limited extension, the purpose of the work, 
according to which, in case the works have a different structure and targeted audience, 
the mere fact that some ideas are shared is not sufficient to assess plagiarism.144 
At the same time, a broad view of the work cannot escape a careful and peculiar 
scrutiny of the single and most critical essential elements that compose it, but the mere 
similarity of some single elements, were not considered, among others, to be sufficient 
to establish infringement.145 
Moreover, the kernel or parte saliente of the work has a fundamental role to 
play. The mere and simple recurrence of same incidents or phrases may not amount to 
an infringement when, on the contrary, it is not followed by a transposition of the 
substantial core of the work. This was well explained in Ciossani c Tamaro.146 Besides, 
when the single and individual elements are analysed,147 it becomes crucial to see 
whether these show any particular creative effort that ultimately concurs to differentiate 
them from other works.148 
As it has been earlier explored, the first and preliminary assessment that jurists 
have to make in matters of plagiarism was – and still is – that the work in question 
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 Soc. ed. Briciola musicali c Soc. nuova Soc. ed. Briciola musicali c Soc. nuova Fonit Cetra, 9 May 
1997, Trib. Bologna, [1998] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 170; [1997] Annali it. dir. autore 931, [1997] 
Dir. aut. 510; Perrera c Min. fin., 27 October 1977, Cass. n. 4625, [1978] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 
644; [1978] Giust. civ. I 500, [1978] Giur. it. I 1 2375, [1978] Dir. aut. 561; Paternostro c Vides, 1 
February 1960, Pret. Roma, cit.; Passarelli c Rosa film, 3 March 1956, Pret. Roma, [1956] Rep. Foro it. 
v. Dir. autore n. 824; [1956] Rass. dir. cinem. 47, [1956] Temi rom.124. 
144
 Arrigo c Soc. Rcs libri, 2 April 2003, Trib. Milano, [2005] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 183; [2004] 
Annali it. dir. autore 720. 
145
 Pagliai c. Simoni, 23 May 1947, App. Roma, cit.; Casa musicale Crispoli c Ediz. Music. 
Maurice, 25 January 1968, Cass., [1968] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 716; [1968] Rass. dir. 
cinem. 111; Chiesa c Casa ed. Ballerini, 24 January 1941, Cass. [1941] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 
406; [1941] Dir. aut. 53, [1941] Mon. trib. 496. 
146
 Ciossani c Tamaro, 11 June 2001, Trib. Milano, [2001] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n.132; [2001] Giur. 
it. 2089, [2002] Dir. aut. 323. 
Cf. Ferilli c Carella, 21 October 2002, Trib. Milano, [2003] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 134; [2003] 
Dir. aut. 478; Soc. Bmg Ricordi c De Gregori, 23 May 2002, Trib. Roma, cit. 
147
 The tribunal held that a simple transposition of a few lines (although integrally reproduced) could not 
be considered determinant for the purpose of plagiarism-counterfeiting. Ciossani c Tamaro, 11 June 001, 
Trib. Milano, cit. 
148
 Valente, 4 November 1993, Pret. Pesaro, cit. 
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received actual protection under copyright law. Such a simple but often controversial 
premise, which was already known by earlier courts, has increasingly become a 
leitmotiv for any contemporary judge facing issues of copyright infringement and 
plagiarism. 
In the field of literary works, it soon emerged that any elements composing the 
work that could be confined to the realm of commonplace and public domain hardly 
received protection, unless such elements had been transformed into original 
expressions themselves.149 
As the Sarita Esquenazy case proves, the inspiring idea of a novel shall not in 
itself constitute an element to which protection shall be afforded.150 On the other hand, 
if the simple identity of phrases would not with any certainty conclude for infringement, 
a careful analysis of the works, even via a simple and not specialist reading, may 
display that, despite resorting to the same sources and factual information, these were 
reproduced following the same order and schemes and, therefore, were likely copied 
from the other work.151 
In general, with particular regard to novels, a different representation of themes 
or plots may contribute to excluding the violation,152 and the same could be said when 
similarities occurred but insisted in mere elements of common language that could be 
used by anyone,153 or even with regard to the exact resort to certain rhetorical figures.154  
In Ciossani c Tamaro, in fact, the attention of the Tribunal was also directed towards the 
analysis of the onomatopoeic word that was allegedly appropriated by the defendant, 
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 For what concerns historical works, the creativity required in the works seeking to be protected may 
even consist in the search, selection of sources or material and their connection according to a logical 
order that would provide a personal or expressive reconstruction of the events and facts considered, 
provided that elements belonging to the universal knowledge would not themselves receive protection. 
Arrigo c Soc. Rcs libri, cit.; Villanova c Mazza, 18 December 2007, Trib. Napoli, [2008] Rep. Foro it. v. 
Dir. autore n. 165; [2008] Foro it. I 2041; Pisani c Giardini, 19 November 2001, Trib. Milano, [2004] 
Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 137; [2003] Annali it. dir. autore 737. 
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 Sarita Esquenazi c. Rai-Tv, 1 March 1991, Trib. Roma, cit. 
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 Arrigo c Soc. Rcs libri, 2 April 2003, Trib. Milano, cit. Some similarities may clearly be only clues of 
infringement, but it is then the accurate and contextualised analysis of the work in its entirety that will 
help to define whether there has been a violation. See De Giorgio c Hajek, 10 March 1994, Cass. n. 2345, 
[1994] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 255; [1995] Dir. aut. 153, [1994] Foro it. I 2415, [1994] Impresa 
2154, [1994] Corr. giur. 862. 
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 Sanzò c Preti, 2 April 1975, Pret. Roma, [1975] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 709; [1975] Foro it. I 
2831, [1975] Dir. aut. 419, which concerned the story of a young Hebrew man refuting fascist ideology, 
which both works shared, but each with a different contextualisation and articulation of happenings. 
153
 Corsale c Soc. Snia Viscosa, 18 October 1974, App. Milano, cit. 
154
 Ciossani c Tamaro, 11 June 2001, Trib. Milano, cit. 
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but which could not be considered an original element of a given work, considering its 
function as a mechanism of describing in synthesis sounds originating from the outer 
world.155 Likewise, evidence of the same ideas is not sufficient to demonstrate a 
violation, and what indeed should eventually be proved is that what makes the work 
unique in the sense of original has indeed been taken.156 
Focusing on literary works belonging to the scientific or academic fields, it has 
been suggested that such works may constitute objects of copyright protection only if 
they represent knowledge that can also be represented in a different manner, thus 
excluding, for instance, mathematical formulas.157 In fact, the main element for 
evaluation of originality of scientific thought is the quality of the outcome, thus what its 
author personally adds by creating the work, making it individual and exclusive, from 
the outline of how he/she develops such thought, of how concepts are presented, and of 
the criteria used to gather, classify and coordinate ideas according to a systematic order, 
in other words in the imprint of his/her creativity.158 
Similarly, in Castellaneta c Falcone, with regards to the alleged copying of a 
legal monograph, the court was expected to find the exact criteria to assess whether a 
given work unlawfully took elements and features from other intellectual creations.159 
Indeed, although references to the past are allowed, this does not imply that anyone may 
attain or plunder someone else's work, which would clearly contravene the copyright 
exceptions of Article 70 LA 1941, which are expressly allowed on the condition that the 
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 The same conclusions apply to historical characters that have been used repeatedly, as ruled in Edgar 
Rice Burroughs inc. c Soc. Candygum, 12 November 1976, App. Milano, [1978] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. 
autore n. 645; [1976] Giur. dir. ind. V 733, where the name of a main character of a literary work was to 
be considered a separate element of the work, but not to the extent that it should have been protected in 
itself from being used in other contexts. 
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 Ciossani c Tamaro, 11 June 2001, Trib. Milano, cit. Cf. XX1e XX2 c. Alfa Ed., 9 February 2006, Trib. 
Bologna, [2008] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 166; [2008] Dir. autore 79. 
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 X.Y., 11 January 2004, Trib. Roma, [2006] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 178; [2005] Cass. pen. 3527, 
[2005] Dir. aut. 402. 
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 X.Y., 11 January 2004, Trib. Roma, cit. 
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 Castellaneta M. c Falcone M., 9 December 2005, Trib. Bari, [2006] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 133; 
[2007] Annali it. dir. autore 738, [2006] Corr. mer. 199, which concerned legal academic works. 
Here the plaintiff claimed that the essential and substantial part of her work had been illicitly 
taken by the defendant and this could be proved even through a simple but meticulous reading 
of the two works. After careful analysis of the two works, some elements and circumstances 
allowed affirmation of the subsistence of counterfeiting-plagiarism of the plaintiff’s monograph. 
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moral right of attribution is respected.160 Such principle, indeed, appears to replicate the 
considerations made by the UK judiciary on the matter. 
Furthermore, the large category of literary creation comprises several types of 
work, as the variety of claims considered by Italian courts proves. Among them, one of 
the most interesting examples is represented by Ghirardini, which concerned the claim 
of protecting culinary or cookery books.161 In brief, there emerged the principle that 
what counts is not the recipe in itself, which seems not to receive protection, but the 
creative expression in which the recipe may find explication.162 Within this narrow and 
specialist context, the object of protection is represented by the literary arrangement of 
the whole work, of its contained recipes and the eventual divagations or short stories, 
while the didactic content, thus the actual advice on culinary art, although in a broader 
sense original and useful, does not receive any protection, as it must remain available to 
everybody.163 
The fact that culinary recipes are not protected, however, does not extend to the 
inference that not even is ever shielded from their creative or original assembling.164 In 
line with the Ghirardini decision,165 the insertion, in a cookery book, of recipes of a 
different work does not constitute plagiarism when the former text has its own 
individual originality, which originates from the whole allocation of the matter and the 
peculiar literary manner in which all is assembled.166 This specific point further 
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 This point was also expressly dealt with in Arrigo c Soc. Rcs libri, 2 April 2003, Trib. Milano, [2004] 
cit., where the court underlined how, in order to respect the provision, the work whose use is allowed 
must be, in any case, properly cited, with the indication of title, work and publisher, and with a clear 
indication of the exact collocation of the parts that have been quoted. 
161
 Ghirardini, 24 April 1969, Pret. Venezia, [1970] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 656; [1970] Giur. it. II 
146. 
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 As the Court held, in fact, what should be pointed out is the way in which the author expresses the 
concepts and the arguments that allow consideration of the resulting work among the works that receive 
copyright protection. Ghirardini, 24 April 1969, Pret. Venezia, cit. 
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 In other words, the originality of a didactic work on culinary techniques must be established having 
regard for the form of expression, not for the novelty of the recipes, given that culinary inventions do not 
as such receive copyright protection. 
164
 In this case, the court considered the originality of not only the alleged infringed work, but also the one 
that had supposedly infrined the former. 
165
 Ghirardini, 24 April 1969, Pret. Venezia, cit. 
166
 Yet, what is still clear is that the idea, the chef’s contrivance suggested by taste and artisan experience, 
to combine certain ingredients, even with some particular expedients, shall not be protected. Even if the 
recipes in the two works are exactly the same (and yet were taken from a third source, anonymous), the 
way in which such recipes are organised and coordinated may be sufficient to grant protection, given that 
the text used and the manner sensibly diversify. This would, in the view of the judge, clearly have 
excluded an instance of plagiarism. Ghirardini, 24 April 1969, Pret. Venezia, cit. 
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demonstrates how the relevant criterion in copyright is not absolute novelty, which 
instead belongs to patents, but rather originality and creativity.  
At the same time, as it has been appraised with regard to the UK context, the 
matter becomes even more complex when one considers the involvement of different 
types of work. Here the considerations thus far made are possibly complicated by the 
fact that different types of work intersect and originate the phenomenon described as 
cross-plagiarism (plagio trasversale), for instance, when a novel is plagiarised by a 
cinematographic work. 
Photography is indeed the perfect example to address the issue of considering 
more than one type of work involvement of a not-homogenous plagiarism. In the Davoli 
case in particular, the judge, concerning the alleged copying of photographic works into 
oil paintings, concluded that it did not matter whether the image was fixed in a certain 
manner or form; what really counted was that there had been a slavish reproduction of 
one creative and original work into another, therefore defining the case in favour of the 
plaintiff, since all the constituent elements of the protected work had been taken.167 
Even so, if the crucial principle to consider remains the necessary and 
preliminary assessment of the originality of the work one wishes to protect, the court 
would need to focus precisely on this point, before even considering the alleged 
infringement. This, regardless of the instance that works of a dissimilar sort are 
involved in the dispute.168 
Considering the intersection of sculpture and broadcast, one of the most 
notorious Italian cases remains the mouse with human appearance, Topo Gigio, 
extremely popular in the days when the court was called upon to decide whether the 
defendant’s sculpture, Topino (literally, little mouse), was, among other things, the 
plagiarism-counterfeiting of T.G. After a careful comparative examination, the tribunal 
opted for denying it on the basis of total unlikeness between the works in question, 
which itself could only deny the alleged infringement. Moreover, it was held that both 
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 M. Davoli c G. Muscio, 27 December 2006, Trib. Milano, [2007] Provv. urgenza v.5340; [2007] Dir. 
aut. 264, [2007] Foro. it. 619. 
168
 See Sarita Esquenazi c. Rai-Tv, 1 March 1991, Trib. Roma, cit., which concerned a film for 
broadcasting that was allegedly taken from a novel; the trial judge concluded that the plaintiff, the author 
of the novel, could only boast of the mere storyline (idea-trama) that is recurrently found in women's 
literature. The fact that some elements were actually similar, with regard to both the plot and the main 
characters, did not indeed prove any illicit appropriation, especially considering the fact that the idea 
inspiring the novel was not at all original and instead was a typical literary topos. 
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works were clearly inspired by the Disney Mickey Mouse, which corroborated the 
decision of not affording any protection to Topo Gigio.169 
Concerning the musical field, if the main principle has to be that the author 
deserves protection because of his/her original creation, this seems not always to be the 
case. By its very nature, in fact, music is characterised by citations and continuous 
inspirations. Therefore, perhaps even more so than in other contexts, the borrowing and 
appropriation may not be as relevant as to determine infringement. Inspirations were 
found, for instance, in Rossi c Fiorello, in which the Court of Appeal considered that the 
kernel of the poem was a mere inspirational theme, the love feeling, which is absolutely 
recurrent in poetry and cannot be considered as having originality in itself,170 especially 
when it can be also traced in other well-known pamphlets or arias of famous operas are 
considered.171 In brief, as the case suggests, in music in particular, another issue 
altogether is when musical borrowing or homage become plagiarism.  
As stated previously with regard to other types of work, any judgement of 
plagiarism must be carried out by preliminarily accessing whether or not the work 
requiring protection is original and thus deserving of being shielded. Although this is 
the order that should ideally be followed, the courts may choose first to appraise the 
subsistence of plagiarism and then to consider whether the work or both works are 
original.172  
In particular, such an originality assessment concerns careful scrutiny of the 
elements that compose a musical work. The first element that has traditionally been 
considered is melody. Its centrality, in fact, which is found in several pronouncements, 
is mainly explained by the easiness in which the average or ordinary listener would 
recall it. Defined by the court in terms of a succession of notes that acquires the typical 
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 Perego c Soc. Ceramica Canova, 27 November 1963, Trib. Padova, cit. 
The plaintiff, however, had better luck with further claims, obtaining protection for the puppet against the 
defendant's works, which were deemed an almost exact reproduction of the external form of the plaintiff's 
work, despite all considered marginal modifications in Perego c Ditta Conti & Soffientini, 26 June 1963, 
Trib. Milano, [1963] Riv. dir. ind. 213; and Soc. Cremona c Broggini, 2 June 1963, Trib. Varese, [1964] 
Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 777; [1963] Riv. dir. ind. II 214. 
170
 Rossi c Fiorello, 1 June 2004, App. Milano, cit. 
171
 In such cases, moreover, the practicability of transversal plagiarism between a musical and a literary 
work can be observed. 
172
 This second option was followed in Minelli Donati c Panzeri, 29 April 1976, Trib. Milano, [1977] 
Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 680; [1977] Riv. dir. ind. II 457. Cf. Bacalov c Endrigo, 23 November 2005 
n. 24594, Corte Cass., cit., for which the creativity to be assessed must concern, in particular, the work 
that is allegedly plagiarised, but it could also extend to the other work as well. 
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physiognomy and coordinates with the memory of the listener, it is often distinguished 
from other elements such as harmony and rhythm, where the latter is a particular 
accentuation that characterises the musical period or phrase, yet seems alone insufficient 
to distinguish the originality of the song.173 
Such centrality is certainly true with particular regard to popular music, in which 
melody seems to better express immediately and incisively the creative kernel of the 
piece or song, which then allows individuation and discernment thereof from any 
other.174 However, when melody essentially turns into an element that is commonplace 
and recurring, its appropriation seems generally insufficient to endorse a claim of 
plagiarism, since the identity of melodic structure may simply consist of a trivial 
element that is unworthy of protection.175 
However, the melody was not the only element for consideration to emerge on a 
few occasions, when the courts noticed how it could not be considered the sole factor to 
appraise the originality of a song.176 Indeed, to some extent it may be accurate repeating 
conclusively that the melody, especially in popular music, is the individualising element 
of the work since it absorbs its creative kernel, and so it is the main element for 
individuating and recognising a song, which any ordinary listener immediately 
                                                          
173
 The centrality of the melody, however, does not imply that any note of which it consists is equally 
important, but there are indeed certain notes in which the melodic accent falls, and these are to be 
considered as the pivots on which melody is articulated. Minelli Donati c Panzeri, 29 April 1976, Trib. 
Milano, cit. 
174
 Therefore, the judgement on musical plagiarism should follow exactly this process, according to Soc. 
Sony Music Entertainment Italy c Carrisi, 18 December 1997, Trib. Milano, cit. 
175
 Branduardi c Soc. Buitoni Perugina, 12 May 1993, Trib. Roma, cit., which speaks of «melodico».  
Cf. Soc. Sony Music Entertainment Italy c Carrisi, 18 December 1997, Trib. Milano, cit., which found 
that the central question is that both songs share the same theme with several other songs. 
See also M.P. c Fornaciari, 16 January 2006, Trib. Milano, cit., where the rhyme line “estati dimenticate” 
could not be considered protected, but indeed absolutely commonplace and universal.  
This was the case in Soc. ed. Briciola musicali c Soc. nuova Fonit Cetra, 9 May 1997, Trib. Bologna, cit., 
when the melodic scheme was featured by the use of stylistic elements and formulas taken from other 
popular music composers. The songs were carefully composed and analysed by experts and, isolating 
their respective central theme, harmonic schemes, it was then concluded that these were extensively used 
in other compositions. 
In other words, the melodic and harmonic stylistic elements belonging to the universal heritage of music 
appear to be excluded in general terms from protection. Bilotta c De Angelis, R.A.I. e S.I.A.E., 12 April 
1986, Trib. Roma, [1988] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 105; [1987] Dir. aut. 521, [1986] Dir. radiodiff. 
121. 
176
 Carrisi c Jackson, 24 November 1999, App. Milano, cit., according to which every melody contains in 
itself the seed of harmonisation, and so melody may easily influence the harmonic bent. Furthermore, it 
cannot be denied that rhythm has any relevance, especially in popular music, where the time that bursts 
from the notes in succession is in itself a constituent element; nor that the perception of a rhythmic 
assonance may also help the listener to identify the notes. 
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perceives.177  
Indeed, it is precisely when a trivial melody is found in other songs, without also 
being characterised by specific and autonomous creativity that the work will likely 
receive no protection. This does not infer that any reference to other previous works or 
the musical repertory is banned but rather that its finding may lead to consider the work 
as not protectable.178 Likewise, this does not imply that a new creative effort may not be 
based on the same common melody, insofar as the composition is elaborated or 
integrated by variations that are in themselves protected. Besides, any variations 
inserted would receive protection on the condition that it does not merely consist in a 
fawning reproduction of another song’s theme.179 
In addition, the fact that the works under consideration belong to distinct fields 
or genres does not automatically exclude infringement.180 Moreover, the diversity of the 
musical genre cannot be considered determinant in a claim for infringement,181 although 
it could be argued that it may be considered a symptom of distinctiveness. The fact that 
the audience for which the works are created is different, or the works’ concrete form or 
the way they are performed differ, does not seem to matter either.182 
In conclusion, the parameter of similarity may regard any element of the musical 
composition, including melody, harmony and rhythm, which could all be regarded as 
possible elements of evaluation in the case of an alleged infringement. Indeed, the most 
striking example may be the almost literal reproduction of the main motive of the work, 
which could occur by copying even a few but significant number of bars that indeed 
identify the kernel of the song, namely what makes the song original, like but not 
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 Carrisi c Jackson, 24 November 1999, App. Milano, cit. 
178
 M.P. c Fornaciari, 16 January 2006, Trib. Milano, cit. 
179
 Bacalov c Endrigo, 23 November 2005 n. 24594, Corte Cass., cit. 
Besides, similarly to what happens with literary works, the remembrance of music assonances does not 
launch “substantial identity”, which may also be excluded when the correspondence of musical bars is 
only marginal. In fact, when comparing musical works, in order to assess the protection of songs from 
appropriation, the analysis cannot be limited to just a few scores, but the interpreter must be oriented 
towards the whole significance of the musical text, at least towards its periods or phrases. Minelli Donati 
c Panzeri, 29 April 1976, Trib. Milano, cit. 
180
 In Sony c Carrisi, for instance, the judge considered how the lack of originality of Carrisi’s song could 
also be demonstrated by the similarities with other songs, even belonging to different genres, based on the 
theory that contacts and interferences with other genres or culture are frequent and undeniable. On the one 
hand, they represent innovation, while on the other hand they may however also foster abuse. Soc. Sony 
Music Entertainment Italy c Carrisi, 18 December 1997, Trib. Milano, cit. 
181
 Bilotta c De Angelis, R.A.I. e S.I.A.E., 12 April 1986, Trib. Roma, cit. 
182
 Bacalov c Endrigo, 23 November 2005 n. 24594, Corte Cass., cit., which considered not influential the 
fact that one work was a commercial song and the other the soundtrack for a movie. 
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limited to, its refrain.183 What matters, in the end, is not the quantity of the taking,184 but 
the substantiality thereof, which in itself has the capacity to evoke the song and 
conceivably distinguish it from others.185 
 
 
2.4 UK case law from early 1950 onwards 
 
Refocusing on the UK case law, the reference to the word plagiarism appeared like a 
flashback during the late 1980s, in the British Leyland v Armstrong case, which referred 
to the following principle: 
It is common ground that all two- and three-dimensional 
objects can today be described in literary form. Thus, whether 
one considers the Mona Lisa, a cubist drawing, a carburettor or 
drawing of an exhaust system, if such common ground is taken 
as a springboard for the contention that reproduction does not 
give rise to the infringement of an artistic work when only 
literary information is taken and used, the consequence would 
be that plagiarism of all forms of artistic works will become 
permissible.186 
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 Bacalov c Endrigo, 23 November 2005 n. 24594, Corte Cass., cit. 
Cf. Soc. ed. musicali Emi Song c Rcs libri, 28 October 2002, Trib. Milano, [2003] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. 
autore n. 135, [2003] Dir. aut. 486, which defines it referring to an unequivocal similarity. 
See also Pietri c Fonzo, 15 April 1932, App. Milano, cit., which ascertained the illicit appropriation of the 
refrain of a song in a different operetta when there was no mention of the author or the source. 
184
 Another aspect to take into necessary account is, in fact, the possibility that plagiarism subsists only 
with regard to a part of the work (plagio parziale). See, among others, Traldi c Ditta Uniformi fasciste, 27 
January 1941, Cass. Regno, cit., where, however, the Supreme Court made it clear that if such part 
allegedly taken is not in any case creative or original, there will not be any subsistence for protection. 
Cf. De Marco, 4 luglio 1958, Trib. Milano, [1959] Rep. Foro it. v. Dir. autore n. 686; [1959] Foro it. II 
218, [1959] Riv. it. dir. proc. pen. 227, holding that the mere similarity of some single elements could not 
be considered as sufficient to establish infringement. 
185
 Other elements may be recalled by the ordinary listener other than the melody although, as it was held 
in Soc. Bmg Ricordi c De Gregori, 23 May 2002, Trib. Roma, cit., it is the most noteworthy featuring 
element of a song (parte caratterizzante), consistent even in just a few verses or lines, which is protected 
from being appropriated by others, and generally allows the audience to remember the song (and possibly 
the author and/or performer).  
186
 British Leyland Motor Corporation Ltd. and another Respondents and Armstrong Patents Co. Ltd. and 
another Appellants, 27 February 1986, House Of Lords, cit. 
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The case, which dealt with the reproduction of engineering drawing, also allows for 
exploration of the subject of indirect infringement.187 Once it reached the House of 
Lords, it was there remarked upon about the principle that the infringement of copyright 
in works that have been substantially reproduced in others’ work188 is not diminished by 
the inference that «the process of copying has been achieved in a form or forms which 
do not themselves constitute artistic works [provided that] the essence of protection be 
the value of the product of the work, the essence of infringement is the reaping of a 
benefit without doing that work, whatever the process».189 
The same conclusions, as emphasised by the House of Lords, are applicable in 
the case of musical works.190 However, it is also a clear and shared principle that «the 
original maker ought not to have an exclusive right to prevent the use of the idea or 
system in or underlying the work, nor a right to a monopoly in its subject matter».191  
When a mere copying is found, therefore, such copying is rebuked in whatever 
form it is expressed, thus even indirectly. The case, finally, offers the chance to ponder 
over the concept of indirect copying with regard any type of intellectual work.192 As 
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 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had infringed the copyright in their original drawings by 
indirect copying. In the first instance, however, it was held that the defendants’ works appeared to be an 
evident copy of the plaintiffs' drawings, given that in those, considered artistic works, copyright subsisted 
and therefore they were entitled to receive the protection of the law. Once the case was appealed, the 
Court of Appeal maintained that decision. British Leyland Motor Corporation Ltd. and another 
Respondents and Armstrong Patents Co. Ltd. and another Appellants, 27 February 1986, House Of 
Lords, cit. 
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 See also Francis Day & Hunter Ltd and another v Bron and another, 25 February 1963, Court of 
Appeal, cit., regarding the need for a causal connection between the protected work and the work that has 
allegedly infringed it. 
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 Hanfstaengl v Baines & Co., 17 December 1894, House of Lords [1895] AC 20, [1895] 11 TLR 131. 
190
 As the House of Lords explains, in fact, suggesting the analogy, «suppose an opera by Offenbach of 
which within weeks there are arrangements, say, for piano alone or piano and voice or for some other 
instrument. Suppose that some person procures a copy of the piano arrangement and makes out of it a 
new operetta but using the original tunes. Such indirect copying constitutes infringement». British 
Leyland Motor Corporation Ltd. and another Respondents and Armstrong Patents Co. Ltd. and another 
Appellants, 27 February 1986, House Of Lords, cit.  
Cf. Boosey v Fairlie, 14 December 1877, Court of Appeal, [1877] 7 ChD 301; Boosey v Fairlie, 28 July 
1879, House of Lords, [1877] 4 AppCas 711. 
191
 On the contrary, as the House of Lords further articulates, «the right he should have is to prevent the 
skill and labour in the original work being pirated without his consent. That right is “to stop third parties 
from helping themselves to too liberal a portion of another man's skill and labour for their own 
exploitation», so citing the authority of Whitford J. in LB (Plastics) Ltd. v Swish Products Ltd, Chancery, 
[1977] FSR 87; LB (Plastics) Ltd. v Swish Products Ltd, Court of Appeal, [1978] FSR 32; LB (Plastics) 
Ltd. v Swish Products Ltd, House of Lords, [1979] RPC 551, [1979] FSR 145. 
192
 As their Lordships reminded, «the concept of indirect copying was first introduced into artistic 
copyright fully justified its use for it was necessary to protect the value of the artists' work from piracy by 
means of copies of intermediate works». British Leyland Motor Corporation Ltd. and another 
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older case law established, in fact, «when the subject of a picture is copied, it is of no 
consequence whether that is done directly from the picture itself or through intervening 
copies; if in the result that which is copied be an imitation of the picture, then it is 
immaterial whether that be arrived at directly or by intermediate steps».193 
The idea–expression dichotomy, which we have seen dominating the scene of a 
large portion of scholarly works in the field, returns with great intensity in some of the 
most recent UK decisions. In the Designers Guild case, in particular, Lord Hoffmann, 
examining the findings of the previous judgements, recalled that, besides a number of 
authorities possibly being applicable to regulating the case, it is still necessary to clarify 
what one means by ideas.194 Yet, as he explained, «every element in the expression of 
an artistic work (unless it got there by accident or compulsion) is the expression of an 
idea on the part of the author [which] is protected, both as a cumulative whole and also 
to the extent to which they form a “substantial part” of the work».195  
At the same time, the intent of his Lordship is to recall that substantiality does 
not have to be intended as having quantitative significance, at least in the sense that it is 
limited to identifying some parts of the plaintiff’s work that can be said quantitatively 
relevant. Besides, neither seems correct to conclude that a qualitative test alone should 
be applied.196 
Considering the various authorities that have since the beginning focused on the 
concepts of substantiality and the single parts of the work, it has been correctly 
emphasised that «the ‘part’ which is regarded as substantial can be a feature or 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Respondents and Armstrong Patents Co. Ltd. and another Appellants, 27 February 1986, House Of 
Lords, cit. 
193
 Ex parte Beal, 23 April 1868, Queen's Bench, [1868] LR 3 QB 387. 
194
 As his Lordship additionally observes, «plainly there can be no copyright in an idea which is merely in 
the head, which has not been expressed in copyrightable form, as a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic 
work. But the distinction between ideas and expression cannot mean anything so trivial as that». 
Designers Guild Limited v Russell Williams (Textiles) Limited (Trading as Washington Dc), 23 
November 2000, House of Lords, cit. 
195
 Designers Guild Limited v Russell Williams (Textiles) Limited (Trading as Washington Dc), 23 
November 2000, House of Lords, cit. 
196
 As Lord Hoffman further explains, «although the term ‘substantial part’ might suggest a quantitative 
test, or at least the ability to identify some discrete part which, on quantitative or qualitative grounds, can 
be regarded as substantial, it is clear upon the authorities that neither is the correct test». Cf. Ladbroke 
(Football) Ltd. v William Hill (Football) Ltd., 21 January 1964, House of Lords, cit., which when 
clarified establishes that substantiality should concern the qualitative rather than quantitative aspect.  
Designers Guild Limited v Russell Williams (Textiles) Limited (Trading as Washington Dc), 23 
November 2000, House of Lords, cit. 
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combination of features of the work, abstracted from it rather than forming a discrete 
part [or] the original elements in the plot of a play or novel may be a substantial part, so 
that copyright may be infringed by a work which does not reproduce a single sentence 
of the original».197 
Such an argument is greatly influenced by the functioning of the idea–expression 
dichotomy. Provided that ideas are not protected, and this even though they have a 
literary, dramatic or artistic nature, insofar as they are not original, similar conclusions 
apply to commonplace elements that may not upsurge as a substantial part of the 
work.198 Besides, courts also face the difficulty of ascertaining whether there had to be 
any difference in the appraisal of substantiality depending on the type of work involved. 
Concerning the arts, in particular, but with a description that is likely to apply to many 
other contexts, it has once been concluded that «the more abstract and simple the copied 
idea, the less likely it is to constitute a substantial part», especially when it turns into the 
breadth of banality.199 
In the spirit of such wide-ranging considerations, staying with artistic works, the 
UK Supreme Court in Lucasfilm v Ainsworth more recently faced the challenge of 
applying the above-illustrated principles in works that may even cross the border of a 
single type of intellectual creation. Furthermore, the case in question allows pondering 
over the difficulties of dealing with the possible clashes, not only among the different 
legal interpretation of certain copyright phenomena that may require the involvement of 
some expertise to facilitate the judge’s own evaluation, but also between the legal 
understanding of some copyright concepts and their general language interpretation.200 
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 Designers Guild Limited v Russell Williams (Textiles) Limited (Trading as Washington Dc), 23 
November 2000, House of Lords, cit. 
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 As he better clarifies, «it is on this ground that the mere notion of combining stripes and flowers would 
not have amounted to a substantial part of the plaintiff's work. At that level of abstraction, the idea, 
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Limited (Trading as Washington Dc), 23 November 2000, House of Lords, cit. 
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 Lucasfilm Ltd and others v Ainsworth and another, 27 July 2011, Supreme Court, cit. 
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The Supreme Court, in particular, carefully handled the meaning of sculpture, 
for which it also looked at its ordinary and common sense, and its reconciliation with 
objects that are created for a particular scope that is indeed not artistic, but according to 
a broad scope of copyright law may conflate into the category of original works of 
art.201 
Furthermore, talking about the concept of reproduction of an artistic work, 
which in the judge’s view remains, first of all, a matter of fact that often requires some 
expertise to be evaluated, in Dorling v Honnor it was instead held that «each drawing of 
a part was an object within the subsection and that it would appear to him as a non-
expert that these parts when made were a reproduction of the corresponding plan, each 
drawing in the plan having […] artistic copyright», accepting that reproduction may 
have more than a single dimension.202 
Francis Day v Bron, additionally, offers the occasion to reflect upon the 
peculiarity of a musical work’s infringement and, at the same time, considers the 
possibility of copyright infringement by unconscious or subconscious copying, which, 
however, was in the case in question denied, both by the trial judge and on appeal.203 
Justice Wilberforce, in fact, considering the similarity of the songs, focused on the 
kernel of the plaintiff’s song, its first eight bars, explaining how: «they imprint 
themselves on the mind, [t]hey give it its character and its memorability, [which 
becomes] relevant when one has to consider the question of copying or coincidence».204 
At the same time, his Lordship considered that much of the theme contains many 
conventions or clichés, which usually make it more difficult and sometimes unbearable 
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 In this way, the Supreme Court notices how «the argument has centred on the right approach to three-
dimensional objects that have both an artistic purpose (of some sort) and a utilitarian function (of some 
sort). These issues are addressed in the rest of the judge’s guidelines». However, the fact that claimants 
brought to the bench some world-famous examples of sculptures was not decisive. 
Lucasfilm Ltd and others v Ainsworth and another, 27 July 2011, Supreme Court, cit. 
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 Dorling v Honnor Marine Ltd, 10 April 1963, Chancery, cit. 
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 The plaintiff complained that his song, In a Little Spanish Town, had been substantially reproduced, in 
its first eight bars of the chorus, by the defendant’s piece, Why, either consciously or unconsciously. 
However, the evidence was not sufficiently conclusive to prove that conscious copying had occurred. 
Futhermore, even if there were still some degree of similarity between the songs, it was not sufficiently 
demonstrated that alleged unconscious copying had taken place, to the extent that the defendant had 
«sufficient knowledge or memory of ‘Spanish Town’ to justify the conclusion that in composing ‘Why’ 
he had unconsciously copied [it]». Francis Day & Hunter Ltd and another v Bron and another, 25 
February 1963, Court of Appeal, cit. Wilberforce. 
204
 Francis Day & Hunter Ltd and another v Bron and another, 25 February 1963, Court of Appeal, cit. 
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to establish infringement,205 similarly to what had been purported by some Italian 
courts. 
In particular, although acknowledging that reproduction might not necessarily be 
identical so as to amount to infringement, especially since «in music was not a question 
of note for note comparison but depended upon whether the alleged infringing work was 
substantially the same as the original work», any evidence on the similarity between the 
works, as well as the actual chance to access the original, could simply result in a prima 
facie case of infringement.206 Such a presumption, however, may be anyway and 
anytime excluded when evidence to the contrary is given. 
In the case of music copyright infringement, similarly to that which the Italian 
magistrates have observed, the emphasis has primarily been placed on the melody, for 
instance, by inferring that «there is a noticeable correspondence between the two songs. 
It is not note for note, nor at any point do more than five consecutive notes coincide, but 
the correspondence exists».207  
Furthermore, it may not even be sufficient to establish the complete 
identification of notes and, consequently, one cannot infer that any difference or 
variation is insignificant. In other words, melody is not the only criterion to consider 
and other elements of composition, such as harmony, time and rhythm may indeed have 
their own relevance, but insofar as they prove to be significant and conceivably not 
when they are mere ordinary or commonplace.208  
This already multifaceted representation becomes even more convoluted when 
the issue of unconscious copying is added. Extremely difficult to define, where its 
actual and accurate understanding seems to require the aid of experts who should know 
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 Nevertheless, this is not to conclude that clichés or any musical conventions do not matter at all, it 
being acknowledged: «the device of repetition, of resting for two bars on a long note and of repetition in 
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not just the work of a given discipline or science, but even more the human mind, such a 
concept indeed appears to be absolutely slippery and even those who have supported it 
admit that «strictly speaking, it is a contradiction in terms».209 
Even in the legitimate effort to ensure the fullest protection to copyright, it 
appears too much to argue that: «if it were possible for a person merely to alter a tune 
slightly and then avoid liability by denying that he had looked at the original, it would 
open the way to blatant plagiarism [while] in musical copyright the rule should be that 
once the two tunes are shown to be substantially similar, and the possibility of access is 
proved, the defendant will be held liable for infringement unless he can prove 
affirmatively that he did not have access».210 
There is little doubt, however, that it may be useful to support the arguments of 
those who fear being usurped of their work in one way or another, and yet also by 
means of tunes that can allegedly be reproduced without even thinking of it, but indeed, 
it seems to be going too far.211 
                                                          
209
 As suggested in Francis Day, unconscious copying «means reproduction amounting to an 
infringement. It means that a person has reproduced a substantial part of a copyright work, not because he 
looked at it, or thought of the original, but because it was at the back of his mind, or on his subconscious 
mind, from having heard it on the radio or elsewhere. Francis Day & Hunter Ltd and another v Bron and 
another, 25 February 1963, Court of Appeal, cit. 
210
 Francis Day & Hunter Ltd and another v Bron and another, 25 February 1963, Court of Appeal, cit. 
211
 A submission of this kind, in part, echoes the desperate cries of Richard Spinello’s appeal to guard 
against the daunting technology that threatens the nights of many copyright holders who fear the chance 
of an escalation of appropriations and misattributions that would shrink their works and fatigue. Cf. 
supra, Chapter 3. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
The concrete application of the concepts thus far illustrated has helped to complete the 
theoretical analysis of plagiarism and attribution of authorship from different angles. 
The perspective on copyright infringement provided by the judiciary, therefore, has 
hopefully better explained the most contentious aspects of the subject.  
Indeed, depending on the exact legal context, case law may directly or only 
incidentally consider the failure to acknowledge authorship in the work. Most of the 
time, the first concern of the plaintiff will be the violation of his/her exclusive 
exploitation right in the work, and only after there may be explicit or implicit 
consideration of a violation of his/her right to be identified as the author of the work. 
However, if the development of literature has proved something, it is certainly that – 
with the limits already discussed – proper acknowledgment of sources, personal 
assimilation of authorities’ works and wise imitation has always mattered. 
These general considerations apply to the legal contexts of both Italy and the 
United Kingdom, although with some immediate distinctions, which have already been 
underlined. First, the former afforded protection to the moral right of attribution long 
before the latter. Second, according to the Italian LA 1941, such a right undoubtedly 
receives autonomous protection, even if in practice this is nearly always accompanied 
by claims of economic rights' violation. Third, it is also correct to say that the Italian 
judiciary would more often and explicitly refer to the concept of plagiarism, even if – as 
in the case of the UK – the law does not expressly mention it. 
Furthermore, the circumstance that the UK law grants a more limited shield to 
moral rights does not indisputably imply that, once the Copyright Act has expressly 
introduced moral right provision, claimants are impeded from bringing an action before 
the court for a breach of statutory duty under CDPA 1988. 
It is, however, accurate to say that it is more likely, given the aforementioned 
features of UK moral rights provisions, claimants would rather focus on bringing an 
action for copyright infringement, for all the reasons previously discussed, but this is 
recurrently shared by a jurisdiction such as Italy, in which moral rights have received 
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the highest protection. Moreover, Italian courts have long struggled with the absence of 
a clear definition of plagiarism and, consequently, they have often relied on the double 
concept of plagiarism-counterfeiting, which clearly keeps a strong bond with the 
exclusive exploitation rights. 
While acknowledging the dissimilarities that have been from the beginning 
discussed, especially in terms of the traditional UK approach to confining misattribution 
to instances of copyright infringement and the typical Continental choice of affording 
independent protection to the moral right of attribution, there is still enough leeway to 
identify a certain degree of likeness between the two. 
Focusing all the attention on the UK case law, even before the enactment of a 
statutory moral right protection, there have been some instances in which courts have 
explored the issue of plagiarism, mostly considering it to be assimilated to the concept 
of piracy, occasionally defining it as a literary larceny that could yet infringe copyright, 
and finally disclosing its existence beyond the copyright dimension. Therefore, it is 
exactly with the analysis of the judiciary that the greatest distances between the two 
systems tend somehow to diminish, thus proving the inference that the method of 
examining case law is an indispensable instrument for comparative legal studies. 
Even if we fear the word plagiarism, rather referring to it in terms of lack of 
authorship acknowledgement or, more broadly, authorship misattribution, we cannot 
ignore the fact that it exists for the law, even if not literally in statutory terms. This 
reflection also allows for broader consideration of the relevance of protecting moral 
rights in copyright law.  
In the opinion of the author, in fact, it is time to make peace with the 
circumstance that the legislator has chosen to protect moral rights. Whether we like it or 
not, the moral right of the author to be identified as such (even with all the limitations 
that have been imposed) remains a clear choice of the legislator, even granting the 
influence of the international dimension, which is not an imposition but still a choice 
that has been made by the rational (sic!) legislator. Furthermore, recognising the role of 
the norm of attribution as a proper incentive to creation not only leads to a better 
understanding of plagiarism and its dynamics, but also helps to further reconcile the two 
legal systems that are the object of the instant research. 
On the contrary, even allowing for the criticism of the introduction or the 
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defensibility of moral rights protection, if we want to challenge this, it seems that the 
only option would be to eradicate the provisions or otherwise intervene with a more 
stringent regulation, which would clearly pose the boundaries of infringement and 
provide a clear definition of the phenomenon.  
This, however, does not imply that a harsher regulation is expected – a 
conclusion that appears to be supported by the arguments thus far articulated by the 
chosen interdisciplinary approach to this controversial subject. Careful consideration of 
contextualised knowledge fields, such as arts and literature, and of the ethical and social 
regulations, indeed, may help the pursuit of a different direction, which does not have to 
be the same in both legal systems here considered, but rather imply some common 
contemplations. 
In terms of the Italian law, the usurpation of authorship could find a different 
collocation in the LA 1941. First, it might find a distinct dimension, which would even 
better honour the independence of moral rights. It is true that the copyright law, 
affording civil protection to moral rights, considers applicable the norms provided 
against the breach of economic rights. However, the bond between these two often blurs 
and yet a cleared distinction would be rather welcome.  
By doing so, the autonomy of the moral right of attribution should be cherished, 
and with a similar purpose, the same may be purported with regard to the other moral 
rights, although this would require a further close examination that is not possible at this 
time. In any case, providing a clearer collocation to attribution within the framework of 
copyright law seems to represent a good chance of also discerning the applicable 
sanctions and attemptable remedies.  
Clearly, the typical affiliation of plagiarism and counterfeiting does not help. 
Yet, this may be another reason why it should better clarify when a certain conduct is 
likely to amount to a mere infringement of the moral right of attribution and, in such a 
case, what the exact answer of the law, if any, would be. 
Furthermore, providing that a justification of misattribution tout court is unlikely 
and, to some extent, it is unreasonable for it to be apprehended, rather the range of 
applicable actions and remedies should be qualified, which aim at protecting the right of 
attribution in its actual moral dimension. This may be reached, first allowing authors to 
bring an action via a swifter and more thorough procedure that is designed not simply to 
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establish and punish the infringement, but rather, and most importantly, to effectively 
ensure that the attribution is acknowledged. This could be achieved, for instance, by 
adding the name of the actual author to the work in question, similarly to the 
mechanism that consents to make public the judgement that affirms the infringement. 
Second, the most complex aspect concerns its criminal dimension as an 
aggravated element to evaluate one of the possible felonies considered in the concurrent 
infringement of exclusive economic rights, envisioned by Section 2 of Article 171, 
which, it is worth recalling, is the only place in which the LA 1941 expressly mentions 
the usurpation of paternity.  
In essence, plagiarism should be radically excluded from a criminal dimension, 
even when only considered in an escalating function, and rather be left exclusively to 
the civil dimension, which undoubtedly seems to be the only accurate place in which the 
said usurpation should eventually apply. This inference, indeed, derives from the 
consideration that misattribution of authorship has nothing to do with criminal conduct, 
even though its connection with the concurrent occurrence of conduct may have both 
civil and criminal consequences. As previously concluded, furthermore, there is nothing 
in the conduct of not acknowledging authorship of the author that may bring us to infer 
that we could reasonably face a criminal offence.  
Contrary to what could be argued, in particular, by recalling the etymological 
origins of the term plagiarism that mirrors the offence of theft, none of the essential 
elements required by the law to establish such an offence are foreseen. One option, 
therefore, could be to reformulate the instant Article 171 LA 1941, avoiding any 
mention of the right of attribution, in order to refute conclusively any possible and 
dangerous association with the criminal setting. 
This particular aspect appears to be guaranteed by UK law, which does not 
confuse the two dimensions, civil and criminal. In the CDPA 1988, in fact, the criminal 
provisions only consider conduct that may amount to an infringement of exploitation 
rights, which saves the legislator from the hindrance. However, this does not exempt it 
from any criticism of the UK statutory framework.  
Regarding the United Kingdom, it is true that the CDPA 1988 places several 
limitations on the protection of moral rights, including the right to be identified as the 
author (or director) of the work. However, a more accurate consideration of the 
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consequences of violating such a right, which would clearly amount to a breach of 
statutory duty, would be more than welcome. 
Leaving the provision as it is may even pave the way for the possible personal 
backsliding that the UK has often and openly avoided, also in respect to its typical 
preference for the protection of exclusive exploitation rights. On the contrary, a clear 
and express definition of what may expressly amount to a violation of the right in 
question, and additionally a specific set of norms regarding the possible remedies that 
may apply in the case of its sole breach, regardless of the infringement of economic 
rights, would prevent that eventuality.  
The fact that, generally speaking, the claims that have thus far been brought have 
concerned almost exclusively the sole economic dimension does not make it sufficient 
to argue that a claim for a violation of moral rights, which would action a breach of 
statutory duty, will never be brought. Consequently, a possible option may be to amend 
the CDPA 1988 to expressly include and thoughtfully regulate such an eventuality. 
That moral right receives a more limited protection does not make it sufficient to 
conclude that an infringement of the moral right of attribution necessarily deserves less 
of a shield. In the opinion of the author, it should be better defined whether the 
legislator’s aim to sanction exclusively  the instances in which violation of the author or 
director's right to be identified as such is accompanied by an infringement of his/her 
exclusive economic rights, or whether there can reasonably be a dedicated space to 
foresee some protection for the moral right of attribution alone, of course with all the 
limitations that the Statute provides. 
Furthermore, should the law wish to maintain the latter, as would most likely be 
the case unless the only reason for moral rights to be introduced were to make the law 
look good, without any actual and genuine interest to give it life, the sections of the 
CDPA 1988 dedicated to moral rights would not be considered a litera morta. Similarly 
to what has been sustained with regard to the possible options left to the Italian 
legislator, there seems to be sufficient latitude to think of a different range of remedies, 
which would lucidly take into account the differences between the two situations and 
hopefully better appreciate the actual prejudice, without necessarily leaving the right 
exposed. Otherwise, there seems to be no reason to protect moral rights at all. 
Additionally, the recent attempts of the UK legislature to bring some necessary 
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updates to the Statute do not completely satisfy. Concerning the 2014 amendments to 
the private copying exceptions and, in particular, the requirement that any allowed 
quotation of another person's copyright work must be accompanied by a sufficient 
acknowledgement, unless impossible, does not completely fulfil and, above all, does not 
impede a further clarification that probably only a more comprehensive reform could 
meet. 
Besides, the aforementioned exception actually confirms the assumption that 
there is no reason to believe that authorship acknowledgement is not to be protected by 
law. However, it still does not provide all the instruments for the interpreter. In any 
case, the amendments having just been made, we will probably need to wait until this 
provision is brought before the court to see its actual strength. Consequently, there 
seems to be even more evidence to support the inference that a clearer stance of the law 
on this convoluted issue is needed. 
In the meantime and, more generally, with the broader aim of looking at the 
wider strengths of moral rights, extirpating from the law the notion of the moral right of 
attribution is not, in the opinion of the author, a viable and reasonable option. This is not 
only in consideration of the historical incidence of moral rights within the Italian 
legislation, but also acknowledging the wider and undeniable social expectancy of 
protecting authorship attribution that the analysis of social norms applied to copyright 
has revealed. Similarly, although on different grounds, the same expectation is shared 
by the United Kingdom, even allowing the limits that the UK law has placed on its 
protection.  
Recapping what has so far been considered, it can be concluded that if the law 
has chosen to protect a certain entitlement, as with the moral right of attribution, despite 
any international commitment or hypothetical moral conspiracy, the best possible 
regulation is expected.  
Of course, there is no proof that clearer guidelines will actually guarantee the 
most confident safeguards. The fact that a notion of plagiarism has not thus far reached 
statutory width may be a symptom of that, but this is not to be considered a decisive 
factor, especially since it finds some, yet controversial, space in the case law. Therefore, 
there certainly seems to be an obligation by the legislation to aim at the most accurate 
depiction and consequent regulation of the phenomenon. 
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At the same time, a cleared position of the legislation would make possible a 
distinction of the different instances in which the lack of acknowledgement may occur. 
This supports the idea that there might be cases in which misattribution could be 
sanctioned and cases in which it should not be considered actionable at all. Here we 
may refer to the instances that could better find remedy in ethical or social norms, but 
also in literary and artistic criticism, instead of going before the court. 
However, assuming that the reutilisation of others’ creations depends entirely on 
the rule that authorship cannot be misattributed, there seems to be a definite social 
expectancy of credit or acknowledgement. This is a recognition that, indeed, may not 
only have only an informal foundation, especially if taken to the public sphere; in fact, 
in this latter context such an expectation likely assumes the shades of a formal 
requirement, which would then support the inference that the law may need to approach 
the subject with more clarity and certainty. 
The task of the law is not to indiscriminately comfort the author for any breach 
of his/her right in the work, nor is it the aim of the magistrates to let their role be 
substituted by experts in different fields, in the arts and literature as in other disciplines 
or sciences. Besides, although we may easily understand the importunate choice of 
establishing literary or artistic tribunals, we cannot deny the relevance of the auxiliary 
aid of experts, whom the metaphorical “eye or hear of the court” has often better seen or 
heard. 
Yet, despite the careful analysis of scholars who have frequently commented on 
the cases from time to time considered, we may still not have the clearest idea of what 
plagiarism means, as does neither legislator nor judiciary. However, it is essentially the 
latter that cannot avoid considering the matter, given that when a claim is brought to its 
attention, the court shall not refute to give a ruling. Based on these premises, there 
seems little alternative but for the judge to decide the case and, acknowledging the 
specialty of the matter under consideration, he/she may need to resort to the help of 
experts, who hopefully have a clearer view of its complex and convoluted mechanisms. 
In addition, the quest for expert appraisal of the subject certainly needs to be 
taken into consideration. The peculiar nature of intellectual creations seems to 
necessarily imply a meticulous scrutiny of how non-legal subjects need to be appraised 
with the eye of the law, especially within the judicial dimension, where the direct 
  
236 
 
involvement of a certain expertise, or referral to a professional audience, is considered. 
Indeed, it is when taking into account the essential and remarkable contribution 
of these multiple dimensions that the role of the court is most appreciated. The ultimate 
word, when one enters the courtroom, is left to the hopefully learned and wise 
discretion of the judiciary.  Nevertheless, there are instances in which the court itself 
should not even be involved, and this may be reached only through a better approach of 
the legislation on the matter. 
Similar consideration could also be made with regard to the possible abuse of 
claims involving instances of copyright infringement that consist in the violation of the 
economic rights in the works. In any case, sustaining that such economic bearing would 
allow and justify any judicial expedient does not seem reasonable either. More 
generally, the reaction against copyright violations should not imply the operation of 
double standards, where, on the one hand, claims on economic grounds find unlimited 
upholding, while, on the other hand, claims essentially based on non-economic grounds 
should never be allowed. There should rather be a balance of interests to be sought in 
both cases. 
It is also true that the contractual route still represents a possible way of 
expenditure. However, as has been maintained, the fragile and weak bargaining position 
in which authors often find themselves may not lead to the consideration of contracts as 
the only viable option for protecting the right of attribution. This consideration applies 
not only in contexts where the right to be identified as the author of the work can be 
waived, as in the United Kingdom, but more generally also in contexts where the right 
is, in principle, inalienable and everlasting, but yet cannot be sufficiently and adequately 
protected by mere contractual means. 
The same concerns, indeed, may also regard the other potential routes of 
protection, either remaining in the legal boundaries or moving into the realm of social 
and community norms. With a particular focus on the former, in fact, when one takes 
into account the area of torts or other common law mechanisms of protection, such as 
the peculiar public interest defence, as a possible way of shielding the right of 
attribution, it is imaginable to see the limits of such protection. 
In the first place, they are not expressly conceived for this purpose, but are only 
eventually and sometimes virtually applicable to misattribution instances. Second, they 
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may still be inadequate and thus leave the author with unsatisfied claims. Concerning 
the latter option, instead, if in some cases the resort to non-legal discipline facilitates 
appraisal of the phenomenon and perhaps offers new tools for regulation and rulings to 
legislators and magistrates, it may not be sufficient to ensure nourishing protection. In 
addition, there may be instances in which this is feasible, and others in which it is not. 
More likely, there could be cases in which the social norms and their informal sanction 
properly address the issue and avoid resorting to the legal scheme, but there may also be 
situations in which this informal settlement is not sufficient.  
What has thus far been envisioned is that both these approaches, legal and non-
legal, may effectively provide a good device for understanding the phenomenon of 
plagiarism and all the possible shades in which the misattribution of authorship may 
occur, and in some circumstances may also provide themselves with the mechanism of 
protection and the consequent remedies. However, in all the instances in which this may 
not be possible, their aid is still of essential use for the lawyer and, above all, for the 
judges that happen to consider the dues of the unsatisfied claimant who laments the 
breach of his/her rights. 
The interdisciplinary approach is to be seen exactly from this perspective, and 
for this reason a large part of the analysis has been dedicated to the survey of the 
evolution of the concepts of attribution and plagiarism, but also of creativity and 
originality, according to the interpretation of other non-legal disciplines, before 
considering their exact legal collocation. Without a broader view on these subject 
matters, in fact, it appears difficult to understand many of the principles that the 
judiciary later explained in the case law on the matter, which have been, and 
increasingly will be, highly specialist. Such approach is a potentially treasured aid for 
the law that seeks to regulate the phenomenon in the best possible way, considering its 
practical and social dimensions, and also taking into account the expectations of the 
public and affording protection to its general interest. 
A similar awareness has characterised recourse to the comparative method, 
which had the unmistakeable value of better appraising the criticality of one's system by 
referring to another, especially when it belongs to a very different legal tradition. The 
fundamental purpose of considering the approaches of Italy and the United Kingdom 
towards the right of attribution has, since the beginning, been to better see the variable 
  
238 
 
and most controversial elements of misattribution, while also hopefully foreseeing some 
indications and possible suggestions by which each individual system may learn 
something from the other. 
Many considerations, indeed, remain applicable to both systems, when otherwise 
a more distinguishing approach is demanded. In particular, it seems accurate to argue 
that any abuse of judgements should always be refuted. The powerful but fragile 
mechanism of the law should in fact be on the move when there are good reasons to 
praise it.  
The next thought goes immediately to the procedural structure that each legal 
system may establish in order to reach this goal effectively, but this necessarily needs to 
be omitted at this stage. For the purpose of the present dissertation, it may be sufficient 
to notice that this is one of several aspects of copyright law that require further 
legislative clarification. The Italian and UK systems, despite some recent amendments, 
are, to use an expression that is certainly etched in our memory, “substantially” stuck in 
the 1940s and 1990s. 
As with other aspects of copyright law, the existence of a grey area, even granted 
that the same grey may have innumerable gradations and shades, requires a conscious 
and mature acknowledgment by both the legislature and the judiciary. Where the latter 
may provide a better statutory regulation, the former may clarify the remaining 
vagueness. The time for a comprehensive and systematic reform will come and, 
perhaps, some of the questions and doubts surrounding the misattribution of authorship 
will find answers. 
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